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This dissertation is an ethnographic and historical study of youth activism in a space of 
geopolitical conflict. It examines ways in which young activists in Indian-administered Kashmir, 
caught in chronic conditions of state violence and traversed by transnational discourses of 
identity, experience precarity while desperately seeking to constitute themselves as political 
subjects through their involvement in Tehreek, or the movement for independence. Toward a 
theory of political subjectivity as a process of autopoiesis, understood both as a historically 
contingent yet critical form of reflexivity and as practices of protest, and precarity as a condition 
marked by persistent vulnerability to state violence made possible under a legally mandated state 
of emergency, I analyze youth activism and state violence as necessarily interlinked objects of 
ethnographic and historical inquiry. Keeping in view the anthropological critique of positions 
that treat ethnographic subjects as culturally-bound passive objects of violence or as trapped in 
the logics of state power, and inspired by emergent anthropological attempts to engage with 
theories of subjection and becoming, I study how youth activists, carrying injuries on their 
bodies and memories of violence, persistently engage in multiple genres of criticism and 
contestation. Kashmiri youth activists give counter-narratives to the official histories of Kashmir, 
reinterpret critical events from the past in the present, scoff at inconsistencies between state-
managed elections and the professed norms of democracy, and highlight contradictions between 
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the official secularist claims and the state’s religious majoritarian tendencies. These activists 
seek to escape the official categories that make them liable to punitive government control, 
while, at the same time, aiming to fashion an alternative discourse of emancipation within 
Tehreek. I examine critical events, like a natural disaster or an election, to show how youth 
activists navigate the fractured landscape of politics in Kashmir. At the same time, by looking at 
the fault lines within the movement, I analyze how ideological fissures within Tehreek have 
remained like an open wound for the activists. Based on fifteen months of fieldwork, my study 
contributes to the growing body of anthropological scholarship that analyzes how marginal 
groups come to contest relations of power and articulate alternative political projects that 
traverse local moral systems as well as the global languages of justice. Taking these projects as 
“politics on the periphery,” I trace how precarity is constructed and overcome at the intersection 
of postcolonial state violence, political mobilization, and contestations of history, gender, and 
religion. While this dissertation is a study of activists, it is as much a history of the long-standing 
Tehreek movement, its roots, dynamics, and internal schisms. I locate this history of Tehreek in 
the broader politics and history of dislocation and despair among non-dominant nationalities that 
have been denied political self-determination by postcolonial nation-states. As such, the 
dissertation expands inquiry into new hierarchies of power and forms of inequality that emerged 
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Note on Naming  
The names which appear in this dissertation, including youth activists, human rights activists, 
students, flood relief workers, members of Tehreek groups, and volunteers, have been changed to 
protect their identity. Others whose names have been changed are election campaigners in 
Chapter 5 and ex-members of the Ikhwan in Chapter 5. The names of key Tehreek leaders, 
Tehreek history-writers, former leaders of the Ikhwan, dead armed activists or youth activists, 
and top government leaders have not been altered. While I have changed names of precise 
neighborhoods and villages in the dissertation, but not the names of large towns. The names of 
organizations and political parties have not been changed. I have changed the names of the local 
charity and the community organization that appear in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, respectively. 
The politics of naming regions in Kashmir is fraught with political consequences. In 
India, the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir is officially called “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” 
but Pakistan as well as Kashmiris call it “Azad Kashmir” (Free Kashmir). In Pakistan, on the 
other hand, the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir is called “Indian-held Kashmir,” but India and 
Kashmiris call it Jammu and Kashmir, and sometimes just Kashmir. To avoid confusion, I will 
use “Azad Kashmir” for the Pakistan-controlled side of Kashmir, and “Kashmir” for the Indian-
controlled side. I will distinguish Jammu or Ladakh regions from Kashmir, when the clarification 
is necessary. 
The Indian state and media describe Kashmiri politicians who endorse Indian control 
over Kashmir as “mainstream,” while those opposed to Indian control as “separatists.” Tehreek 
activists, however, tend to call the former “collaborators,” and don’t see them as representing the 
mainstream of Kashmiri opinion. To avoid the charged connotations of both these positions, I 
will use the term “loyalist” for pro-India politicians (like the National Conference and People’s 
Democratic Party) and “Tehreek” for those who are part of the Tehreek movement (Jammu 
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Kashmir Liberation Front, Tehreek-Hurriyat, Hurriyat Conference, and others). Here “loyalist” is 
simply taken to imply those who take an oath to remain loyal to the Indian Constitution, and 
includes members of political parties that contest elections for seats in the (Jammu and) Kashmir 
Legislative Assembly or the Indian Parliament. Tehreek parties do not accept the validity of 
Indian Constitution or elections in Kashmir. 
 At various places, I have shortened names of different organizations, groups, or charities 
for smoother reading. In each chapter, I have given full names before I shorten them: 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front — JKLF 
Hizbul Mujahideen — the Hizb 
Jama’at-i-Islami — Jama’at  
Bharatya Janata Party — BJP 
Indian National Congress — Congress 
Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen — the Ikhwan 
Muslim Mujahideen — MM 







Two images  
It is a sunny June morning in Srinagar in 2014. Atif and I are sitting on a bench under a 
chinar tree on the Bund, a touristy embankment along the Jhelum river that meanders through the 
middle of the city. Across the street from us is a papier-mâché gift store. A framed black and 
white photo is hanging in its window. Atif, a young political activist from downtown Srinagar 
and a student at a university, has been telling me about how he has been borrowing money to 
fight a “PSA case” against him. He has just spent six months in a prison, where he was sent 
under the Public Safety Act, a law that allows the state to imprison Kashmiris without a trial, 
sometimes for up to two years. I notice Atif has stopped speaking as he intently looks at the 
framed picture in the gift store window.  
“Do you know that picture?” he asks me.  
I shake my head. 
“Neither does the store owner. This picture depicts the source of our misery.”  
Intrigued, I cross the street and read the caption:  
The first meeting between the Sheikh ABDULLAH, Kashmir's first minister, and the UN 
Commission sent to investigate Indian claims of Pakistan aid to Moslem raiders invading 
Kashmir. Meeting takes place in the Sheikh's garden and the group gets down to business around 
a map of Kashmir. 
The picture is from July 1948 and was taken by Henri Cartier-Bresson, one of the 




dramatic events unfolding in Kashmir.1 After his tours to the border areas embedded with Indian 
soldiers fighting a war with Pakistan over the region, he was in Srinagar following the activities 
of a newly appointed United Nations commission.2 The commission was there to “investigate 
and mediate the dispute” and to “recommend various measures including the use of observers to 
stop the fighting.” However, Cartier-Bresson’s caption (“investigate Indian claims of Pakistan 
aid to Moslem raiders invading Kashmir”) adopts the Indian position on the events.  
In the picture (see figure 1), a group of Western UN officials appears to have moved from 
their lawn chairs and are lounging on a hand-woven carpet laid out on the sloped lawns of the 
hillside home of Kashmir’s “Prime Minister” Sheikh Abdullah. Two local officials are busy 
showing the officials lines on a large map placed on the opposite end of the carpet. In the 
foreground, another group of officials is sprawled on the carpet, lazily chatting under the sun. 
One official seems to have just dozed off. A Kashmiri attendant is carrying a tray of drinks into 
the garden. Cartier-Bresson believed photography must give a “proper expression” to “the 
decisive moment,” or that instant which captures the “significance of an event” (1952, 1-14). 
This picture, however, apprehends a moment that appears anything but decisive.  
Looking intently at the picture, Atif tries to find a meaning in the scene depicted. The 
store owner walks out to join us. “This is just for tourists,” he says, smiling, “They feel reassured 
when they know that people from their countries have been coming here.” Kashmir was, until the 
late 1980s, a popular tourist destination. Not so now. Yet, he wants to continue linking his store 
with “the colonial times,” which is more a nostalgia for past patronage by his Western clientele 
                                                 
1 Henri Cartier-Bresson (1908–2004), a world-famous French photographer and co-founder of Magnum Photos, was 
travelling in the subcontinent (1947-48) to cover India’s “birth of a nation.” See also fn 277, p. 331. 
2 Initially set up under UN Security Council 39 (1948) as “UN Commission on India and Pakistan” in January 1948, 
it was later enlarged in April 1948, under UNSC Resolution 47 (1948), to become “UN Military Observers Group in 




rather than colonialism itself; Kashmir was never really under direct British colonial rule. 
 
Figure 1. A group of UN officials in Srinagar, Kashmir. July 1948. © Henri Cartier-Bresson / Magnum Photos 
“Maybe the photographer wanted to show to the world that the conflict in Kashmir was 
winding down,” says Atif, engrossed in the picture. “Or, that the UN didn’t take the plight of 
Kashmiri people that seriously,” he adds, with a discernable bitterness. Then his sense of disquiet 
grows: “Maybe he wanted to show that Kashmiris were not part of the decisions that were 
leading to the division of their country.”  
Maybe. The picture is eerily tranquil for its time, given that a major war was going on 
just fifty miles northwest of Srinagar, and an ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Kashmiris 
had taken place on the southwestern border of the state. We can’t decide if Cartier-Bresson’s 
placid picture is hiding the truth (the intense violence all around), or revealing in a profound way 





My friend AH, a journalist, has an office nearby. There is a framed picture on the wall. The 
picture, which a Kashmiri photojournalist Aijaz Rahi has taken in South Kashmir, is from 1996. 
In the middle of a muddy village road, a frail, older-looking man is standing, spread-eagled and 
crouched forward. His feet are bare and his trousers rolled above his knees. Even though his back 
is facing Rahi’s camera and we can’t see his face, it is evident from his posture that he is agitated 
and afraid. A large, angry looking group of youths, including a few women, are fast moving 
toward him. Their object of anger, however, seems past him and past the photographer. Moments 
before the picture was taken, AH tells me, Indian soldiers had shot dead a villager, and the 
protestors were marching toward the military camp, ready for a confrontation. It is not clear if 
the older-looking man is pressing the crowd to keep moving or if he is pleading with them to turn 
back, fearful that more people might lose their lives.  
However, before one can make sense of Rahi’s photograph, the picture projects the 
kinetic force it visually represents—the Kashmiri bodies moving chaotically forward—on the 
viewer’s senses. A raw intensity courses through the picture, spilling out of the frame, catching 
the viewer at a visceral level. AH, who was a young university student in the mid-1990s, 
describes a similar sensation when he first saw the picture. “Even now I feel something intense 
rising in me when I look at it. I removed it several times, but I keep bringing it back,” he says. 
The photograph captures the decisive moment of an uprising that began in 1990 in Kashmir, an 
uprising that was primarily led by young Kashmiris intent on upending the geo-political order 




have burst forth against history itself; at least against the history they have been told to accept as 
an immutable fate.3  
 
“Tehreek is about reclaiming our right to decide our future as a people.” This is what most of my 
primary interlocutors in Kashmir have been saying. Atif tells me: “Tehreek is about moving 
ahead, and not remaining trapped in the past when our aspirations for freedom were ignored.” 
Tehreek is the region’s long-running “struggle for freedom.” The word literally means 
“movement.” There is a word for freedom as well: azadi. It is more than a mere word, though; 
azadi has been a rallying cry for several generations of Kashmiri activists, especially since 1931, 
when the first mass mobilization began in Kashmir. For my primary interlocutors, whom I call 
Tehreek activists, most of them young men and women, azadi is polysemous, and might even 
appear as a signifier for a multiplicity of political visions, projects, and potentialities.4 Before 
1947, azadi meant freedom from the despotic Dogra monarchy, demand for a responsible 
government, and a call for a socialist program of land redistribution. After 1947, azadi meant 
right to self-determination and an end to the military occupation in Kashmir. Azadi is at its 
foundation, as most of my interlocutors would agree, underpinned by a shared, historic desire for 
Kashmir to become independent.  
“We are telling the world to recognize our voice,” says Atif. 
This is probably why Cartier-Bresson’s photograph is poignant. It captures a moment that 
appears to deny the existence of Kashmiris as political subjects. It is as if Kashmir’s history has 
been settled, with the region’s residents pushed to be mere spectators in the unfolding drama. 
                                                 
3 The picture was destroyed in the September 2014 flood. Unfortunately, no negatives could be found either. The 
picture was taken with an SLR analog camera.  
4 “Azadi” is a Persian word, and has been incorporated into several languages, including Kashmiri, Urdu, and 




There is no regard for the almost two-decades long Tehreek that had begun in 1931. In a way, the 
photograph, with the map and the sedentary mood, encapsulates the molar politics of nation-
states (India/Pakistan), preoccupied with dichotomous identities (Hindu/Muslim), coding 
territory as “India/Hindu” or “Pakistan/Muslim.” In this binary scheme, overseen by the UN, 
Kashmiris find no place.  
Rahi’s picture, in contrast, depicts something that erupts into the scene as a primal force; 
as Kashmiri youth claiming political subjecthood in defiance of the nation-state logic as well as 
the cautious older generation of Kashmiris silenced by years of political repression. The picture’s 
power is especially heightened by the absence of any visible object (of people’s outrage) in the 
scene. People, it appears, have taken a line of flight towards a destination unknown and 
unforeseeable.5 This line of flight can turn out badly in the end. The politics of azadi may still 
lead to repression in the future, if not of the same scale as under the military occupation in the 
present. And some Tehreek parties could become authoritarian in precisely the way the Indian 
state is in Kashmir. After all, Tehreek has its own internal segmentarities that erupt occasionally 
as sectarian and gender fault lines. Yet, to youth activists like Atif, Tehreek appears to be a 
“liberatory” line of flight, a path to become something other than what the dominant nation-
states, India and Pakistan, would like Kashmiris to be.  
In the governing accounts of Kashmir’s modern history, neither of these pictures, Cartier-
Bresson’s or Rahi’s, might be considered iconic. Indian accounts often hail the moment of the 
Dogra monarch signing the accession treaty with India in 1947 as the decisive national event; it 
                                                 
5 I draw the concepts “molar” and “lines of flight” from Gilles Deleuze’s essay "Many Politics" (Deleuze and Parnet 
1987, 124—147). Deleuze defines molar politics as defined by binary divisions, rigid segmentarity, 
territorialization, homogenization of difference, and preservation of dominant power. Molar politics is contrasted 
with molecular fluxes, the third which is neither this nor that, but an asymmetrical becoming of the two, and disturbs 




is an event that Tehreek activists, in turn, see as “catastrophic.” In Indian accounts, the military 
repression in Kashmir since 1947, and which intensified after 1990, remains invisible. The two 
pictures, if anything, introduce us to a mode of seeing that help understand how the molar 
politics of nation-states is entwined with the lines of flight of youth activism. Rahi’s picture 
pierces the history of Kashmir as it has often been told, but more importantly it destabilizes the 
senses this history has sought to cultivate, the senses which take the primacy of the nation-state 
order in South Asia as axiomatic and a priori.   
For youth activists in Kashmir, the point of their activism is not simply to challenge the 
state’s “official accounts,” confront the “military occupation,” or claim Kashmiris as “victims” 
of history. They want to enfold their visions of azadi into the historic movement they have 
inherited. I call this mode of simultaneous contestation of the terms of subjection in the present 
and the visionary politics of the future as political subjectivity, and explore, in the coming pages, 
its conceptual parameters based on my ethnographic work with Tehreek youth activists. The two 
images, Cartier-Bresson’s and Rahi’s, signify for me a tense historical space within which I 
explore what it means for youth activists in Kashmir to become political, and to claim 
participation in the unfolding history of the region.   
There is no easy way to tell the story of Kashmir. As would be expected of any space of 
political contestation, all linear narratives remain contested. Yet, to understand the perspectives 
of youth activists in Kashmir, a story, as accurate as possible, must be told—or, at least, the way 
youth activists tell it to themselves.  
History, treaties, and violence 
“So much of my childhood was spent learning about the beauty of this place,” says 




militarization. Again, she is looking at a picture, one of the stock postcard pictures of Kashmir, 
the kind that are sold to tourists along the shores of the Dal Lake in Srinagar. Kashmiris also buy 
these scenic pictures of Kashmir as keepsakes for their homes, suggesting an aesthetic 
underpinning to the idea of being “Kashmiri.” Kashmiri landscape itself becomes an iconic 
recipient of devotion, over and above any ethno-cultural ideal of Kashmiriness. Zarina’s thoughts 
bring back my own memories. Everyone, it seems, had the same thing to say about the region’s 
“beauty:” the imposing Himalayas, the verdant valleys, the innumerable springs, the life-giving 
river Jhelum, and the crystal lakes. In school, we spent years recounting the “magic of Kashmir’s 
four seasons.” We knew about the almond-blossoms of the Spring, the festive but hard work of 
paddy sowing in the Summer, the harvest and the fiery red Chinar leaves of the Autumn, and the 
warm stories and carpet weaving during the icy Winter. We were, of course, only rehearsing 
what visitors to Kashmir had written about the place before us, or what its kings, queens, and 
their court poets had said. Kashmir was beautiful. Yet, the repertoire of the discourses of its 
beauty had erased its people’s history, the history of violence that formed the backdrop to their 
present condition, as well as made invisible their aspirations and the history of their struggle. 
Kashmir had become, as Ananya Kabir (2009) has called it, a “territory of desire.”  
Many travelers had come and gone over the centuries, leaving behind their impressions of 
the place. The condition of Kashmiris often evoked a sense of tragedy and pity, but the topic 
would quickly shift back to the descriptions of its beauty. Before 1947, the Dogra monarchy had 
ruled with an iron fist, which was inevitable since the regime was singularly devoted to 
extracting maximum tax and free labor from its subjects. There was another reason why the 
Dogra rule was primarily coercive. An upper-caste Hindu clan from Jammu, the Dogras were 




turning against the Sikh rulers of Punjab during the Anglo-Sikh wars. Sikhs had also ruled 
Kashmir briefly before 1846. The Dogras were their vassals, or local enforcers. As the British 
and the Dogras signed what came to be called the Treaty of Amritsar, Kashmiris, who were 
mostly Muslim, opposed it. Those in Kashmir who knew a few things about the Dogras, saw the 
treaty as a commercial “sale deed,” which had sold Kashmir and its people to a rapacious clan 
infamous for their cruelty. The Dogras had paid, by their own reckoning, a large sum of money 
to the Company officials. Kashmiris resisted the treaty, and for a while kept the Dogras from 
claiming their prize. The British threatened an invasion, Kashmiris flinched, and the Dogras 
walked in on Srinagar triumphant without even having to conquer the region. Muhammad Iqbal 
(1877-1938), a Kashmiri-origin poet, whose family had settled in western Punjab, would later 
write of the Treaty of Amritsar: 
O morning breeze, if you happen to pass by Geneva  
Carry our word to the League of the Nations  
They have sold the tiller, the fields, the orchards and the flower-gardens 
They have sold an entire nation, and for what a cheap price!6 
 
The Dogras, instead of setting up a tolerant order, which had historically marked 
principalities across South Asia facing similar or opposite (Muslim ruler, Hindu subjects) 
scenarios, chose to rule by force. They were zealous in espousing the primacy of Hinduism over 
a non-Hindu population, and established what the historian Mirdu Rai (2004) has called a 
“Hindu State.” In this state, Kashmiri Muslims were heavily taxed, socio-politically 
marginalized, and repressed. To support the regime, Dogras had deployed the services of 
                                                 
6 The original poem is in Persian and appears in Iqbal’s famous work Javid Nama. This couplet has been translated 
into Urdu and English by several anonymous sources, all of whom seem to go beyond the original. The version I use 




Kashmir’s tiny Brahmin population, called the Pandits, as well as upper-caste Hindus from 
Jammu and Punjab and a few Pir Muslims. Creating an enduring fissure between Muslims and 
Pandits, religious identity gradually came to overlap with class identity. In Rai’s terms, Hindus 
were the ruling class, and Muslims the subjects. As I argue in Chapter 6, the schism between 
Muslims and Hindus was a result of the Dogra state’s discriminatory policies and not some 
essential religious conflict between the two. 
The Dogra system had, despite its obvious contradictions, endured. In 1931, Muslims 
finally organized first into the Muslim Conference, then, under the leadership of Sheikh 
Abdullah, into the National Conference. Initially, the Muslim Conference demanded an equitable 
“responsible government” and “elementary, basic rights” under the monarchy.7 But then, as the 
British Empire in India was beginning to come to an end, Abdullah questioned the continued 
validity of the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar,8 called for an end to the feudal, monarchical order, and 
the establishment of a secular, socialist Kashmir with popular sovereignty. The events were, 
however, not under his control, as the larger forces in South Asia were carving the subcontinent 
into India and Pakistan. Yet, despite his good intentions, his political naiveté got the better of 
him. Abdullah’s shadow would be cast on the subsequent events in Kashmir and beyond. 
Abdullah was closer to Indian National Congress leaders, like Jawaharlal Nehru, than to 
the Muslim League’s Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah, who had called for Pakistan, did not like 
Abdullah much either. Nehru and his Congress had supported Abdullah’s contentions: “princely 
rights” (like those of the Dogras) were subservient to the “will of the state peoples;” treaties 
between princes and the British should be annulled; and, the people’s will should be determined. 
                                                 
7 See Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul, eds. (1977, 63-129), ‘National Demand,’ Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference 1938. 
Legal document 62. 
8 Ibid, 98-207, ‘Resolution (January 17, 1946). Working Committee All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 




Jinnah’s Muslim League had, on the other hand, remained vague on the question of the 
difference between the princes’ rights and the will of state peoples.9 Congress had effectively 
cornered Jinnah as a proponent of “communalism” (politics based on religious identity) and 
presented itself as the secular mainstream within the anti-colonial movement. This political 
scene, and his own personal likes and dislikes, blinded Abdullah to the real nature of events 
unfolding in the subcontinent. Nehru’s Congress, while accepting the will of the people, had also 
passed a resolution for the “Unity of India,” which opposed any state’s or people’s decision to 
“secede” from “the Indian Union or Federation.”10 Abdullah had also ignored the vehement 
domestic opposition to Congress’s claims on Kashmir. Important parties in Jammu and Kashmir, 
like the Kisan Mazdoor (Peasant Worker) Conference and the Muslim Conference, had passed 
resolutions in favor or endorsement of independence,11 while the Kashmir Socialist Party 
endorsed accession with Pakistan.12 This was especially true in Jammu, where Chaudhary 
Ghulam Abbas was the most prominent Muslim leader, even though during the crucial months of 
1947, the Dogras kept him in jail. In short, while Abdullah was no doubt an important leader in 
Kashmir, popular for his socialist rhetoric, his word was not the “will of the Kashmiri people.” 
The four months from August 1947 to November 1947 were traumatic ones in the 
region’s history. As the British empire in India came to an end, the Dogra ruler, Hari Singh, 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 74-163. ‘Resolution, Working Committee of the All India Muslim League.’ (April 2, 1942). Legal Document 
73. 
10 Ibid., 75-165. ‘Resolution of the “Unity of India” passed by the All India Congress Committee.’ (April 29-May 2, 
1942). Legal document 74. Since the “union” or “federation” in 1942 was just a notional entity instead of an actual 
one, the idea of secession was meaningless. The resolution, however, makes clear the Congress’s attitude toward the 
future of the states.  
11 Ibid., 100-209, 106-217. ‘Presidential Address, Kisan Conference.’ (May 11, 1946). Legal document 99; ‘Press 
statement Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan President Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference.’ (May 10, 1947). Legal 
document 105.  
12 Ibid., 110-222. ‘Resolution, Kashmir Socialist Party’ (September 18, 1947), Legal document 109. In 1947, Kisan 
Mazdoor Conference also shifted its position toward joining Pakistan. See Ibid., 109-220 ‘Resolution, Kisan 




found himself scrambling for a kingdom his ancestors had received as a gift and in which its 
Muslim subjects had toiled to support a lavish life for a tiny class of people affiliated to Hari 
Singh’s clan. Since the mid-1930s, Hari Singh had envisioned for his kingdom a quasi-sovereign 
status within a federal “India of the future.” At the same time, a dream of “independence” for his 
kingdom had also begun to grow inside him (Guha 2007, 77), a dream he simultaneously wanted 
to crush among his subjects. In a series of carefully planned steps that included a genocide, the 
ruler crushed the aspirations of independence among his subjects in a final act of cruelty, even 
though he lost his kingdom as well.  
Writing about those fateful months in Kashmir, historian Alex von Tunzelmann (2005: 
281-304) notes that the king saw his interests as opposed to those of his subjects. First, he 
dismissed his Prime Minister, a Hindu who had recommended accession to Pakistan, and briefly 
took advice from his Astrologer, who recommended independence (in which the Dogras would 
rule in perpetuity). But eventually he listened to his wife and brother, both of whom 
recommended accession with the Hindu-majority India. Second, he started disarming his Muslim 
soldiers (who were mostly from Poonch, a region close to the border with Pakistan), and who, as 
a result, began deserting his army. He simultaneously bolstered his Dogra units with men and 
weapons.13 Third, as von Tunzelmann (2007: 286) writes: 
During September and October 1947, the Maharaja’s Dogra-led troops carried out a campaign of 
sustained harassment, arson, physical violence, and genocide against Muslim Kashmir in at least 
two areas—Poonch, right on the border with Pakistan, and pockets of southern Jammu…(M)ore 
or less the entire Muslim population of Jammu, amounting to around half a million people, was 
displaced [into Pakistan], with around 200,000 of those disappearing completely.  
                                                 




 The true scale of this ethnic cleansing is hard to know;14 but, given the census records 
before and after 1947, Jammu province, from being a Muslim-majority region, had within a 
matter of a few months become a decidedly Hindu-majority area.15 Von Tunzelmann notes, 
“India would deny that any holocaust had taken place, perhaps because it had secretly been 
providing arms to the Dogra side” (2007: 287). Military units from the Indian province of Patiala 
were already secretly operating in Srinagar (Lamb 1994, 130-32). Then, on October 20 of that 
same year, the Dogra army attacked Muslim villages across the border in Pakistan, leading to 
hundreds of deaths.16 Across several regions of the state Muslims arose in protest and rebellion, 
and parts of Kashmir (around Poonch) even declared independence as a “Free Kashmir” state 
(popularly called Azad Kashmir). On Nehru’s advice, Hari Singh suddenly released his bitter foe 
Abdullah from jail and appointed him as an “Emergency Administrator.” To the shock of many, 
Abdullah not only accepted the position, he also declared support for the Dogra ruler’s decision 
to accede with India. He remained vehement though about Hari Singh’s future and asked him to 
abdicate the throne, and eventually to remove “Maharaja” even as a ceremonial position. 
By late October 1947, the news of ethnic cleansing in Jammu had reached Muslim Pathan 
tribes in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province. There, Afridis and Mehsuds, two Pathan 
tribes historically discredited by the British for their “fierce independence,” “religious zeal,” as 
well as their “appetite for plunder,” assembled and poured into Kashmir in a disorganized 
                                                 
14 New scholarly work on the events of 1947 in Jammu and Kashmir that sheds some light on the ethnic cleansing 
include work by Cabeiri deBergh Robinson (2013) and Christopher Snedden (2013). In recent years, certain eye 
witness accounts have also emerged, especially the account of Ved Bhasin, a veteran journalist from Jammu, who 
was himself from a Dogra background (Naqvi 2016). There are also several accounts from Pakistan, including 
statements issued by Azad Kashmir Parliament, which are discussed in Snedden (2001). 
15 The 1941 Census of India shows that the Muslim population of Jammu province was 61.19 percent, while the 
Hindu population was 37.19 percent. The ethnic cleansing of Muslims took place in the western districts of Jammu 
(Snedden 2001). 




campaign in support of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir.17 There are no independent 
eyewitness accounts to this “tribal invasion” (Guha 2007, 79), and its latter day historical 
reconstruction is mired in India-Pakistan diplomatic exchanges in the United Nations Security 
Council. A few broad observations, however, can be made. Along the way, the Afridis and 
Mehsuds drove out small groups of Hindus and Sikhs, who began migrating to Jammu. With 
their victory over the Dogra forces in Kashmir looking close, it seems (although there is no 
record again) that they also plundered Muslims of Baramulla in Kashmir. Kashmiris, caught 
between a rock (the image of fierce Muslim tribesmen) and a hard place (Hindu Dogras), were 
frightened into silence. They were also left leaderless, as most of the leaders had remained in jail 
much of this time, foolishly, according to elderly Kashmiris who recount these stories. Hari 
Singh found the perfect opportunity to do what his Indian friends wanted him to do.18 Toward 
the end of October 1947, he escaped from Srinagar, along with the vast treasure from the state 
exchequer, leaving Kashmir defenseless. On his way to Jammu, he sought military help from 
India, and in return he accepted the Indian demand that Kashmir accede with India. Abdullah, 
fearful of the tribesmen, endorsed Hari Singh’s decision. Internal opposition in Kashmir to 
Abdullah’s volte face was crushed.  
But what about the legality of the Dogra king’s accession to India? The British, unable to 
administer their Indian empire after World War II, had asked all the princes under their 
dominion, including the Dogras, to join either India or Pakistan. It wasn’t really a choice. Rulers 
who had a majority Muslim subject population in their states and had a contiguous border with 
                                                 
17 Pathans in NWFP had kinship ties with Pathans in Kashmir, especially the Afridis, and the Kashmiri Pathans, who 
served in the Dogra army, had been among the first Muslim soldiers to be disarmed, disbanded, and told to go home. 
It is likely that these kinship ties played a big role in provoking the Pathans of NWFP to make their raids against the 
Dogra army. But as an alibi for the Indian invasion, Pathans probably changed the destiny of Kashmiris. 




the state of Pakistan were to join Pakistan. Those who had Hindu majority subjects and a 
contiguity of border with the state of India were to join India. Under this logic, Hari Singh 
should have joined Pakistan. While more than five hundred large and small princely kingdoms 
under the British Empire had followed this principle (except Hyderabad and Junagadh, which 
were soon resolved through military force and a plebiscite, respectively), only Kashmir’s ruler 
made a choice that flouted the logic. Defying the aspirations of an overwhelming majority of his 
subjects, Hari Singh signed the Treaty of Accession with India. Whether the decision was 
necessitated by the incursion of Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan into Kashmir, or whether the 
decision had been impending and actually caused the tribesmen to attack the Dogra state, 
remains a matter for historical debate. But it is a fact that Indian leaders made signing of the 
accession treaty a legal condition for their military help in securing the Dogra state, which, if 
they considered Hari Singh the sovereign, should not have been necessary at all. After all, Hari 
Singh could have asked for help as a sovereign ruler, and India would not have broken 
international law by providing it. And if they did not think Hari Singh had sovereign rights, as 
Congress leaders had repeatedly asserted previously, why was there the need to have him sign 
the document at all? Quite plausibly, M.K. Gandhi, and especially Nehru, knew about Hari 
Singh’s involvement in abetting the genocide in Jammu, and yet they supported his decision.  
Even after accomplishing the political coup against his own subjects, the Maharaja 
continued carrying out ethnic cleansing. Von Tunzelmann (2007: 294) wrote: 
On 5 November (1947), 120 trucks mysteriously arrived in the city of Jammu. Local Muslims 
were rounded up and told that they would be taken to the Pakistan border, then released across it. 
Five thousand civilian men, women and children complied and got into the trucks. Instead of 
driving to the border, the trucks turned the other way, and took the Muslims further into the heart 




massacred their charges. A few hundred escaped by hiding in fields or canals. The rest were 
killed.   
These events became the originary wound upon which the post-1947 Indian rule in 
Kashmir was built. The state has erased the history of this violence from its narrative. Indian 
postcolonial scholarship has left the subject untouched, and sometimes even gone on to deny its 
existence altogether. Much Indian scholarship as well as the official Indian narrative, instead 
tends to recount the violence inflicted by the Muslim tribesmen, which was minor compared to 
the scale of horror inflicted by the Dogra forces. How was the Dogra state able to carry out so 
much violence with such impunity? Having deserted his capital and without any shred of 
legitimacy left among his subjects, did Hari Singh have the authority to accede to India? Some of 
the answers lie in the nature of the Dogra state itself, a state which was never really built upon 
any popular legitimacy. I explore this question in detail in Chapter 6. 
Given the massive violence against the people whose political aspirations Sheikh 
Abdullah claimed to represent, it is imperative to ask why he would support the undemocratic 
decision of a regime he considered his bête noire? His motives remain unclear. Is it possible that 
Abdullah felt there was a better chance for Kashmir to claim independence from a Hindu-
majority India once the dust of the sub-continental partition had settled, than there was from a 
Muslim Pakistan? Another possible reason is that several of Pakistan’s top leaders were drawn 
from feudal backgrounds, while India’s leaders (specifically Nehru) proclaimed socialist views. 
Abdullah, according to his memoirs, had felt that support from Indian leaders would make it 
easier to carry out the economic redistribution program that he had promised to Kashmiris.19 He 
was wrong on both accounts. He did carry out the land reforms in 1949, yet, as he realized, he 
                                                 
19 Some of Abdullah’s views on these questions are described in his autobiography Atish-e-Chinar (Fire of Chinar), 




needed no hand from India in doing so. In fact, as it became apparent, the absentee landlords 
Abdullah took land from would soon script his fall, with full support from the Indian state. And 
independence for Kashmir—or even the “autonomy” that was part of the Treaty of Accession,20 
and upon which he had rested his hope—became a receding mirage under India.    
The Dogra king, running from his rebellious subjects, signed the treaty on October 26, 
1947.21 India, with some military units already covertly operating in Kashmir, immediately sent 
troops to protect the regime and check the advance of the tribesmen on Srinagar. The Indian 
invasion set off another wave of flight of Muslims from Jammu. Pakistan formally joined the war 
in May 1948, too late to effect any new changes on the ground. In November 1948, India carried 
out a major offensive in Kashmir, which pushed thousands of Muslim families from western 
areas of Kashmir into Azad Kashmir and further into Pakistan. Over the next few years, the 
forced evictions continued, leaving behind around two hundred depopulated villages; the Indian 
government would later describe these as “uninhabited villages” (Snedden 2001, 127). Two 
months later, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for a ceasefire along a line that 
came to be called the Line of Control (LoC). The ceasefire came into effect on January 1, 1949. 
The UNSC had passed Resolution 47 in 1948, which effectively voided the Treaty of Accession, 
and called for a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri people. India initially agreed it 
would hold the plebiscite, but reneged on the promise soon afterwards.  
                                                 
20 Under the Treaty of Accession of 1947, India was supposed to only control Kashmir’s foreign affairs, defense, 
and communication. All the other sovereign state functions were to rest with the Kashmir government. This was 
called “autonomy,” and enshrined as part of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Within a decade, autonomy was 
gone, and Article 370 became an empty shell. By the early 1960s, the “elected” governments in Kashmir had very 
limited authority in the affairs of the state (Noorani 2011, 3). See also Report of the State Autonomy Committee, 
2000. 
21 According to British historian Alistair Lamb (1994), the actual document was signed on October 27, 1947, which 
raises another legal question about the nature of Indian military action in Kashmir, which officially began on 




Sheikh Abdullah came out of the fiasco looking weak and losing credibility among 
Kashmiris. Would it have mattered if, instead of endorsing the Treaty of Accession with India, 
he had insisted that the Dogras declare Kashmir independent and had approached the UN on his 
own? It is hard to tell. What is certain is that as India and Pakistan came to occupy parts of 
Kashmir, Kashmiris began to gradually grasp the true import of 1947. Kashmir was bisected 
amid enormous violence. The trauma caused by the division was palpable. Abdullah’s National 
Conference had lost its way at a crucial juncture in the region’s history. None of Abdullah’s 
biographers appear to have asked if he knew about the scale of ethnic cleansing in Jammu. Given 
that he was appointed as “Head of Emergency Administration” in the state on October 30, 1947, 
it is unlikely he didn’t know.22 In any case, the National Conference could no longer claim the 
mantle of Tehreek. Not only was the historic opportunity to secure Kashmir’s independence lost, 
but Abdullah’s party had been utterly unable to negotiate a dignified political arrangement for 
Kashmir vis-à-vis Pakistan and India.  
Alongside the dream of independence, historic westward routes so crucial to Kashmir 
were suddenly truncated. For centuries, trade, culture, and people had moved back and forth 
through these routes, from Central Asia and Iran in the north-west as well as the Indian 
subcontinent to the south. These routes were all but closed. Kashmiris were suddenly trapped in 
a geographical conundrum, utterly dependent on the whims of the Indian state, which controlled 
the treacherous southward route. There was some consolation, though. In Kashmir Valley, the 
                                                 
22 Legal historian A. G. Noorani (2017) notes that in 1948, Abdullah had written a letter to India’s Deputy Prime 
Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, “(Hari) Singh’s mentor,” stating that “I have made no secret of it so far and I repeat it 
that the Maharaja has generally lost the confidence of the people [who] entertain bitterness against him…There was 
enacted in every village and town through which he passed an orgy of arson and loot and murder of Muslims. In 




most populous of all the regions of the Dogra state, chaos reigned, but remarkably there was no 
violence against the Pandit minority during this era. 
Regarding Abdullah, after nominally anointing (and cultivating) him as Kashmir’s “sole” 
and “secular” leader, not least a “friend,” Nehru unceremoniously removed him in 1953 (Guha 
2007, 76). Not only had Abdullah infuriated the absentee landlords from Jammu with his land 
reforms, but also the Hindu nationalists from India for symbolically proclaiming Kashmir as a 
“special state within India.” The question had been about creating a flag for Kashmir and 
replacing the position of Maharaja, which had somehow continued after 1947, with an elected 
head. Hindu nationalists in India (led by the Jana Sangh party) and Jammu’s upper caste Hindus 
(led by the Praja Parishad party) launched the “Kashmir Andolan” movement against Sheikh 
Abdullah, demanding “full integration” of Kashmir into India (Jaffrelot 1996, 129). All of this 
was systematically supported by Nehru’s cabinet, which had several Jana Sangh members. 
Having realized that his power was nominal, and finally beginning to grasp the dynamics of 
Hindu nationalism in India, Abdullah started dropping hints about the unimplemented UN 
plebiscite and independence in his speeches in Kashmir. This did not go over well with his 
“friend” Nehru, who accused Abdullah of hatching a conspiracy with support from Americans, 
and put him in jail in 1953.  
Abdullah spent the best part of the next twenty years in Indian prisons and political exile. 
Perhaps the reality of Kashmir’s new geo-political situation had started to make him question his 
judgment, but it was too late. He would only be allowed to return to Kashmir politics in 1975, on 
the condition that he drop the plebiscite demand and accept for himself, and for Kashmiris, a 
severely curtailed role in their own government. Abdullah obeyed—again in a shattering act of 




years of imprisonment and exile. Tehreek became a void. The National Conference no longer 
held the people’s imagination. A period of political wilderness in Kashmir ensued (1975-1987), 
with several revolutionary underground groups emerging, including the Jammu Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) under the leadership of Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhat. The only 
organized party on the ground at the time was the Jama’at Islami Jammu Kashmir (henceforth 
Jama’at), a strictly cadre-based Islamist party which had emerged in the region in the 1940s, and 
gradually come to contest elections. Yet, Jama’at’s petit bourgeois roots as well as adherence to 
conservative social convictions and opposition to shrine-based popular Islamic devotionalism, 
excluded peasants, workers, and women, thus restricting its reach—at least until the late 1980s, 
when it shed its political quietism.    
After a hundred-year rule under the Dogras, Kashmiris had come under Indian control. 
India proclaimed Kashmiris to be “citizens,” but wouldn’t accept their right to self-
determination. Both regimes ruled Kashmiris without necessarily bothering to ask their opinion. 
The Dogras, admittedly, were not under any normative obligation to do so. The Dogra regime 
was, after all, not a modern polity, and its maharajas had never claimed to be modern. They were 
intent on keeping their subjects as subjects. The Indian government, by contrast, was a signatory 
of the UN Charter, which was based on the principle of self-determination for “nations big and 
small,” as well as morally bound by UN Resolution 47, which had explicitly affirmed the 
Kashmiri right to self-determination and called for a plebiscite. Nehru had even addressed 
Kashmiris in Srinagar in 1948 and promised them their right to self-determination. But Kashmir, 
whose beauty had enchanted him and which he coveted as a land of his Pandit ancestors, was a 
prize not to be given away (von Tunzelmann 2007, 290; Anderson 2012). When a young 




1953, told Nehru it was not prudent to stifle the democratic voice of Kashmiris, Nehru replied 
unsentimentally: “We have gambled at the international stage on Kashmir, and we can’t afford to 
lose. At the moment, we are there at the point of a bayonet. Till things improve, democracy and 
morality can wait” (Puri 1993, 46). As Perry Anderson notes, “Sixty years later the bayonets are 
still there, democracy nowhere in sight” (2012, 119). 
These events in Kashmir are not just a historical background; history is always 
foregrounded in Tehreek narratives and part of the Kashmiri political subjectivity. History is not 
something in the past, but always facing the present. For instance, for Kashmiri revisionist 
history writers sympathetic to Tehreek—and whom I call Tehreek history-writers—history 
appears as a cruel joke; or, “the eternal return of the same,” to borrow Nietzsche’s metaphor for 
tragedy (1974, 273). The Treaty of Accession had handed Kashmiris to India just as the Treaty of 
Amritsar had handed them to the Dogras. Nevertheless, the unfulfilled promise of a plebiscite, 
the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Jammu, India’s invasion of Kashmir, and the subsequent 
occupation, as well as Sheikh Abdullah’s short-sightedness, have become poignant themes for 
Tehreek history-writers. I examine their work in Chapter 2. 
The Uprising and the Occupation 
To be a Tehreek activist is to fundamentally challenge the official historical accounts of 
Kashmir, especially the validity of accession. But if the revisionist accounts of 1931 and 1947 
reach Kashmiri youth activists through the work of Tehreek history-writers, the intensity of 
political conflict which sustains activist subjectivities arises also from engagement with public 
memory of the present and everyday frictions with the state. Most Kashmiri youth activists see 
themselves as heirs to the underground revolutionary dream of Kashmiri liberation that grew in 




Hamid Sheikh, Yasin Malik and Javaid Mir, who led the mass armed uprising of 1990. Some of 
these youth leaders died in their twenties, while others spent years in jail. Their own inspiration 
was JKLF founder Maqbool Bhat, a nationalist revolutionary, who was hanged by the Indian 
government in 1984. Public memory of the 1980s and the 1990s is not under the control of the 
state; one could even argue that the uprising that took place in 1990 was primarily about the state 
losing control over the governing narrative of the region’s politics.   
By the late 1980s, with the old Abdullah dead (d. 1982) and his descendants establishing 
their own political dynasty under Indian patronage, a newer generation of Kashmiris was getting 
restless. Many among this restless social group were in their late teens or early twenties, who 
spilled on to the streets, mobilizing people and preaching rebellion. As Ali, a surviving JKLF 
activist of the 1990 uprising, told me, “Before 1947, the National Conference had been a 
revolutionary party of the Kashmiri people. But by 1980, it was a party of Abdullah’s little 
princelings holding on to power through electoral fraud and rigging.” His reference to 
“princelings” is a deliberate allusion to the Dogras and the essential continuity of the pre- and 
post-1947 order. Only sixteen when he decided to join the armed movement, Ali believes, 
“There was no other option. It was about our survival as a people. The National Conference 
represented India in Kashmir. No one represented Kashmiris.”  
In 1987, a few Tehreek parties came together as the Mutahhida Muslim Mahaz (Muslim 
United Front) to contest state elections, and lost amid widespread allegations of rigging by the 
National Conference, which was in alliance with India’s Congress party. Mahaz’s loss, however, 
strengthened its political influence more than a win would have. The party had no real agenda, 
except its opposition to the National Conference. But, in just being an opposition, the Mahaz was 




rigging of elections in 1987 (Bose 2007, 236), pushed even the politically quietist parties to 
gradually accept the logic of the underground leaders. Even the Jama’at Islami, which had been 
contesting elections locally since 1963, with a limited success, had joined the Mahaz. When 
Maqbool Bhat was hanged in 1984, Jama’at had mourned his death but also rebuked his call for 
rebellion against the state as “extremism” driven by “emotions” (Sikand 2002, 746). After the 
election, however, Jama’at started to face internal pressure, especially from its youth-wing the 
Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulba (Islamic Students Union, established in 1977), to shed its emphasis on 
resolution of the Kashmir question through jamhoori andaz, the “democratic way.” The Jama’at, 
nevertheless, was among the last Mahaz constituents to endorse the armed Tehreek. 
Then in autumn 1988, as Ali, the JKLF activist, points out: 
Indian soldiers shot Kashmiri civilians dead at several places; in one case for protesting electricity 
cuts. Mass beatings and shootings were a common sight on the streets. The government imposed 
frequent all-day curfews. In the next few months, almost two dozen of my associates from the 
JKLF crossed the LoC into Azad Kashmir to receive arms training, and returned to fight the 
Indian military.  
For the initial group of rebels, who became the core of the pro-unification and pro-
independence JKLF, armed activism was meant only to break the “stifling political impasse” in 
Kashmir; as Ali put it, “The goal was to start a mass movement.” They had succeeded. Suddenly, 
Tehreek was again at the center of the Kashmiri political imagination. So popular was the JKLF 
and Tehreek that the power of the National Conference on the ground just melted away. In some 
cases, National Conference members were killed by fringe armed groups that had emerged at the 
same time. Several state functionaries were also attacked in 1988-89, including a retired judge 




leader of the Hindu rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Then in late 1989, JKLF scored a 
few symbolic victories, like securing the release of fellow activists from a government that had 
adopted a hardline policy against even unarmed protestors. Kashmiris celebrated these symbolic 
victories in ever larger demonstrations and rallies. “We had just been losing all the time, our 
freedoms, our people, our land,” Ali says, “Extracting a small concession from India felt like an 
achievement.”  
The National Conference government resigned on January 18, 1990. The next day, India 
imposed “President’s Rule,” bringing Kashmir under the direct rule of New Delhi and appointing 
Jagmohan as the new governor of the region. Jagmohan immediately forced all foreign press 
reporters to leave Kashmir and gave soldiers a free hand to confront Kashmiri protestors with 
deadly violence. Jagmohan was an iron-fisted bureaucrat with Hindu rightwing leanings. During 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule (1975-77), he had led a forcible 
sterilization campaign and evicted tens of thousands of poor people from Delhi (Tarlo 2003, 39). 
His appointment was his second stint as governor in Kashmir. In his first term (1984-88), he had 
presided over the dismissal of a National Conference government, extensive curfews, mass 
arrests and beatings of Kashmiri youth, and the rigged elections of 1987. The day he took office 
for his second term, thousands of Kashmiri Pandit families began leaving Kashmir, feeling 
threatened by the wave of protests. Immediately afterwards, Jagmohan ordered shootings across 
several areas of Srinagar in which hundreds of Kashmiris died. Later, he would poetically 
celebrate his swift action to “save Kashmir” from the “diabolical plan” of the secessionists: 
“Whether A loses life or B, it is the blood of all of us that spills (sic)” (Jagmohan 2006, 18).23     
                                                 
23 Jagmohan wrote about his time as governor in Kashmir in 1991. The Indian government faced international 
criticism over his scorched earth tactics in Kashmir and in August 1990 he was recalled. A loner, he liked to imagine 
himself as surrounded by enemies. He saw Kashmir as “crawling with scorpions.” He had previously written a book 




But as the massacres continued, the trickle of Kashmiri youth crossing LoC for arms 
training turned into a flood. Tehreek mass mobilization had become a full-blown armed 
movement. To subdue Tehreek, India increased its military deployment in the region to more 
than half a million soldiers.24 The main instrument of violence, however, was the enactment of 
the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and a slew of other emergency ordinances in 
1990. These emergency ordinances suspended the already-curtailed civil liberties of Kashmiris 
indefinitely and gave extensive powers to the military to eradicate Tehreek and return Kashmir to 
“law and order” (Duschinski, 2009). AFSPA gave the Indian military personnel power to kill or 
arrest individuals in Kashmir, and seize and destroy their property, if they were deemed or 
suspected to be a threat to the “territorial integrity” of the state. This threat could include 
questioning India’s sovereignty over Kashmir or showing “disrespect” toward its institutions or 
symbols (like not standing up for the Indian national anthem, or stepping on the Indian national 
flag). Quite remarkably, the law gave the power of interpreting such “threats to sovereignty” or 
the “disrespect toward state symbols” to even low-ranking officers, leaving it to their “opinion” 
whom to kill, when to arrest, and what to destroy (Government of India 1990, 2-4). Not only did 
this mean that even serious human rights violations, which escalated rapidly, would become 
                                                 
thousands of poor residents of Delhi out of the city in 1975-77. About Jagmohan’s book, Emma Tarlo writes, “In 
Island of Truth, he portrays himself as a lone honest man surrounded by hypocrites and buffeted by concocted 
accusations” (2003: 42). He had been accused of ordering the shooting of protestors during the infamous Turkman 
Gate episode. Jagmohan eventually joined the BJP. 
24 Seema Kazi has documented that in 1990, during the first year of the armed rebellion, there were 150,000 Indian 
soldiers in Kashmir (1 per 27 civilians). These numbers have grown since, even though the number of armed 
militants has come down to a handful. By 1994, she writes, the number of Indian soldiers in Kashmir had reached 
400,000 (44 percent of India’s total army), and by 2010 to somewhere between 500,000 to 700,000 (1 per every 10 
civilians), making Kashmir the “most heavily militarized place in the world” (Kazi 2010, 97). A new study arrived 
at an exact range of 656,638 to 750,981 armed soldiers, all concentrated in an area of 8639 square miles with a 
civilian population of 6.9 million (IPTK-APDP 2015). A specialized force for Kashmir, Rashtriya Rifles, was 
created in the early 1990s, which became the core of the Indian counterinsurgency apparatus. Its officers were drawn 
from the regular military as well as paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force and Border Security 
Force. These “agencies,” which later included the Kashmir police, operated separately and autonomously, even 
though they were brought under a “unified command” under the overall oversight of the New-Delhi appointed 




immune from legal prosecution, but that the exercise of state violence would also become utterly 
subject to a soldier’s personal judgment, without any need for accountable or objective rationale, 
or institutional oversight (Noorani 2009). A 2012 report described the situation as “an entrenched 
culture of impunity” (IPTK-APDP 2012, 7). Another report noted, “To date, not a single alleged 
perpetrator of a human rights violation has been prosecuted in a civilian court. Victims and their 
families routinely face intimidation and threats from the security forces when attempting to bring 
cases against soldiers” (Amnesty International 2015, 66). 
Effectively, AFSPA and military control turned Kashmir into a state of exception,25 and 
the region came to resemble a typical “late colonial occupation.” Achille Mbembe has described 
such regions as spaces where the exercise of state sovereignty takes on the modality of a 
“splintering occupation”—it fragments the territory into zones of control and surveillance, where 
new boundaries and hierarchies are created, and where, more generally, new “social and spatial 
relations” are inscribed on the ground (2003: 25-26). A vast new architecture of control and 
surveillance grew in Kashmir, which the Indian military enforced primarily through coercion. 
What emerged in Kashmir can be described as a military occupation—an ensemble of spatial 
strategies and violent practices that the occupier state employs to dominate physical space in a 
region where its rule lacks, or has lost, popular legitimacy and thus faces the imminent challenge 
of being popularly supplanted (Junaid 2013, 161). Of course, this is based on the historical 
premise that India’s presence in Kashmir has not been endorsed by a popular will. Nevertheless, 
under this occupation, while everyday life activities were throttled, spectacular forms of violence 
took place regularly. Public massacres of Kashmiris increased dramatically, so did enforced 
                                                 
25 On the de-facto impunity that the military enjoys in Kashmir, see Yale Law School, The Myth of Normalcy in 





disappearances and deaths in custody. Thousands were sent to prisons or tortured in notorious 
“interrogation centers.”   
The armed movement, however, could not be easily defeated, at least not until the Indian 
state realized Tehreek’s fatal flaw. Tehreek, since the early 1990s, was represented first by the 
JKLF, and then by a new political formation, the Hurriyat Conference. The Hurriyat Conference 
was an amalgamation of dozens of parties, and as such it did not have a coherent vision of its 
own beyond the basic premise of all its constituent groups: Return to the UN resolutions and 
hold the Plebiscite. It stayed away from committing fully either to independence or to a merger 
with Pakistan. Only the Jama’at Islami, which after its initial reluctance began patronizing the 
Hizbul Mujahideen (“Army of Mujahids”), or the Hizb, had a cohesive ideology. Jama’at had 
since 1947 seen Kashmir as a “natural part of Pakistan” because of Kashmir’s Muslim identity. 
Yet, it had contested state elections and even entered the state legislature, which was a subtle, if 
pragmatic endorsement of the post-1947 political order. Jama’at described itself as a socio-
political organization guided by the sharia Islamic code and was opposed to popular shrine-
related Muslim practices.26 For the small, newly-emerging Kashmiri Muslim middle class, 
especially the Pir community,27 the Jama’at had provided a vehicle for their cultural and political 
advancement (Sikand 2002, 720). The party, however, spent its resources on mundane issues of 
                                                 
26 Nevertheless, Jama’at always remained socially and politically flexible, as compared to more orthodox Islamic 
groups in Kashmir like the Ahl-Hadees. It sought what it called a “return to tauheed” or unity of God, and opposed 
shirk, or “associationism,” which granted the power of intercession, illumination (kashf), and miracle (karamat) to 
Sufis (Sikand 2002, 7-9). Yet, unlike Ahl-Hadees which takes a literalist stance and rejects everything beyond the 
Quran and Prophetic Sayings (hadees) as authoritative religious sources, Jama’at in Kashmir sought to revise the 
hagiographic tradition of writing about Sufis, known as tazkiras, and reinterpret Sufis as trying to enforce Islamic 
principles (shariah). 
27 Sikand (2002) notes that almost all the original founders of Jama’at’s were Pirs. Pirs claimed direct descent from 
Prophet Muhammad and possessed considerable social capital in Kashmir because of their control over Muslim 
religious establishments. While they had retained their traditional status during the Dogra era, in the wake of land 
reforms, the community suddenly found themselves faced with an assertive peasant and working class who no 




everyday life (government jobs, salaries, and inflation) and on setting up schools, where Muslim 
children (girls and boys) could get both modern scientific and Islamic moral education; this 
helped the Jama’at build a strong cadre base across Kashmir. 
The National Conference had always been weary of the Jama’at, seeing the latter as a 
threat, who could invoke religious passions against its power, and as fifth columnists for 
Pakistan. The Indian government imposed a ban on Jama’at in 1975, which was lifted two years 
later.28 In 1979, when Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul-Haq hanged Pakistan’s former prime 
minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, sections of Kashmiris attacked Jama’at properties.29 But Jama’at 
emerged from these setbacks rather unscathed and remained a powerful social force. Its influence 
largely came from its extensive investment in its strong network of schools and charities, which 
it had started in the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1970s, a new generation of Jama’at activists 
who had studied in its schools emerged. They were driven by the notion of an “ideal Islamic 
order” (nizam-e-mustafa) as well as a desire for “worldly advancement” (Sikand 2002, 727). 
While the Jama’at had been confined by national boundaries and was committed to social 
“reform” and elections,30 its youth wing, the Jamiat-ul-Tulba, took on an increasingly 
international revolutionary Islamic line. The Jamiat youth enthusiastically celebrated the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, organized international Islamic conferences in Kashmir, and in later years 
became the leadership of the Hizb. The Jama’at, the Jamiat, and the Hizb were pro-Pakistan and 
                                                 
28 Jama’at was banned as part of a wider repression in India by Indira Gandhi who had imposed Emergency in the 
country (1975-77).  
29 It is a bizarre episode in Kashmiri political history. Bhutto was popular among some sections of Kashmiris, 
especially for his political rhetoric on Kashmir as well as his leftwing populism. General Zia was an Islamist close to 
the US, and had the support of Pakistan’s Jama’at Islami. The Jama’at in Kashmir was thus seen as colluding with 
General Zia. Some have blamed the National Conference and the Indian agencies for rioting against the Jama’at. 
Among Jama’at leadership, however, it was widely known that the provocation had come from local ulema 
(“religious scholars”) who were resentful of Jama’at’s anti-shrine propaganda.  
30 Like its counterpart in Pakistan, Jama’at in Kashmir had become autonomous from its parent body Jam’aat Islami 




strictly opposed to the pro-independence JKLF, whom the pro-Pakistan factions discredited as 
“secular leftists.” This was, therefore, the broader shape of political formations as they existed at 
the start of the 1990 uprising.  
Watching with some surprise the mass uprising in Kashmir,31 Pakistan had ramped up 
support for militants, but specifically for the Jama’at-related pro-Pakistan Hizb. Under pressure 
from the Indian military as well as attacks by the Hizb, the JKLF wilted within a few years. But 
while the Hizb displaced the JKLF as the dominant armed group, it could not replicate JKLF’s 
popularity. Hizb had highly trained cadres, some of them recruits from Pakistan and even 
Afghanistan. Although still an insurgent group on the run, it became powerful within Tehreek 
and sought to dominate other groups, especially the JKLF (Bose 2007, 235-237). Culminating 
eventually in open hostilities, Hizb’s tactics led to divisions within as well as exits from Tehreek. 
This infighting, as I argue in Chapter 5, emerged as a split in the Kashmiri political subjectivity, 
something youth activists are still unable to suture. One consequence was the emergence of the 
counterinsurgent militia, the Ikhwanis, who fought with the Hizb and wreaked havoc in the 
countryside.  
By the late 1990s, the armed Tehreek was finally over, or restricted to isolated areas. Yet, 
the military occupation had lost none of its intensity. Counterinsurgency had led to more than 
70,000 Kashmiri lives lost, and around 8,000 disappeared; many more were left maimed, or with 
grievous bodily and psychic scars, and thousands were in jails (IPTK-APDP 2012). Pakistan, 
whose support was welcomed by Tehreek activists, turned out to be a double-edged sword. 
Pakistan’s involvement, like the fateful arrival of Pathan tribesmen in 1947, had split Tehreek. 
Yet, in a way, the fate of armed militancy was sealed by its own ill-conceived logic: what was 
                                                 
31 Pakistan had previously attempted to rouse Kashmiris to rebel in 1947 and then in 1965, but it had not drawn 




supposed to be a momentary tactic in the eyes of its pioneers had turned into a protracted guerilla 
campaign. Armed insurrection was meant to provoke a popular movement, which it did. But, 
when the military occupation responded with overwhelming violence against the movement, 
armed tactics became Tehreek’s central dynamic, creating space for the Pakistani state to 
intervene in Kashmiri politics even more.  
The prominence of armed groups had gradually reduced the participation of Kashmiri 
intellectuals, poets, writers, and others, who had been important ideological proponents of the 
JKLF. What this meant was that young Tehreek activists, who were the main social group 
driving the movement, became politicized within a space where the pro-unification, pro-
independence stance was no longer the central Tehreek ideology that they could inhabit. Pro-
Pakistan perspectives were based on mutually contradictory notions of “unity of Islamic ummah” 
(which was opposed to nationalisms per se) and Pakistani nationalism. As was clear, these 
multiple political stances—as visions for Kashmir’s future—were inherently exclusive of each 
other; the only point of convergence being their opposition to Indian control over Kashmir.     
The Indian state, emboldened by its success in first exploiting the split and then defeating 
the armed militants, chose to aggressively embark on integrating Kashmir into India; often 
through projects specifically oriented to claim Kashmir as Indian or even sacred Hindu territory. 
This involved, for instance, turning the traditional Hindu religious Amarnath pilgrimage in 
southern Kashmir into a nationalistic event. These integrationist projects had already been pre-
figured by earlier campaigns, like the Jana Sangh’s Kashmir Andolan in the early 1950s. 
Although, the Andolan had not enjoyed direct state support, by the 1990s these mobilizations 
received full state backing. For instance, the BJP launched an India-wide movement, Ekta Yatra 




was to culminate in Kashmir, where its leaders were to raise India’s national flag in the heart of 
Srinagar city (Jaffrelot 1996, 450). The Indian government provided the organizers with a full 
spectrum of logistical support and security, and ferried the BJP leaders to Srinagar in helicopters. 
In Kashmir, the yatra was met with cold anger. Dramatically, JKLF militants launched rockets 
toward the venue bringing the event to an early end (Awasthi, Baweja and Bamzai 2013). JKLF 
in Azad Kashmir had also started a counter-procession to cross the LoC which was met with 
violence by Pakistani border guards (Agence France-Press 1992). 
Kashmir Andolan and Ekta Yatra were explicitly political mobilizations, not religious 
ones. But by the beginning of the 2000s, India saw the religious Amarnath yatra as crucial to the 
project of “national integration.” The yatra had since the early 20th century become an annual 
event in Kashmir and Kashmiri Muslims facilitated it by providing services to the Hindu 
pilgrims. By 2008, India had expanded the scope of the pilgrimage considerably: extending the 
traditional fifteen day-long event in the summer to two months, allowing hundreds of thousands 
of pilgrims (where there had only been a few thousand previously) to ecologically fragile glacial 
regions, and building large-scale permanent infrastructure deep in the mountains. Tehreek 
activists saw these developments as ideological projects meant to entrench Indian control over 
Kashmiri land. Successive waves of popular protests erupted in Kashmir in 2008. Indian soldiers 
killed dozens of Kashmiris and injured thousands in response (Associated Press 2013). The 
protests marked a new phase in Tehreek: a turn to non-violent mass mobilization and a cessation 
of armed violence.    
But the moment was short-lived. In the summers of 2009 and 2010, and intermittently 




(Bukhari 2010).32 State violence pushed many youths to join the armed militancy, while others, 
like Zarine, to drop traditional life-goals and take up the dangerous work of human rights 
activism. Summers in Kashmir had again ceased to be the season of sowing paddy, or as a 
welcome relief from the harsh Himalayan cold. They had become, in Zarine’s words, a “season 
of fear,” a premonition of a return of the halaat, or “bad conditions.” Among the dead and the 
disappeared since the 1990s, most were young Kashmiris. Evoking the trauma of losing an entire 
generation of youths in his native land, poet Agha Shahid Ali (d. 2001) wrote: 
And the night’s sun there in Srinagar? Guns shoot stars into the sky, the storm of constellations 
night after night, the infinite that rages on. It was Id-ul-Zuha: a record of God’s inability, for even 
He must melt sometimes, to let Ishmael be executed by the hand of his father. Srinagar was under 
curfew. The identity pass may or may not have helped in the crackdown. Son after son—never to 
return from the night of torture—was taken away (Ali 2009, 172). 
In the summer of 2016, two years after my meetings with Atif and Zarine, when a young 
militant activist Burhan Wani was shot dead by Indian soldiers, during the Muslim celebrations 
of Id-ul-Zuha, I sat sleepless, contemplating what the summer had in store for Kashmir and its 
youth. There was not only the fear of soldiers yet again mowing down young protestors that kept 
many Kashmiris in a state of anxiety, but the geopolitical situation had also made Kashmir a 
dangerous place. In the years since the 1947 war, India and Pakistan had fought each other in 
Kashmir in 1965 and 1971.33 In 1998, the two countries exploded nuclear test devices, and the 
next year fought a gruesome battle in the icy mountains above Kashmir. Then again, in 2001, 
                                                 
32 While the 2010 protested started after three youths were shot dead by soldiers in Kupwara, the 2009 protests were 
a response to a case of rape and murder of two women in Shopian in Kashmir. While independent reports confirmed 
what the people had suspected—the involvement of Indian soldiers—the government claimed the reports to be 
fabricated (Independent Women’s Initiative for Justice 2009 and Majlis-e-Mashawarat 2010).  
33 While 1965 was primarily fought over Kashmir, the 1971 war took place in East Pakistan (which soon became 




they came close to a nuclear war, which, if it had started, would have begun first with the 
annihilation of Kashmir.  
During all these years, India had justified its control of Kashmir to the “international 
community” based not only on the accession treaty of 1947, but also by ideologically investing 
the notion of Muslim-majority Kashmir being part of India as critical to maintaining the country 
as a “secular state.” This was a position, for instance, laid out by Indian political scientists Sumit 
Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, who claimed that if Kashmir broke away from India, it would have 
serious consequences for “secularism, democracy, federalism and nationalism—the four pillars 
of India’s political structure” (1994, 405-409). For the most part, the international community 
had accepted this seemingly liberal view from India, even though nothing India was doing in 
Kashmir showed the state’s commitment to these “pillars” (except nationalism). As Anderson 
notes, “Held fast by Nehru to prove that India was a secular state, Kashmir has demonstrated the 
exact opposite: confessional expansionism” (2012, 175). Questioning the veneer of India’s 
official secularity, he argues further: “What is hidden within India is Hindustan (India as a land 
of Hindus). It is that which shapes the state and determines the frontiers between freedom and 
repression, what is allowed and what is forbidden” (Anderson 2012, 145). Pakistan, on the other 
hand, saw control over Kashmir as critical to its water security (all the rivers feeding Pakistan’s 
agriculture flowed from Kashmir), as well as ideologically central to its founding logic as a state 
for South Asian Muslims. For both, Kashmir was ideologically the “unfinished business of 
Partition,” but in truth they saw it as a “territory of desire” and its residents as incidental to the 
landscape.  




Political subjectivity and youth activists 
Recent works on the political conflict in Kashmir have focused on the dynamics of state 
terror (Mahmood 2000), intensive militarization (Kazi 2010), and the legally sanctioned 
impunity the military enjoys in the region (Duschinksi 2009). These works critically examine 
how the regime of a national security state and the juridico-political logic of exception in 
Kashmir lead to a punitive subjugation of Kashmiris. By revealing the repressive uses of the 
state’s institutional power, this scholarship destabilizes the self-image of Indian control over 
Kashmir as the guarantor of “peace” and “democracy” (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994, 416). It also 
breaks from traditional state-centric writings on Kashmir that take Kashmiri subjectivity as 
uniform and pre-given, politics merely as elite transactions, and the question of sovereignty in 
the region as settled in 1947 (Jha 1991; Ganguly 1996 & 2003; Ganguly and Bajpai 1994; Akbar 
2002; Behara 2007; Guha 2007).  
Yet, this emerging scholarship has left unanalyzed the dynamics of Tehreek in Kashmir, 
which, instead of seeing the Indian state as just a set of institutions, signifies it as an external 
“empire” (Kaul 2011) with no legitimacy to rule Kashmir. If, as Cornelius Castoriadis suggests, 
the state’s capacity to shape subjectivity depends on how the state becomes part of the “social 
imaginary” (1987, 81), then we need to consider the counter-hegemonic discourses and practices 
as the limit of state power (Mueggler 2001, 4-7). This is especially true in the case of Kashmiri 
youth, who often refer to Indian policies in Kashmir as sāmrājiyat, or “imperial” (Urdu). It is my 
contention that understanding politics as either elite transactions or as an expression of the state’s 
internal rationality tells us very little about youth activism, its perseverance, or even the nature of 
“conflict” in Kashmir. Instead, we need to study youth activism in terms of an agonistic 




The centrality of Kashmiri youth activists in my work is not meant simply to foreground 
a marginalized social group caught in a conflict that is often understood just as an inter-state 
territorial dispute. Understanding youth activism is to trace the historical and contemporary 
contours of politics in the region. Youth activism is the primary locus of the state and Tehreek 
discourses and practices, yet it is never fully determined by them. The state and Tehreek 
leadership try to reshape Kashmiri youth in their self-image as either submissive “Indian 
citizens/nationalists” or as resistant “Kashmiri/Tehreek supporters,” respectively. Of course, 
Tehreek possesses no comparable means as the state to affect Kashmiri youth. The state has at its 
disposal a vast phalanx of institutions, besides the military, which perform these functions; these 
functions may range from seemingly “depoliticized” arenas of public engagement, like 
environmentalism mediated through the courts (Bhan and Trisal 2016) to “social services,” such 
as helping substance-abusers recover, carried out by the police (Varma 2016).34 These 
institutions strategically coordinate to entrench Indian control over youth political imaginaries.  
Kashmiri youth activists, however, see the actions of the Indian state (and Tehreek) 
within a perspective that is shaped by alternative historical narratives and violent everyday 
experiences. It might be useful here to take a contrasting look at the model of belief and 
perspective Clifford Geertz put forward in his examination of religion as a cultural system. He 
argued that “religious belief involves not a Baconian induction from everyday experience…but 
rather a prior acceptance of authority which transforms that experience” (Geertz 1973, 109). 
While religious beliefs are qualitatively different from political beliefs, there is a resemblance in 
                                                 
34 As Mona Bhan and Nishita Trisal point out, for instance, environmentalism centered on Dal Lake conservation in 
Srinagar and its mediation through courts, “allows for a different kind of state making in Kashmir, one that in 
addition to the boots on the ground also deploys affective registers of desire and loss to mourn for a place once 
celebrated for its pristine land and waterscapes” (2016, 3). Saiba Varma, in her work on Kashmir Police’s Drug De-
addiction Center in Srinagar, also shows how the clinicians aim to “transform unruly Kashmiri citizens into docile, 




form. Broadly speaking, if belief is the structure, experiences are events. Experiences make sense 
only within the frame of beliefs. Kashmiri youth activists frame the actions of state forces within 
a political perspective that defines the state as “exterior,” “illegitimate,” and “without moral 
authority.” Consequently, they see their experiences as “injustice,” “unfair suffering,” and as 
“resistance.” They try to develop and confirm their political frame through their engagement 
with the political history of the region.  
Unlike a religious perspective, however, a political belief is not always available a priori. 
It may evolve over time and even suddenly disappear. That is why, it is hard to dismiss the 
constitutive role of everyday or critical experiences. A political belief may become unsustainable 
after a period of time, for instance if there is a vast discrepancy between the experiences of 
people and their beliefs/perspectives. It is plausible to argue that youth experiences are shaped by 
Tehreek “frames” they have already received. Yet, experiences of chronic state violence, both 
individual experiences as well as shared ones—experiences confirmed in the accounts of fellow 
activists, in the stories that circulate on social and the news media, and even in the self-glorifying 
militarized discourses of state authorities—reinforce Tehreek frames. This is equally true in the 
case of those I call “Tehreek history-writers,” who write about Kashmir’s past from a perspective 
sympathetic to Tehreek. Their engagements with the past are shaped by the logics of the present-
day struggle, but what they see in the past also resonates in their experiences of the present. 
What this suggests is that it is productive to keep the tension between “experiences” and 
“perspectives/frames” ongoing. I argue that the concept of subjectivity is critical to 
understanding activism among Kashmiri youth as it captures this tension well in a space of 




Let me distinguish the concept of subjectivity as I use it. First, in contrast to “identity,” 
which is often simply a non-problematic alignment of the individual interiority with the molar 
logics of social relations (Indian/Kashmiri; oppressor/victim), subjectivity is a fluid, dynamic 
process, which is never truly aligned with dominant logics or binarisms. If identity is a self-same 
relation, subjectivity involves friction and non-conformity. Second, subjectivity is also not the 
same as “subject position” or “subjection.” Subject position is created or assigned by the state or 
any other vertical structure of power. Louis Althusser theorized subjection in terms of 
“interpellation,” which occurs when a cultural/political agent “hails” a person with “ideological 
information” and the latter subjectively recognizes him or herself in the speech (2001, 174-
75).  Reproduction of such subject-norms or positions happens if they habitually become part of 
the lived experiences of subjects (Comaroff 1985; Bourdieu 1977). In Kashmir, the state 
criminalizes Tehreek, divides Kashmiris into “loyal” nationalists and “subversive” anti-nationals, 
and creates categories of youth “role models.” These are subject positions. Indeed, they 
significantly shape how people may perceive themselves or others, but activists do not 
necessarily inhabit these categories as the state would like them to. Instead, they may “turn” 
these terms/positions from within.35 An injury or scar from a confrontation with soldiers may 
become a badge for peer-group respect; death from state violence becomes martyrdom; and a 
“PSA case,” like the one Aqib was facing, a sign of political integrity. 
What this means is that while Kashmiri youth are caught in the logics of state power, 
their activism signifies a limit to those logics. Military occupation is a pervasive feature of 
Kashmiri public space and its violence seeps deep into interpersonal and social relations, often 
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splitting individuals from within (for instance, by making them doubt the possibility of 
emancipation or azadi). Yet, occupation is not hegemonic; it is fundamentally marked by 
coercion rather than persuasion or a natural acceptance.36 Youth activists are, however, not only 
conscious of the conditions that impel them to keep in abeyance ordinary life projects and join 
Tehreek, they also resist those conditions and formulate their own political projects. They 
question the governing assumptions of the occupation and the dominant historical narratives, 
while producing alternative accounts of the past and distinct visions for the future.  
What is “subjectivity” then? Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman have usefully formulated 
subjectivity as the “historically contingent consciousness of individuals situated in fields of 
relational power,” and which is produced through “critical encounters with violence” and 
“entanglement of global flows of images and discourses with local logics of identity formation” 
(2000, 1). This conception of subjectivity responds well to two anthropological concerns: first, 
the imperative to re-investigate the relationship between violence, power, and subjectivity, 
especially in “unstable places” in the context of post-Cold War eruption of ethnic violence 
(Greenhouse, Mertz & Warren 2002; Das 2008); second, to understand how globalization 
enables transnational imagery and discourses to undergo mutations for locally situated struggles 
(Bowen 1993). Elsewhere, Das relates subjectivity to violence, which is conceptualized as 
having occurred within the “weave of life as lived in the kinship universe” or as “sudden and 
traumatic” violence; while the former is “past continuous” and narratable, the latter remains 
“frozen” and unspeakable (2006, 88-89). She sees “frozen” violence as a product of events that 
cast their shadow from the past. To me, not only is this a passive conception of subjectivity in its 
encounters with violence, but traumatic violence is also assumed to have fallen into the 
                                                 





background. What happens in those societies (like Kashmir) where violence is “chronic” rather 
than episodic or transient (Vigh 2008) and produces its own unique and persistent forms of 
sensing it (Green 1999; Taussig 1992; Jeganathan 2004), and where there is no pre-existing 
world to remake nor an imminent aftermath of violence? How do we account for activists who 
challenge the terms of their subjection, rather than let the work of time heal trauma? 
Let me briefly suggest three interlinking paths toward conceptualizing subjectivity that is 
necessarily political. Slavoj Zizek, in examining Hegelian ontology, suggests that subjectivity as 
“self” emerges only in a “mad gesture” of radical withdrawal from “reality”—a reality whose 
ontological status is too chaotic. This withdrawal is followed by its symbolic reconstitution. In a 
way, Zizek is suggesting that we fall into subjectivity from madness, instead of the other way 
around (2000, 35-37). In a broad sense, then, this (theological) fall from “nature” (madness, 
chaos) to “culture” (finding self) is connected to the idea of a rupture, or Event.  
More pertinently, Alain Badiou opens a way of linking the idea of event to subjectivity at 
the level of politics. For Badiou, "Event is something that brings to light a possibility that was 
invisible or even unthinkable.” Opposed to structure, especially the dominant structure—which 
is the state power and which governs the real as well as pronounces that which is possible and 
impossible—the event (always a political event) creates a possibility that escapes the prevailing 
power’s control over “possibles.” Political involvement, for Badiou, means to seize the 
possibility, and to be seized by it. To become a political subject, thus, is to be prepared for an 
event, to become “subjectively disposed to recognizing new possibilities,” and to “criticize” the 
established order. As Badiou argues, criticism is a matter of showing that the possibilities offered 
by the dominant power are insufficient and inhuman; “inhuman,” in the strict sense, Badiou says, 




that of which it is capable." Criticism here is not an intellectual exercise. The political subject’s 
“fidelity to the events” is found in "practical procedures and in organizations, in the taking-up of 
positions and in an activism that conserves the memory of things.” Political subjects act, and 
formulate a political project, in the name of the possibility, which might be denoted by a general 
idea (Badiou 2013, 9-16). In Kashmir, such an idea is “azadi” (freedom), which becomes the 
horizon of political activism for Tehreek activists, who question the inhumanity of military 
control. 
Finally, subjectivity is akin to “critical political experience” as conceptualized by Pierre 
Bourdieu. Bourdieu contrasts political subjectivity to the state, which he defines as 
An organizational structure and authority regulating practices, which institutes and inculcates 
common symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory, state 
forms of classification, or in other terms practical schemes of perception, appreciation, and action 
(2000, 174).  
Political subjectivity is, in contrast, constituted through “critical political experiences,” which 
Bourdieu describes as “suspend(ing) the suspension of doubt” as to the possibility that the 
“social world could be other than what is implied in the experience of the world taken-for-
granted” (2000, 175). Suspending the suspension of doubt is not a passive act, or something that 
takes place automatically; it requires, in Bourdieu’s terms, actual “conceptual work,” and is 
cultivated as a “disposition” over time. Belief in azadi or independence among youth activists 
requires a sustained critical political work in the face of hegemonic projects of the state as well 
as the overwhelming sense of exhaustion the perception of defeat might entail. The youth 
activists I worked with often felt pressures from their families, peers, and social norms and 




their activism. To be caught in the crosshairs of the state, for instance, meant a significant 
setback in planning life according to traditional cultural norms.    
To be sure, therefore, subjectivity is a problem. It is not a priori, or given; it is formed 
(through a radical withdrawal from the given reality, in response to an event, or by doubting 
what is taken-for-granted) and is cultivated (through symbolic reconstitution of the self, bearing 
fidelity to the event, and conceptual work). It requires not only an openness to possibilities but 
the active work of criticism and political organizing. Through this work, subjectivity becomes 
self-organizing. As Rosi Braidotti has argued, subjectivity is “a process of auto-poiesis or self-
styling, which involves complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values” 
(2013, 52). Crucially, Braidotti considers the elements of creativity and imagination, desires, 
hopes and aspirations, which I argue are also key to understanding youth activism in Kashmir. 
Let me point here, then, that political subjectivity in Kashmir is a subjectivity in 
crisis. On one side, this crisis is the ontological condition of a social world that has been falling 
apart under the occupation; on the other, it is a crisis of language, as the dominant interstate 
paradigm of political discourse denies Kashmiri claims of political subjecthood. Political 
subjectivity in Kashmir emerges primarily from traumatic experiences with state violence. Here 
subjectivity is “traumatic” in the sense that experiences of violence, for the most part, are either 
not fully articulated, or are silenced (by criminalizing dissent, making claims of violent 
experiences liable to further violence, or naturalizing punitive containment in the name of state 
security).  
These experiences, of course, acquire meaning within Tehreek frames, but they also 
renew these frames. Experiences of violence among the activists I worked with started as 




witnessing those of other activists. Given this, I see experiences of violence as political when 
multiple singular subjective journeys collide and begin to overcome or generate frictions and 
differences around new ideas, practices and social relations, and when they begin to make 
incisions into dominant discourses based on commitments to ideal horizons of politics, as the 
activists define them: insāniyat (“humanity”), insāf (“justice”), azadi (“freedom”). Frictions and 
differences, as Ernesto Lacan has argued, are not weaknesses but sources of strength, as the 
reveal new sites of struggle within a movement (2000, 45-46 and 1996, 20-21).37  
Political subjectivity in Kashmir responds to events. It falls and heightens in relation to 
dramatic political events that transform key assumptions about society, state, and social relations 
(like the 1947 or the 1990 uprising in Kashmir) or everyday political events (like confrontations 
between soldiers and youth activists on the streets) that keep the governing relations of power 
visible on the surface. Amid the intensity of the historical conflict in Kashmir, political 
subjectivity has become embedded in the way militarization of space and acts of memorialization 
of resistance have come to define the political geography of the region, and embodied in the way 
Kashmiris relate to this geography in their daily lives. Crises of ontological and discursive 
worlds, however, leave activists perpetually on shaky foundations. They may bristle in outrage or 
be led into self-doubt. They often use the arsenal of one ideology against the other, without 
fidelity toward either. For instance, “Islam” may provide the language against nationalism at one 
moment; the critique of “nationalism” may become entangled with the discourse of “global 
justice” the next moment; while, at another time, religion setting limits on public discourse may 
itself appear as a problem to be resolved.  
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Nevertheless, activism in Kashmir demands continuous engagement and understanding 
from youth activists, and involves an exacting ability to be simultaneously within (to live under 
occupation) and without (to understand its mechanisms). Martin Heidegger’s idea of “thinking” 
takes the form of sustained “attentiveness,” or of staying with entities (1968, 4-5).38 But in 
spaces of chronic conflict human experience and attention is taxed heavily, and staying with 
things is hard. For instance, under the occupation, youth activists find it tough to consistently 
engage and remain attentive. It is draining to keep up the fight, commit to one strategy, or 
maintain focus on the “goal.” Activists would often sigh and say tha’ek waen (“it gets tiring”) or 
recite a poetic verse to suggest a loss of umeed (“hope”). Yet, in the same breath, announce yi 
chu karun (“it must be done”) or yi chu naseebas (“it [struggle] is our fate”). Each time a protest 
ends or an agitation bears no “result,” or even when a fellow activist is arrested or hurt, it strains 
their ability to continue. And while a sense of fatigue with persistent violence is natural, activists 
become even more weary amid the “one-sided nationalist din” amplified by 24/7 Indian news 
channels. 
For my purposes, I see political subjectivity as a process of autopoiesis that takes place 
within spaces of crisis. It is a disposition formed amid historically framed critical experiences 
that arise from events, both as radical ruptures as well as everyday violent encounters. It involves 
critical conceptual and organizing work, which demands a consistent engagement with the past 
and a public contestation of the social terms of subjection. But it also considers the everyday 
difficulties, beyond the threat of violence, in carrying out such work. Understanding the 
formation of political subjectivity among Kashmiri youth activists, then, is to examine it in 
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relation to the history of the discourses of identity in Kashmir, youths’ contestations of dominant 
narratives of history and norms of politics (elections, for instance), as well as their critical 
encounters with violence and its effects. One begins to get a sense of political subjectivity among 
youth activists by recognizing their shared models of recounting personal life stories, the modes 
through which they narrate critical events in contrast to the official accounts, the forms and 
repertoires of their protests and claim-making within Tehreek, their poetic and literary 
constructions of the self and forms of belonging, and their practices of remembrance and social 
commemoration. Even their bodily practices may signify political meanings, like when youth 
activists assemble in protest or during demonstrations, or when they walk within militarized 
urban spaces.39  
Tehreek, sovereignty, and Indian nationalism  
My research began with a few simple questions: Why do Kashmiri youth become 
involved in Tehreek when such an involvement exacts heavy costs on them? What are the modes 
in which this involvement or engagement takes place? In what forms do they express their 
sentiments and aspirations? Are their private aspirations, for instance, different from their public 
ones? Is it possible to keep private and public separate in understanding the dynamics of the 
occupation and Tehreek in Kashmir? Instead of taking the politicization of Kashmiri youth as a 
given, or centering the inter-state dynamic involved in the so-called “Kashmir-Dispute” in my 
analysis,40 I chose to analyze the perspectives, practices, and political projects of Kashmiri 
activists, as well as the conditions within which they live and try to make themselves visible 
through their politics.  
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Indeed, in challenging the post-1947 order in South Asia, these activists inhabit a 
political space shaped by historical forces that had created that order. They are animated not so 
much by a politics of “citizenship rights” under India’s constitutional system, as by a politics of 
self-determination that aims to disrupt state claims of sovereignty over Kashmir. Tehreek 
discourse does involve the question of rights, but it calls instead upon international covenants on 
human and political rights. Tehreek activists see the Indian constitution as an infringement, “a 
Trojan horse,” which has been used to undermine even the “autonomy” that Kashmir had been 
“promised under the treaty of accession.”  
Yet, while it is uncontestable that Kashmiri youth activists and Tehreek have kept the 
question of sovereignty in tension, the dissolution of the post-1947 order looks far from 
imminent. What, then, explains Tehreek’s influence? Even though they robustly criticize 
Tehreek leaders and their personal politics, Tehreek has a hold on youth imagination larger than 
its actual strength to change facts on the ground. Clearly, twenty-seven years of struggle have not 
positively changed the Indian government’s policy; the Indian state has grown more 
uncompromising toward Tehreek than ever. Nevertheless, to examine political subjectivity in 
Kashmir is to retell the history of Tehreek. The movement occupies the center of Kashmiri 
social, cultural, and political imagination; almost every aspect of Kashmiri society relates to it. 
Most organized groups in Kashmir—labor unions, women’s rights groups,41 religious 
formations, professional associations (like the Bar Association, Doctors Association, or Teachers 
Union), newspaper guilds, human rights groups—participate in the movement in one way or the 
other. Even the electoral parties, generally opposed to Tehreek, must engage with political 
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themes that arise from Tehreek’s key political positions.42 The movement also significantly 
shapes the contours of cultural production in Kashmir, be that in music, literature, film, or 
theatre. Indeed, among the artists or writers most popular are those who produce music or novels 
with themes from Tehreek at their center. In colleges or schools, youths take an active stance on 
the politics of the movement. Most support Tehreek vigorously; those who don’t often tend to be 
from families connected with the government or electoral parties.  
What I intend to do in this dissertation is to analyze the formation of political subjectivity 
among youth activists in relation to the origins, dynamics, and the fault lines within Tehreek, as 
well as how youth activists understand their own position within the movement. Basically, I 
intend to tell an account of Tehreek from the perspective of those who have been involved in it. 
It is important not to see Tehreek as simply a “social movement.” Social movements, in their 
broadest sense, are “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity, 
outside of institutional…channels for…challenging or defending extant authority…in the group, 
organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part” (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 
2004, 11; cf. Edelman 2001). Tehreek is a “collectivity” but it is made up of several 
organizations with sometimes contradictory political projects. The movement has also seen wide 
discontinuities, which sometimes makes it difficult to trace its precise origins. The “extant 
authorities”—from the Dogra state to the Indian state—have also changed, and while there are 
similarities between the way the two have used coercion as a primary modality of rule, there are 
                                                 
42 There are now several electoral parties, but the largest ones are the National Conference, the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP), the Congress, and the BJP. These parties contest elections, and affirm Indian sovereignty in Kashmir, 
but have significant differences in terms of Kashmir’s political status within India. While the NC and the PDP, both 
centered in Muslim majority Kashmir, stand for “autonomy” or “self-rule,” Congress and BJP, with significant 




significant differences in the kinds of polities these two entities are. At the same time, different 
key organizations have represented the movement in different eras.    
At the same time, some Indian political scientists have claimed Tehreek to be a “sub-
nationalist movement,” thus positioning Indian nationalism as mature and natural, and Kashmiri 
nationalism as unreasonable, if not completely illegitimate (Mehta 2011; Varshney 1991). Others 
see it as “illiberal” and “secessionist” movement without normative claims to national statehood 
(Chandhoke 2012). These arguments are ahistorical (and deceptive); and, yet, Tehreek cannot be 
easily categorized within the dominant frameworks of understanding nationalism. Its leaders and 
intellectuals have not shown an abiding interest in arguing for Kashmiri “nationhood” based on 
shared memories, myths, or territorial belonging—or what Anthony D. Smith (1991) called 
ethnie—even though there is a case to be made that such elements of nationhood do exist in 
Kashmir. Nor has there been an investment in imagining Kashmir as a nation that would be in 
line with the modernist or constructivist formulation of Benedict Anderson (2006). Tehreek has, 
all these years, been unable to give Kashmiris even such symbols of their collective struggle as a 
flag—a source of angst to some youth activists, if not all.43 Language and religion also offer only 
shaky, unstable foundations to imagine the nation, though religious identity (as I argue in 
Chapter 6) became salient in the early 20th century, if only in response to Dogra policies of 
religious discrimination. 
 Indeed, there has historically been a place-based and geographical notion of what it is to 
be a “Kashmiri” (in relation to such regional identities as Punjabi), but it simply suggests that to 
be Kashmiri is to be from Kashmir. It is tempting to argue that the assertion of Kashmiri identity 
has increasingly become solidified as a negative political identity, that is in opposition to the 
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dominant, overarching “Indian” identity, and to some extent “Pakistani” identity. As one 
Kashmiri intellectual, expressing frustration at, what he called, this “state of national 
incoherence,” told me:  
Tehreek leaders are shy of telling people to remain tied to a cultural notion of Kashmiriness, and 
people are not sure whether religion provides a sufficient ground for identity. Our identity is not 
based on what we are, but on what we are not.  
Some Tehreek constituents have a rather legal/technical definition of what it means to be 
Kashmiri: all those people who were and are legal “state subjects” of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir before 1947.44 This definition is tied to the UN Security Council resolutions which calls 
for all the people of the historic Kashmir state to vote in a plebiscite. A legal definition of the 
self, however, is not always sustainable, especially in the face of historical experiences. Muslim 
experiences under the Dogras, the events of 1947 that split Kashmir as a geopolitical arena in 
which different ethnic or religious groups had previously contested and co-existed, and the 
present-day military occupation have all put countervailing delimitations on defining Kashmiri 
identity in terms of a language, region, or religion. 
However, as will become evident in the coming pages, Kashmiri political subjectivity has 
become deeply enmeshed with the cultural-political forces undergirding the occupation itself. 
What does that mean? Occupation in Kashmir is not just an objective form or a material structure 
made of camps and pickets, checkpoints and interrogation centers, soldiers and informers, or 
even emergency laws and violent practices. Occupation is invested with a nationalist desire to 
attain control. Anderson’s description of the Indian occupation in Kashmir as “confessional 
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expansionism” (2012: 175) brings crucial attention to the two constitutive elements of this 
desire: the dense undercurrent of Hindu nationalism, and the “imperial rule” that mark India’s 
link with Kashmir (Chatterjee 1997).45 It is plausible to contend that the occupation in Kashmir 
is a manifestation of the Indian nationalist desire to overcompensate for historical memories of 
colonial and pre-colonial control by “foreigners”—a trope often invoked in the Hindu nationalist 
discourses. It is not enough to achieve independence as a Hindu nation, but to act upon “others,” 
just as Hindus were once acted upon.  
It is useful to dwell longer on the question of Hindu nationalism and how it shapes the 
dynamics of the occupation. According to Christophe Jaffrelot, the ideology of prominent Hindu 
nationalist formations, like the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh (RSS),46 which aggressively 
pushes for an integration of Kashmir into India, rests on three pillars: “geographical unity, racial 
features, and a common culture” (1996: 26). First, RSS claims primacy of Hindus in India 
because; according to its ideologues, India is their “fatherland” (pitrabhumi) as well as their 
“sacred land” (punyabhumi). While Muslims and Christians may live in India, their sacred land 
is in “Mecca” and “the Vatican,” respectively. Second, even though upper-caste Hindus see 
themselves as racially superior to lower-caste Hindus (and non-Hindus), in general, the idea of 
“Hindu unity” is based on shared racial features (like “blood”)—which is also shared by some 
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hands of the central executive…the chief executive personally negotiates a settlement with the regional leader…The 
same method has been followed with Dr. Farooq Abdullah in Jammu and Kashmir. It seems a somewhat new 
phenomenon in Indian politics…(I)t is an old technique, received from the days when Hindustan was a sprawling 
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system of imperial rule” (Chatterjee 1997, 137).  
46 RSS, or Nationalist Self-service Organization, claims it is not involved in politics, but is merely a cultural 
organization. But its cadres are and have been part of other major Hindu nationalist organizations, like Jana Sangh, 




Muslims and Christians. The ancestors of these latter Muslims and Christians are seen to have 
converted from Hinduism, and Hindu nationalists would allow them to be “Indianised” simply 
by “reconversion.” Third, the notion of “common culture” presents Hinduism not just as a 
religion but as a “way of life.” Those Muslims and Christians, whose ancestors came from 
“outside India”—in medieval times—could claim Indianness only if they shed their own 
religious culture and embraced Hindu culture. In some RSS formulations, non-Hindus can claim 
“citizenship” but they could never be accepted as Indians (Jaffrelot 1996, 25-33; and 2007).  
For Ashis Nandy, Hindu nationalism is a “modernist project which seeks to retool, on 
behalf of the global nation-state system, Hinduism into a national ideology and the Hindus into a 
‘proper’ nationality” (1998, 283). He argues the project is a response of the “Brahminical, urban, 
westernizing Indians to their uprooting, cultural and geographic,” that, at least in part, arises 
from a sense of “inferiority” in relation to Semitic faiths (Nandy 1998, 294). Elsewhere, Nandy 
claims, “Since about the middle of the nineteenth century…there has been a deep embarrassment 
and discontent with the lived experience of Hinduism” (2002, 131). RSS’s public statements 
echo this sentiment, and claim its objective as the “restoration of the Hindu psyche to its pristine 
form” (RSS Vision and Mission). In other words, a sense of resentment courses through the 
Hindu nationalist project, which, according to Nandy, seeks to “militarize” what Hindu 
nationalists perceive as “effeminate, disorganized Hindus” (1998, 294).  
It is not my contention here to ask if Nandy is correct or not, nor is it to make claims on 
the “psychology” behind Hindu nationalism.47 But when it comes to Hindu nationalist discourse 
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on Kashmir, it is clear that it forms the most militant ideological force behind the occupation. It 
is worth quoting at length from RSS’s “Vision and Mission” statement to understand its position 
on Kashmir: 
The State of Jammu & Kashmir, with its oppressive Muslim-majority character, has been a 
headache for our country ever since Independence. The forces inimical to Bharat [India] never 
wanted Kashmir to integrate itself with Bharat, and in October 1947, immediately after 
Independence when Pakistan’s forces invaded Kashmir, these elements conspired with the enemy 
to defeat every move to save the situation from our side. However, thanks to the timely 
collaboration of the entire Sangh [Bharatya Jana Sangh, a close RSS affiliate] force then present 
at Jammu with the Armed Forces of Bharat, Kashmir was saved. Had it not been for the 
premature and insensible cease-fire declared unilaterally by our own government, even while a 
large chunk of our territory was still under the siege of the enemy, our Armed Forces would then 
itself have driven out the latter completely beyond the borders and there would not have been this 
problem of 'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir' (POK), which even now continues to be a scourge 
undermining the sovereignty of Bharat. The problem of Kashmir, in fact, is one of our own 
making, since, keeping in mind its unique demographic character, unlike other States, it has been 
conferred a special status under Article 370 of the Constitution, even after its total accession with 
Bharat. In 1952, Bharatiya Jan Sangh and Praja Parishad, in those days the political front of the 
Sangh in Jammu & Kashmir State, jointly agitated against this special status; and the BJS had to 
pay a heavy price in the death of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, the founder-president of the 
party, in Srinagar jail. He died under dubious circumstances, after being incarcerated there for 
having led a batch of satyagrahis defying the ban on his entry into the State. However, because of 
this agitation, the game plan of the conspirators with Sheikh Abdullah as the kingpin, after being 
                                                 






exposed, was thwarted and Kashmir was once more saved, for the time being [in 1953]. The 
endless appeasement of the Muslim population, especially in Kashmir, practiced by the 
successive governments at Delhi, has been the bane of our government's Kashmir policy. Just as 
too much mollycoddling and lack of discipline spoil the child, so has been Kashmir, a problem 
created out of our own folly. With about one-third of the State territory illegally occupied by 
Pakistan, a hostile neighbour, the alienated area has virtually become a haven for subversives. 
Knowing fully well that an open war with Bharat may prove too costly and also with chances of 
winning unpredictable, Pakistan is waging a cold war, abetting the militants, supplying them with 
arms, training them for armed revolt from within. [Unaltered text]. 
To any independent observer, the state violence in Kashmir would hardly appear as 
“appeasement” or “too much mollycoddling,” however, RSS and its numerous affiliates would 
prefer an even more aggressive control over Kashmiris. The uprising of 1990 in Kashmir has 
coincided with the dramatic rise of Hindu nationalism in India. As is obvious from the statement, 
Hindu nationalists have always had a major presence in the Indian state’s policies, but over the 
last quarter of a century, RSS has come front and center. Its numerous, high-profile think-tanks 
give “strategic guidance” to government and military officials on Kashmir and on national 
security. It organizes events within and outside of Kashmir that project Tehreek as an affront to 
Indian nationalism. It organizes shastra puja or “arms worship” for Hindu youth in Jammu, 
while claiming to change the “minds of Kashmiri youth” away from activism. RSS’s political 
face, BJP, has been in power several times since 1996, and the current prime minister is an RSS 
member, as are many others in his government. Under the occupation, thus, Hindu nationalist 
projects, aided by its control over the government, gather enormous force in Kashmir. 
Kashmiris, in short, are the perfect “other” that the Hindu nationalism has constructed: as 




RSS believes, oppressed Hindus once (although Kashmiri Muslims were themselves subjects of 
Muslim, Sikh and Hindu rulers from “outside”); and, as Kashmiris, they are seen as ungrateful 
subversives within modern India, who are conspiring to break apart the organic unity of India’s 
sacred geography. The ongoing project of constructing India as a Hindu nation puts deep 
pressure on Tehreek. Tehreek groups tend to spend considerable effort holding on to Muslim 
symbolism, even among those groups that are not Islamist in orientation per se.  
It is this complex historico-political landscape that youth activists in Kashmir navigate 
and inhabit, even as they contend with state violence that is pervasive, and contest subject 
positions that the state imposes. Youth activists in Kashmir, with whom I worked, are often 
aware of the Hindu nationalist projects in Kashmir. Interestingly, they find it “easier” to deal 
with Hindu nationalism conceptually, as it makes sense of the violence of the occupation; at 
least, better than the secular narrative. Indian discourse on “secularism,” with its simultaneous 
inclusive potential (Muslims as citizens) and exclusionary premise (Kashmiri Muslims as latent 
anti-nationals) is harder to grapple with. In critiquing the Hindu majoritarian politics behind the 
Indian state’s policies in Kashmir, many youth activists often tend to uphold “secularism,” but 
they don’t want to sacrifice their own aspirations for independence for the sake of India’s 
secularism, as some Indian liberal experts demand from Kashmiris.  
And yet, not everything makes sense. Kashmiri youth activists who read about the anti-
colonial movement in India, are often left baffled by the desire behind India’s occupation. It is 
not an analytical bafflement. They see why India might want to control Kashmiri territory: there 
is the “geo-strategic location of Kashmir,” there is the “cheap hydroelectricity,” and, perhaps “in 
the future, some rare mineral might be discovered”—Aqib’s words. It is more a moral 




by Britain?” “How can they call Maqbool Bhat a ‘terrorist’ and hang him, when they celebrate 
figures like Bhagat Singh, who was called a ‘terrorist’ by the British and hanged?” “How can 
they celebrate the leaders of their national movement, like Gandhi and Nehru, but send our 
leaders Geelani and Yasin to jail or keep them house arrested?” These are Zarine’s words, who 
feels that the occupation ultimately cannot be rationally explained, and arguments therefore may 
not suffice; that, occupation is “evil.” William Connolly sees “evil” when “the opponents use 
violence against you when you have not sought to colonize or silence them” or they “without 
provocation, violently impose their faith on the unwilling” (2005, 35). This conceptual evil is the 
dark knot outside of politics; that is, normal conceptions of political action fail to address it. 
Zarine sees why some youth activists have taken up arms, even though it seems clearly a tactic 
that would end in self-annihilation. Maybe reminding the occupation of its own colonized past 
might be a better, non-violent way to open dialogue. As Irfan, a survivor from the 1990 uprising, 
told me in 2014, “What is the point of freedom when no one is alive?”          
 Rural/urban difference and the women’s question    
Let me restate that youth activists are not a homogenous group who all possess an 
undifferentiated and uniform consciousness. They are divided ideologically by questions of sect, 
the meanings they attribute to azadi, or preference for one set of political practices over another. 
However, they don’t fall neatly into one set of positions over others. They remain internally split, 
and take multiple positions, sometimes mutually contradictory ones even. What unites them is 
their shared opposition to the occupation and their participation in Tehreek, which provides a 
unified space for their activism.  
While youth activists may contest state-imposed subject positions, social identities are 




are less fluid than ideological positions. For instance, urban youth activists and rural activists 
face differential degrees of state violence. Violence on urban youth is intense but also more 
visible, unlike in the countryside where violence remains invisibilized. At the same time, 
warding off social pressures, like starting an “adult” life (job, marriage, children), is harder for 
rural youth than for urban ones. These pressures sometimes lead more rural youth than urban 
ones to join state forces or become conduits for electoral parties, for sometimes these are the 
only viable paths toward a conventional life. Urban activists often tend to taunt rural youth over 
making such life choices (“lining up for army jobs”), something I witnessed regularly on 
university campuses where rural youth face ridicule, especially during election time. The rural 
populace tends to vote more than urban populations, and urban activists treat voting in elections 
as a “betrayal” of Tehreek. (I discuss this dynamic in detail in Chapter 4). At the same time, rural 
youth are also more likely to join armed militants than urban youth; becoming an armed militant 
may ward off social pressures, bringing respect even from urban youth, but it drastically cuts 
short their lives.   
Women activists, limited by older Tehreek leaders’ traditional patriarchal attitudes 
toward gender relations, regularly face not only gendered state violence (Kazi 2009; Chatterjee 
2012) but also the burden of domestic continuity in the absence of men, who may have been 
killed or jailed.48 Several Indian scholars have contended that Tehreek has been oppressive 
toward Kashmiri women (Butalia 2002), often ignoring the constitutive role of the Indian 
militarization of public spaces in limiting women’s participation in Kashmiri socio-political 
                                                 
48 Sexual violence against Kashmiri women by state forces has been rampant, though often denied by the 




life.49 It is arguable, however, that the rise of some Islamist groups since the mid-1990s has had 
an adverse effect on Kashmiri women. Despite these pressures, more women have entered public 
spaces with jobs and higher education, and as political activists, in the last twenty-seven years of 
Tehreek overall than ever before. Kashmiri women not only participate in, but also organize 
Tehreek protests. In many instances, women actively confront soldiers in street battles, or even 
to save men. Several Kashmiri women have taken leadership positions in Tehreek (Habib 2011), 
actively participated in combat as armed activists (Shekhawat 2015), or become, what the state 
calls, Over Ground Workers. At a wider scale, through everyday practices of remembrance and 
commemoration, they turn memory and mourning into a potent political force. For instance, 
women deploy unique cultural practices, like singing wanwun (songs sung collectively during 
weddings) at the funerals of fallen armed militants, thus intensifying the affective politics of 
mourning. All these practices of resistance remain within the register of Tehreek politics, yet 
may be invisible to those disconnected from Kashmiri women’s worlds.50 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that major Tehreek parties have not produced explicitly 
progressive agendas for gender justice in Kashmir—especially, in the overall context of a 
military occupation that has been viciously violent toward women. Many youth activists I 
worked with saw this disregard for the “women’s question,” beyond the discourse of “honor,” as 
a failure of Tehreek. It is in this context that young women activists, like Zarine, have sought to 
fashion an identity beyond notions of “passive victimhood” or “glorified sacrificer” (Waiting 
                                                 
49 For instance, in the book, Voices of Kashmir (Butalia 2002), written primarily by Delhi-based writers (but 
presented as “voices from Kashmir”), only one essay, by Hamida Bano, a Kashmiri woman, directly addresses the 
question of state violence, militarization, and gender.  
50 For an insightful and insider look at the women’s participation in Tehreek, see Habib (2011). Anjum Zamrooda 





Mother, Half-Widow). By participating in the discursive contestations within Tehreek, they push 
fellow male youth activists to see contradictions within their own gender ideologies.  
Another obvious question that arises, with my focus on youth activists, is the question of 
older activists. While youth activists remain the key social group behind Tehreek as well as the 
main sufferers under the occupation, older activists hold positions of status as leaders of Tehreek 
parties. The leader of an important faction, Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, is eighty-five-year-old Ali Shah 
Geelani, who began his activist journey as a young teacher and journalist aligned with the 
National Conference, and then in 1953, when Abdullah was arrested, joined Jama’at Islami. 
Several older activists, including Geelani, have spent multiple years in prison, and suffered 
violence at the hands of the state (and in some cases, at the hands of armed militants too). Yet, in 
numerical terms they don’t form a social group by themselves within the movement. Some older 
activists narrated to me their activist biographies centered on their politicization as youth 
activists—either before 1947 or before 1990, which suggests their own investment in affirming 
youth activism as key to Tehreek. Additionally, there are not any clear lines of influence from 
older activists on younger activists—Geelani, despite his stints as a state legislator, is one 
exception; he remains popular among many Kashmiri youth.   
Map of the dissertation 
The dissertation consists of six chapters, which investigate Kashmiri youth engagements 
with Tehreek in the present, historical narratives of Kashmir’s past, critical events in modern 
political history of the region, dominant norms of politics, and the fissures within the movement.  
Chapter 1 is based on ethnographic portraits and activist biographies of four Kashmiri 
youths. It describes how the formation of political subjectivity is intersected by experiences with 




an analysis of their life trajectories, their senses of precarity, and their political engagements, I 
examine how Kashmiri youth desperately constitute themselves as political subjects within a 
violent context that has criminalized their politics and desires. I analyze the implications of my 
empirical data and analysis for contemporary understandings of youth activism and political 
subjectivity in Kashmir.  
I examine the work of Tehreek history-writers and their counter-narratives to the 
dominant Indian nationalist accounts of Kashmir in Chapter 2. As non-professional writers, 
Tehreek history-writers produce revisionist accounts of key historical events and figures in the 
modern political history of the region. Based on interviews with these writers and analysis of 
their writings, I examine how the dominant modes of postcolonial history writing in South Asia 
become a subject of critique in the margins of the postcolonial state, and how Tehreek history-
writers look to the past to produce an alternative understanding of Kashmiri political identity. 
I analyze the visual politics centered on the catastrophic floods of 2014 in Kashmir in 
Chapter 3. While the government’s disaster management plan fell into disarray, images of the 
Kashmir valley under water and the Indian military distributing food and blankets became a 
center of public debate. The images evoked calls for empathy outside Kashmir, but in TV 
studios, they were displayed as exemplars of military humanitarianism. In Kashmir, where the 
civilian relationship with the Indian military is ridden with political tensions, and often 
underwritten by violence, I describe how the flood as a dramatic event brought into view the 
infrastructure of military control in the region and accentuated the rift between the state and the 
people. 
In Chapter 4, I follow the work of Kashmiri youth activists involved in the election and 




contested in a space of historical conflict. The elections brought to light the normative 
incongruities, particularly in how state authorities present elections as a substitute for the right to 
self-determination. Youth activists stressed these contradictions to argue that elections in 
Kashmir were intimately tied to the continuation of the state of emergency, and invoked a 
symbolic language of sacrifice and betrayal to call for a public boycott. Through an analysis of 
how Kashmiris understand the history of elections, then, I explore the social meanings of 
“democracy” in Kashmir. The normative incongruities in “democracy under the occupation,” I 
argue, also sheds light on the aporias in Tehreek’s own politics of representation. 
In Chapter 5, I look at a group of Kashmiri youths who were part of a violent counter-
insurgency militia, the Ikhwan, in the mid-1990s, and who now find themselves caught in a space 
of inescapable despair. The state has abandoned them, while Kashmiris fear and distrust them. 
Based on accounts of surviving members of the now-disbanded group, the chapter examines how 
the state’s counterinsurgency campaigns and the unresolved fissures within Tehreek combined to 
produce a split within the Kashmiri political subjectivity. 
Finally, Chapter 6 involves a critical reading of colonial and postcolonial era tracts on 
Kashmir to trace the formation of Kashmiri Muslim identity under the Dogra state, and how this 
past continues to resonate in the present. The chapter looks at the modes of taxation on Muslim 
cultivators and artisans, alongside the state’s discriminatory policies against Muslim practices, as 
forming the key context in which mass mobilization of Muslims in Kashmir occurred. It also 
revisits the main reasons behind the “debacle of 1947,” when, as Tehreek history-writers argue, a 
“historical opportunity was missed by Kashmir leaders to create an independent Kashmir.”  
This dissertation, then, is an interplay of history and ethnography. It is about resonances. 




1996, 29) or, in other words, between the event and the everyday.51 The nature of ethnographic 
research often privileges the everyday over the event. Events are seen simply as momentary tears 
in the seamless fabric of the everyday. In places like Kashmir, events are embedded within, and 
continuously disrupt, the structure of the daily life. The everyday itself is eventful, while events 
cast their long shadows laterally across time into the past and the future. Yet, events are not self-
contained; there are multiplicities embedded within them, which bring to fore the underlying 
relations of power in society.  
Like the two images that I described at the start and the feelings they evoke, I attempt to 
show how the past lives on in the present. History, as already stated, is not in the background, but 
at the forefront. It structures the contemporary political subjectivity in Kashmir. Kashmiris return 
to the past not only to comprehend the sources of endemic violence in the present, but also 
because events from the past resonate strongly, beckoning comparisons and evoking uncanny 
resemblances. Even though the past becomes irrecoverable in the aftermath of events, events 
become something of mnemonic markers within political narratives. Tracing political 
subjectivity, I suggest, calls for reinventing the tools of critical historical anthropology, and 
considering such questions as space and place, discourse and practice, ideology and language, 
affect and meaning, and the existential and the unconscious, not as separate inquiries, but 
together, as intertwined analytical threads that shape political subjectivity. 
                                                 
51 Concrete universal, a concept taken from Hegel, is that which is operative in contingent circumstances and has no 
life apart from those circumstances. Or, as Edward Casey puts it: “It is endoskeletal to what happens in a given time 




CHAPTER 1  
YOUTH ACTIVISTS: SUBJECTIVITY, PRECARITY, AND THE POLYSEMY OF 
AZADI  
 
in this country we step out with doors in our arms. 
 Children run out with windows in their arms. 
 You drag it behind you in lit corridors. 
 If the switch is pulled you will be torn from everything  
—Agha Shahid Ali (2009, 176) 
 
“Azadi is freedom from fear,” Zarine had said: 
There is uncertainty about the future everywhere in the world, but here we live with a certainty 
that the future is not good. We know our family’s turn will come: we will lose someone, my 
brother will be tortured, our house will be dynamited. It is just a matter of time.  
Outside, cars were honking incessantly.  
“Looks like another traffic jam,” I said, shaking my head.  
The city was bustling. But traffic congestions had become longer and noisier. She looked 
out of the window and said, smiling: “You are annoyed with the cars now; you might miss these 
sounds soon.” [Conversation recorded with Zarine in Srinagar in early May 2016]. 
  
How easy it is to misread halaat, or “conditions,” in Kashmir. They can be normal (sometimes), 
bad (frequently), or just too-hard-to-guess (most of the time). When people are shopping in Lal 
Chowk or tourists flock around the Dal Lake in the capital Srinagar, it is easy to assume, as the 
pro-government media does, that “normalcy” in Kashmir is the same as “peace.” But normalcy 
can be forced upon a situation teeming with violence and simmering with outrage, as is often the 
case in Kashmir. It needs only one spark to explode. It always explodes. 
For the two months since I returned to Kashmir in May 2016, I have been listening 




opponents in the pro-independence Tehreek movement, as well as to everyday conversations 
among youth activists on college campuses, in the countryside, on the streets, and on social 
media. Anger and anxiety have been building up against the government’s plan to establish 
permanent colonies for Indian military personnel and segregated settlements for Kashmiri 
Hindus. Many Kashmiris see these plans as India trying to entrench its military occupation in the 
region and to territorially break up Kashmir based on religious identity. Some youth activists 
have described these plans as a prelude to “Israeli-type settlements” and even “ethnic cleansing.” 
A groundswell of anxiety has pushed even the sometimes-discordant leaders of Tehreek to issue 
“joint statements.” Yet, tourists from the Indian planes have arrived in droves, and Srinagar’s 
hotels and houseboats are full.  
A new government came to power in March in 2015. The Kashmir-based People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) sought votes to keep out India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu 
nationalist party in power in India. But once the results came and the PDP fell short of a 
majority, it joined hands with the BJP. The BJP had won a majority in the province of Jammu, a 
traditional rival to Kashmir. Immediately, one after another, the PDP’s “promises” fell apart, as 
the more assertive BJP embarked on its long-standing program of erasing Kashmir’s “special 
status” within the Indian Union. The “special status” is enshrined in the Indian Constitution as 
Article 370. Negotiated in the heady years between 1947 and 1952, Article 370, in principle, 
guarantees Kashmir “autonomy” in most areas except defense, foreign affairs, and 
communication. In practice, Article 370 has become a shell. In the seventy years of Indian rule in 
Kashmir, various Indian administrations have eroded Article 370 of all its promised substance, 
leaving it an empty symbol of Kashmir’s distinctiveness as a state within India. The BJP, 




since the colonial era, has been Hindutva. As a nationalist paradigm, Hindutva demands an 
erasure of all cultural and political identities besides “Indian,” which it equates with being 
Hindu. Hence, the outrage in Kashmir, which is predominantly Muslim and possesses a historical 
memory of being a political realm distinct from India. PDP’s volte face has further delegitimized 
“elections” as an institution in the eyes of Kashmiris, and vindicated youth activists who had 
campaigned to boycott the elections.  
It is in this context, that the events that are about to unfold snowball into months of 
protests, repression, and deaths. The events reveal how Kashmiri youth find themselves in the 
cross hairs of state violence, and how this violence becomes intertwined with the formation of 
their political subjectivity.  
This chapter has essentially two parts. In the first part, I describe the event of a death of a 
young rebel and how it unleashed violence that, while always latent within the occupation, sheds 
a critical light on what it means to be young under a state of chronic violence. I tell this account 
in the form of a diary description to present a slice of the politically charged context to which 
Kashmiri youth become regularly drawn into and how they come to stage themselves as key 
political actors. The second part is based on my engagement with two youth activists, one a 
former militant and now a “social worker” (a man) and another a human rights activist (a 
woman). Based on an analysis of their life and activist trajectories, I argue that youth activism, 
while shaped by experiences of state violence, is not merely a reaction to it, but involves 
transforming the terms of violent subjection that the state has instituted to criminalize Kashmiri 
youth. Activist narratives and practices reveal that while young Kashmiris share experiences of 
violence, their modes of engagement with Tehreek are varied and dynamic. In the face of state 




political engagement that gives youth politics meaning beyond what the interstate conflict over 
sovereignty in Kashmir would suggest. Tehreek also becomes the political site in which two 
marginalized subjectivities—young Kashmiri men and women activists—constitute each other in 
everyday contexts of precarity. 
Ominous news 
Friday, 8 July 2016: It is the third day of Id in Kashmir. The month of Ramzan is over, 
and those who fasted sixteen hours daily in this year’s unusually hot summer are rebuilding their 
strength. The attendance at the local mosque has thinned. I am hoping the pious would broadcast 
their piety over the loudspeakers placed on top of the mosques only during prescribed prayer 
times—five times a day—and not all the time as has been the norm since the beginning of 
Ramzan. Between honking cars and blaring loudspeakers, the sounds have been incessant. Most 
people won’t return to their offices until tomorrow, even though only the first day of the Id is 
listed as an official holiday. Shopkeepers too, after the pre-Id hectic sales, are slow to reopen 
their shops. Schools have been closed for the summer break, and children are spending time 
playing cricket, or picnicking in one of the many Mughal Gardens along the region’s foothills. 
Despite smoldering tensions, Kashmir is quiet. It is an almost perfect setting for the devastating 
news that is about to come and turn everything upside down. 
I have come to visit my parents for Id at their home in Anantnag town in south Kashmir. 
In the evening, I hear women gathered outside in the street speaking in raised voices among 
themselves. The men are in the mosque or perhaps milling about in front of shops. My mother 
calls me downstairs. She looks ashen and her voice quivers.  





The voices outside grow louder. I look out of the window. Some women are wiping tears. 
Burhan, a militant commander of a Kashmiri group that the Indian government has banned, was 
just twenty-two years old. I have heard people speak about him, many passionately, some in a 
tragic tone. Kashmiri armed militants—locally known as mujahids—generally have a life-span 
of a few months before the government kills them, but Burhan survived six years. Unlike other 
mujahids, who prefer to remain in the shadows, Burhan had uploaded videos and photos of 
himself and his comrades on social media. His legend had grown, irritating the Indian 
government. Kashmiri youth circulated his pictures widely, often captioning the pictures and 
videos with laudatory messages. Some called him “brave,” others prayed for his safety. The 
Indian media called Burhan a “poster boy for Hizbul.” Hizbul Mujahideen or the Hizb (Party of 
the Mujahids) was his group, which has historically been a pro-Pakistan organization and 
emphasizes Kashmir’s Muslim identity. Yet, many Kashmiris speak about Burhan and his group 
not so much as representing Hizb’s pro-Pakistan ideology, which in itself is not as popular as the 
idea of Kashmiri independence, but as a “pious rebel” fighting na’haq qabza or an “unjust 
occupation.” 
But there have been so many young mujahids since Kashmir’s mass movement for 
independence began in 1990—even charismatic ones—that initially I am unable to understand 
the import of the news of Burhan’s death. My mother, however, senses trouble almost 
instinctively.  
“This is different. You don’t know.” 
I return upstairs to look at my phone. More than a dozen messages have appeared on the 
screen. News has spread fast. Burhan has been killed in a hamlet close to Anantnag, and my 




Ikhwanis are Kashmiris who broke with Tehreek in 1994 and joined the state as a 
counterinsurgent militia against the Hizb.1 Some villages and towns had come to be associated 
with Ikhwanis because they had allowed them space or been forced to accept them. Now 
“Ikhwani” has become a general term for “collaborator” or “informer.” I did not know much 
about the hamlet.  
On the Facebook page of an online news site, I see the picture of Burhan’s dead body. 
The body has blood spots, and the mouth and the eyes are slightly open. The picture was 
probably taken by his killers soon after he was shot, and then uploaded on the Internet. The 
picture follows the established governmental routine of representing Kashmiri militants as wild, 
hunted felons whose deaths should be considered unremarkable and serve as an example for 
others. But, in this case, it seems not to have worked for the government so well. Alongside the 
picture of the dead young mujahid, people are circulating Burhan’s other pictures in which he 
looks rather intrepid and even flamboyant, with guns slung over his shoulders as he stands 
smiling amid the mountains around his native Tral town. For his killers, the body of a dead rebel 
is a trophy. Promotions and cash rewards are given to those who kill Kashmiri rebels. Special 
Task Force personnel of the Kashmir police often get rewards and their Deputy Superintendents 
are fast-tracked to become Superintendents. It’s the same with the officers of the Indian 
military’s main counterinsurgency arm, the Rashtriya Rifles, or the other branches of the Indian 
security apparatus in Kashmir, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security 
Force (BSF). 
I confirm the news to my mother.  
“No one in the neighborhood is cooking meals tonight,” she says.  
                                                 




Soon afterwards, one by one, loudspeakers on top of mosques turn silent. This is a bit 
unusual. The prayer time is not over, and normally at this hour there is an unremitting hum of 
religious kalimat blaring through loudspeakers. From the mosque in the locality, someone clears 
his throat on the loudspeaker, reads a few Quranic verses, and then asks people in the locality to 
wait for an important announcement: “All the people in the locality are requested to come out of 
their homes and assemble near the mosque. Tehreek-i-Kashmir’s young and dynamic leader, 
Burhan Wani, has been martyred.”  
Instead of describing Burhan simply as a commander of the Hizb, the man calls him the 
leader of the broader Tehreek, the movement for Kashmiri self-determination. For a young man, 
who has lived six years in hiding, this public recognition in the locality is only the beginning. In 
the days to come, Burhan’s legend would have reverberated beyond Kashmir, bringing India and 
Pakistan almost to the brink of war, and threatening to dissolve the regional interstate bloc 
SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation).   
The man repeats the announcement, and ends it by praying for azadi (freedom from 
India): “Ya Allah, liberate us from this zulm o jabr (cruelty and oppression)!”  
“Amen,” respond those inside and outside the mosque, vehemently.  
In the distance, cars, motorbikes, trucks, and tractors full of people, are crossing the 
bridge on the stream that flows behind my parents’ home. They are chanting slogans:  
“Hum kya chahate, Azadi!” (We want, freedom!) 
“Burhan waali, Azadi!” (Like the freedom, Burhan wanted!) 
 “As-salam as-salam, ae shaheed-o as-salam” (Salam o-martyrs!).  
“They are all going to Bamdoor,” a neighbor tells me. Bamdoor is the hamlet where 




Around 10 pm, the Internet slows down and then is completely off. Half an hour later, 
mobile phones are down as well. My phone displays a “No Service” message. From then on, 
news would only travel by word of mouth, or through raucous Indian TV news-channels, which 
lose no time in describing Burhan as a “terrorist” and his death as a success for the Indian 
military. Panels of TV experts on Kashmir are quickly assembled, and their consensus is that 
Wani’s death is the final nail in the coffin for Tehreek.  
“Kashmiri separatism will now die,” claims one expert.  
“Youngsters must now leave the path of confrontation against the state,” suggests 
another.  
“Resistance is futile,” announces the discussion moderator. 
 But the Indian TV channels are so discredited in Kashmir that, as one of my parents’ 
neighbors describes it, only Kashmiris with low-blood pressure find it suitable to watch them.  
“They talk as if they care about our nawjawan (youth),” he says, “Their soldiers have 
killed tens of thousands of our brightest over the years.” 
The sounds of slogans and mourning from different parts of the town travel over the 
stream behind the house. I close my eyes, but can’t sleep.  
Burhan 
I must have fallen asleep some time deep into the night. The next morning, I am awoken 
by wafts of teargas and chili-gas smoke coming in from an open window. My eyes are heavy and 
itchy. From the distance, I hear light thuds of teargas canisters bursting, followed by occasional 
bursts of gunfire. Slow wind must have carried the noxious gases to the neighborhood. Bilal, the 
milkman, has arrived somehow.  




Bilal is in his mid-twenties. He lives with his mother and young sisters nearby. When he 
was nine, his father went missing. The man had a thriving small business; he supplied milk to 
several neighborhoods in the area. Neighbors had seen paramilitary soldiers push Bilal’s father 
into their van and speed away. The business was lost, and the family fell on bad times. However, 
Bilal, with help from his mother, picked up the pieces. He started supplying milk in the 
mornings, and went to school and then college during the day. His sisters were in school as well. 
But business was never the same again, nor the family. 
 Bilal lives nearby, but on the way to our neighborhood he has to cross a paramilitary 
camp housed in a cinema. Soldiers occupied the cinema in 1990 only a few years after it had 
been opened. No movies were ever played after that, unless one considers the horrific scenes of 
torture some people describe having witnessed (or undergone) in its box sections. On its front 
wall, the huge cloth poster for the last Hindi movie played has gradually frayed from time, and 
the bullet holes from years of guerilla attacks on the camp has left the poster in tatters. It was a 
popular place once, not so much for the ludicrous Bollywood movies, but for the novelty of 
watching something on a large screen. Children used to steal apples from its adjoining orchard, 
which was part of the cinema. The owners, Kashmiris from Srinagar, tolerated them; the children 
tolerated the milling crowds of cinema goers who had suddenly invaded this quiet part of the 
town. But now, hardly anyone outside the neighborhood remembers the cinema. It became yet 
another place in the town to be feared. People were taken in, tortured, and many never returned. 
Bilal believes his father was one of those people. To reach the neighborhood, where he supplies 
milk to a few houses, he has circumvented the cinema by walking through the woods around it. 
“You shouldn’t have come. It is too risky,” admonishes my mother.  




Despite the shootings and teargas, I see many people, mostly young, from the 
neighborhood leaving from the back-lane.  
“They are all going to Tral,” my mother says.  
Tral, fifteen miles north of Anantnag, is Burhan Wani’s hometown. News has spread that 
his body has arrived there.  
“They will perform jinaza (Muslim funerary rites) and then return.”  
Only a few will be able to reach, though. Soldiers force many to return. For a moment, I 
had wanted to go as well to witness the event, but my Birkenstock sandals, the only ones I have 
carried to Anantnag, thwart me. I wouldn’t be able to run in them, and might become someone 
else’s liability if soldiers chased us. Then there is also the possibility of getting shot.  
“Soldiers and police are shooting at crowds on the highway!” yells a man in his forties 
who has returned but has lost his slippers while running away. 
Why do people want to go to Tral? I ask. Funerals of young militants have become mass 
emotional events. This used to happen in the early 1990s when the armed Tehreek began. Tens 
of thousands would gather, offer jinaza, and carry the bodies of fallen JKLF activists to the 
martyr’s graveyards—specially designated grave sites for mujahids—in large processions. Then, 
for years, the Indian government refused to hand over militants’ bodies to the people, and would 
dump them in rivers, forests, mass graves, or along the LoC. In the last couple of years, people, 
especially in the countryside, began encircling “encounter sites,” or places where soldiers would 
surround militants and kill them, and then refuse to budge until the bodies were returned. They 
would even try to save besieged militants by coming in between soldiers and militants engaged 
in gunfights. A few months ago, Indian authorities decided again not to return militants’ bodies. 




From several people who have returned from Tral after the jinaza, this is what I heard had 
happened with Burhan’s body: On Friday night, after his killing, the body was taken to a police 
station in Kokernag, which is close to Bamdoor. Soon after, the news reached Burhan’s parents, 
who set off for Kokernag from Tral. There the police told them they could not get the body of 
their son back. By that time thousands of people were marching toward Kokernag’s police 
station. Burhan’s parents were told that the only way the body could be returned to the family 
was if they quietly buried their son that very night. The body was then carried to the Indian 
army’s ammunition depot in the hills of Khundru above Anantnag, airlifted from there to 
Badamibagh Army Cantonment in Srinagar, and then driven to a Rashtriya Rifles camp near 
Tral. Having traced a part of the geography of militarized space overnight, the body was finally 
handed over to the police in Tral. But while the police in Tral were preparing for a quiet funeral 
at night, the townspeople had assembled in such large numbers that Burhan’s body had to be 
turned over to them. And then an extraordinary thing happened. By early morning close to three 
hundred thousand people, from places as far as the isolated Lolab valley in north Kashmir, had 
arrived in the usually sleepy Tral town. A series of forty jinazas would be offered during the day 
to accommodate all of them.  
Meanwhile, people in other towns and villages of Kashmir are also offering jinazas in 
hundreds of small and large gatherings. One such gathering took place on the main road near the 
cinema. While soldiers and the youths glared at each other, no words were exchanged. The 
soldiers inside the camp didn’t react and stayed inside. The meeting dispersed peacefully. 
However, news coming from other places has not been so good.  
By early afternoon, soldiers had shot dead five mourners and injured more than a 




South Kashmir. Young men and women are attacking paramilitary camps and police stations 
with pebbles, brickbats, and stones. They have “looted” a police armory in a village near 
Kulgam, and set the station on fire. News of the armory loot could be a rumor. Ironically, in the 
absence of phones, rumors tend to spread faster, which defeats at least part of the government’s 
logic as to why phones and the Internet in Kashmir have been shut down. The other part of this 
logic, that shutting down communication will prevent organization of protests, also appears 
tenuous: people seem to be organizing spontaneously. As one activist will tell me later, cutting 
phone networks actually helps Tehreek activists on the ground as they can work without the fear 
of informers tipping off government forces.     
Gradually, more news about the events surrounding Burhan’s killing starts trickling in. 
He had escaped the military dragnet for six years despite a massive manhunt by the army, 
paramilitary forces, and police, who had put a million-rupee cash reward on his head. In the end, 
he had been accidentally traced and killed. Details of the encounter do not sit well with the 
people who claim Burhan couldn’t have let himself get trapped so easily. Shaken by popular 
mood on the day after Burhan’s death, the Kashmir police announce they were surprised to find 
Burhan’s body among the dead militants at the encounter site. They had information there were 
militants present but they didn’t know who it was. It was a “lucky coincidence.” Party officials 
of PDP in Srinagar evade responsibility for the killing. They say, they wish he could have been 
caught alive. 
Yet, on Friday evening when mourners had reached the house in which the “encounter” 
had taken place, they had found bloodied bed sheets and walls, and heard from locals that the 
encounter had lasted only a couple of minutes. Almost all encounters in Kashmir last hours, 




was intact, not a bullet hole in the walls or doors or windows, just clean shots. The killer party, it 
was clear, had arrived at the right door, opened it, and found their victims lying unconscious in 
the room. It was a “fake encounter,” the mourners concluded. A fake encounter is said to have 
taken place if soldiers or police catch a militant and then shoot him dead at close range, but stage 
the event in a way that suggests there was a crossfire. While, from time to time, the Indian 
counterinsurgency in Kashmir has involved explicit policies like “Catch and Kill,” fake 
encounters are “dishonorable” for the police. They are, however, hard to resist when cash 
rewards and promotions are at stake. In Indian courts, fake encounters are called “extra-judicial 
killings.” But emergency laws in Kashmir, like AFSPA, make such killings impossible to 
prosecute. Human rights advocates use the term “custodial killings.”  
The suggestion of a fake encounter has outraged people. Some say the house owner, a 
relative of one of the dead associates of Burhan, had mixed poison in the juice and fish served to 
them, knocking the three unconscious. The poison, they believe, had been supplied by the 
Kashmir Police’s counterinsurgency wing, the Special Operations Group (SOG), which arrived 
on the scene, along with a posse of federal commandos from New Delhi, and finished the three 
rebels quickly.  
A few days later, an angry mob will descend on the village and burn the house down, 
along with a few others in the locality. Those who witnessed the arson believe that the mob was 
led by provocateurs from pro-Indian parties (Congress and National Conference) who are now in 
the opposition in the Kashmir government. Others say the arsonists included those ruling party 
(PDP) activists who are not happy with their party bosses allying with the Hindu-nationalist BJP.  
It is hard to tell rumors from facts when facts in a place like Kashmir often sound odd. 




region into months long frenzy ending in deaths of close to a hundred youths and injuries to 
more than fifteen thousand others, and, as stated already, open the possibility of a nuclear war 
between India and Pakistan.  
A Tehreek activist familiar with Burhan’s story told me that six years ago, Burhan, then 
fifteen, and his slightly older brother Khalid were “humiliated and beaten regularly” by the SOG 
personnel in Tral. There was no apparent reason for why they should have been treated like that, 
but the culture of impunity that the state has cultivated among its forces since 1990 makes these 
incidents routine. The SOG men had seen the two brothers on a motor bike and hadn’t liked their 
“boyish nonchalance.” No one would, of course, have remembered the reason behind the 
incident, as simple as the motorbike incident, if what happened next hadn’t happened. After all, 
many teenage boys and young men in Kashmir experience some form of violence and 
humiliation at the hands of government forces at one point or the other. And, since the entire 
government machinery—from its courts to its bureaucrats—are singularly devoted to writing off 
the violence of the state forces, youths find it better to keep quiet or fight “stone battles” with 
soldiers on the streets, rather than risk seeking justice in the courts, which could lead to further 
harassment.   
That evening, while Khalid went home, Burhan took off to join the Hizb. This was not an 
unusual journey for a Kashmiri teenager, but it was not what he had wanted to do with his life. 
Burhan’s family was a middle-class rural family and he was, as some of his friends would 
remember, a “bright student” at school. Joining Hizb was a death sentence. Even with guerilla 
training across the LoC in Azad Kashmir, Kashmiri militants often expected to live no more than 
six months. Burhan didn’t even cross the LoC. He probably never received any arms training. He 




He didn’t hide for too long. In the fall of 2010, a five-month long protest movement had 
just ended. Indian forces had killed more than a hundred Kashmiris. The protests ended with a 
deep sense of despondency, as senior Tehreek leaders were unable to turn the sustained protests 
into a tangible political outcome. Then, Kashmiri youth activists began appreciating the 
possibilities of anonymous activism on the social media. Social media had emerged as a nascent 
space in Kashmir to express outrage and reach out to a global audience interested in human 
rights. Kashmiri writers, journalists, poets, artists, students, and Tehreek activists began posting 
their writings, memoirs, notes, short stories, poems, pictures, videos, and comments online, as 
well as creating new web-based networks. This was a few months before the so-called Arab 
Spring protests began and turned the Indian government’s attention toward “subversives” using 
the social media. By 2011, the government had launched cyber cells to target online Kashmiri 
activists, which drove many into an anonymous mode. 
For Burhan, since he had already joined the Hizb, anonymity had no meaning. In fact, 
what he did surprised the government. He started posting pictures and videos of himself online, 
and speaking directly to Kashmiri youth. The government had always controlled the flow of 
information in Kashmir (with perhaps radio in the early 1990s being an exception, but that too in 
a limited way). Tehreek leaders could communicate with people only in mosques and sometimes 
through the Urdu press. But their audiences had always been fragmented. By the late 1990s, the 
government came down hard on even the mosques. On several occasions, I had heard that the 
government was importing pliant new imams from Indian nationalist-minded Islamic seminaries 
in North India to preach in Kashmiri mosques. While this was probably a minor phenomenon, 




Desai 2015). Nevertheless, Burhan soon became a household name, especially in the countryside 
in South Kashmir.  
The Tehreek activist, who was fond of Burhan, remembered him for his “defiance” of the 
government, even though he had apparently never fired his gun or hurt a soldier or a policeman. 
Just the fact that he had frustrated the government’s efforts to kill him for six years came to 
symbolize his defiance. To the activist, he did not become a rebel due to the resentment from his 
experience as a fifteen-year-old boy, but because he had consciously chosen to “stand up to the 
occupation.”  
“It is easy to morally crumble when faced with constant humiliation,” said the activist, 
who had reached Tral to attend Burhan’s funeral, “but he chose the path of a dignified life.”  
A few years before they killed Burhan, the Indian military had killed Burhan’s brother 
Khalid, even though he was not a militant.  
Youth 
The short lives and political deaths of the two brothers are a tragic metaphor for Kashmiri 
youth in the present. What does it mean to be a nawajawan, or a “youth,” in Kashmir? I am 
reminded of an exasperated response of a group of sangbāz, or “stone-pelters”—young boys who 
often clashed with soldiers and police in the streets—when I met them in 2010, and asked them 
what they were hoping to achieve putting themselves in the path of harm:  
What are we supposed to do? They kill us, break our bones, blind us, and keep us in prison. So 
many of our brothers are in jail under PSA. Most will be held for two years in a row without trial. 
Then they will be let go and arrested for two more years. When they finally let us go, they harass 
us, and our families, and ask them to keep paying money to keep us out of the jail. If our leaders 




 They were talking about the Public Safety Act, under which the government imprisons 
Kashmiris for months without trial (Amnesty 2011). I had immediately regretted my patronizing 
question, but couldn’t help noticing how their understanding of the past and experiences of the 
present shape their political actions. The weight of history and a violent state machinery had 
fallen on the shoulders of Kashmiri youth early on in their lives, a time when their 
“nonchalance” should have been seen as the norm instead of it provoking the wrath of state 
forces. The weight of history was two-fold: first, the external geo-political scenario in which 
India and Pakistan laid territorial claims on Kashmir and ignored the aspirations of Kashmiris; 
and second, the humiliation of being held hostage through the “connivance,” “collaboration,” or 
“incompetence” of Kashmir’s own politicians (PDP and NC), as an activist described it. As we 
will see in Chapter 2, several Kashmiris had been making conscious efforts to engage with the 
past, trying to understand the motives of leaders like Sheikh Abdullah, and give Tehreek a much-
needed historical perspective.  
For most youths, daily confrontations with the apparatus of occupation were the norm. 
This apparatus, in the form of camps, pickets, bunkers, and patrols, frequently reinforced by a 
mechanism of round-the-clock curfews and restrictions, was ever-present in daily life. It was 
hard to leave your house and not be confronted by armed soldiers minutely observing you, 
making you stand in lines to be frisked, demanding your identity papers, or even making you feel 
threatened by driving their vehicles recklessly through the town’s narrow streets. Often, entire 
neighborhoods would be besieged, houses searched, and women assaulted as men were forced to 
assemble in open areas for identity parades. Confrontations were inevitable. For younger 




about them—electoral politics was stage-managed by the Indian state to put the compliant 
segments of society in power—their protests would devolve into stone pelting.  
The category nawjawan or “youth” emerged in Kashmir roughly in 1990 as Tehreek 
became an armed movement with mass support, and then again in 2008 and 2010, when the 
movement returned, this time in the form of large-scale non-violent protests. Although the wider 
Kashmiri society was involved in the movement throughout, many Tehreek activists describe the 
events of 1990 and later as “youth uprisings.” Most of the leadership in the beginning had been 
young (mostly) men. Even the older leadership (those who had a history of political engagement 
before 1990) would claim Tehreek to be the movement of Kashmiri youth. The older leaders, 
who gradually took over the leadership of the movement, described Kashmiri youth as ba-
sha’oor, or “socially and politically conscious.” Yet, while youths remained their main political 
constituency—it was the efficacy of youth activism in the streets upon which the power of 
Tehreek leaders depended—youths could, by the same token, be a source of danger, especially if 
the youth activists refused to follow the leaders’ programs or constrained their room for 
negotiations with the state. 
On the other hand, the Indian state also claimed that the uprisings in 1990 and later were 
driven by Kashmiri youth. Of course, for the loyalist government in Srinagar, these youths were 
either gumrah nawajawan (Urdu: “wayward” or “impressionable youth”), who had been easily 
manipulated by the Pakistani government, or, in the eyes of the Indian government in New Delhi, 
desh-virodhi (Hindi: “subversive anti-nationals”), who needed to be contained, punitively if that 
is what it took. Government functionaries often spoke of “role-model youth” and “undesirable 




the civil services, or were civil service aspirants. Burhan, the now dead rebel, and his brother 
Khalid, were archetypical “undesirable youth.”  
Post-1990, a prominent stream of Indian writing on Kashmir became centered on 
analyzing the so-called “Kashmiri mind,” which, it was claimed, refused to accept the political 
“reality”—that is, the permanence of Indian control. Some of this mentalist tradition goes back to 
the early colonial writings on Kashmir, which after 1947 seeped into Indian writings. The 
quintessential exponent of this argument is the influential Indian writer Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 
Drawing from Ashutosh Varshney’s (1991) argument that the Kashmir problem arose because 
there were three incompatible nationalisms jostling together (Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri), 
Mehta says it was “inevitable” Kashmir bore the “burden of two military establishments” (2010, 
3). In his view, while the “Pakistani establishment would foment violence at all costs, without 
limit or compunction, (t)he Indian state, by contrast, simply could not think of a way of keeping 
order that did not have the appearance of a military occupation” (Mehta 2010, 3). Leaving aside 
the not-so-subtle contrast in imputing mal-intent behind Pakistan’s support of Tehreek and good 
intent behind India’s military occupation, Mehta sees military control as occupation but only in 
appearance and its continuation as inevitable. Accordingly, he states, “politics in…Kashmir is 
more deeply psychological rather than ideological or interest-driven,” and as such Indian 
“interventions in Kashmir have to be therapeutic, more than technical or political” (Mehta 2010, 
7-8). Mehta then turns to the subject of Kashmiri youth:  
There is, amongst Kashmiri youth, an odd combination of romanticism and disillusionment. It is 
romantic in the sense that they are refusing to bow to a larger logic of history; they are refusing to 
bow to the factual logic that the large nation state in which they reside is bringing to bear upon 
them. But they are also in the process caught up in an identity trap that has no resolution. They 




the Indian state imposes, there is no room for any ordinariness in Kashmir. What can solve this 
impasse? No one knows. But one can only hope that these youths will redirect their energies and 
horizons. Rather than remain trapped in the narrow confines that history has condemned us to, 
they will be the agents of reimagining a better India. It will imagine a future where azadi will 
liberate us from our identities rather than condemn us to fight over them (2010, 11). 
To his “liberal” credit, Mehta acknowledges the “depredations of the Indian state,” yet, as 
a nationalist, he refuses to accept that the military occupation (even in its “appearance”) has an 
utterly illiberal core at its heart (the specifically “Indian” desire to control Kashmiris). He puts 
the burden of liberating the “Indian polity” from the “trap of identity” on Kashmiri youth, even 
as he presents their critique of and protest against the occupation as delusional. It is arguable that 
occupation and identity conflicts are related in a sort of positive feedback loop-system, 
reinforcing and intensifying each other, but the “fight” over identity is not the originary reason 
behind the occupation (before 1947 there was no fight between the “three nationalisms” per se); 
occupation is the reason why identities became politicized and conflicted in the first place. Why 
should, one might ask, Kashmiri youth “bow” to the occupation, to defend, what Mehta calls, 
“the normatively defensible idea of India?” What would Kashmiri youth find so appealing in the 
“idea of India,” which is clearly indefensible as an idea in Kashmir, that they will not be able to 
find in the “idea of Kashmir?” What could be more “therapeutic” than the end of the occupation 
and conceding the democratic right of self-determination? How can “ordinariness” exist under a 
state of emergency? I quote Mehta at length here because this supposedly “liberal,” moralizing 
point of view pervades the Indian public sphere beneath Hindu rightwing nationalism, which, of 
course, does not even acknowledge the existence of the occupation.  
As is evident, generalizations about the “psyche” of Kashmiri youth remain a key subtext 




tropes of “immaturity” and “resentment,” and a nationalist invisibilizing of the occupation. Some 
saw the movement’s turn to arms in 1990 a result of “economic frustration” of the Kashmiri 
middle class (Jha 1991). This argument was hardly sustainable, because, in 1990, a Kashmiri 
middle class had hardly existed beyond pockets of urban Kashmir, many of whom were, in any 
case, tied to the pro-Indian establishment. In direct contradiction to the middle-class thesis, 
others understood the 1990 uprising as having been led by “subaltern youth,” who were 
“economically alienated” from India (Prakash 2000). Still others saw “educated youth” as the 
prominent Tehreek actors, those who could not be accommodated within the “decaying 
institutions” of the state (Ganguly 2003; Wildman 2002). Of course, subaltern youth were most 
active in Tehreek mobilizations, but their subaltern status was neither new nor was it simply 
based on their economic alienation from India. The notion of economic alienation not only 
distracts attention from the Tehreek’s political contestation of India’s sovereignty in Kashmir, 
but also puts the burden of alienation on Kashmiri youth, who are represented as culturally and 
psychologically incapable of adjusting to the “new economy,” like traveling outside of Kashmir 
for jobs. In short, the classes under analyses kept changing but the mentalist tropes remained.  
In Kashmir, after the period of armed Tehreek had subsided in 2001, the pro-India 
loyalist parties like the People’s Democratic Party and the National Conference, adopted 
elements of this mentalist discourse and deployed it alongside discourses of “development” that 
were borrowed from the Indian military’s counterinsurgency doctrine. Confronted with a 
legitimacy crisis, with widespread opposition to their status as legitimate actors within politics 
among Kashmiris, these parties insisted that a Kashmiri obsession with the past was coming in 




Indian elite,2 and the Indian military had presented itself as a “force for civilian development” in 
Kashmir.3 The pro-India Kashmiri elite borrowed that language of military governance and 
neoliberalism to depict young Tehreek activists as a dangerous underclass structurally separate 
and culturally distinct from mainstream Kashmir.4 In economic terms, this “underclass” of 
youths were those who had fallen behind, and who, thus, needed to be absorbed into the 
workforce. In behaviorist terms, they were seen as deviant, quasi-criminal, and anti-social, with a 
distaste for work, and who, therefore, needed to be stopped from disrupting the supposedly self-
regulating market economy (cf. Macdonald 1997).  
Toward the early 2000s, the Indian government started a process of employing thousands 
of Kashmiris in extremely low-wage jobs (even by India’s own very low standards). These 
“jobs” kept youths under the poverty line, paying as little as 1500 rupees (around USD 20) a 
month. A minute fraction of these jobs turned into slightly higher paying jobs, but most were a 
ladder to nowhere. And, as it turned out (especially in 2008 and 2010), Kashmiri youth wanted to 
work and build their lives, but they also protested everyday military repression and continued to 
aspire for independence. The government, with its well-oiled apparatus of military control at 
hand, therefore, found it more efficient to contain and coerce Kashmiri youth rather than 
“absorb” them into the economy. Prominent government functionaries, military and civilian, 
began describing Kashmir youth as “drug addicts,” thus linking the discourse of 
counterinsurgency with the “Global War on Drugs” narrative (cf. Hayden. 2015).5 The Kashmir 
                                                 
2 During the 1990s and 2000, India went through major “structural adjustments,” shifting from a planned economic 
system to a market-oriented economy. 
3 See also Chapter 3. 
4 The roots of this framework lie in both economic and behaviorist sociological theories of late capitalist societies, 
which tend to see underclasses as “dangerous” and “welfare dependent” sections of society, separate from traditional 
working classes. For a critique of the idea of underclass, see Macnicol (1987) and Macdonald (1997). 
5 While some have uncritically accepted the governmental claim that there is a “drug problem” among Kashmiri 




police, employing the services of the state-employed clinicians and non-governmental 
organizations, even went about creating “drug de-addiction centers” for Kashmiri youth, 
presenting its mandate as “social service” (Varma 2016). 
Not surprisingly, in presenting Kashmiri youth as immature, resentful, subversive, as well 
as psychologically unstable, and thereby criminalizing their activism, much of the Indian 
scholarship on Tehreek, liberal apologia for the occupation, and, of course, the military and 
civilian government functionaries, discounted the effects of pervasive state violence, especially 
the way Kashmiri youth experienced this violence in their everyday lives. Kashmiri youth were, 
instead, held responsible for provoking violence against themselves, because, as the argument 
went, they had chosen to confront the state. Pronouncedly failing to address the question of 
occupation, these arguments also discounted the history of the movement and its discourses of 
emancipation, and how these had become part of Kashmir’s cultural memory. There was in fact 
hardly any studies which took into view the experiences and perspectives of Kashmiri youth.  
Considering these critical gaps—as well as deliberate obfuscations—in studies of 
Kashmir,6 I was curious to understand who the subject of the governmental enunciations was 
when it referred to “youth.” In Kashmir, the meaning of “youth” had historically changed; the 
term itself was a kind of “linguistic shifter” (Silverstein 1976) that received its meaning from 
situated use. The meaning of youth in Kashmir went beyond the logics of age. For instance, 
many Tehreek activists, who were part of the 1990 movement but are now in their forties, were 
also sometimes called youth leaders. The traditional nawjawan (or “budding adult”) in Kashmir 
used to be the liminal, floating state between childhood and adulthood; but after the Uprising the 
                                                 
6 Studies of Kashmir, not to mention Tehreek, has curiously been missing in the work of Subaltern Studies 
Collective, which was centered on questions of subaltern subjects of the Indian state raising critical questions around 




term came to represent a position of historical responsibility. The traditional rites of passage (cf. 
Van Gennep 1960), like marriage, for instance, no longer indicated a transition into adulthood, 
even though many youths, like Bilal, have had to take on family responsibilities, such as caring 
for their disrupted families, from very early on. Nawjawan was one who grasped the importance 
of the historic movement, Tehreek. In exploring Kashmiri youth subjectivity, therefore, “youth” 
should neither be taken as a given category nor as an in-between stage in the formation of self-
hood. Youth is a processual identity, which must be understood only after analyzing its evolving 
cultural and political uses (Bucholtz 2002; Diouf 1996; Durham 2000).  
Kashmiri youth, I argue, are primarily subjects of violence. Caught in chronic conditions 
of state repression, however, young Kashmiris are not its passive recipients. They desperately 
constitute themselves as political subjects through their involvement in Tehreek. They do so 
broadly through a dynamic engagement with the region’s history, which I discuss in Chapter 2, 
and through public contestations of the military occupation. On an everyday level, they respond 
to the occupation with consistent argumentation and criticism, or with creative expressive forms 
like writing, art, and poetry (largely focus of middle class urban youth), but also with street 
confrontations and armed militancy (largely working class or rural youth). While public 
contestation of the occupation as verbal criticisms is a predominant aspect of activist life, direct 
confrontations with state forces become more intense during times of heightened political 
tensions. Below I describe a direct confrontation, involving what are called sangbāz.   
On the streets 
The incident takes place on the sunday morning, three days after Burhan Wani’s death, as 
protests become intensified. News of deaths in paramilitary shootings on Saturday has spread. 




assemble in small groups. Some of them are probably only ten or twelve-years old. At the end of 
the road, soldiers from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), an Indian paramilitary force, 
look on. The soldiers are in full body armor, armed with rifles, bamboo sticks, teargas, and 
pump-action pellet guns. I anticipate trouble, but keep looking on. A few soldiers start walking 
towards them, ready to give chase. The protestors stop and heckle the soldiers in Hindi: 
“Goons, show us what you have got!”  
“Modi’s pups, go home!” (Modi is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi).  
To the Kashmiri police officers mixed among the CRPF soldiers, the protestors shout the 
most pointed taunts in Urdu and Koshur:  
“Traitors, listen, we will take our azadi!”  
“Apologize and join us!” 
 “How cheap did you sell yourselves!”  
“Do you have no shame!”  
The Indian soldiers hurl back abuses, and use expletives:  
“You will get azadi in your asses!”  
“Go to Pakistan, just leave your mothers and sisters here!” 
 This is the shape of the “dialogue” on the streets, which, as one would expect, quickly 
breaks down.  
The soldiers shoot teargas shells. A teargas canister makes a long arc, lands near the 
protestors, and spurts noxious gas. A young boy picks it up and flings it back. It doesn’t reach 
the soldiers. More heckling, taunts, abuses, and expletives follow. Suddenly, a large armored 
CRPF van swerves right onto the road, and charges straight toward the protestors at high-speed. 




fall into ditches on the side of the road. No one is hit. The van stops ahead but is unable to turn 
around. It reverses at a slower speed. The protestors pick pebbles and stones from the stream’s 
banks and hammer the van with a deafening clangor. The soldiers fire more teargas canisters, 
some of which fall at the feet of the protestors, who immediately kick them into the stream. The 
soldiers and police charge and fire pellets. The protestors turn their backs and scatter again. They 
are trying to protect their eyes from pellets. A few shots are fired as well, some in the air, some 
at the protestors. No one is hit. But pellets have hit a few youths. These are lead pellets, which 
scatter at high speed and become embedded in soft tissue. They severely deface the body and can 
cause blindness. They cause a severe burning sensation. The youths yell in pain, and run to the 
back. The pattern continues late into the afternoon, when suddenly at six o’clock both sides 
withdraw and all I can hear is water flowing gently in the stream.  
Sangbāzi often starts from minor confrontations, and then the two sides get locked into a 
fury of violence, which frequently spirals into scenes of bodily injuries and even deaths. While 
the example I described above took place in the context of the death of a Tehreek militant, in an 
outlying neighborhood in Anantnag,7 typical sangbāzi begins in the interior areas of old towns or 
Downtown Srinagar, either when youths mock soldiers patrolling the streets, or when soldiers 
smash vehicles or store windows, or harass walkers.  
These scenes are “stylized sets of acts” that take a “repetitive” form, and would thus fit 
well into what Judith Butler calls a “performance” (1999, xv-xvi). They reproduce discourses 
about youth activists as “subversive” and “undisciplined” who must be punitively contained, 
even though most youth activists are not sangbāz. Do these acts become part of activist 
subjectivity through an interiorization of the conflict that is enacted on the streets? At some level, 
                                                 





sangbāz seem to aspire for a certain “notoriety” in the face of a powerful and violent enemy. 
They want to appear recalcitrant and obstinate. In listening to sangbāz describe their fellow 
stone-pelting youths, one gets a sense of how street prestige accrues from circulating legends 
about one’s brazen fearlessness and brash disregard for authority. “X has baed gorda” (big 
kidneys). “Y is syod hoon” (a straight dog). “Z chu ne pateh path bronth wichan” (doesn’t care 
for anything).  
Some of this self-fashioning is, in fact, directed as much toward the shareef (“noble”) 
people or Kashmiri middle class, as toward Indian soldiers. Sangbāz youth in Srinagar 
sometimes address shareef youth as “chocolate-aa” or “hyo, pizza-hut-ta” or “burger-bacha”—
taunting, with a Kashmiri twist on English words, the new consumerism of the middle class. 
“Shareef” people see sangbāz as a nuisance and call them khær, which means “undisciplined;” 
yet they often concede that sangbāz are brave for standing up to India’s might. Even Tehreek 
leadership sees them with a weary resignation, yet acknowledge that, like the armed mujahids, 
sangbāz keep the occupation and its violence from normalizing itself.   
While the state (especially local authorities) present stone-pelting as exhibits for 
extensive incarceration and justification for the use of deadly force, stone pelting is clearly a 
“weapon of the weak.” The pointed verbal barbs and taunts of sangbāz toward the soldiers and 
the shareef suggest an assertion of agency, a moral critique, as well as a sense of humor. A few 
years ago, when I witnessed another such street battle, I had heard sangbāz shout “pandah sheth 
te bateh” at Kashmiri policemen (Junaid 2014). It meant “fifteen hundred rupees and a plate of 
rice,” which is what Kashmiri policemen deployed on the streets were believed to be paid each 
month by the state. Mocking them for their low wages (USD 20/month) was part of the general 




bateh or rice was a remark with deep historical resonance. It went back to the Dogra era when 
the state had instituted grain-control restrictions for the artisans in the towns to keep them 
dependent, while subsidizing cheap rice for the urban idle classes (see Chapter 6).  
Post-1947, when Sheikh Abdullah was still seeking plebiscite, he had asked Kashmiris to 
eat potatoes and avoid imported rice, if they wanted azadi. After his arrest in 1953, his pro-India 
opponents called him aelweh bab or Father Potato, and Ghulam Ahmed Bakshi, a National 
Conference turncoat, who was installed as Kashmir’s Prime Minister by Nehru in Abdullah’s 
place, was granted generous imports of rice to keep the urban classes in good humor. Rural 
cultivators, who supported Abdullah, derided the urban idle classes for developing a dependence 
on “imported rice”—or chændi bateh. In the 1990s, bateh continued to resonate as a figure of 
speech. Those armed militants seen as slack in morals or suspected of intending to “surrender” 
were called bateh mujahid or “Rice-plate Mujahids.” Rice had acquired a metonymic association 
with “collaboration,” “idleness,” “moral slackening,” as well as “dependence on India.” In their 
homes, however, sangbāz themselves are subject to a similar moral critique and humor. Their kin 
sometimes call them bateh jinn or rice demons, because, “They just eat rice and don’t know a 
trade.”   
There is, thus, another dimension to sangbāz life, which is marked by social suffering. If 
the charged confrontations on the streets are furtive moments that may last a full day or an 
evening, what do sangbāz youth do the rest of the time? Many of them are formally in school or 
even college. Some run errands for their family-run stores, or apprentice for others. Most 
sangbāz youth do these things in tandem. So, in truth, they are not slothful or unwilling to work. 
But the school and college education in Kashmir is centered on annual tests, with emphasis on 




76). Work is also contingent and unrewarding. Most of the time, therefore, is unstructured and 
empty. Often, when I greeted youths by saying kyah chukh karan (“How is it going?” which, in 
Kashmiri, is just part of the greeting and usually no exact answer is expected), they made self-
deprecating jokes about how they “just sit there and kill time.”  
Throughout my fieldwork from 2014 to 2016, I spent a considerable amount of my time 
with Kashmiri youth, but it was mostly at their homes. There, the female household members 
would joke about boys becoming domesticated, and would ask them to contribute more to the 
chores, like the “rest of the women” do. Yet, the women would become anxious when young 
men stepped out of homes, and would plead with them to return. If they stayed out longer than 
expected, women would go after looking for them. Several times, I saw mothers search for their 
sons in the streets, and bring them back home from shop-fronts, where young men sometimes 
lingered around. Some women told me they would prefer their sons to be home than go out and 
risk getting shot or arrested. Women ventured out on streets more often. They would put on 
burqas8 and walk in public spaces less apprehensively, and thereby give their sartorial practices a 
very different meaning under occupation than is normally presumed. Young men at home, 
however, spent a lot of time watching and sharing videos with each other on their phones. Videos 
related to Tehreek activism or of soldiers attacking Kashmiris would affect their mood and bring 
a sense of solemnity to their demeanor. But there were also videos about piety or morality, as 
well as “funny videos” that were regularly shared and shown to others. 
There were no safe public spaces for young men to meet, share in conviviality, or express 
identity. In the South Asian context, much has been written about the cultural significance of 
spaces like addās (Chakrabarty 1999) and “tea-stalls” (Jeffrey 2010), where young men meet, 
                                                 




spend idle time, and fashion distinctive masculinities. These spaces also become sites of 
affirmative culture. The military occupation of public spaces in Kashmir has erased such 
possibilities. Kashmiri youth still met each other, but in transitory public spaces, like shop-fronts. 
There wasn’t a predetermined or culturally-specified space outside home where they could 
gather. In Anantnag, such public spaces were even more limited, because of the overbearing 
presence of the military snipers and bunkers on the hill that overlooked the town. Each time, 
friends had to be summoned to the home of one youth or the other. Parents became anxious when 
young men assembled at a home and would admonish them from going outside. 
While mostly cloistered at home, the occasions when sangbāz youth came on the streets 
to protest changed the scene completely. The news of the assembly would pass spontaneously by 
word of mouth, and youth groups would take their positions. For a while they would control the 
inner lanes of their neighborhoods or even roads. Sometimes, such occasions, when soldiers 
withdrew, the streets became sites of spontaneous warmth. Men and women spoke loudly and 
called out to each other. Youths walked idly and aimlessly, with arms thrown over each other’s’ 
shoulders. Women walked briskly, but without burkas, often stopping to greet each other, or 
telling annoyed men that they were being summoned home. These moments lasted into late 
evenings.  
But during the state violence that started after the death of Burhan Wani even the homes 
became unsafe for friends to gather.    
________ 
I can’t stay in Anantnag anymore. It feels claustrophobic. I will take a chance and try to reach 
Srinagar, where, hopefully, the phones might be working. Monday morning, I wake up at four 




works. On the highway to Srinagar, I don’t spot any soldiers or protestors. There is just a ghostly 
silence all around. Midway to Srinagar, near the town of Avantipora, I run into a caravan of 
buses carrying Hindu pilgrims. They are headed south to India. The buses are going fast and do 
not dim their strong headlights. I stop the car. After the caravan passes, the car refuses to start 
again. It is approaching six in the morning. The military would be deployed soon to enforce the 
curfew, and if I don’t leave I might be stuck there till midnight. I knock at the gate of a nearby 
house, and ask for help. The lady of the house opens the gate for me, and lets me keep the car 
inside. She says I must either stay the day or leave immediately.  
I decide to walk toward Avantipora hoping to hitch a ride to Srinagar from there. I wave 
down a small car. The driver turns out to be a Kashmiri police officer in civilian clothes. He 
agrees to drop me near Avantipora. On the way, he tells me: 
I am afraid to travel in my official car these days…And, I don’t want to be seen in my police 
wardi (uniform). People are afraid of us, and we are afraid of the people. I have never felt I am 
Indian, and because of my job people here don’t think I belong to Kashmir. We are just Kashmiri 
slaves of a free India.  
Voluntary slaves, I want to say, but curb my tongue—and feel sorry for thinking that 
thought.  
“This is just a job for me,” he keeps repeating, as I get out of the car in Avantipora.  
It is indeed just a job; a job he feels almost sorry to have. I have no words to commiserate 
with him. I thank him for the ride. I wait for a while, then walk. There is no one on the road. 
Finally, a car comes along and stops. The man driving is from Tral. He describes the scenes at 
Burhan’s funeral in detail, and then says:  
Burhan may have kept the armed movement going during his brief lifetime, but in his death, he 




They are wrong. Burhan was a political activist. He would go around, speak to ordinary people, 
and convince them of the need for freedom from India.  
Having witnessed the scenes at the funeral, the man says Tehreek had taken a new turn: 
Now only the really committed individuals join the armed struggle. They are educated and 
politically mature, even if young. They know they will only live six months to a year, but they are 
just too tired of the humiliation they face every day.  
Is it imperative to pick weapons and die because one has been humiliated, or for a cause, 
however just the cause may be? I want to ask him, but again I keep quiet. He turns pensive and 
speaks, as if he had anticipated my question: “Will the soldiers stop their oppression here if our 
youth kept quiet? Will they leave our land on their own?”  
By the time we reach Srinagar, it is already seven in the morning. I part ways with the 
man, and head straight to meet two of my friends in the city. Srinagar is tense, but not as grim as 
Anantnag. Some phones are working, but now I don’t know what I need a phone for.  
Both my friends are journalists, and it seems always prepared for the worst. Their Internet 
is working, and they are taking personal risks filing daily reports of killings and protests. The 
government has just imposed a ban on the Kashmiri press—a “press emergency,” as the local 
journalists call it. The printing presses are sealed, newspapers have been confiscated, and 
reporters’ passes have been revoked. Only a few TV journalists, the ones working for Indian TV 
news-channels are allowed to move around freely and report. Their reports are often slanted, and 
use the language of the state to describe the protests. No Kashmiri journalist would call Burhan a 
“terrorist” or see the protests as the “handiwork of Pakistan,” the way the Indian journalists 




sitting in Delhi determine how the reports are represented. Frustrated with such journalists, 
Kashmiri youth have recently engaged them in acrimonious exchanges. 
In contrast, Kashmiri journalists working for international press are a relatively accurate 
window into what is happening in Kashmir. If not for them, no one outside Kashmir would truly 
know how brutally the state is crushing the protests. The international press has its own 
censorious mechanisms and discursive filters, but they have an appearance of “neutrality.” 
Nevertheless, their reports force even some journalists working for Indian TV to visit hospitals 
and reluctantly report on pellet injuries. Another group of reporters who have worked diligently 
are those working for the local press—many of them are Kashmiri youth sympathetic to Tehreek. 
They go and bring reports from the ground, even from the distant countryside where the Indian 
or international press hardly ever reach. Their reports are often laced with themes of suffering, 
pain and mourning.   
By Tuesday, more than thirty Kashmiris have been shot to death, while hundreds carry 
grievous wounds. Distressed reports arrive from inside crammed Kashmiri hospitals. Little boys 
and girls, as young as four, have been left pock-marked and pierced by lead pellets. Many have 
lost their eyes. Huddled together in Kashmiri hospitals, which are running out of beds for the 
injured, pellet victims have dark glasses covering their bandaged eyes. Many have their backs 
covered in pellet injuries with blood still oozing from the wounds. The doctors and nurses are 
stretched thin. They have had time to remove only those pellets which have pierced critical areas 
of the body, not ones stuck inside soft tissues. A doctor, who has arrived from India, says he has 
never seen this number of “peacetime casualties,” and that the situation inside the hospital wards 




“The Indian state is at war with us Kashmiri people,” a Tehreek activists tells me, 
“punishing us for attending the funeral of a ‘terrorist.’ We see Burhan Wani as a martyr, who 
gave his life for Kashmiri liberation.”  
Wednesday is no different. More people are dead. Many more injured—thirty-five 
hundred people, by some estimates. The injured include soldiers. Many injured Kashmiris have 
bullet wounds above their waist, or pellet injuries to their backs, legs and eyes. These casualties 
suggest the state forces have not even followed their own Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 
for crowd control. Use of lead pellets is not part of the SOP, nor is use of live bullets. Shootings 
above the waist and use of pellets suggest the intent has been to kill and maim.  
  
Figure 2. As a Kashmiri child is blinded by soldiers shooting pellets, the region's Chief Minister is blinded by her loyalty to the 




Some soldiers have been hit by stones. The Indian news-channels regularly broadcast 
reports from the Army’s 92 Base Hospital in Srinagar, where soldiers and police officers are 
lying in bed with bandaged foreheads. Seeing such reports often evokes pain and anguish from 
Kashmiris, even from those who throw stones. There is an etiquette of street battle. When 
sangbāz youth and Indian soldiers confront each other, they clearly treat each-other as 
opponents. When they are not confronting each other, the relationship becomes somewhat less 
clear. At several places over the years, youth activists have come to the aid of policemen or 
soldiers if the latter are in an accident or need assistance. A lone police vehicle skidded off the 
road on the highway a couple of days after the protests began, and sangbāz dropped their stones 
and ran to help. During the flood in 2014, villagers swam to help drowning soldiers whose boat 
had capsized. Context determines the antagonism in their relationship.    
“A hurt soldier is no reason for celebration,” an activist had told me a few years ago, “We 
don’t know them or what they are like when they are not attacking us. India has dehumanized us, 
but the occupation has dehumanized the soldiers too.”  
I wonder what conversations go on among soldiers when they are back in their camps.  
“Most of the injuries are minor,” the army doctor tells the TV reporter, “the jawans will 
be up and about soon.”  
Aamir  
In the afternoon on Wednesday, I come to know of the death of Aamir Latoo from 
Bijbehara. He was twenty-two. His picture is carried in a news-report, which also mentions his 
Facebook posts. I am drawn toward his face. He has taken the picture himself. His face looks 
genial, if slightly comical—like someone who is trying to make fun of himself. I try to imagine 




social media must raise critical ethical questions about the world of social media, not to mention 
cause awkwardness. I wonder if there is a way to tell the California-based Facebook executives 
that the person they have “active” on their open network has been shot to death, and that they 
must close his file now.  
On Aamir’s Facebook wall are an assorted range of couplets from the famous 13th 
century Sufi poet Jalal-ud-Din Rumi; these are mostly about the unity of the universe, the 
entwining of life and love, and the eternity of the soul. There is light banter with his friends. 
There are pictures of his fake stunts on a motorbike. There are Id greetings. There is a prayer for 
“peace and prosperity” for Kashmir—but also sent to his friends in India. I close it down. Even 
though I want to imagine him, I want to leave his world to him.   
Aamir’s posts are moving. Of course, they have not saved Aamir from an untimely death, 
but I hope the world sees his posts so he may not die anonymously or become just another 
statistic of this invisibilized war. I hope he defies the kind of numerical death the state has 
consigned him to, the kind which forces the living to keep an ongoing count of the dead. Aamir, 
I would come to know later, was a Delhi University student, who had come to visit his parents a 
few weeks before Burhan’s death. While watching a protest, Aamir was shot by paramilitary 
forces outside his home in Bijbehara. As he was being taken in an ambulance to a hospital in 
Srinagar, soldiers dragged him out and beat him, resulting in further loss of blood. A youth 
volunteer at the hospital, where most of the injured have been brought, tells me the doctors gave 
Aamir a blood transfusion but he had too many lacerations through which the blood would come 
out. “This one has been a year of death through too many wounds,” the volunteer says, “Several 




beatings.” Just three days before his own death, Aamir had mourned the death of Burhan Wani 
on his Facebook page in words that seemed to express a deep sense of intimacy and emotion.  
Aamir’s Facebook posts do not stand entirely for the person who wrote them, nor do I 
take them to represent the perspective of all Kashmiri youth. The intertwining of his mundane 
longings and his political aspirations, his desire to dwell in the profundity of Rumi’s poetic 
thought as well as partake in the lightness of his own social world, is a small portion of the world 
he inhabited. He seems to have been comfortable writing as intimately to his “Indian” friends as 
to his “Kashmiri” friends. Of course, the post about Burhan appears to have rent this conviviality 
vulnerable; his “Indian” friends are unsure how to respond to his affection toward a rebel which 
the Indian government has declared a “terrorist.” They appear lost for words even more when a 
Kashmiri friend announces on his wall that “Aamir is no more alive.” The shock of violence that 
befell Aamir had made these interpersonal dichotomies visible, and given them a grotesque new 
meaning. To be considered a “normal” youth, whose death may be uniformly mourned, would it 
have required Aamir to sanitize his feelings from the violence in Kashmir? Now he was a martyr 
in Kashmir, and at best an enigma to his Indian friends.  
The hospital volunteer gives me detailed descriptions of Aamir’s injuries, delivering them 
in a prosaic tone. He has seen the number of dead rise in the mortuary, and seen the injured being 
brought in to the hospital in their hundreds each day. I notice how his descriptions are subtly 
reconstituting my own senses. When I return, and try to write down my notes, I wonder what I 
should do with what I had come to know. Could I, in my writing, “bracket off” violence 
unfolding all around, violence in which most of those I was working with were caught? In 
writing about youth political subjectivity, where does one place their close experiences with 





I look at my notes. The question of “violence” has vexed social theorists. Anthropologists 
have shown how violence can be understood better within specific, historicized contexts than as 
a transcendental category of analysis (Whitehead 2004). However, violence is a product of an 
interplay between discourses and practices of order and disorder, and as such takes on a certain 
overarching character (Arendt 1969; Comaroff & Comaroff 2006). The general dialectic of order 
and disorder tends to create zones and discourses of exception (like military occupations, 
counterinsurgency, “cultures of violence,” or even “inner city”), in which violence becomes 
normalized and even morally acceptable to those in whose name such a violence is carried out 
(Agamben 1998; Mbembe 2003). These names—underpinned by notions of racial supremacy or 
concepts of national order or ethnic solidarity—institutionalize violence, while violence further 




consolidates the power of these categories (Davis 1983; Mamdani 2001). Be that as it may, 
violence remains critical to the making of new subjects (Das and Kleinman 2000; Butler 1997). 
Violence is spectacular, present, and evental, but it also creeps into the everyday recesses of 
social life, often as fear (Foucault 1995; Das 2006; Green 1999). It traumatizes the body, psyche, 
and senses, as well as reorganizes their constitutive power (Scarry 1985), and yet might even be 
productive of totally new political forms (Clastres 2010). 
While “violence” performs enormous conceptual work in scholarship on human social 
condition, it remains an unwieldy category. It is hard to define. On one side, it is corporeal and 
evident; on the other, it assumes reality only when it is narrated as violence by its victims 
(Kleinman & Kleinman 1996). This is equally complicated by the tension between the actuality 
of violence (the act of violence and its narration by its victims) and the forms and ethics of its 
scholarly representation, especially in ethnographic writing.9 An allegorical reading of violence 
might blind one to its shattering or gradually corrosive effects on bodily, psychic, sensual, and 
social aspects of human life. Yet, even descriptive writings about violence provoke charges of 
voyeurism, and might be self-defeating. Charged imagery of violence may objectify the suffering 
and might turn the sufferer into an object of pity. Indeed, we need to be cautious against the 
aestheticization of suffering, but should it also mean anesthetization to violence in our writing?       
Anthropologists like Nancy Scheper-Hughes call for “barefoot anthropologists” who 
must produce “politically complicated and morally demanding texts and images capable of 
sinking through the layers of acceptance, complicity, and bad faith that allow the suffering and 
the deaths to continue” (Scheper-Hughes 1995, 416-17). Other anthropologists like Allen 
Feldman (1991) argue that violence, as pain and suffering, is not “pre-cultural” or a self-evident 
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category of experience, but a complex cultural phenomenon, which draws from both the 
“viscerality of violence” and the “way violence is represented” (cited in Valentine 2007, 209-
10). And, yet, as Valentine Daniel points out, “violence is an event (marked by) excess…The 
very attempt to label this excess is condemned to fail…Everything can be narrated, but what is 
narrated is no longer what happened” (1996, 207-08).10 In essence, Daniel’s argument is in line 
with Feldman’s, who calls for analyzing representations, discourses, and “stories” about violent 
social realities, yet ultimately the decision to “label” being an ethical choice for the 
anthropologist—which affirms Scheper-Hughes’ proposal. In this light, what is the appropriate 
stance for an anthropologist to take—as a distant observer or as a political activist? Is there a 
stance possible that is neither oriented to instrumentalizing people’s experiences toward the 
theoretical ends of knowledge nor instrumentalizing knowledge towards the political ends of 
human struggle? Or, is it possible that the two stances, as Daniel seems to suggest, are one and 
the same, even if they remain split within the disciplinary rhetoric?  
In reading Aamir’s words and listening to those of the volunteer who witnessed Aamir’s 
death, I ask myself who I am in their midst. Why did the hospital volunteer earnestly give me the 
details of Aamir’s death, when I told him I am a Kashmiri anthropologist? Of course, Aamir did 
not leave a digital record of his life for any anthropologist to reconstruct it after his death. 
Perhaps, if he knew, he would have erased it. But it is there, the words and the record, now 
smoldering inside me and inside many others who came to know Aamir from his Facebook 
account after his death. There are many stories like Aamir’s, but is there a point in listing them 
all? The deaths will be listed in the reports of endless “fact-finding commissions,” of which there 
is no dearth in Kashmir. Instead of Aamir or Burhan, one could write about the killings of 
                                                 




Yasmin, a young woman in Pulwama, who was trying to save her cousin from soldiers, or about 
Insha, a twelve-year old girl blinded by pellets, all in the summer of 2016. To me, these lives and 
deaths are the costs the state of emergency and the history of denied rights imposes on Kashmiri 
youth. Indeed, there is a need to delimit the self-anointed role of the anthropologist as an 
authoritative witness whose texts bear the aura of ethnographic realism, yet if violence shapes 
our senses, our writing must not be cleansed from its traces in a narcissistic embrace of 
“distance.”  
The key thing to remember is this: Violence is an excess within everyday life; since 
violence is evental, it is assumed that in writing about the social, violence can be bracketed off. 
Scheper-Hughes and Phillipe Bourgois argue that, “People everywhere have an enormous 
capacity to absorb the hideous and go on with life and business as usual” (2009, 26). I tend to 
disagree. While it may be true that many people carry on, business is never as usual. Some lives, 
like Aamir’s, are extinguished, or, like Insha’s, drastically reduced in quality. The social itself is 
never the same. Violence as excess becomes interwoven into the everyday. 
Precarity 
Violence in Kashmir has become routine. It is chronic rather than episodic or transient, 
and this “chronicity” (cf. Vigh 2008) means violence is felt in a specific way among Kashmiri 
youth. It is not just the violations of bodily integrity, psychic wounds, or traumas received in the 
past that many youths experience or carry with them, but violence experienced as a potentiality 
immanent in everyday life. If this experience is to be given a name, I would call it precarity.11 In 
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spaces of endemic violence, precarity is woven into the fabric of social life and generated as 
general fear in the “mode of anticipation” (Jeganathan 2004, 37). Judith Butler has described it 
as a function of “exposure” of human sociality, and “disposability” of certain populations whose 
lives are not considered “grievable” (2004, 19-40). It is a condition in which the infrastructure 
for the continuation of life has been degraded (Biehl and Locke 2010).  
While these conditions obtain under the military occupation, I take precarity specifically 
as a condition marked by a persistent vulnerability to state violence made possible under a 
legally mandated state of exception. In Kashmir, an extraordinary concentration of Indian armed 
forces, allowed to operate with immunity under AFSPA and backed by state discourses that 
criminalize youth activism and represents Kashmiris as latent or real subversives, makes 
Kashmiri lives precarious. If, however, violence of the occupation issues from its physical 
architecture of control and the discourses of exception, it also lurks as an incorporeal potential in 
everyday life. Soldiers with fingers on triggers or weapons that remain visible and hidden in public 
spaces, army vehicles that go at threatening speeds on narrow Kashmiri roads, or ammunition 
depots buried under Kashmiri hills that abut densely-populated villages, carry this incorporeal 
potential to kill or injure.12 This potential for violence is incorporeal because it is formless but 
sensate and palpable; it courses through the architecture of occupation, and erupts regularly.     
Precarity is a generalized feeling among Kashmiri youth, but it is not sensed uniformly. 
Young Tehreek activists are, indeed, the most vulnerable. Urban youth from poorer, working-
class neighborhoods or “downtown” live with the fear of state violence more often than their 
peers who live in affluent “civil lines” areas. The latter generally tend to have connections 
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(through family or business) in the government. Youth in the countryside fear the military and 
the police more than the urban youth. Rural youth have faced a sustained military repression 
much longer and more intensely than urban youth, but violence in the countryside remains 
largely invisible, sometimes even to the Srinagar-based press. At the same time, while most 
Tehreek activists are men, and thus the primary targets of state violence, violence against women 
is an important element of the state strategy for the containment of Kashmiris (Mushtaq et al 
2016; Chatterjee 2012; Kazi 2010).13 These distinctions are important to consider, especially the 
question of women activists, yet it is important not to lose sight of the fact that political 
subjectivity and precarity are pervasive and interrelated modes of consciousness among 
Kashmiri youth in general. 
It is important to understand that the main object of Tehreek youth activism is the end of 
the occupation, however, similarities of experience among them may not lead to the adoption of 
similar forms of activism or emphasis on method. A small number, mostly from the countryside, 
join armed militancy. When Burhan became a mujahid, there were probably less than a hundred 
active militants in Kashmir. In 2016, their number had not increased considerably. Compare this 
to Kashmir in early 1990, when the number of armed militants ran into the thousands. Armed 
militancy is strictly cadre-based and hierarchical. It has local roots but the leadership are based 
both in Indian-administered Kashmir as well as in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.  
Sangbāz youth are more in number. They are amorphous and often act in spontaneously 
formed groups, but these groups are loosely-based and function autonomously. They are mostly 
concentrated in urban areas, where each neighborhood has a few dozen youths who come out on 
the streets to confront soldiers. In recent years, sangbāz youth have also emerged in the 
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countryside, where they help armed militants escape military cordons or organize funerals for 
them. 
The largest number of Tehreek youth activists, however, are those who may join protests 
and organize outside the scenes of the street, but adopt an independent stance as individuals. 
They identify themselves as “part of Tehreek” and express a “deep commitment to azadi.” Yet, 
their non-affiliation and non-allegiance to any party or group allows them to critique certain 
Tehreek practices, like frequent general strikes, or question the leaders of Tehreek parties. They 
may also support armed militancy and sangbāzi, but not always.   
Below I tell the stories, activist-trajectories, experiences of violence, and self-
understanding of two such youth activists, which will also show how Tehreek becomes a charged 




arena in which gendered constructions might be reinforced but also challenged. Irfan, whose 
story I recount first, comes from a poor, semi-urban family. If Burhan, who came from a middle-
class rural background, became a mujahid, Irfan turned back from it—or, more precisely, 
became something else than what the state pushes Kashmiri youth to become.   
Irfan 
Irfan was seventeen years old in 1994 when he was blindfolded and lined up along an icy 
stream deep in the forests of south Kashmir, ready to be shot. As he recalls, five other Kashmiris 
who had been brought with him and blindfolded had fallen next to him, one by one.  
“Under Catch and Kill, they took no prisoners. If they got you, you were dead.”  
Thousands had perished under this policy in Kashmir in the early 1990s. Soldiers would 
lay siege to villages and towns, arrest suspected rebels, and shoot them. That day, however, Irfan 
was not shot. Here is how he describes his experience: 
The brigadier [senior ranking officer in Indian army] pulled me aside and told his men to leave 
me. I don’t know what moved his heart. I was shorter than the other five, may be that is why. My 
beard had also only just begun to sprout. I wasn’t afraid. I knew I would drop dead before I would 
even hear the shot behind my head. By the time the Indian army captured me the second time, I 
had stopped worrying about dying. I don’t know why I am alive. Allah saved me. But maybe 
Allah wanted me to work for the poor and the destitute, and bring me to the work I am doing with 
NuS.  
This was, in fact, the second time that Irfan had survived a brush with death.  
I first met Irfan in Anantnag after the September floods of 2014. He worked at NuS, a 
local Islamic charity that distributed small monthly stipends to orphans and widows, trained 




involved in relief and rehabilitation along with other organizations, and Irfan joined me a few 
times to help assess flood damage. He was thirty-seven but looked much older. When he spoke, 
his right hand almost involuntarily covered the large scar that ran all the way down the right side 
of his face. His beard was thick now and hid the scar partially, yet his hand still moved up to his 
face. “You see, I spent months in torture chambers,” he says, pointing to his face, “After the 
brigadier let me go, I wasn’t sent home. They put me in Khanabal’s Joint Interrogation Center 
for months and then in Kotbalwal jail for a year. Throughout this time, they tortured me.” 
Irfan had hardly ever spoken about his bodily injuries to his friends at NuS or to his 
neighbors. They knew; once when he went swimming in the stream with a few friends, they saw 
the marks. He never went again. His friends respected him for not “flaunting” his torture marks. 
But the marks had become a seal of credibility. Though he was young, even senior members of 
NuS listened carefully to his words when he spoke.  
“For a long time, I didn’t speak to anyone what they did to me at the JIC.”  
Irfan had even left Kashmir for a while. He was from the generation who had seen the 
1990s uprising. After the 2008 and 2010 protests, new, younger activists had become prominent.  
Now I feel I need to say these things. Some younger people, who don’t know me, ask me why I 
didn’t get married. Who will tell them when you go through torture, there are certain things you 
learn to live without? I passed three months in JIC, almost the whole time semi-conscious. Each 
time I would wake up, they passed the current.    
Irfan had joined a rebel group in 1991, when he was fifteen. He had become politically 
conscious when he was at school. 
I went to a Jama’at school, which emphasized Islamic teachings and behavior. I liked the school 




there was a protest in the town, the police would come and arrest them. Many of them 
disappeared during the Catch and Kill era. They were not mujahids.  
Jama’at Islami, a prominent Islamic reformist party in Kashmir, had established its 
schools in Kashmir from the 1960s onwards. These schools were banned by the government 
several times, first during 1975-77 and then in the mid-1990s. Jama’at schools ran without state 
recognition, but they proved to be popular among “Kashmiri Muslim middle classes,” who felt 
need for education in both “secular disciplines” as well as “religious sciences,” or more precisely 
training for worldly jobs and for Islamic moral education (Sikand 2002, 723, 735).  Often the 
teachers were associated with Jama’at or its youth wing Jamiat-ul-Tulba (Union of Students), 
who questioned India’s claims on Kashmir. These teachers thus often found themselves as 
targets of state forces (Sikand 2002, 736). While Irfan learnt about Islamic notions of piety in his 
school, he came to see their importance in his later life, and not immediately in his desire to join 
militants.    
As a young rebel, however, Irfan was a liability for his senior mujahids who were 
constantly on the move. They tried to send him back, but he persisted: “I told them ‘Don’t give 
me a gun, I will do paperwork.’ Gradually, they agreed.” He calls this early phase of his life 
kagazi (paperwork). Only later, was he promoted to do askari or armed work. Irfan was arrested 
a year later when an informer pointed him out during a “crackdown.” Crackdowns were basically 
extended house to house search operations during which soldiers forced men to assemble in an 
open area and pass them in an identity parade in front of masked local informers. An informers 
nod was as good as a death sentence. Here is how he describes the first time he was arrested:  
There was an encounter with the military in K village. I fell unconscious and lost my rifle in the 
paddy fields. Fellow mujahids carried me back to our hideout. Despite mujahids objecting, I 




an informer told them I was a mujahid. They were going to kill me in a ditch. An army officer 
looked at me and said I was too young to be a mujahid. He asked me if I knew what petals and 
gynoecium were. I knew some botany. I answered correctly. He told me to leave Tehreek and go 
to a school instead. They thrashed me, took me to their camp, and kept me there for fifteen days. 
My father had to come and give in writing that I will not join the mujahids again. Of course, I did. 
The officer was mad. He told people he would kill me the moment he catches me.  
That was the first time that Irfan was arrested and had escaped a possible death. The 
brigadier who gave him a lease on life the second time did not ask him questions from botany. 
He probably didn’t know he had the famous “Urfi” in his hands. Urfi was Irfan’s nom de guerre. 
Irfan was by then a tenacious guerilla, no longer a kagazi mujahid who fell unconscious in the 
middle of a shootout.  
“I never surrendered a bullet to the Indian military, despite all their torture.”  
That is why, when he finally heeded his father’s advice in 1994 and left Kashmir, his 
former comrades were not resentful. He worked in Delhi for two years and passed unnoticed. 
Upon his return in late 1995, however, he found his father had passed away, his mother was ill, 
and his hometown had radically changed. The government-sponsored Ikhwan militia had created 
an “atmosphere of terror” among the people, says Irfan: 
Many mujahid commanders had been killed. Pro-Tehreek intellectuals were assassinated. For the 
first time, I felt real fear. Not because Ikhwanis would kill me but because I couldn’t understand 
what was happening, what war we were fighting. It was very confusing.  
Ikhwanis were former guerillas who had turned against their former comrades. They were 
backed by the Indian military. “They were dangerous because they knew all about who 
supported us, who gave us shelter and food,” says Irfan, “Indian military did not know much.” 




“When I was a mujahid, and then during my time in Delhi, military would harass, beat, 
and threaten my family and relatives. I didn’t want that anymore.”  
Irfan decided to train as a dental technician, which he completed two years later. But his 
troubles didn’t stop. “Police registered a case against me,” he says, “I had to go every week to 
show my face. I couldn’t start my own practice because the police would have started taking 
money from me.” Instead, he joined NuS.  
“I don’t need money. I live very frugally. Life is like a burning candle. Before it 
extinguishes, it is better to spend it serving the poor than in desire.”  
I asked him during which time of his life did he feel the happiest. He reminisces about his 
time as a mujahid:   
Some younger folks keep urging me to go hike the mountains with them. I lived in the mountains 
for three years with mujahids, surviving on whatever the mountains had to offer. It was a time of 
piety. All we cared for was Allah’s gratification. We knew death was near but we were not afraid. 
We were free of sins. That was the best time.  
Was there no other way to be pious than to take up arms? “Nobody wants to die,” Irfan 
replies. “We had a pious objective: to liberate Kashmir from India’s rule.” But why?  
Look we never said India is bad, we just said leave our country. Kashmir is neither part of India 
nor Pakistan. It is its own small country. That is how it must be. They kill so many people, just 
because we want azadi. Why should our freedom threaten them? We didn’t ask them to give us 
their home.  
Was the armed resistance a successful strategy, I ask Irfan. “Perhaps, it would have been 




replies. Yet, he is also critical of the Pakistan-backed groups who tried to dominate the Kashmiri 
armed groups.  
“We handed Ikhwanis over to India on a plate.”  
Irfan believes internal fighting between Tehreek groups led the Ikhwanis to join the 
Indian counterinsurgency.14 While he remains committed to azadi, however, as he says: 
Tehreek must become a pious struggle again. Not an armed or a violent one, but a silent 
movement, where we tell India: “Brother, leave us.” And there will be no bloodshed. No more 
torture. Soldiers kill us because they don’t think we have families or emotions, or that we want to 
live. If we think like that about them, then we are no better.   
When I ask Irfan what he means by piety, he replies with a broad set of ideas, without 
emphasizing any particular aspect:  
Piety means bringing about Islamic laws, it means non-violent struggle for justice, remembering 
the martyrs, and not becoming materialistic or be-haya (immodest). If people become pious, India 
will not be able to corrupt us.  
After he dropped the idea of opening his dental practice, Irfan had an opportunity to work 
at a bank, but since he considers “interest-based banking” as “sinful,” he refused the offer.  
Younger activists who support armed activism or street battles with soldiers believe it is 
wishful to think that India would listen to the peaceful appeals Irfan is suggesting. Many are not 
sure if “Islam” is what Tehreek’s focus should be. They believe Tehreek is a political struggle. 
Yet, Irfan’s experience in the armed Tehreek has an authority they cannot simply dismiss.  
                                                 




In his transition from armed activism, Irfan had become more religious and focused on 
notions of piety. Religion had become an anchor. Perhaps, his emphasis on religion was also a 
way to ward off the peer pressure for him to return to militancy. If he returned to “normal” life as 
a pious Muslim, it would satisfy both the state forces who wanted him out of militancy, alive or 
dead, and his peers, who might have seen his return from militancy as an act of “surrender.” Yet, 
his turn to piety was not new. The values Irfan counts as “pious” came from his time spent in a 
Jama’at school, where a high emphasis was laid on nurturing a belief in the Islamic system as the 
ideal socio-political order. This early education also emphasized notions of moral uprightness 
tied to the idea of haya (modesty) and purdah (veil). 
To Irfan, giving up the armed Tehreek was a conscious decision. He had given it 
considerable thought, beyond the domestic exigencies that had made the decision an imperative 
or the fear that Ikhwanis might harm his family. He seemed to believe Tehreek needed to be re-
envisioned beyond the dichotomy of violence and non-violence. Violence and non-violence, as 
he claimed, were not in the hands of Kashmiris; the state set the terms of its engagement with 
Kashmir. Rethinking the armed Tehreek, for him, required ethically reconsidering its “impact on 
our own selves,” as he put it. This is borne in the way he describes the process of his thought 
which led him to not return to militancy:    
Both men and women must become modest and veil themselves. But men have a greater 
responsibility in this regard, especially during a struggle like Tehreek when men have more 
power. In the early 1990s, I had heard stories of some armed guerillas besmirching the name of 
the movement by acting toward Kashmiri women like the Indian military did. When you have a 
gun in your hand you sometimes forget what you are truly fighting for. Working with NuS, 
especially with poorer or widowed women from the city, showed me how vulnerable and silenced 




behind them. My father died and my mother has had to take care of the home without any 
support. As a mujahid, I spent most of my time hungry and tired, but I was free and happy, 
roaming carefree in the mountains. But when I returned home I saw how the families of mujahids 
had been destroyed by the military and the Ikhwanis. Women bore the cost of the movement. If I 
had died, my mother would have been left completely alone.  
Clearly, Irfan had lived a significant period of his life precariously. He had borne much 
violence during the years he thinks he had “felt free.” Counterinsurgency experts claim that the 
“average life span” of a Kashmiri guerilla is six months. Irfan had not defied this assessment, just 
escaped his fate twice by the skin of his teeth. His life’s experiences had not changed his views 
about azadi as a just struggle, only that armed aspects of Tehreek needed to be reconsidered. His 
critique of violence followed not from his own subjection to violence, but his growing awareness 
of the costs it imposes on others, especially women. As a young man, he had felt himself to be in 
a position of subalternity to the Indian forces, but the sense of “freedom” brought about by 
taking up arms had also brought shattering realizations: If resistance allows power through 
violence to become a political principle, it would produce newer subaltern subjects, like women, 
as well as “corrupt” the movement from within, producing formations like the Ikhwan.  
While Irfan continued to live precariously—his name was still in the police records—his 
real fear had come from the confusions the logic of armed resistance had brought to the fore. 
Accordingly, taking up arms was easier than navigating a path toward non-violence. Irfan took 
care in humanizing his torturers, even presenting the military officer who had ordered five deaths 
as having a degree of compassion. His belief in a reasoned dialogue as sufficient is not shared by 
many others, who think the state has no reason to listen to a powerless people. But Irfan believes 
that Tehreek must not think like the state. In his view, “corruption” is not so much about turning 




violence as rational. Thus, making Tehreek a “pious struggle” also means humanizing the 
“enemy,” even when the enemy dehumanizes you. Doing so is crucial both to the movement as 
well as for cultivating a new self. Violence is not simply what one experiences on the body or the 
mind, but what accepting its logic does to our senses of the self. Irfan’s struggle has not only 
been against a violent, occupier state, but also with the “natural” response this state evokes.    
 
Irfan’s path to non-violent Tehreek had been shaped by his reflections on women. Yet he 
assumes women to be passive victims of violence. Within a context like Kashmir, women have 
borne an extraordinary burden of the political turmoil. Women face direct and structural violence 
from the state forces as well as confront a traditionally conservative Kashmiri society. Tehreek 
leaders often see Kashmiri women as “vulnerable” to Indian forces, and thus in need of 
“protection.” Yet, it is women who, aware of the vulnerability of men to state violence, often 
become the protectors. They protest men’s detention, search for disappeared male relatives, and 
sometimes even physically shield men from soldiers (Parashar 2011; Bano 2002; Zia 2016).  
What about women’s involvement in Tehreek? Sketches of prominent Kashmiri women 
indicate their involvement in Kashmir’s politics before 1990 (Khan 2010). Some have assumed, 
however, that the post-1990 violence and the emerging orthodox religious turn in urban centers 
prevented women’s political involvement ((Butalia 2002; Molen & Bal 2011). This contention is 
not borne by ethnographic work, which shows Kashmiri women to be active participants both in 
a traditionally male-centered arena of Tehreek like armed activism (Shekhawat 2015) as well as 
in the wider field of Tehreek’s politics of protest and organizing (Kazi 2009; Zia 2016). Indeed, 
Tehreek leaders’ “protectionist” rhetoric creates an overarching discourse that sometimes 




shows, young women activists have shaped activist stand-points from where they can 
simultaneously partake in Tehreek political discourses as well as question the gendered politics 
of the movement’s leaders. 
Zarine    
I had known Zarine and her work for a human rights organization for several years. Since 
2010, she had visited hundreds of families who had cases of custodial killings, sexual violence, 
and enforced disappearances pending in state courts. As part of a people’s tribunal she had 
helped review the work of the courts in relation to human rights abuses claims. As she told me:  
Pursuing such cases in courts often ends in frustration. But these families believe keeping the 
cases open is the least they can do for their kin who have suffered. It is a way to remember them. 
I believe there is justice in the world. If not now, then in the future. But if we don’t pursue it, it 
will not come.  
In part, Zarine believed, the cases would become part of an “archive against the crimes of 
the occupation.”  
Tehreek organizations were generally not happy with pursuing cases in the courts, for 
they believe doing so legitimizes Indian courts in Kashmir. Zarine, however, saw no 
contradiction between seeking justice in the court and seeking the right to self-determination. 
She also took an independent stance on other politically fraught questions. For instance, on the 
question of accepting money in lieu of relatives killed by Indian soldiers, she saw her own 
position as pragmatic, even though not ideal. Indian government described the payment as a 
“compensation,” while Tehreek activists called it “blood money.” Zarine saw it in legal terms as 
a “temporary relief” and argued with her fellow activists that the issue must be considered in 




rather than in terms of politically volatile concepts like “loyalty” and “betrayal.” In trying to 
push these positions to the center of the Tehreek discourse, Zarine and her other young female 
activist colleagues, had begun to raise questions that had previously not been given serious 
attention in Tehreek.  
In 2014, feeling exasperated with the “stubbornness” of her fellow male activists, Zarine 
told me she believed women could run the movement better. “Thoughtful women,” she had 
quickly added:  
Not someone like AB, who wants to put all women under dark burkas and teach them to be 
submissive to men. What is azadi worth if it means we leave India’s male chauvinist occupation 
and come under a male chauvinist theological state.  
Zarine was referring to a prominent Tehreek leader, known for her socially conservative 
Islamist views.    
Zarine’s path to activism had in some respects been like her male counterparts, yet there 
were significant differences. Unlike most of her female colleagues, she grew up in a village close 
to where Burhan Wani was from. This is how she narrates her early experiences:  
I was an obedient kid; I helped my mother with domestic chores (smiles). I was one of six 
daughters; we have just one brother; he is the eldest. I was six years old in 1994, when I first saw 
the military crackdown with my eyes. My cousin was a mujahid. He used to come to our home 
sometimes, especially around Id. We were very fond of him. He had been training to become a 
doctor, but he left and joined the mujahids. He would leave his gun somewhere else before 
visiting us, so we children won’t feel scared. That day when he left our house, soldiers came and 
surrounded us. They took my father, brother, and other men from the village to the roadside. We 
were alone. Some soldiers took away my mother’s jewelry, our almonds, and cash. A few soldiers 




cousin. My mother was screaming in pain. What could she tell them, she didn’t know anything. I 
was so afraid but I could not bear her cries. I took a padlock, which was lying nearby, in my 
hands, kicked open the door, and hit the soldier who was torturing my mother in his back. He 
looked at me, mad with rage. Then he lifted me and flung me outside. I hit the wall in the hallway 
and blanked out. I woke up several days later in the hospital.    
Zarine’s mother had survived, but the whole family had been left shaken. Zarine had 
previously heard stories of torture. Two men in her village had been killed. Her father had 
mentioned once how one of them had been tortured. She learnt the word “torture” later when she 
started her human rights work, but it had helped make sense of her experiences growing up. 
There had been other formative experiences:  
Someone said there was a list of mukhbirs (informers) pasted on the wall of the mosque. 
Mujahids were looking for the informers. I was fearful that they might say one of my relatives 
was a mukhbir. After the crackdown incident, I had asked my father, why soldiers did what they 
did. My father, himself shocked, told me we should all forget about the incident at home. But my 
mother would fight with him about telling us to forget. Then soldiers would come to the village 
and give us toffees. My mother would say, ‘Don’t accept anything from them. They are not our 
people.’ Every time, I saw a soldier with a uniform and a gun, I knew I had to be afraid of him. 
As a young girl, I thought about these demarcations. I thought about the line between mujahids 
and mukhbirs, about us and them, about Kashmiris and soldiers.    
When Zarine was nine, her father found out he had leukemia. Within a year, he passed 
away. Her family was in turmoil when her father’s brother claimed their share of ancestral land. 
This was the father of the cousin who was a mujahid, and for whom the family had suffered. 




my father’s death,” says Zarine, “He missed his youthful years caring for us. But by that time, 
we were economically stable.”    
 Zarine’s mother was keen on sending all her children to college. She succeeded. The 
sisters got postgraduate degrees in fields ranging from Biochemistry to Statistics. Zarine got hers 
in law. Only her brother dropped out of college and took a job. But getting educated was a 
struggle, both because of the militarized milieu and the traditional conservatism of her village. 
Zarine describes an incident involving her older sister Shada: 
Shada is good looking. She was walking toward her college once, when soldiers passed some 
lewd comments. Shada turned around and gave them a mouthful. She told them: “Go tell this to 
your mothers and sisters.” “You are from India.” “Get out of our home.” In the evening, a local 
shopkeeper came to our home and told Shada not to go to the college because the army was 
looking for her. She stayed home for a while. My mother was worried.  
 The sisters argued with the mother that the shopkeeper was trying to scare them and 
prevent them from going to college. Shada had claimed she had never argued with the soldiers. 
Zarine says it was only weeks later that Shada told the family what had happened. While she 
thinks neighbors, especially women, appreciated her mother for holding the home together, they 
didn’t like how the sisters were becoming outspoken. Watching Zarine and her sisters go to 
college or work, some older women would taunt her mother: 
They would say “We have seen it all now!” That our “mother was earning off of her daughters.” 
As if our education had brought on the End of the World. They sat on their verandas smoking 
hookas and telling my mother to get us married. In truth, they were jealous. But then whenever us 





 The village was not educated in general, neither many men nor women had been to 
school. Zarine’s own mother had some schooling. She sometimes fought back against these older 
women, but didn’t care enough to take their snide remarks seriously. Neither did Zarine. Her 
bitterness was reserved for her second cousins and an uncle. Even in 2014, when Zarine’s work 
had come to be appreciated among activist circles in Srinagar, and she was taking on the 
military’s human rights abuses, these relatives kept bothering her. 
When I return home in the evening, my cousins say “aye’kha” (Oh, you have finally returned!), 
or “How many areas have you graced with your presence today?” They are such losers. They 
want a petty government job, get married, and eat large plates of rice. I was with my brother on a 
bus back home and my cousin gets on. He tells me, “Zarine, I saw you outside… (a coffee shop).” 
He was basically trying to rile my brother by saying that I was hanging out at a place where lots 
of unmarried couples visit. I said I was hungry and had gone for a snack. My brother looked at 
me and said “Don’t listen to this idiot. You don’t need to explain anything to anyone.” My 
brother has been like a father to me. Tehreek is close to his heart. He knows how important our 
work is.   
 Zarine’s struggle had been structured by social pressures of a traditionally male oriented 
culture, but she didn’t share a uniform condemnation of men. She knew men were “not all the 
same.” Her own brother had stood by her all along. Further, Kashmiri men remained in a 
position of being dominated by Indian state forces. Ather Zia has described gender relations in 
Kashmir as forming part of a “non-hegemonic patriarchy that is subjugated by militarization and 
an oppressive administration” (2016, 173). That men had been the primary object of state 
violence had shaped Zarine’s own understanding of the women’s position within Tehreek. 
Kashmiri women activists were in a “double-bind,” she felt. On one side, they remained sensitive 




violence. On the other side, they pushed back against patriarchy that infused some Tehreek 
leaders’ perspectives on Kashmiri women. In their work, Zarine and her fellow activists were 
especially attuned to cases which could destabilize the patriarchal norms in society.  
 This was illustrated by Zarine’s views on the cases of women whose husbands had been 
forcibly disappeared by government forces. Speaking about what were described by some human 
rights groups as “half-widows,” she felt questions which had previously not been raised could be 
brought into the public debate. “Half-widows” were women whose husbands had been forcibly 
disappeared but whose status as alive or dead could not be firmly established, primarily because 
the military refused to accept that the disappeared had been in their custody. As Zarine 
explained:  
These women keep the cases of their disappeared husbands alive and it takes immense strength. 
But it also leads to a situation where they are forced to think they cannot remarry. Socially, it 
would be seen as a “betrayal” of the disappeared husband. Her husband’s relatives would lay 
claim on her husband’s share of property. The courts also do not consider a remarried widow of a 
disappeared person as the “immediate beneficiary” for any temporary relief [or which the state 
describes as “compensation”]. The courts would consider other relatives of the disappeared 
husband, unless the couple had children, as the beneficiary, who are solely interested in 
“compensation” and not a search for justice. Remarriage could mean exclusion for a half-widow 
and lasting turmoil for her children.   
 Several half-widows had taken to organizing themselves and a deploy an “affective 
politics of mourning” to forge their own activist identities (Zia 2016). While male Tehreek 
activists saw these women as “courageous,” “strong” and as “willing to sacrifice,” Zarine took 
issue with this panegyric perspective, which tended to efface the everyday struggles of these 




been “left behind to struggle alone,” and to take women’s perspectives on political strategy 
within the movement seriously.  
Yet, Zarine saw Tehreek both as a “struggle for independence” as well as an agent of 
“social transformation,” and both as interlinked processes. In her meetings with Kashmiri women 
she recognized that though they had suffered, Tehreek had also produced a space of fluid social 
relations in which women could negotiate new positions for themselves. From active combatants 
and militant couriers to street agitators and demonstrators, Kashmiri women had, since the early 
1990s, assumed for themselves previously unknown roles.15 Tehreek had, in a way, become a 
key site for, what Judith Butler (1988) has called, the constitutive performances of gender and 
identity. As opposed to the state discourse, which simultaneously suppresses women and 
presents them as victims of Tehreek, the movement had become a dynamic social force in which 
new gender relations could be forged.  
 This is evident, for instance, in how Zarine talks about pushing back against male 
attitudes in her organization. While her work with the victim families of state violence is tough 
and has been meaningful to her, Zarine believes certain kinds of the human rights work get 
automatically assigned to her and her female colleagues, because men feel that women alone can 
handle such cases, mostly those involving sexual violence. “Yes, of course, we are better 
prepared to document such cases,” she says, “but making this ‘our job’ also excludes us from 
other work which is then seen as ‘not our work.’” She wants women to develop effective 
strategies to become members of the executive bodies of Tehreek organizations.16 She is 
frustrated with female Tehreek leaders, like AB, who ask women to join Tehreek but then take a 
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secondary role behind men. She wanted to “talk to the senior leaders and tell them not to take 
women’s involvement for-granted.”  
In Srinagar, Zarine’s efforts to meet a senior Hurriyat leader had been thwarted, mainly 
because he had been in jail most of the time. But several years ago, when Burhan Wani was alive 
and still relatively unknown, Zarine had taken a grave risk to go and meet with him. Burhan was 
still a teenager but Zarine was curious to know his views. After a trek, arranged by Burhan’s 
friends, he had appeared with a mask, but had left his weapon behind.  
“I told him, ‘You can take that thing off,’ and he obeyed.”  
This is how she describes the conversation: 
He did not know how to react to my presence. He was worried I had put my life in jeopardy, but 
also proud a Kashmiri sister from a village had taken so much trouble to meet with him. Burhan 
said, he and his colleagues were “independent of the Hurriyat” [key Tehreek groups]. They didn’t 
get support either from the Hurriyat in Srinagar or from Pakistan. He thinks people from the 
countryside suffered a lot but didn’t get recognition. “Even rural martyrs feel discrimination.” 
Tehreek, he felt, was too Srinagar-centric. He was thoughtful about the need to not fall for the 
easy accusations. He knew mukhbirs and police face pressure to act against mujahids. He said 
some of his colleagues wanted to take revenge against policemen who were attacking youths after 
the 2010 protests. But Burhan had told them not to do so. Instead, he asked them to send 
messages to the police asking them to use any excuse they could to not come out during protests. 
He said, “If we kill policemen, their families will suffer.” He was worried that Kashmiri youth 
were entering the armed movement in a random manner. He does not want too many youths 
taking up arms, just a dedicated few who could last. When I asked him about women activists, he 
said elderly Tehreek leaders were mistaken. Women must make decisions. He believed azadi 
includes full equality for women. “You must take your public role through struggle,” he told me, 




When Zarine left, she had felt pained at the thought that this “bright young boy” may not 
live long. She never saw him again, except in videos where he seemed to be relishing playing 
cricket with his fellow guerillas and singing mournful Kashmiri songs. But she appeared hopeful 
that younger Tehreek leaders no longer held stifling patriarchal attitudes toward women’s 
involvement.   
During my research, I had met several other young female activists, who had increasingly 
begun to nibble away at the male-dominated public sphere. Most of these activists were from 
urban areas. Zarine was from a village. She shared several aspects of her life with these fellow 
women, but she had been trying to overcome challenges that are unique to life in the countryside. 
In some ways, though, gender relations in the Kashmiri countryside are not quite as rigid as in 
urban lower-middle income classes. Zarine feels in rural communities, women are actually less 
reverential toward men and their norms. She relishes telling me about an incident in her village:  
When an imam from Srinagar once came to preach in the mosque, women made fun of his long 
beard and mocked his advice to men to take away mobile phones from women. Men told him that 
if they did that they will be chased out of the village by women, that he didn’t know how vicious 
women in villages can be [laughs].  
While Zarine wore a hijab in the city, she didn’t do so in her village. Knowing Zarine’s 
work, her criticism of Tehreek leaders, and her broader struggles being an activist in a space that 
has long been occupied by men alone, suggests Tehreek had become a vehicle for multiple social 
projects within the Kashmiri public sphere. All these projects converged under the sign of azadi. 
Dreams of azadi 
If the concept of precarity gives an impression of a lack of agency, that is not the case, as 




to see practices of subjects in terms of “adaptation to violence” (Strathern, Stewart & Whitehead, 
2006), “resistance” (Scott 1990), or “resilience” (Scheper-Hughes 2008; Das & Kleinman 2001). 
Indeed, Kashmiri youth—both men and women—resist state violence. They use different genres 
of critique, including their writings, art work or poetry, or, as we will see in the next chapter, 
historical commentaries. They might mock official statements and discourses in their everyday 
conversations, or consciously or unconsciously deploy practices of defiance or civil disobedience 
in public spaces, including their refusal to follow orders from government forces (even if it might 
lead to beatings). And, of course, a few—armed mujahids and sangbāz youth—use or keep open 
the possibility of violence against state institutions and forces.  
Yet, one way or the other, the notion of adaptation or resistance assumes subjects that are 
fully caught up in the logics of state power, and merely reacting to it. What has been interesting 
to me in my work with youth activists in Kashmir is the question of political projects that escape 
the state logics, and the modes through which these counter projects of youth activists might 
have the capability to transform the hegemonic terms of their subjection.17 Based on the synoptic 
accounts of the activist biographies above, I take a view of agency that posits an activism which 
is not simply reactive but one that constitutes Kashmiri youth as political subjects in their own 
right, even though they are objects of violence and invisibilized in interstate politics.  
Irfan’s path to non-violence is based on a thoughtful understanding of the consequences 
of accepting the cyclical logic of violence, part of which he comes to recognize with his work in 
an Islamic charity. Zarine’s attempt to open conversations about women’s position in Tehreek by 
drawing on the emancipatory discourse of azadi goes against the prevailing view that Tehreek 
politics forecloses such a possibility. Again, her critique of patriarchy involves her human rights 
                                                 




activism. Both Irfan and Zarine effectively deployed their experiences, their work, and their 
proximity to Tehreek to advance goals important to them. While their overall life worlds are 
structured by the dyad of occupation and resistance, their projects are independent of the state 
itself. They remain committed to Tehreek politics, even though they want to transform it from 
within.   
Even Burhan had defied the state’s attempt to consign him to obscurity. His path to 
armed activism was occasioned by his (and his brother’s) experience of violence at the hands of 
state forces. But in shaping a new, visible image for himself as an armed revolutionary, Burhan 
had not only succeeded in interrupting the state’s usual narrative about militants as marginalized 
“wild” figures, but also in bringing a new recognition for the rural youth activists who tend to 
remain invisible in Tehreek’s Srinagar centered politics of commemoration. Of course, it is hard 
to see the work of a guerilla who died in his youth as “successful.” Aamir’s untimely death again 
reminds one of the tragic pitfalls in the broader ethics of resistance. Is “normal” itself, after all, 
one possible, urgent goal Kashmiris must reach in their relation to the occupation? The summer 
of 2016 showed that even within an overall framework of the absurdity of the occupation, there 
are protracted intense periods when even that absurd begins to look desirable.       
 
For six months, the government’s crackdown on people was relentless. A friend from Anantnag 
would later tell me that the children in his house had fallen sick from being confined. “Kashmir 
is a large prison,” he said:  
Violence is casual and boring. There is really nothing to do, but wait. Some government 
bureaucrat will decide one cheerful day that curfew may be lifted, and it will be. Then he will 




Throughout this time, news of deaths and injuries continued to come, even though the 
government had blocked phones and the Internet. Between the utter need of people to have an 
everyday “normalcy” and the Indian state’s relentless production of abnormality, Tehreek leaders 
often fall short of an adequate form of politics that might ameliorate the public life. In response 
to Burhan’s killing, Hurriyat leaders announced a program of protest called the “Protest 
Calendar.” People were supposed to march on the streets, pray for defeat of the evil occupation 
in the mosques or observe hartal or general strike, according to the Calendar. Women were to 
come out one day, transporters the next day, and then the shopkeepers. But as an activist 
explained:  
Sometimes, the Calendar itself grates on public life. While the state imposes violent crackdowns 
and curfew, Hurriyat gives calls for general strike. Both reinforce people’s pain, but then people 
have been left with no choice but to continue.  
There were small stories of resilience in the face of the repression, which itself suggest 
the logic of state violence, however drastic, is not fully internalized by communities. People 
collected grains, pulses, and vegetables to be sent to Anantnag’s main hospital where local youth 
activists had organized a community kitchen. “These are desperate times,” said Suhail, a 
volunteer. His mother was letting neighbors take vegetables from her small kitchen garden. 
Others gave extra rice to those who didn’t have it. I knew of a person who owns a drug store. He 
collected prescriptions from the sick or older people in the neighborhood and brought back 
whatever he could, for free.  
Some of these are old Kashmiri instincts, I knew. People are “used to” long periods of 
curfews and military sieges, as I was often reminded. In the 1990s, months would pass before 




usually stock their homes well in the fall with pulses, dried vegetables, and fuel, which last late 
into the spring. When snow avalanches close the highways, this traditional autumnal planning 
comes handy. This year was different, however; curfews began in the middle of summer, and 
stored food was not yet replenished.  
By the end of the summer, I had left Kashmir. I was told that a few phones, which mostly 
the government officials used, were working. I arranged to speak with Suhail again, who had 
managed to find a working phone. Things hadn’t changed, he said:  
Protests have become more disciplined. They are following the Protest Calendar. Tehreek leaders 
have requested people to protest peacefully, despite the provocations from the Indian soldiers. 
There was a bike rally, then women took out a rally, then people were writing slogans on walls. 
People are trying their best not to respond to paramilitary violence with stone throwing. Everyone 
says we have to do it this time, throw out India from Kashmir. It is now or never. 
I have heard that before, “Now or never.” Yet each time the state tightens the noose, 
more tightly than people—any people—can endure. People need freedom, but they also need 
food and medicine, and to be able to move about. In 1990, Kashmiris bore two and a half months 
of curfews, and many long years of India’s suppression of the armed rebellion that followed. In 
2010, they held out for five months, and several years of vindictive state violence against the 
youths who had led the protest movement that year. Could India force people to return to 
“normalcy” soon again? Is there ever a return?  
Each successive wave of state violence produces new subjects who take lines of flight; 
they become something other than what the state attempts to make of them. In the lives, deaths, 
and the work of youth activists—of Burhan, Irfan and Zarine (and even the poetically minded 




means liberation from India, but it also carries more meanings than a limited notion of 
“liberation from India” can capture. In its polysemy, azadi means “political freedom,” as well as 
a “desire for liberation in an existentialist sense” or a “life of dignity in this world and 
beyond”—these were sentiments I regularly heard from youth activists. The coercive apparatus 
of the occupation cannot grasp these meanings, nor is the polysemy of azadi understandable 
through the interstate territorial prism. These meanings only appear in the diversity of Kashmiri 





TEHREEK HISTORY-WRITERS: HISTORY AND TRAUMA  
 
Indeed, what produces statements in each of us is not ego as subject, it’s something entirely different: 
multiplicities, masses and mobs, peoples and tribes, collective arrangements; they cross through us, they 
are within us, and they seem unfamiliar because they are part of our unconscious. The challenge for real 
psychoanalysis, an anti-psychoanalytical analysis, is to discover these collective arrangements of 
expression, these collective networks, these peoples who are in us and who make us speak, and who are the 
source of our statement.  
–Gilles Deleuze (2004, 276).  
Tehreek, Tae’reekh, and the entangled histories of the past and the present  
Historical timelines and messy histories 
On a balmy afternoon in 2014, along the banks of River Jhelum in Srinagar, I sat among 
a dozen Kashmiri writers, university students, social activists, and journalists, who I had brought 
together to talk about the Kashmiri self-determination movement, or Tehreek. While all those 
present took the right to self-determination as an “indisputable” and “universally acknowledged” 
fact, they sought to return to history to explain its validity in Kashmir. Often, in such 
conversations, the way history of Kashmir is invoked appears like a historical timeline:  
In 1586, the Mughal emperor Akbar, having failed to conquer Kashmir through force, tricked the 
Chak king, Yusuf Shah, out of his capital in Srinagar on the pretext of negotiations, and then 
arrested and permanently exiled him. The Mughals then took Kashmir easily. This was the first 
instance of the establishment of foreign rule and the loss of Kashmiri independence. Then in 
1753, a general in the Afghan King Nadir Shah’s army defeated the Mughal governor of 
Kashmir, and established Afghan rule for the next sixty-seven years. The Afghans, in turn, were 
defeated by the Sikhs of Punjab in 1819, but the Sikh rule in Kashmir proved short-lived and 
lasted only twenty-seven years. In 1846, the British East India Company, by then the main power 
on the Indian subcontinent, defeated the Sikhs, took Kashmir from the latter’s possession and sold 




crucial moment in the war. Gulab Singh established the Dogra dynasty, which ruled for a hundred 
years, lasting till 1947.  
In this “timeline,” the transitions in ruling dynasties in Kashmir are not interpreted 
uniformly, as was evident during the conversation near the river. The participants described the 
Mughal rule as “overall benign,” even though Mughal benevolence is only remembered through 
the architectural icons they had left behind—especially the geometrically symmetrical flower 
gardens, also known as the Mughal Gardens. But several participants joked and invoked popular 
Kashmiri taunts against their Mughal rulers, words like “shikas-mogul” or “pogeh-mogul,” to 
suggest that the Mughals were nevertheless resented as “foreign rulers.”1 In contrast, the 
Afghans, and what followed them, were described as “cruel” and “exploitative.” An enduring 
memory of the Afghan era, which a history student narrated, is that of soldiers bundling 
Kashmiri tax offenders in sacks lined with nettle grass and lowering them into Dal Lake with a 
heavy stone tied to the sack to drown them. Significantly, however, the period of Afghan rule is 
remembered as rather “evenly cruel” toward the majority Muslim and the minority Hindu 
populations of Kashmir. But the time of Sikh rule, everyone agreed, represented the beginning of 
a systematic and exceptional “oppression” toward Kashmiri Muslims, an oppression which only 
intensified during the long Dogra century.  
In this account of Kashmir’s history, neither the timeline nor the oppression is seen to 
have ended in 1947. In that year, Hari Singh, the last Dogra ruler, “signed off” Kashmir to India, 
thus inaugurating a new era of “foreign domination.” As the participants in the meeting 
described it, the Dogra ruler acceded the state to India “without regard for the opinions or the 
interests of his Kashmiri subjects.” Thus, unlike the dominant Indian representations of the year 
                                                 
1 Shikas-Mogul means “broke-Mughals” and was probably used because upon taking over Kashmir, the lore is that 




1947 as marking the “birth of freedom,” in the Kashmiri historical consciousness, the year is part 
of a transition to yet another period of foreign rule, as well as the source of a continuing dispute 
over the political status of the region. Instead of freedom, 1947 marks the birth of a “new 
Tehreek” in Kashmir. This new movement, which remained as a repressed sentiment and an 
underground movement for the next forty years, became a mass movement in the winter of 1989-
90, when Kashmiris first rose to protest Indian control and then took up arms to liberate 
Kashmir. As a writer in our meeting put it: “Tehreek is the expression of the demand as well as 
the result of the long-denied political rights of Kashmiris as a people, especially our right to 
become independent, rights which the Indian state refuses to acknowledge.”  
Behind this linear timeline—interspersed as it is by a broad sense of “deceit,” “betrayal,” 
and a “denial” of political agency—lies a messy history, which is both a field of contestation and 
a source of collective trauma. I use the term “history” here to signify a discursive space 
constituted by the contesting narratives of Kashmir’s past and present. These narratives include 
the official Indian account of Kashmir, Tehreek historical narratives, as well as histories of 
Kashmir produced by academic scholars or non-specialist writers.  
The officially authorized historical account is the one that aligns with the dominant 
nationalist historiography in India. This historiography is typically marked by erasures of 
regional histories of South Asia, including that of Kashmir. Its master code is “India” as the 
dominant national signifier, as well as a timeless and pre-given national-territorial space. On one 
side, the official account often remains unconscious of the historicity of “India” both as a nation 
and as a territory; on the other, India’s sovereignty over Kashmir is treated as natural, a priori 
resolved, and even celebrated as a sign of India’s “secularism”—in opposition to the anti-




activists, respectively). Even in “liberal” Indian accounts, Kashmir is seen a “problem” of 
modern India, and is analyzed as an inter-dynastic relation between the Nehrus of India and the 
Abdullahs of Kashmir.2  
The notion of India as a historical political space is, however, underwritten by the idea of 
Hindu nationalism, which in turn shapes the contours of Indian nationalist historiography. There 
is little doubt about this fact among Kashmiris, especially those who are curious about the roots 
of the official account of Kashmir. Indeed, Hindu nationalism alone could provide the 
geographical and cultural signifier “India”—as an organic geo-political body—around which the 
state history could be written.3 Despite these contentious roots, the official historical narrative is 
enforced in school curriculums especially though textbooks (including in Kashmiri schools), and 
is reproduced via popular culture (primarily in the popular Hindi cinema), in the nationalist 
iconography, and by India’s national news media.  
Tehreek narratives contest the Indian official accounts. They posit the year 1947 as the 
beginning of a “new imperialism” in Kashmir, even seeing it as a betrayal of the promise of 
South Asia’s anti-colonial struggle. Tehreek intellectuals argue that 1947 represents the defeat of 
the movement for popular sovereignty among the overwhelmingly Muslim subaltern classes in 
Kashmir. That movement, in their view, had begun in 1931. Initially, the 1931 movement had 
                                                 
2 The most prominent of such an account is Ramachandra Guha’s (2007) India After Gandhi. Guha’s account 
includes several sections on Kashmir. He prioritizes the perspectives of Nehru, the principal actor in his narrative, 
who saw Kashmir through the prism of its “strategic importance” as a border state, its symbolic value in keeping 
India “secular,” as well as his own personal “ethnic” connection (Guha 2007, 75-78). While Guha describes himself 
as a “liberal,” historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who approves of Guha’s work, describes him rather as “an Indian 
nationalist, albeit a moderate and self-critical one” (2013, 36). 
3 Hindu nationalism itself had partly acquired its geographical and cultural imagination through the work of colonial 
historiographers and later orientalists, despite the fragmented expanse of the British Indian empire. That India was 
an “ancient civilization” is a view presented alike by orientalists such as Basham (1959), secular nationalists like 
Nehru (1985), and Hindu nationalists like Majumdar (1977). See also Subrahmanyam (2013, 1-10) on how this 





started as a spontaneous revolt against the discriminatory policies of the Dogra monarchy, but 
had, eventually, turned into a popular struggle to end the monarchy itself and to establish a 
“popular” and “free self-government.” Instead of leading to freedom, however, the national 
movement in Kashmir (also called the “first freedom struggle”) was subverted.  
My Kashmiri interlocutors, sympathetic to Tehreek, claim that three main reasons lay 
behind the subversion: the “partition” of the subcontinent under the British; “authoritarian 
tendencies” among the political elite of the newly created states of India and Pakistan; and, most 
painfully, the “opportunism” and “lack of foresight” among Kashmir’s own political leaders. 
This subversion of Kashmir’s first freedom struggle is often narrated in detail in Tehreek 
accounts, which also contest the official version, episode by episode, on how the events of 1947 
led to Kashmir being split into two parts, one coming under the control of India and the other 
under Pakistan. Accordingly, Tehreek intellectuals see the events of 1989-90 as vindicating their 
stand. When the movement erupted from being a largely repressed sentiment and underground 
activism to becoming a popular armed resistance for independence, it was enough to demonstrate 
that the question of sovereignty in the region had remained unresolved. 
As I will show, there are significant internal variations within Tehreek historical 
narratives in terms of themes, periods of interest, and modes of writing, which suggests that 
Tehreek’s historical consciousness is not based on a systematic body of knowledge or a singular 
ideology. As historical writings produced outside the institutions of the state, the narratives 
remain fragmentary, even though as a body of historical literature they remain entangled with 
each other. However, a broad scheme can be established in these narratives for the purposes of 
illuminating their key elements. There are those that focus on the events of 1947, especially 




of Islam unfolding in the region. A few, but only a few, venture into sketching a long arc of a 
people’s history of Kashmir, from the ancient era to the present, based on revisiting “origin 
stories.” And some are content simply chronicling the present. I will lay out central aspects of 
these four historical narratives toward the end of this chapter based on interviews with main 
figures, reading of key texts, as well as through the perspective of the audiences of these 
narratives.  
It is important to note that two key elements unify the main proponents of Tehreek 
historical narratives, and justify my use of the term “Tehreek history-writers” for them. First, all 
four narratives that I delineate have emerged in contestation with the official Indian nationalist 
account of Kashmir. Second, Tehreek history-writers’ perspectives are deeply shaped by their 
experience of living under the occupation. Let me elaborate on this description further by 
locating Tehreek history-writers within the region’s longstanding tradition of history writing.   
The figure of the “Tehreek history-writer”  
There has been a long, interconnected tradition of history writing in Kashmir, mostly in 
the form of kāvyās and tāreekhs. Kāvyās were long poems written in Sanskrit between 11th and 
15th century in Kashmir. They drew upon mythical sources as well as historical events centered 
on the life and reigns of kings and queens of Kashmir. Tāreekhs were Persian chronicles written 
after 16th century and which incorporated some elements from the kāvyās. These writings, 
especially the vibrant Persian tāreekhs, significantly shaped the narrative tradition in Kashmir. 
But, much of this tradition was centered on the lives of Hindu kings and Muslim sultans, or of 
sages and sufis, written in court languages which the common people did not speak. There was, 
however, a rich oral tradition of narrating the past in Kashmir and its adjoining smaller valleys, 




vakhs), and fables—a veritable archive for a potential social history of Kashmir. Aside from 
these, there have since the 19th century been several works that form the historical writing 
tradition in Kashmir. One can broadly categorize them as: pre-1947 British writings; pre-1947 
Kashmiri writings; post-1947 Indian writings; post-1947 Kashmiri writings; and, political 
autobiographies and biographies.4  
Tehreek history-writers engage with some of the themes that arise from practices and 
narrative traditions centered on kāvyās and tāreekhs. Many of them deal intensively with 
accounts that emerged since the 19th century.5 Tehreek history-writers are not, therefore, writing 
within a narrative void. Their writings are, however, attempting to produce a space for Tehreek 
by questioning India’s legitimacy in Kashmir. In this chapter, my focus is on this latter aspect. I 
examine how Tehreek history-writing has emerged as a direct response to contemporary political 
conditions in Kashmir, especially in the aftermath of the 1990 uprising. 
To be clear, there are Kashmiri intellectuals who may “softly” align with the official 
historical account, even though they may not fully accept the premise that Kashmir’s 
“integration” into India is natural or justified. Situated in institutional spaces, like universities, 
                                                 
4 Pre-1947 British writings often take either a pro-Dogra stance, or explicitly criticize the Dogra rule in Kashmir. 
These include: Arthur Brinckman’s The Wrongs of Cashmere (1967); Robert Thorp’s Kashmir Misgovernment 
(1968); William Digby Condemned Unheard (1890); Arthur Wingate’s ‘Preliminary Report’ (1890); William 
Wakefield’s Happy Valley (1879); and, Walter Lawrence’s The Vale of Kashmir (1895). Pre-1947 Kashmiri writings 
include Sanskrit texts like Kalhana’s Rajatarangini (12th C, Sanskrit) and several of its subsequent additions 
(including by Jonaraja and Srivara) under the Muslim Sultans. This period also includes several Persian Tareekhs, 
which continued under the Mughals, as well as the Dogras. This last includes Hasan Shah Koihami’s Tareekh-e-
Hasan (3 vols., 1880s). The Dogra era also included Kashmiri writings such as Maqbool Shah Kralwari’s Grees-
Nām and Pire-Nām. Post-1947 Indian writings mostly take a stance which try to justify Indian sovereignty in 
Kashmir, but some of them call for autonomy of Kashmir within the Indian union. These include writings published 
by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Indian government, like M. C. Chagla’s Kashmir 1947-1965, 
UN speeches (1965), as well as M.J. Akbar’s Kashmir: Behind the Vale (2002). Post-1947 Kashmiri writings 
include those by Prem Nath Bazaz’s The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (1976), which can easily be 
categorized as a Tehreek history; Ishaq Khan’s scholarly work A History of Srinagar (2013); and R. K. Parmu’s A 
History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir (1969). Political autobiographies include Sheikh Abdullah’s The Fire of Chinar 
(orig. in Urdu, Atish-e-Chinar, 1985), Mir Qasim’s My Life and Times (1992), Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Secrets of 
Prison (orig. in Urdu, Roodad-e-Qafas, 5th ed. 1995). Biographies include, Dewan Kripa Ram’s Gulab Nama (2nd 
ed., 1977); Bilqees Taseer’s The Kashmir of Sheikh Abdullah (1986). This is by no means an exhaustive list.  




where their jobs might come under threat, they tend to remain publicly silent on the question of 
Indian claims on Kashmir. Since one of my key interests in this dissertation is to examine the 
formation of political subjectivity among youth activists through an engagement with history, my 
focus is the historical writings of those intellectuals who are either part of Tehreek-related 
organizations, express support for Tehreek, or, at least, endorse the stated Tehreek goal of the 
Kashmiri right to self-determination. I am also interested in their work because they write and 
popularize narratives of Kashmir’s past that counter official accounts, often with the express 
intent of destabilizing those aspects of the Indian nationalist historiography that see Indian 
sovereignty over Kashmir as unproblematic.  
For the intellectuals in whose work I am interested, I use the term “history-writers” 
instead of “historians” simply because they are not “professional historians.” History-writers are 
neither based in academic institutions nor do they claim authority based on training in historical 
methods. Like professional historians, though, they devote considerable intellectual effort and 
passion to their work.6 As history-writers, they are autodidacts, often, as they themselves admit, 
“thrown into writing” or “forced to write” to present the “true picture.” They “feel the need” to 
publicly counter official accounts, chronicle ongoing events, and, in general, preserve their 
writings for the sake of “posterity.” 
Some of the early Tehreek history-writings in Kashmir emerged in the period 
immediately after 1947, but were published in Pakistan.7 But Tehreek history-writers have 
                                                 
6 In other contexts, such practitioners have been called “homespun historians.” I avoid using “homespun historians” 
because of its crude and patronizing connotations, even while recognizing the good intentions of the scholars who 
used it to question the intellectual mining of homespun histories by “guild historians” as an unalloyed source of 
customary knowledge and even native psyche (Peterson and Macola 2009). 
7 Among these, Saraf’s two-volume Kashmiris Fight for Freedom (1979) remains a key text. Saraf was the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Azad Kashmir. Another important work is Bazaz’s The History of the Struggle 
(1976). Bazaz was a Kashmiri Pandit, leader of the Kisan Mazdoor Party in Kashmir, who strongly opposed 




written primarily in the aftermath of the 1989-90 uprising. They tend to write in a conversational 
style; mostly in English and Urdu, and sometimes in Kashmiri—a language that was until 
recently was not taught in schools.8 Their works appear in the form of books, pamphlets, and 
newspaper columns. While the actual number of Tehreek history-writers is small, their writings 
have gained broad popularity in Kashmir. Prominent newspapers, like Greater Kashmir, Rising 
Kashmir, Kashmir Reader, or Uzma feature their revisionist historical accounts on their opinion 
pages almost daily. Published by local publishers, their books sometimes run into several 
reprints. During my work with youth activists, I had noted that they frequently circulated the 
writings of Tehreek history-writers, or cited their work when pushing a point during discussions 
over history. Even a cursory look at the shelves of major bookstores in Srinagar will show more 
books written about Kashmir’s history than writings in other genres. This growth in the audience 
for history writing has taken place alongside a dramatic growth in newspaper readership in 
Kashmir in general.9     
Tehreek history-writers do not form a “school” or a “group,” and are largely independent 
of each other. Some are local literary figures, journalists, lawyers, or even retired government 
                                                 
8 In English, Zahir-ud-Din’s book Flashback (2013) has been influential among youth activists. In Urdu, P. G. 
Rasool’s Mumlikat Kay Aakhri Din (“The Last Days of the Republic,” 2001) and Maslai Kashmir ki Tareekhi 
Asliyat (“Historic Reality of the Kashmir Problem,” 2013) are important texts. Sanaullah Bhat’s Kashmir-1947 se 
1977 tak (“Kashmir – From 1947 to 1977,” Srinagar 2014, second reprint) is another text within this genre, and so is 
Abdul Majid Matoo’s Kashmir Issue—A Historical Perspective (2000). 
9 The number of newspapers and periodicals has grown enormously in the years after 1989-90, especially during the 
first decade of the new millennium. Each year dozens of new titles have emerged, but admittedly only a few of them 
have been independent initiatives, the rest are either profit ventures seeking to generate advertisement revenue, and 
are seen to be supported by the Government of India’s Ministry of Information, Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as 
the military (Gulati 2015). Kashmiri journalists often express concern that the government funds some newspapers 
at the cost of others, putting pressure on genuine newspapers to tow the government line. [Remarkably, in a place 
where English is neither a native language (Kashmiri, Pahari, Gojri, Dogri, etc. being native tongues in the region) 
nor the state language (which is Urdu), almost forty percent of the publications are in English (Ramesh Pandita 
2013)]. Some of this growth of newspapers and their readership has corresponded with a change in the content as 
well. The mostly state propaganda of the pre-1989-90 newspapers has been replaced by a more “balanced” coverage 
of news stories, which often leads the state to clamp down on publications, stop their distribution, and even block 
the Internet. Part of the reason for this shift in content is that many of the reporters and journalists who write are now 




employees, while others have been full-time Tehreek activists. They regularly encounter each 
other, read each other’s writings, but only in very few cases have I noted any sustained mutual 
engagement. This lack of cohesiveness, I was told, has had partly to do with adopting “guerrilla 
tactics in writing,” amid a system which appears determined to deprive all “intellectual support 
to the movement.” While it may sound implausible that such tactics are a systematic response to 
state repression, numerous Kashmiri intellectuals have been murdered over the years. As a result, 
Tehreek history-writers find themselves, as individuals, in precarious positions, worried their 
writings might invite the wrath of the state. 
 
In the following pages, I examine the contested narratives of Kashmir’s past, especially the way 
this past is apprehended in the work of Tehreek history-writers. My own anthropological attempt 
in relation to these Tehreek history-writers is to trace a genealogy of Kashmir’s political present 
by—to borrow a phrase from Clifford Geertz—looking over the shoulders of those already doing 
so. I try to understand the following: Why do Tehreek history-writers read the dilemmas of the 
present as traumatic remnants from the past? What events are accorded importance in their 
writings? How do their accounts diverge from the official history? And, in general, how does the 
past intervene in their understanding of the present in Kashmir? Taken together, I describe their 
engagement and the intervention of the past in the present political struggles in Kashmir as an 
entanglement with history. I argue that, while the post-1989-90 Tehreek represents a potential 
for, and a gradual consolidation of, a new political subjectivity in Kashmir, the movement has 
been deeply shaped by an intense entanglement with history.  
This entanglement is already evoked by the similitude of the terms Tehreek and 




determination movement as an entanglement with history in three different senses. First, I 
underscore popular attempts to change the political fate of Kashmir through mass mobilization, 
protests, and armed struggle. Second, I highlight a simultaneous experience of a lack of control 
over the actual unfolding of the region’s history, and a feeling of being caught or trapped in 
history. And, finally, I emphasize Tehreek history-writers’ anxious and agonistic engagement 
with history, as well as their struggle to reconfigure and rewrite Kashmir’s past. I argue that 
Tehreek history-writers not only contest the dominant official accounts, but also suture 
fragments of collective memory into a coherent alternative history.  
To account for the formation of Kashmiri political subjectivity in its entanglement with 
history, I follow Giles Deleuze’s words: “One should…start with the real individual statements, 
give people conditions, including the material conditions, for the production of their individual 
statements, in order to discover the real collective arrangements that produce them” (2002: 
276). Drawing from interviews (conducted in 2014-15) with two Tehreek history-writers, Zahir-
ud-Din and Shakil Bakshi, I will analyze their work and modes of writing history as points of 
entry into certain specific aspects of Kashmir’s political past, especially contests over the 
meaning of historical events and the legitimacy of Indian control over Kashmir. Analysis of a 
public lecture “J&K History” by Ghulam Qadir Lone will show how history writings intervene in 
the broader debate over identity within Tehreek, often to shape Kashmiris as primarily Muslim. 
In contrast, reading Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din’s short historical text A Fresh Approach to the History 
of Kashmir will reveal a way out of the identity trap as a well as a politics of indigeneity. All in 
all, the four figures and their works illuminate why Tehreek and its intellectuals remain invested 
in, and invested by, history. While the life experiences of all these writers is crucial to their 




an alternative history of the past is complicated by the anxieties of the actual work of writing 
history from the ground up, including having to contend with an occupation that has appropriated 
the sources of collective memory and delegitimized any alternative accounts.  
To reiterate, this chapter is neither an historical account of Kashmir’s past nor a 
sociological study of Tehreek history-writers as a group. I focus mostly on what is common in 
their statements and writings and what makes them significant to Kashmiri political subjectivity. 
I look at the commonalities to trace their differences with the official accounts. And, while I 
acknowledge that their internal differences are significant, these differences have not become 
part of the public debate on Kashmir’s history. I focus especially on Zahir-u-Din because his 
work remains paradigmatic of Tehreek history-writing. His work is also sustained, accessible, 
and probably the most popular in this genre. In line with this, the chapter delineates those 
elements of Kashmir’s political history that have acquired significance in the present through the 
emergence of the Tehreek movement. Here, instead of laying out a linear sequence of events, or 
narrating this history from the vantage point of the predominant inter-state prism—which sees 
Kashmir as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan or as a story of conflicting national 
sovereignties—I juxtapose events from the past and the present to underscore how history in 
Kashmir is remembered in terms of an unsettled past continuing to haunt the present, and how 
Tehreek history-writers emphasize these continuities in their work.  
History-writing and subjectivity 
Chronicler of the present  
Returning to Kashmir for research in 2014, I knew the weight of history was going to 




with soldiers. July 13 represented two dates from the past that had continued to resonate through 
these years. On July 13, 1989, Kashmiri militants fired gunshots at Indian soldiers who were 
charging at a group of people on a bridge over the River Jhelum in Srinagar. On that day, people 
had assembled to observe Martyrs Day, which commemorates the victims of a massacre on July 
13, 1931 when Kashmir was under the Dogra monarchy. The symbolism of choosing Martyrs 
Day for the militant action was evident only to a few people in Kashmir in 1989, but as was clear 
in the tense clashes of 2014, the date’s symbolic force in the years following had enormously 
grown.  
To Shakil Bakshi, who saw the region’s history as a series of alam-nakh baab (“grievous 
chapters”), the event of shooting back in 1989 was radically new. The “baegi (rebel) action,” as 
Bakshi (b. 1963) describes it in retrospect, was the moment of transformation for Kashmir. A 
leader of a Srinagar-based youth group Islamic Students League (ISL), Bakshi had found himself 
at the center of the unfolding events. ISL, formed in 1986, had been mobilizing people for a 
“pure freedom movement” by organizing protests on issues ranging from “discrimination against 
Muslim students” in exams for medical and engineering colleges to defying the government ban 
on Muslim religious processions. Bakshi, who had spent two years in jail for organizing protests, 
had felt that Tehreek had become “confused” by the “pseudo-secessionism” of the National 
Conference leaders. They had, in his view, used the “plebiscite demand” from India simply to 
gain power in Kashmir. Describing the background to the shooting incident of 1989, Bakshi 
says:  
By 1977, Tehreek had been all but repressed. Tehreek parties like Jama’at Islami joined elections 
hoping to defeat Sheikh Abdullah, who had walked back on the Plebiscite question in 1975. But 
Abdullah won. Then he turned the opposition to Indian rule into an opposition toward the 




thereby falling into a Congress trap. Abdullah also started planting his own children for future 
positions of power, and harshly suppressed any kind of criticism, attacking the press and 
harassing editors. After his death in 1982, India used the internal fractures within the Abdullah 
family to strengthen its own position in Kashmir. Sheikh’s son, Farooq, would eventually accept 
further entrenchment of Indian control in exchange for his chief ministership. In 1984, JKLF 
leader Maqbool Bhat was hanged in an Indian prison. We were shocked. On the fortieth day of 
mourning, I was arrested along with other students. In the meantime, older anti-government 
voices, including Mirwaiz Farooq (the chief priest in Srinagar) and the Islamist Jama’at Islami, 
had literally given up on Tehreek.  
According to Bakshi, this build up had become quite stifling, especially among young 
Kashmiris who found themselves limited both by loss of leadership as well means to carry on the 
movement.    
Kashmiri youth had separated from this older leadership. Our ISL membership was increasing in 
strength. Jama’at’s youth wing Jami’at Tulba was quite active. In fact, Jama’at even renounced 
Tulba, forcing several of its members to escape abroad. Several youths formed underground 
groups, like Holy War Fighters, Al-Jihad, Al-Maqbool and what not. They exploded a few small 
bombs near government buildings. But Tehreek had lost so much ground that people felt the 
bombs were just Indian intelligence agencies creating chaos to force the National Conference out 
of the government. Soon these youths were arrested. Our dear leader Ishfaq Majeed Wani then 
went to Pakistan, where he met General Zia [Pakistani military ruler] and sought help. Zia 
promised help. Ishfaq returned with weapons and a strategy. He wanted ISL to be a banner for his 
armed struggle, but we said we didn’t have enough of a political base yet, and that the armed 
movement could not function without a popular base. He agreed and joined JKLF instead. Then 
General Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988, and Pakistan closed off all help. Ishfaq and his 




armed movement. India became quite repressive. For every form of protest, even if it was about 
lack of electricity, government forces would shoot straight at people and kill. A year later, on 
Martyrs Day, a few JKLF cadres opened fire on the bridge. Everything exploded. Suddenly, there 
was only Tehreek everywhere. Pakistan saw this and offered help. But Ishfaq told them, “No we 
need more commitment, not like last time; you come under slight pressure and you buckle.” He 
said, “This business of twenty-eight rounds and fifteen-day training won’t work. Our nation is 
plunging into a fight with a huge country. We need more.” He was also looking for alternative 
bases for the movement: China, Libya, etc. Pakistan then turned this into a red versus green war. 
It was not a religious war. 
In his account, Bakshi describes the opening moments of the guerilla war that was going 
to last more than a decade. As the news of the July 13, 1989 attack on the bridge spread, large 
crowds of people had come out onto the streets of Srinagar to directly confront the Indian 
paramilitary forces. “When they saw that it was our own people who had taken on the Indian 
soldiers, they lost all fear, and openly mocked the soldiers,” says Bakshi, “People smeared earth 
on their faces, and were ready to die,” using a local phrase to emphasize the collective 
demonstration of courage. The incident on the bridge had become the opening act in a series that 
would set off, a few months later, a tumultuous armed uprising for azadi, or liberation of 
Kashmir from India. With the uprising growing in strength and crowds surging into the streets in 
response to the call of young militants.  
Bakshi began addressing political meetings, but soon he found himself and the ISL 
without political space as armed Tehreek took center-stage. Out of the events of 1989-90, a 
fractious but more or less coherent set of political groups took shape. The key difference was 
their positions regarding Kashmir’s “independence” or “merger with Pakistan,” as well as the 




popular organization, and to which ISL was close, stood for a secular, independent Kashmir. Pro-
Pakistan groups were backed by the Pakistani military and came to be patronized in Kashmir by 
Jama’at Islami. Jama’at branded JKLF as “communists,” which had gotten a bad name among 
many Muslims after the Soviet war in Afghanistan. This is what Bakshi means when he says 
“red versus green”—communists versus Islamists. By March 1990, Ishfaq was killed in an 
ambush, and Bakshi was arrested. When he was released from prison, the red versus green 
conflict had intensified. He took to writing. 
Bakshi started maintaining elaborate diaries in which he began chronicling everyday 
political events under the title “Today in History.” He publishes elements from it on Facebook 
and includes lists of events, like massacres, martyrdoms, arson by Indian soldiers, public 
statements, visits of dignitaries, etc., that have occurred on a particular day. When I ask him 
about the significance of his diaries; he replies: “You will be able to see its significance in the 
future.” Although he does not see his work as that of a historian, he is content for people to see 
his diaries as an archive of Tehreek. He elaborates: 
Young rebels hardly care for history; they see it as the job of old historians to write history. 
Rebels just act. That is why I felt our Tehreek might not even be remembered by our future 
generations. Historians will still write the history of modern Kashmir as a family history of the 
Abdullahs or whoever sides with India. Who will remember Ishfaq Majeed Wani, a twenty-three-
year-old who sparked a revolution among us? It is not about who he was, but about what he and 
his fellow rebels did. That is why every event, big and small, is in my diaries.   
 Bakshi’s mode of history writing creates a “shadow archive” of state violence, for the 




rational necessity, a response to the armed movement.10 Bakshi’s chronicle is an archive of the 
fractured or dis-membered present, which might be discovered later, but of which no official 
record would have existed. Although he clearly has a “historical plot” in mind when he speaks 
about the uprising, his written material is organized as dates/year with minimal description, 
eschewing even a cursory judgment that could be evident in the use of language. An example 
would be: 
#9Feb #Anniversary  
1990: 17 killed, hartal on Juma. 
1991: Eight die in fresh violence in Kashmir [Provides news link]  
           First Death in #Batamaloo Baber Khan. In #Sumbal 4 killed 
 
1993: Riyaz Ahmed Lone s/o Munawar. Sangrama Sopore Varmul. Nazir Ahmed Shah s/o … 
[Provides names of several others and the places of death] 
1994: Tariq Ahmed Malik… [Long list of dead and anniversaries] 
1995: In #Zainakote 5 shopkeepers were killed. DoK of Idrees Amin Saker of #Shopian [DoK: 
Date of killing] 
. 
. 
2013: #Afzal Guru [Provides a web link. Hanging of Afzal Guru in an Indian Jail]. 
This writing takes on the form of a “chronicle,” which Hayden White has defined as an 
overtly narrative-less recording of calendrical events (1990, 42).11 Bakshi, for instance, doesn’t 
give details of Afzal Guru’s hanging, which among Kashmiris was an important event in 2013. 
                                                 
10 I draw the phrase “shadow archive” from Alan Sekula (1986), who writes in the context of photography and 
racism in the US South during segregation.  
11 White argues chronicles and annals are facts, which become material for history. As opposed to chronicles, 




“They will be able to find material on Guru, but perhaps not so much on shopkeepers or the 
seventeen who were killed on February 9, 1990,” contends Bakshi, “Now if they want, our new 
generations will look at the date and then search the archives and locate other materials.”  
Linking dates through a memory of loss and death is a powerful way of creating political 
subjectivity. Every day becomes a day of loss and remembrance. Each date carries the force of 
history behind it, impelling remembrance. Beyond its ideological work, there is, however, a 
logistical imperative to Bakshi’s style. As he explains: “Events in Kashmir happened at such a 
great pace—so many were dying, so many statements were being made—that I had to just accept 
the fate of writing them down in the simplest form possible.” Indeed, there is a broader narrative 
arc in his simple diary entries. That arc traces the fundamental belief in the assumptions of 
Tehreek and the significance of the 1990 uprising in Kashmir.  
Tehreek as historical event  
Looking back, Tehreek history-writers claim that for the self-determination movement, 
which had been subdued since 1947, the incidents of 1989-90 represented a historical break—or, 
truly an event. Over the meaning of “the event,” however, they remain divided. For some, it was 
radically new as it gave birth to a “new form of politics and struggle,” especially the popular 
armed movement—never before had Kashmiris taken up arms against the state. For others, the 
incidents of 1989-90 represented an event because it had “condensed” the modern history of 
Kashmir, and the questions over its political status, into a “singular moment,” bringing its 
deepest contradictions to the surface. For others still, 1989-90 constituted an event because it 
evoked the “continuity” of the past in the present—especially, as they saw it, the political 
moment of 1989-90 was the “culmination of mass politics” for the establishment of a 




Tehreek activist, who had told me that resistance runs in his “family’s blood” (his grandfather 
had been imprisoned during the Dogra era, while his father later spent time in Indian prisons), 
captured this sense of the past’s resonance in the present rather evocatively: “There was much 
euphoria around; people thought azadi was near, but Tehreek brought back all the painful 
memories.”  
For Kashmiris in general, the event marked a transition into, what they describe as, 
kharaab haalaat or “bad conditions”—a protracted period marked by social mistrust, circulation 
of poisonous rumors, existential precarity, and an uncertainty about the time ahead. During the 
autumn and winter of 1989-90, Indian troops committed a series of massacres of Kashmiri 
civilians, outlawed anti-government protests, and arrested thousands. Kashmiri militants, in turn, 
carried out several killings and kidnappings of government figures, including those from the 
minority Hindu community. This led to a migration of Hindus from the Kashmir valley to the 
Jammu province of the state in the south. Simultaneously, many Muslim families from the 
northern border districts of Kashmir fled their homes for the Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir. 
Meanwhile, thousands of young Kashmiris crossed the Line of Control into Azad Kashmir to 
join militant groups. The Indian government imposed draconian new laws in the region, giving 
the military extraordinary powers under the overall authority of a New Delhi-appointed governor 
to suppress the movement. The state described the movement as a “proxy war” launched by 
Pakistan. Characterizing Tehreek in this way allowed the government to extensively use military 
force on a people whom it legally claimed to be its own.  
What these developments really represent is a moment when the relationship between the 
people and the state transformed into one of direct confrontation. As Tehreek history-writers’ 




challenged the legitimacy of the Indian state in Kashmir. And the state, by deploying the military 
and legislating emergency, sought to impose its dominance primarily through coercion. The 
breakdown of the state’s assumed hegemony pushed Kashmiri intellectuals to seek sources of 
understanding the present through the past. Not only did the audience for a new politics of 
memory grow, it also created space for the figure of “Tehreek history-writer,” who became 
instrumental in shaping Kashmiri political subjectivity.  
Citing Francois Furet's definition of the term, Veena Das has described a “critical event” 
as an “event par excellence because it institutes a new modality of historical action, which (is) 
not inscribed in the inventory of that situation” (1995, 5). While this conception of event 
captures formally the rupture from the past, it does not account for how the event becomes 
historical. Alain Badiou’s conceptualization of event, which in his philosophical register is 
termed political event, seems more appropriate. He formulates event as something that “brings to 
light a possibility that was invisible or even unthinkable…An event (which) is not by itself the 
creation of a reality; it is the creation of a possibility.” A political event, according to Badiou, 
does not necessarily have to have a world-historic magnitude (as in Furet’s understanding, who 
was writing about the French Revolution), “whatever its scale, (it) is a local opening up of 
political possibilities.” But more crucially, as Badiou adds, “Everything will depend on the way 
in which the possibility proposed by the event is grasped, elaborated, incorporated, and set out in 
the world” (2010, 9-10). In this formulation, it is the way the event as a possibility is understood 
and sought to be fulfilled, and which requires actual critical and creative work, that can make an 




requires actual work to “name” and sustain such a subjectivity.12 Have Tehreek history-writers 
been performing precisely this kind of role within the movement? To Shakil Bakshi, the 1989-90 
uprising was an opportunity to give some degree of order to the otherwise inchoate “painful 
memories” of Tehreek and confused pre-1989 “sentiments.” This could be done through an 
orderly, chronological arrangement of everyday events.   
History-writer as witness 
A few weeks after my arrival in Srinagar for research, I met Zahir-ud-Din. At that time, 
he was an editor of a local English daily Kashmir Reader. Zahir-ud-Din is also a history-writer 
and has authored several books. Initially, his role as a history-writer had not been clear to me. He 
had written an article in his newspaper about the historical significance of July 13, 2014. But, I 
anticipated our conversation was going to be centered on problems he was facing editing a 
newspaper that took a stance against the occupation, how he managed to get the newspaper 
published and distributed during extended periods of curfew, and how he was dealing with the 
paper’s financial difficulties, which, I had been told, were a direct consequence of its stance.  
Zahir-ud-Din, however, was more interested in talking about history. The newspaper was 
to him a “vehicle for telling our history.” Disappointed with a “lack of accurate accounts” of 
Kashmir’s pasts, Zahir-ud-Din told me that he hoped to write a “people’s history” of Kashmir. 
He wanted to “bring to light the stories of those who had expressed dissent with the political 
order established in 1947,” and discover “our heroes” who could inspire people into action. At 
the same time, he sought to “expose those who had collaborated with (the political order).” I had 
                                                 
12 Simon Critchley has argued, following Antonio Gramsci, that “Politics is always about nomination. It is about 
naming a political subjectivity and organizing politically around that name” (2012, 103). Further, Critchley points 




been reading his articles in the newspapers and had been recommended his books by several 
Tehreek activists. His articles—and his books—seemed to be part of a longer series. One had to, 
therefore, fully read his collected work to make better sense of it.  
Several of Zahir-ud-Din’s pieces began with a pop quiz about Kashmir’s history, which 
he then went on to answer himself for his readers. For instance, before boarding an auto-
rickshaw to his office in Batehmalūn on the day I first met him, I had picked up that day’s 
edition of the Kashmir Reader to read his long-running column “Unsung Heroes.” In that 
column, Zahir-ud-Din had taken issue with, what he had described as, a “false notion” prevalent 
as “common sense” among the “self-assured educated classes” about the lack of opposition to 
Sheikh Abdullah in the Constituent Assembly in the early 1950s. Zahir-ud-Din then went on to 
debunk the notion using evidence gathered from an interview with an old Constituent Assembly 
member, who had been witness to several speeches opposing Abdullah’s endorsement of the 
1947 accession treaty. Zahir-ud-Din had managed, despite great difficulty, to trace down and 
interview the member.  
Zahir-ud-Din’s writing strategy involves locating ignored, even minor, but counter-
intuitive historical details and voices, to destabilize his readers’ understanding. His readers, 
“once awakened would then seek their own truth.” Zahir-ud-Din says his writings are not meant 
to be “academic expositions.” Not that he derides the ability of academic historians to question 
the official discourse, but he is “not sure if real historical scholarship would be allowed in 
Kashmiri universities, which are tightly controlled by the state.” Zahir-ud-Din presents his work 
as “educational material” for a specific readership: “basically students and researchers like 




historians of Kashmir had “concealed.” Zahir-ud-Din argues that these facts shed light on how 
the “official history exists only to legitimate India’s sovereignty claims.”  
Zahir-ud-Din’s office is just a few hundred meters from where he grew up in 
Batehmalūn, a Srinagar neighborhood deeply connected to his own politicization. From outside, 
Batehmalūn looks like a bewildering urban sprawl. It is full of old residential colonies, 
government offices, mosques, rows upon rows of tiny retail stores, schools, and the headquarters 
of a major Islamist party. All of these are squeezed around a noisy bus depot and an enormous 
Indian military base, whose expanse remains mostly invisible from the outside. In 1965, during 
the second India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, the soldiers from the base burnt down Batehmalūn, 
apparently in retaliation against the residents who were raising slogans in support of armed 
militias that had crossed into Kashmir from Azad Kashmir. Zahir-ud-Din was a young boy then, 
but he remembers the incident as the first spark of his politicization. By the time of the 1990 
uprising, he was already a student activist in Kashmir University, studying law but also 
interested in early Islamic history.  
 The event that fully transformed Zahir-ud-Din into a political activist, and then into a 
writer, was a massacre in Srinagar on January 21, 1990. A procession of Kashmiris protesting 
police atrocities was—yet again—crossing a city bridge, this time the Gaw Kadal (the Bridge of 
the Cow), which is close to the main city square, Lal Chowk, when Indian paramilitary forces 
shot at them. Zahir-ud-Din was present in the crowd. He recounts the incident: 
I was part of the procession. They just sprayed bullets. Unprovoked firing. Totally unprovoked. 
This was a peaceful procession. Its slogan (was) “Allah u Akbar” [Allah is Great]. No slogans 
against Pandits. No slogans against India even. We were marching to express solidarity with the 
people of Chota Bazaar, where a woman had been molested during a search operation…It 




While Shakil Bakshi, as a key political activist at the time, had presented the earlier 
incident on July 13, 1989 as the critical event, most Kashmiris would agree that the Gaw Kadal 
incident was what finally pushed youths to join Tehreek en masse. The incident, which came to 
be known among Kashmiris as the “Gaw Kadal Massacre,” was one among several such 
massacres during the early days of the uprising, and was the first indication for Zahir-ud-Din that 
the official account of events varied drastically from people’s experiences of them. The official 
account had described the procession as “communal,” one threatening to provoke violence 
against Hindus and the state. This account had also concealed the actual number of protestors 
killed by the Indian paramilitary. Says Zahir-ud-Din:  
I am an eyewitness to it. I was in the procession. Fifty-two persons died on the spot. The hospital 
said fifty-two had been brought in. In the evening news, the government announced only eleven 
people were killed. But in our neighborhood graveyard alone they buried fifteen people. 
 In the years ahead, Zahir-ud-Din became involved in Tehreek, and spent several months 
underground to evade arrest and assassination. But as the movement turned into a full-blown 
armed resistance, Zahir-ud-Din turned to writing. He worked with the newly-established English 
newspaper Greater Kashmir, and spent years reporting on the political conflict. He later joined a 
local human rights group called the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, and documented 
cases of human rights abuses. It was during this time, he says, that he started collecting material 
he would need to write an alternative history of Kashmir. He had brought some of this material 
with him to our meeting in a large, unwieldy folder. The folder, he told me, included personal 
diaries, records, and transcripts of interviews with old Kashmiri activists, especially those who 




compile this material came from an exchange he had with a few visitors from abroad who had 
“provoked” him: 
They told us, “Kashmiris always ride upon the shoulders of outsiders. They have not produced a 
hero of their own. There is no indigenous hero.” I was pained. That day we [him and his 
colleagues at the human rights group] took a decision that we will come out with a compilation of 
our heroes. It was entrusted to me, and I went to work. (laughs) 
In his search, as he stumbled from one piece of historical information to another, his 
interest in Kashmir’s history grew into an “intense desire” to write it. He soon began serializing 
his notes in his regular newspaper columns, which became popular. Too eager, however, to bring 
them out as a collection, a local publisher printed an unedited version titled Bouquet: Unsung 
Heroes of Kashmir. While the book sold out, Zahir-ud-Din wasn’t happy, even though he 
understood the “urgency” of its publication. He continued to publish his serialized columns, 
which went into a similar but more polished text Flashback: Kashmir Story (2013).  
During this time, Zahir-ud-Din told me, he became “painfully aware that Kashmir’s past 
was not so much silenced because of a lack of writing, but silenced actually through writings.” 
Most of these writings had come from Indian journalists and academics, whose “sole aim was to 
justify Indian claims over Kashmir.” Nevertheless, he says he was “pleasantly surprised to see a 
few nuanced writings” on the circumstances surrounding the Dogra monarch’s signing of 
accession with India in 1947, and the “political opportunism” of Kashmiri leaders like Sheikh 
Abdullah. Among these, he specifically mentions works by Joseph Korbel, a US diplomat, and 
Alistair Lamb, a British historian, both of whom had parted ways with the “standard Indian 
narrative.” To Zahir-ud-Din, the two authors, “possibly because they came from outside,” had 
remained “objective.” In contrast, he dismisses Sheikh Abdullah’s own autobiographical Atish-e-




had sought to justify his support for the accession, as a “bundle of lies.” He also laments that the 
few Kashmiris who wrote before 1990 had chosen to write “partial accounts,” mostly based on 
the perspectives of pro-accession National Conference leaders. These writers, he claims, had 
“distorted the truth” to gain patronage from the India-loyalist government in Kashmir. A truthful 
history of Kashmir, the “one written from the perspective of the people’s struggle,” would, in his 
view, naturally be opposed to Indian control over Kashmir. 
What is the “distortion” that Tehreek history-writers seek to correct? In whose name can a “true” 
history of Kashmir be written? To contextualize the work of Tehreek history-writers, it is 
important to delineate how they sense the importance of history itself. The next section examines 
how political events from Kashmir’s past become visible within the circumstances of the present; 
how these events carry contested meanings for the state and Tehreek history-writers; and, how 
these writers grapple with aporias of subjecthood, like the issue of defining the proper subject of 
political claims in Kashmir.  
Interpreting 1931 and 1990  
On that July 13 in 2014 when I arrived in Srinagar, I had heard slogans reverberate in the 
streets. Amid loud bangs of the tear gas shells exploding in the streets, I heard: “Back off, 
traitors! We are the true heirs of the martyrs.” Defying a curfew, a group of youths threw stones 
toward armored government cars. The armored cars were transporting government ministers and 
senior bureaucrats to one of the city’s old shrines. The shrine houses a Sufi saint’s grave as well 
as the graves of dozens of Kashmiris killed by Dogra troops in 1931. Indian soldiers had closed 
the main roads, blocked all the city bridges, and severely limited the movement of people and 




government in Kashmir are allowed movement. The loyalists go to visit, what Kashmiris call, the 
“1931 Martyrs Graveyard” and lay flower wreaths at the graves there. The graveyard is in a 
dense neighborhood of downtown Srinagar, where Tehreek activists regularly challenge 
government restrictions through stone throwing and sloganeering. The slogans were directed 
against the loyalists, who also claim to be the heirs to the martyrs of 1931. Yet, despite their 
differences over who the “true heir” to the martyrs should be, among Kashmiri Muslims there is 
largely consensus about the 1931 event itself.  
On July 13, 1931, a group of Kashmiris assembled outside the Central Jail in Srinagar 
with the demand that they be allowed to witness the trial of Abdul Qadir, who the Dogra 
government had arrested and charged with sedition. Qadir had given a speech, in which, 
according to police reports, he had tried to provoke Kashmiri Muslims to attack Hindus.13 
Tehreek history-writers deny this charge, but agree that he had urged people to protest the Dogra 
monarch’s discriminatory policies toward Kashmiri Muslims. The trial was set for July 13, 1931. 
Not used to insubordination from Kashmiri Muslims, the Dogra troops shot dead twenty-two 
people, precipitating a crisis.  
As news of the massacre spread, it further exacerbated the already deep resentment 
Kashmiris held against the despotic Dogra monarchy. While the cavalry charged, shooting and 
beating protestors in the major towns of the state, they faced mutinous crowds throwing stones at 
them and jeering the rulers. Along the way, the protestors destroyed debt records, looted 
granaries, and thrashed some Hindu moneylenders. In the hilly regions of the country, the state 
revenue department’s mostly Hindu officials faced Muslim crowds refusing to pay taxes, setting 
off a “rural revolt” that lasted three years (Rai 2004, 264). Kashmiri Muslims subsequently saw 
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the event as a moment of “resistance,” “sacrifice,” and the “start of the freedom struggle.” The 
Dogra officials (and Hindu groups), however, saw the event as a “communal riot,” with officials 
even pretending shock that their hitherto “docile” Muslim subjects should be so quickly roused 
by “conspirators” like Qadir. Whatever the state officials may have said about him, and despite 
no one knowing what eventually befell the man who had become the center of a political 
maelstrom, Qadir’s stand against the powerful Dogra state became legendary. In the Kashmiri 
imagination, he was a hero.  
Incidentally, Qadir’s origin has, even to the present, remained a source of a contention 
that is quite telling of historical debates on Kashmir. Historian Mridu Rai suggests that Qadir 
was a Pathan butler in the British Army, but it is uncertain, she writes, if he was from Kashmir or 
had come with a British officer vacationing in Kashmir (2004, 259).14 Chitralekha Zutshi adopts 
the view taken by the Dogra state, which claimed Qadir to be a Punjabi from outside (2004, 
212).15 Tehreek history-writers, however, insist that Qadir was a Kashmiri Pathan, whose family 
continued to live in Kashmir after 1931. During the 1931 uprising, the Dogra effort to denounce 
Qadir as gair-mulki, or foreigner, helped the Dogra state to propagate the uprising as an outside 
conspiracy to destabilize the state—a typical and enduring line, later also taken by India, first in 
1947 and then during the Kashmiri uprising of 1989-90. Curiously, Zutshi also accepts the 
official view that Qadir was Ahmediya, a small heterodox sect of Muslims that arose in early 20th 
century Punjab and faced opposition from orthodox Muslim groups. Labeling Qadir as 
Ahmediya would have discredited him among several sections of Kashmir’s Muslims. Among 
Tehreek history-writers, Qadir is believed to have been influenced by the Ahrars, the more 
                                                 
14 Pathans are a people native to the regions close to the present-day border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But 
many Pathan tribes have lived in Kashmir since the late 18th century. 
15 Punjabis are resident mostly of Punjab, now divided between Pakistan and India, but several Punjabi families have 




orthodox and anti-establishment Muslim group also based in Punjab that was opposed to the 
Ahmediya. To Zahir-ud-Din, Qadir is simply a hero because he stood up to the Dogras. 
Regardless of Qadir’s identity, this dispute about a seemingly minor historical detail illustrates 
how the contesting narratives of the state and its subjects continue to rupture the understanding 
of Kashmir’s past, and, more importantly, how historical events from the past have resurfaced to 
acquire new meaning in the present. 
Echoes of the past, especially the events of 1931, were, however, more directly felt 
within the 1990 uprising. When crowds erupted on the scene in Srinagar and other Kashmiri 
towns after the “rebel action” of 13 July 1989, and then magnified into an almost unending cycle 
of mass rallies by the winter of 1990, taking the Indian government (as well as the youthful 
protest leaders like Shakil Bakshi) by surprise, many in Kashmir saw it as the beginning of a new 
stage in Tehreek. As Zahir-ud-Din states:  
A suppressed history of resistance was running through and finding expression in those 
demonstrations. People felt they were part of something historic and for the first time, after the 
1930s and 1940s, they felt they were again writing their own tae’reekh (history) and shaping their 
fate. For the first time, everyone felt history was important.   
I will return to this understanding of the importance of history in Tehreek narratives later, 
but first discuss an issue that has simultaneously become a matter of anguished reflection within 
Tehreek as well as one of its key points of contention with the official Indian discourse.  
Internal schisms 
Within Tehreek accounts, the events of 1989-90 are not represented without their own 




numerous families internally and across the Line of Control. Amid this, the tiny, but “historically 
privileged” Hindu Pandit community (Duschinksi 2008, 41), feeling threatened by the popular 
upsurge, fled Kashmir. Many Pandits left Kashmir between January 19 and 20, 1990, a day 
before the Gaw Kadal massacre. In the prelude to this “exodus” event, armed activists had 
assassinated several senior government officials and loyalist politicians, some of whom were 
prominent Pandits. Affluent Pandits found it easier to settle in Indian cities, but the poorer 
families were stranded in squalid refugee camps in Jammu. Some Pandit activists claim their 
departure was a result of a Kashmiri Muslim conspiracy to carry out “ethnic cleansing” against 
Pandits (Rahul Pandita 2013), while Kashmiri Muslims generally tend to believe that Pandit 
migration was a deliberate, temporary plan to give a “freehand” to Indian military to subdue 
Tehreek (Matoo 2010). Independent observers concur with neither of these positions. As 
Alexander Evans suggests:  
The [Kashmiri Pandit] tragedy has not taken place in isolation in Kashmir, nor was it the result of 
a nefarious Muslim campaign directed against them. Kashmiri Muslim civilians remain by far the 
largest group among those killed in political violence since 1988 and, even at the height of 
selective militant killings in 1989–1990, relatively few KPs were killed (2002, 33).     
Zahir-ud-Din, who is sympathetic to the plight of Pandits in Jammu, laments that in 
government reports only the migration of Pandits is taken account of, and not the displacement 
of Muslims. He argues that a much larger number of Muslims had been forced to migrate out of 
Kashmir since 1947.16 Most Tehreek history-writers would argue that militants had targeted both 
Muslim and Pandit government officials and loyalist politicians, and that it was Indian officials 
who had amplified threats to Pandit officials as a threat to all Pandits. Tehreek history-writers 
                                                 
16 For migration of Muslim families across the border into the Pakistani-controlled side of Kashmir, see Robinson 




primarily hold Kashmir’s Indian governor Jagmohan (see Introduction, p. 24) responsible for 
urging and aiding Pandits to migrate, yet they do not dismiss the arguments that the uprising 
might have made Pandits feel unsafe.17 Zahir-ud-Din insists that Tehreek was not directed 
against Pandits, and points to the “well-being” of those Pandits who stayed back.18 He 
emphasizes that interreligious relations had remained strong in the Kashmir Valley even in 1947 
when the Dogra state was perpetrating an ethnic cleansing of Muslims in adjoining Jammu.19 
The displacement of Pandits is often used by India to denounce Tehreek as an “Islamic 
fundamentalist” movement, but for Tehreek the question, which is still unresolved, is important 
to defining its vision of a future Kashmir. 
Was there an immediate political animus between Muslims and Pandits? Political 
scientist Sumantra Bose has argued that: 
The small Hindu minority indigenous to the Kashmir Valley, known as Kashmiri Pandits, share a 
history, a locality, and a culture with the Muslim majority of the Valley, but are resolutely loyal 
to India and hostile to the dominant pro-independence sentiment (2003, 12). 
While it is understandable that the Pandits would have preferred to live under a state with 
whose majority they shared their religion, Bose’s speculation underestimates the complex 
political contestations among Pandits on the question. Tehreek history-writers point to the 
political prominence in the Muslim imagination of Pandits, like Prem Nath Bazaz, Raghu Nath 
Vaishnavi and others, who stood for Kashmir’s independence, as well as of human rights 
                                                 
17 Jagmohan wanted a “free hand” to deal with the uprising in 1990 with an “iron hand,” and saw Pandits as a 
“hindrance” to his mission (Matoo 2010).   
18 Tehreek parties often publicly plead for a return of all Pandits to their original homes, but insist that it should not 
be tied to any condition that demands an end to the movement for Kashmiri self-determination, as some Hindu 
groups have done. 
19 See Chapter 6 more Muslim-Hindu dynamic in Kashmir. I argue that a long history of state patronage of the 





activists and trade unionists, like Hriday Nath Wanchoo, whose killing in 1992 was widely 
believed to be the work of Indian agencies.20 It is probable that the Pandit view against Tehreek 
hardened in the aftermath of their migration. Indian government officials, who facilitated the 
Pandit migration, had promised that the migration was to be temporary. But, tragically, as the 
state’s war on Kashmiris intensified, the promised return never took place.  
“Sense of déjà vu” 
To Shakil Bakshi and Zahir-ud-Din, the events of 1989-90 had evoked a “sense of déjà 
vu.” They were experienceing a moment like the events of 1931, about which they had come to 
know from “earlier generations.” Some conditions that had preceded the 1931 events had 
changed, but many had remained the same leading up to the events of 1989-90. Further, both saw 
parallels between 1846 and 1947 as symbolically marking the “lack of agency” many Kashmiris 
had over their political fate. In 1947, the last Dogra maharaja, Hari Singh, had passed 
sovereignty over Kashmir into the hands of the newly established Indian state. Hari Singh’s act 
of signing the “Instrument of Accession” with India had, in an echo from yet another era, 
resembled the way the British East India Company had granted Kashmir to the Dogras in 1846. 
“Yitshiy haetshikh titshiy kienikh” (They sold it, the way it was sold to them), Zahir-ud-Din 
remarked about the 1947 treaty of accession. The description of the treaty through the metaphor 
of an economic transaction was meant to emphasize the imperial disregard for Kashmiri rights.  
Based on such parallels between the past and the present, Tehreek history-writers speak 
about feeling bitter, but they also challenge state accounts of these transactions of sovereignty 
                                                 
20 Wanchoo, an ageing Pandit activist from Srinagar, was booked by the government after his assassination. He had 
met with a team from Amnesty International in 1992, just before his death. He was known for filing habeas corpus 
petitions in the courts, as well as claiming his right as a Kashmiri to freely cross the LoC. The government believed 




most vigorously, especially the 1947 treaty of accession. It is important to dwell here on the way 
the events of 1947 are contested, as they form important elements of the larger Tehreek 
narratives. Below, I will take up a few points of contestation regarding 1947 that illustrate the 
importance of revisiting history for Tehreek history-writers, as well as the dilemmas this 
contestation has led to. 
History as trauma 
Accession, Jammu Massacre, and foreign interventions  
In official Indian accounts, the Dogra maharaja’s signing of the treaty of accession with 
India in 1947 was a straightforward affair. The monarch had decided to join a “secular India” 
over a “communal (Muslim) Pakistan.” According to these accounts, this decision was supported 
by his Kashmiri subjects, most of whom followed the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah who had 
endorsed the monarch’s decision. The signing of the treaty took place in haste, the official story 
proceeds, because of the “invasion” of the state by tribal militias or kabayli laskhars, trained and 
sent by the Pakistan Army to forcibly wrest the state from the Dogras. The treaty allowed Indian 
troops to legally enter Kashmir and push out the kabaylis. By then, the narrative goes, the 
Pakistan officially joined the war over Kashmir, and India had to take the matter to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is mostly at this point that the Indian narrative ends, 
principally because the UNSC not only called for an immediate ceasefire, but also a withdrawal 
of both the militaries from Kashmir as well as the holding of a plebiscite in the region.21  
                                                 
21 From 1948 onwards, the United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions on Kashmir, most 






For India, the signing of the treaty of accession had settled the question of sovereignty—
but in reality, the treaty had mandated only a partial sovereignty, explicitly including only three 
areas to be under the ambit of the Indian control: defense, external affairs, and communication. 
India, however, saw the idea of a “plebiscite” as an unexpected outcome of the UN resolutions, 
and a discourse that needed to be silenced in Kashmir. Initially, India’s prime minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, had publicly made promises of a plebiscite to Abdullah’s followers in 
Srinagar. These promises, according to Tehreek history-writers, had bought India time to alter 
the political situation in its favor, which involved violent suppression of the opposition, and in 
1953 culminated in Abdullah’s arrest.   
In Tehreek history-writing, the circumstances surrounding the Treaty of Accession are 
seen as far more complex. The signing had indeed taken place hastily and amid violence, but this 
violence had primarily been of the monarchy’s own making, and preceded the kabayalis raids. 
First and foremost, the Dogra ruler had signed the treaty while abetting brazen acts of ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims in Jammu. The 1947 genocide in Jammu is remarkable, not only for its 
magnitude, but for the way it has been erased from the official as well as Indian nationalist 
accounts. In his history of post-1947 India, Indian historian Ramachandra Guha calls this 
genocide as “panicky migrations” of Muslims from Jammu (2007, 74).  
For Tehreek history-writers, the “Jammu Massacre” is a critical event—the foundational 
act of violence coterminous with the establishment of Indian rule. New scholarship on the event, 
outside of Tehreek history-writing, has suggested that Dogra troops, Hindu militias armed by the 
maharaja’s relatives, and Indian Hindu nationalist jathas pouring in from the south, killed 
between 200,000 to 250,000 Muslim in Jammu, while forcing half-a-million to migrate to 




Tunzelmann (2007) and Christopher Snedden (2007) both note, for instance, that news reports 
that appeared in London in 1948 and accounts of survivors, as well as the sudden fall in Muslim 
demography in Jammu between 1947 and 1949, indicate that close to half a million Muslims 
were evicted from the state, while more than two-hundred thousand Muslims just disappeared, 
most probably killed. Mostly, the violence was carried out by the Dogra troops, Jammu Hindu 
militias armed by the monarch’s relatives, as well as by Indian Hindu nationalist jathas pouring 
in from the south. Snedden points out that Hindus and Sikhs also suffered in many cases, 
primarily because of having to leave their homes from what became Azad Kashmir. But it was 
the Muslims of Jammu who bore the worst of it. Till 1947, Muslims had constituted a two-thirds 
majority in the Jammu province—unlike Hindus and Sikhs who were a small minority in the 
hilly areas of Azad Kashmir.22 After the violence, Muslims became a minority in Jammu. 
For Tehreek history-writers, the official silencing of the “Massacre” in Jammu is neither 
surprising nor incidental. In their view, the silencing represents a constitutive absence within 
Indian narratives that depict the last Dogra ruler not only as “benevolent” but also “legitimate,” 
and hence his accession to India as a valid sovereign act. In Tehreek accounts, the trauma of the 
event is heightened by the fact that even in the midst of the greatest violence, the Dogra ruler’s 
actions had evoked no international censure at that time, or subsequently. Instead, what became 
the predominant view was the “state propaganda” that the Indian forces were in Jammu and 
Kashmir to protect Kashmiris from the kabayalis.  
This view, according to Tehreek history-writers, had ignored several facts. First, that 
there was an ongoing popular anti-monarchical Tehreek in Kashmir, which had since 1944 
demanded the end of monarchy. In the face of ethnic cleansing in Jammu which started right 
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after August 15, 1947, this Tehreek had morphed into an active rebellion in the border areas of 
Poonch. Second, the Dogra ruler had effectively lost power over vast territories to these 
spontaneous uprisings. When he signed the accession treaty, he had escaped from his subjects in 
Kashmir and abandoned his capital Srinagar. And, third, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in 
Jammu was evidence that, as a monarch, Hari Singh represented only the interests of the 
minority Hindus and not those of most of his subjects. All this had preceded the arrival of the so-
called kabayalis toward the last days of October in 1947. 
The question over the “legality” of Indian presence in the region, and the larger question 
of “foreign interventions” in Kashmir, is another point of contestation for Tehreek history-
writers. Did the troops from India enter Kashmir in 1947 even before the treaty was signed? If 
so, did their presence in Kashmir effectively constitute an “invasion,” as Tehreek history-writers, 
parties, and activists claim? (see figures 5 and 6). Historians and legal scholars have long argued 
over the date Hari Singh signed the treaty. Those who claim that Indian forces entered Kashmir 
legally insist that the king had signed the treaty on October 26, 1947, the same day that the 
Indian troops landed in Srinagar.  
Others, like Alistair Lamb (1994), claim the treaty was signed on October 27, suggesting 
the troops had landed illegally a day before the signing. Lamb has also argued that troops from 
the Indian state of Patiala had already entered Kashmir to defend the Dogra rule, much before the 
signing (1994, 130-32). According to Indian accounts, the first “foreign intervention” in Kashmir 
in 1947 took place from the Pakistani side when kabayali lashkars (“tribal militias”) arrived 
from the Pakistani region of the North-West Frontier Province in late October. Tehreek history-




jathas or Hindu militias, who were part of rightwing Indian Hindu nationalist organizations, 
joined Dogra troops to evict Muslims from Jammu in August 1947.23  
                                                 
23 See Introduction for more on this.  
Figure 5. “Forgetting is a luxury, oppressed can’t afford.” Students issue a poster to mark the day Indian soldiers first 





Figure 6. A Tehreek organization issues an Urdu poster for circulation calling for a shutdown to mark October 27 as a 




Lessons of history 
What these contentions over “foreign intervention” (that go even farther back, and 
include questions over the origins of Qadir) really point to is that the state’s legitimacy remains 
deeply contested. Tehreek history-writers revisit these historical events in detail because, in their 
view, illuminating the “imperial nature” of the Indian state’s relationship with Kashmir, as well 
as its basis in the originary violence of 1947, is central to their right to self-determination claim. 
The contestations over the events of 1947 also underline how the historical experience in 
Kashmir is felt as traumatic. This trauma is exacerbated by the way this experience is silenced or 
misrepresented within official accounts. As my conversations with Shakil Bakshi, Zahir-ud-Din 
and other Tehreek history-writers suggest, writing history takes on a therapeutic role. 
For Tehreek history-writers, 1846 and 1947 as critical events evoke a sense of 
helplessness in the face of history. The years 1931 and 1989-90, by contrast, represent Kashmiri 
attempts to make their history. As Zahir-ud-Din put it: “The 1990 uprising was about reclaiming 
and fulfilling the promise of freedom that the 1931 uprising had originally unleashed.” The 1931 
uprising had provided a sense of belief in collective resistance and an ability to envision a future 
of emancipation. The legacy of 1931, however, is complicated by the events of 1947, which went 
against Kashmiri aspirations of freedom. As such, despite its memory becoming a source of hope 
within the longer history of oppression, the 1931 movement’s own interrupted trajectory is 
interpreted as “instructive” and “sobering.” Here, for instance, the role of Sheikh Abdullah has 
become a cause of much expressed agony.  
External forces beyond Kashmiri control led to the 1947 debacle, but Tehreek history-
writers see Kashmir’s own political leadership of the era, including those who had led the 1931 




liberation,” it was because Kashmiri leaders, especially from the dominant National Conference 
party, which had emerged out of the 1931 movement, were both “opportunistic” and “incapable 
of apprehending the historical transformations” taking place in the subcontinent. Tehreek 
history-writers concede that the monarchy had ended in 1947 due to the National Conference’s 
efforts, but it was a “pyrrhic victory.” Dogra rulers had abdicated the throne on their own terms 
and transferred power to India, thus disallowing “popular sovereignty” in Kashmir.    
But an independent Kashmir was possible in 1947, Tehreek history-writers claim. The 
uncertain, intervening era between the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in August 1947 
and the Indian takeover of Kashmir in October 1947, had allowed the possibility, and even brief 
experiments, with precisely such an idea. For instance, several Tehreek organizations in 1947 
(Muslim Conference, Socialist Party, Kisan and Mazdoor Conference) had announced Tehreek’s 
eventual goal to be popular sovereignty and full citizenship rights in an independent Kashmir 
state. Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference had adopted manifesto Naya Kashmir (“New 
Kashmir”) in 1944, which laid out this vision of independence in some detail. But then he not 
only went back on his party’s own popular stance on the question of sovereignty, he had, even 
more tragically, done so during the ethnic cleansing happening in Jammu. Indeed, as Tehreek 
history-writers like to point out, Abdullah’s decision faced opposition, not only from other 
parties in Kashmir but also from members within his own party.24 But those who opposed him 
were excluded, exiled, and gradually silenced.  
                                                 
24 The original party to come out of the 1931 movement was called Muslim Conference, from which National 
Conference split off in 1939. National Conference claimed support of significant sections of Kashmiri peasantry. 
Yet, another party called Kisan Mazdoor (Peasant and Worker) Conference also claimed support of the peasantry. 
Kisan Mazdoor Party first supported independence and later the idea of accession to Pakistan over accession to 
India. Those who had remained as part of the Muslim Conference supported an independent state, even if under a 
constitutional monarchy. Kashmir’s Socialist Party, a small group of people sensing Dogra intentions, chose to 
support accession to Pakistan. In short none of the parties supported accession to India in Kashmir. There was just 
one party in Jammu, Praja Parishad, which represented the interests of small group of upper-caste Hindu landlords in 




Around the same time, the idea of an independent Kashmir had found a brief, but a more 
concrete manifestation. In the south-western regions of the Kashmir state, where Muslim 
Conference was dominant, a provisional independent state called “Azad Kashmir” (Free 
Kashmir) had been declared. Yet, Azad Kashmir, as a truly free state, lasted only a few weeks 
before it was formally taken over by Pakistan. This nominally free state remained under 
Pakistani control after the India-Pakistan war of 1947-49, which ended after the UNSC 
resolutions led to a ceasefire but not the withdrawal of the two militaries from the areas under 
their control at that time. 
“Nation” and the ghost of Sheikh Abdullah 
 Given the checkered legacy of the “first freedom struggle,” the key question that 
Tehreek history-writers ask themselves, in the context of the 1990 uprising, has been how to 
“safeguard the struggle from within” and take it to its mantaqi anjaam (logical conclusion), 
without “failing” yet again. While it is critical for them to contest the Indian accounts as well as 
revisit the role of Kashmiri leaders in the 1947 debacle, they understand the question of 
safeguarding the struggle from within as “creating a people conscious of the past,” who can 
“hold their leaders accountable.” Accordingly, their work raises historical consciousness among 
Kashmiris. The words of a youth activist from Anantnag, discussing Zahir-ud-Din’s essays, 
suggests what this might mean:  
India controls our minds by trying to make their occupation of Kashmir look like a natural 
historical fact, as if this is how our life was supposed to be, as if this is the only possibility there 
was. The government tells us to forget the past and azadi, instead work towards “development” 




possible; we were once very close to achieving it. To achieve azadi, we need to become a ba-
sha’oor qaum [“dignified national community”]. 
On one side, Tehreek history-writers expose the violence embedded within official 
accounts of Kashmiri history and disrupt its normalization in everyday discourse. On the other, 
they also attempt to reconstruct a ba-sha’oor qaum—a new people—as Shakil Bakshi put it. This 
latter idea is often vaguely defined as a “people capable of learning from the past,” but without 
any usual linguistic or religious undertones. I will try to explain ahead why the idea of a 
“dignified nation” may not have found a more concrete definition in Tehreek narratives.  
Several commentators have argued that the dramatic scenes witnessed in Kashmir in 
1990 expressed an emergent- or proto-nationalism (Varshney 1991; Bose 2003). Some of these 
assertions presume that the ideas of nationalism had either been absent previously, or, more 
problematically, these ideas had all by themselves acquired a historical momentum resulting in 
the uprising. In Bose’s (2003) more nuanced view, the manipulation of elections in Kashmir is 
seen to have finally driven people to challenge India. It is widely accepted that the Indian 
establishment had reduced “democracy” in Kashmir to an exercise of hand-selecting loyalist 
Kashmiri politicians in farcical elections,25 but these accounts fail to explain why it was only the 
rigged elections of 1987, and not those held over the previous forty years, that had led to the 
mass mobilization and armed movement.  
Kashmiri qaum or nation, as an idea, had existed long before its proclaimed emergence in 
1990. For Tehreek history-writers, “nationalism” as a language of belonging represents an 
earlier, though besmirched stage within Tehreek. This stage is the era of 1940s and 1950s, the 
only time when an effort was made in Kashmir to turn “nation-building” into an actual, state-
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oriented project. This nationalism, represented by the figure of Sheikh Abdullah, had failed to 
take the project toward popular sovereignty. In 1939, Sheikh Abdullah had forged the National 
Conference, out of the Muslim Conference, as a nationalist party. The National Conference 
claimed to represent all the subjects of the Dogra state, and not just Muslims. But in the 
aftermath of his endorsement of the accession treaty, Abdullah found himself vacillating between 
the idea of a Kashmiri national identity and an Indian one. Since Indian leaders sought to 
centralize the state, the contradiction between the Kashmiri and the Indian national identities 
became accentuated. (Perhaps, if Indian leaders had pursued a confederal postcolonial order—
which Abdullah had been led to believe—things might have turned out differently). 
As Tehreek history-writers see it, by endorsing the accession, Abdullah had “betrayed 
people’s love.” Yet, people appear not to have protested Abdullah (at least not en masse), nor did 
he face rebellion within his own ranks. Tehreek history-writers, like Zahir-ud-Din, give two 
reasons for this. First, Abdullah had kept a critical part of his “promise”: carrying out 
comprehensive land reforms, which provided immediate relief to the Kashmiri peasantry. 
Second, Abdullah’s emergent frictions with India, which came to a head in 1953, were 
interpreted in Kashmir as a hope that Abdullah would eventually lead them to freedom from 
India too, just as he had led them in the struggle against the Dogra state.  
In 1953, India removed Abdullah as the Prime Minister of Kashmir and arrested him. 
While Abdullah spent years in prison, his former deputies denounced him, and jockeyed for 
power and Indian patronage. Under them, the suppression of dissent, which had already started 
under Abdullah, became more intense. This jockeying for power and suppression of dissent 
allowed the Indian state to become more intrusive in the public affairs of Kashmir, eroding even 




return to Kashmir in 1975, the conditions for his rehabilitation included that he drop the idea of 
Plebiscite, which some of his loyalists had adopted as a slogan after 1953 for their new party, 
Plebiscite Front. In return, his family was assured a slice of power and patronage in Kashmir, but 
it earned him no goodwill from the Kashmiri masses. Yet, why people had accepted Abdullah for 
so long, could not be explained simply based on his land reforms or his frictions with India.  
Given this background, Tehreek history-writers are wary of turning the idea of “nation,” 
as it had come to be associated with the politics of National Conference, into a “romantic ideal.” 
Nationalism associated with the failure of post-1947 Kashmiri politics is seen neither as a 
consistent nor desirable idea. If anything, by acceding to the overall dominance of Indian 
nationalism, nationalists like Abdullah had, in the eyes of Tehreek history-writers, only paid “lip 
service to Kashmiri nationalism.” Abdullah’s brand of nationalism had ended up initiating a 
“gradual dissolution of Kashmiris as a people.” As the logic of Indian nationalism demanded, the 
Kashmiri nation would have to gradually assimilate into the “Indian national mainstream.”  
Nevertheless, most Tehreek history-writers resent that the figure of Abdullah and his 
National Conference had been allowed to appropriate the entire idea of the nation. JKLF, which 
led the 1990 uprising, had attempted to reinstate the question of “nation.” In some respects, 
JKLF had even succeeded in separating it from National Conference and reorient it toward its 
original intent: establishing popular sovereignty in Kashmir. Yet, the idea had faltered again 
within a few years, this time under the onslaught of the Pakistani-backed Islamist groups in 
Kashmir. The Islamist groups, like Jama’at Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen, contended that 
“nationalism” as an ideological form needed to be overcome (that nationalism was “unIslamic”), 
even though “Kashmiris-as-a-nation” remained their strategic refrain based on which they alone 




the pro-Pakistani Islamist position on nationalism is “hypocritical,” because these groups want to 
replace Kashmiri nationalism with Pakistani nationalism.  
Caught between the “lip service nationalism” of the National Conference and the 
“hypocritical nationalism” of the pro-Pakistan parties, Tehreek history-writers saw the task of 
Tehreek as a critical imperative: to create a “new people.” “Not a nation of cattle,” as Shakil 
Bakshi put it, “But a people conscious of their past, who cannot be betrayed again.” The solution 
to the always interrupted, always insufficient becoming of the people was seen to lie in the 
retelling of Kashmir’s history—both its “grievous” chapters (1846 and 1947) as well as the 
moments that represented “resistance” (1931 and 1989-90). Attesting to this political imperative, 
a Tehreek history-writer at an event marking the “Indian invasion of October 26, 1947” told his 
audience:  
So much has been hidden from the people, they must know the truth, even if that truth is bitter 
and it might lead us to dislike ourselves.  
History as identity? 
Artifice and the ideological construction of “Kashmiriyat”  
From the beginning, the Indian establishment’s response to Tehreek had been a tough, 
multi-faceted effort to discredit the movement. Apart from the military crackdown and the 
emergency laws, government functionaries would often remind Kashmiris that “the clock could 
not be turned back” and that “Azadi had already come in 1947.” In 1994, India’s parliament 




from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means.”26 This pronouncement 
closed the possibility of carrying out the UNSC resolutions, especially the plebiscite, which had 
become the legal basis for the “Kashmir Dispute.”27 The state media declared Tehreek to be a 
“Pakistani conspiracy.” Kashmiris who had joined the movement were regularly described as 
gumrah naujawan (misled youngsters), Tehreek activists as “Islamic fundamentalists,” and 
Tehreek itself as a symptom of “Muslim communalism.”  
If the “tough” face of the state saw Kashmiris as extremists liable to punitive 
containment, there was a “soft” face of the state too. This face proceeded to ideologically justify 
India’s control over Kashmir based on a contradictory discourse. A shared “secular culture” of a 
harmonious coexistence of Muslims and Hindus linked Kashmiris with India, instead of with 
Pakistan, to the extent that Kashmir represented India’s “secular crown” (Engineer 1991). Some 
commentators saw Kashmir as a syncretic, civilizational “melting pot” of Islamic and Hindu 
mysticisms, unsuited to a confessional Pakistan, but occupying a position as vital within India as 
that of “ancient Greece in European Civilization” (Puri 1995, 60). This “culture” was given a 
rather unimaginative, and a hastily invented name: “Kashmiriyat.”  
On one side, therefore, Kashmiris were depicted as “communal separatists” for 
demanding independence, on the other, they also possessed a “secular, syncretic culture”—of 
course, only if they accepted Indian authority. As part of this ideological construction of 
Kashmiriyat, the Indian state could not completely deny the existence of Kashmiris as a people, 
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(Lok Sabha) Resolution of February 22, 1994, which was passed unanimously. See more in Chapter 5 on the 
consequences of this resolution. 
27 “Kashmir Dispute” is the term used to describe the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, 
the basis of which are the UNSC resolutions. But Tehreek parties, principally JKLF, claim the main dispute is 




but their peoplehood was mandated only in terms of a transient regional (linguistic) identity that 
would eventually meld into or be subsumed under the singular Indian national identity.28 
For Tehreek history-writers, in contrast, Kashmiriyat was to be opposed, in the way the 
Indian state used the idea. As Zahir-ud-Din put it, “The state uses the concept to whitewash the 
actual historical experiences of Kashmiri Muslims who had been exclusively oppressed under the 
Dogras and the Indian state.” The notion of “harmonious coexistence” between, what they 
describe as, the “dominant Hindu minority” and the “dominated Muslim majority,” had glossed 
over the historically “antagonistic political and economic positions” within the state structures 
that the two had occupied. Not to mention the term had limited “Kashmiri culture” to a single 
relation, “Hindu-Muslim,” to the exclusion of other complex relations that intersected daily life 
in Kashmir.  
It was no surprise, then, when one history-writer bitterly called Kashmiriyat a 
“histortion,” a portmanteau expression consisting of history and distortion (probably his own 
invention). Using a Kashmiri expression, he claimed the term to be a noon phol (a lump of salt), 
which, when forced into the mouths, makes people to lose their tongue. To him, the Indian 
discourse of Kashmiriyat had left Kashmiris unable to articulate their politics coherently, until 
the 1990 uprising ruptured that “hegemony.” Because of the rupture, the limited notion of 
Kashmiriyat, deployed as a legitimating idea behind the occupation, was called into question. 
This was also the time when the Hindu majoritarian impulses behind “Indian secularism” were 
coming to the surface,29 leaving Kashmiriyat with no parallel ideal in India. In the eyes of 
                                                 
28 Within the Indian context, “secularism” is not primarily defined as the separation of religion and the state, but as 
the state’s “equidistance” from different, recognized religions. The equidistance is hardly achievable given that 
majoritarianism is expressly the defining aspect of the political landscape, vividly exhibited in the way Hindu 
nationalist parties in India secure power by appealing to the religious identity of the majority.  
29 Around the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Hindu right-wing had grown into a full-blown movement in India. 




Tehreek history-writers, the transition of India’s political culture toward Hindu majoritarianism 
made the official discourse of secularism, especially in relation to Kashmir, anachronistic, and 
even disingenuous. 
Tehreek history-writers, however, do not dismiss the idea of secularity as such. They 
rather see it as a deeply pluralist “ethos,” a feature they believe Kashmiris share with Indians, but 
also with Pakistanis and other peoples of the subcontinent. As ethos, secularity stays beneath the 
realm of state secularism. It is not a state project, but an interpersonal ethic. It is embedded and 
interwoven within the everyday life in Kashmiri villages or urban neighborhoods. According to 
Tehreek history-writers, then, this ethos needs to be historically reclaimed for its intrinsic 
meaning. Tehreek history-writers point out, for instance, that while the Dogra monarchy and the 
Indian state had “fostered differences” between Muslims and Hindus as a state policy, Kashmiris 
must not trap themselves within a “communalist perspective,” nor allow state propaganda to 
define Kashmiri Muslim identity in “sectarian” terms. It was the depth of this pluralist ethos that 
had bound Kashmiris together, despite the uneasy political differences that often ran along 
identitarian lines.   
Given this understanding, Tehreek history-writers see the Indian claim that “Kashmir is 
an integral part of India” as one based on the territorial impulse behind Hindu nationalism 
instead of a “shared secular culture.” The Indian claim posits a conception of the state’s “national 
space” that conveniently overlaps with the Hindu nationalist conception of India as the sacred 
geo-body of the deity Bharat Mata (or, goddess Mother India). Tehreek history-writers suggest 
that Kashmir as “secular crown” is the crown of Bharat Mata. As a territorial deity, Bharat Mata, 
is often depicted in Hindu nationalist iconography as standing in front of the map of India, 
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astride a tiger or lion, and bedecked with weapons and ornate jewelry (Ramaswamy 2010). In 
these depictions, the goddess’s crown sits exactly where Kashmir is located on the map.  
For Tehreek history-writers, peeling away the multiple layers of state discourse on 
Kashmir or challenging Indian secularism is only one part of the problem. The other part is to 
replace this discourse with an alternative, coherent account that can become the ground for a new 
Kashmiri political subjectivity. As already stated, Tehreek history-writers frame the events of 
1989-90 as “historic.” In my view, doing so expresses a desire to narrate the Tehreek uprising as 
“revolutionary,” and to plot an alternative history of Kashmir in terms of “resistance” and 
“struggle”—expressions I often heard Tehreek history-writers use. In this alternative history, the 
main actors will no longer be the states (India or Pakistan) or the statesmen (Nehru, Jinnah, 
Gandhi).30 Neither will its driving logic be territorial expansionism masked as nationalist fictions 
(Kashmir neither as India’s “secular crown” nor as Pakistan’s “jugular vein”). “The new 
history,” as Zahir-ud-Din says, “would be centered on the Kashmiri people and their sentiments.”  
In some ways, the contours and elements of such an endeavor are not hard to locate. 
Kashmir has had a rather continuous, dialogic tradition of Sanskrit-Persian writings that can be 
broadly seen as mytho-historical in content. Drawn from kāvyās and tāreekhs, this tradition 
locates Kashmir as a cultural-political realm of its own. In these accounts, as historian 
Chitralekha Zutshi points out, Kashmir is imagined as a “specific mulk” or country (2013, 215). 
Yet, these accounts are written from the perspectives of the ruling dynasties, validating their rule, 
and composed in languages of power. So, while these works can become cultural reservoirs for 
the kinds of pluralist accounts Tehreek history-writers want to write, they hardly aid in the task 
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of writing a “people’s history.” Even this pluralist tradition faces challenge from communalist 
paradigms that grew first under the Dogras and then under Indian rule. These paradigms also 
present internal challenges to Tehreek history-writing in Kashmir, as the example below will 
illustrate.  
Communalist histories  
Before I had watched Ghulam Qadir Lone’s talk “J&K History” [Lone 2014], I was 
acquainted with the “communalist” problem in Kashmiri history writing. The communalist view 
involved taking the difference in “Hindu” and “Muslim” historical experiences in Kashmir as a 
given. The communalist mode of history writing in the subcontinent had initially developed 
under British historians of India. Emphasizing the religion followed by the ruling dynasties, 
British historians divided the subcontinental history into the Hindu, the Muslim, and the colonial 
periods.31 In many such accounts, the “Muslim period” was presented as a long history of 
oppression of Hindus, who had finally been liberated by the enlightened British rule.32 This 
mode of history writing was then selectively appropriated by Hindu nationalist historians in 
India, and later by Pakistani historians. Hindu nationalist historians saw ancient India as a 
“golden age” under Hindu monarchs, which was interrupted first by “foreign Muslim invaders” 
and then by the British colonizers.33 Pakistani historians, on the other hand, took as their primary 
interest the era beginning with the first time a Muslim Arab army arrived in the subcontinent 
                                                 
31 James Mill’s six volume The History of British India (first published 1818) was a key text that created such a 
periodization.  
32 For problems with this communal periodization in India, see Torri (2014).  
33 In this tradition, R. C. Majumdar’s History and Culture of the Indian People (first volume issued 1951) is the 




(712 CE) and ending with the birth of Pakistan.34 Both Hindu and Muslim communal 
historiography sees history as a long process of separate “national” struggles culminating in the 
formation of India and Pakistan respectively.  
In Kashmir, a similar communalist mode of history writing had developed, first under the 
Dogra patronage and then supported by the Indian government. It had adopted key elements of 
Hindu nationalist historiography. There had been a “Hindu golden age” before the 13th century in 
Kashmir. But the Hindu kingdom had frayed toward the end, due to its “effeminate” kings, 
“selfish” queens, and its “visionless” gurus. Into the chaos had walked “foreigners”—who 
became the first Muslim rulers of Kashmir (Parmu 1969, 77-86).35 Then, an Islamic preacher Mir 
Sayyid Ali Hamdani (1314-1384 CE) arrived from Iran and converted Hindus to Islam. For the 
next several hundred years, primarily under the Muslim sultans of Kashmir, Hindus were 
oppressed (except under Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin). This had largely continued through the Mughal 
and the Afghan eras until 1819. As Kashmir became predominantly Muslim, the small minority 
of Brahmins had finally found reprieve under the Dogras after 1846. Kashmir’s “integration” 
into a Hindu India was, thus, a natural culmination of this history. The Hindu communalist 
history writing presents Islam as “foreign” to Kashmir, and Pandits as its “indigenous” victims. 
The obvious question this mode of history writing did not address was what to do with the 
experiences of most Kashmiris who practiced Islam but were not part of the tiny ruling Muslim 
                                                 
34 Prominent in this tradition is A Short History of Pakistan (Volumes I—IV), edited by Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi. 
However, the first volume by Ahmad Hassan Dani, an archaeologist, includes a detailed account of the pre-Islamic 
societies of the region.    
35 Parmu’s account is one of the more sophisticated versions of this communal mode of history production, even 
though he would describe his own work as part of the Indian nationalist tradition. Parmu laments the 14th century 
loss of Hindu sovereignty in Kashmir and sees the “establishment of Islam” in Kashmir as part of the “Reign of 
terror.” His account of five hundred years of Muslim Sultans, Mughals and Pathans (Afghans) is mostly based on 
their treatment of Kashmiri Hindus. Only Zain-ul-Abedin (1420-70) is lauded for giving exalted status to Hindus 





dynasties. Were their experiences to be considered “foreign?” In any case, could the complex, 
seven-hundred-year-long story of Islamic faith in Kashmir be excised from history?   
That is why when I watched Ghulam Qadir Lone’s talk [Lone 2014], I saw his narrative 
possessing a form similar to the communalist accounts, but from the other side: 
Elements of the Rishi (a local mystic) movement had existed prior to the arrival of Islam in 
Kashmiri society. On the urging of Mir Hamdani, who visited Kashmir thrice [1372-1383 CE], a 
section of Rishis became Muslim. Sheikh Noorudin [b. 1377 CE], whose poetry has pre-Islamic 
and post-Islamic parts, took bayat [oath] with Hamdani’s Sufi teachings. Islamic principles 
became central to Rishiyat, which had previously not included emphasis on religious practices as 
such. Yet, several elements of Rishiyat even now remain unIslamic, and are qabil-e-tardeed 
[deserve rejection]. Hamdani’s Tehreek had involved a dawat [missionary preaching] of Islam, 
but this peaceful spread of religion had led to a cultural toleration of pre-Islamic traditions. 
 After Hamdani, dawat-e-Islam [inviting the unconverted to Islam] stopped, and it just 
became isha’at-e-Islam [preaching Islam to the converted]. Unfortunately, Hamdani, who was 
almost a contemporary of Ibn-Taymiyya,36 had not mentioned Ibn-Taymiyya at all—so there was 
not enough push to Islamize society. Yet, Hamdani’s work stood in contrast to Islamic political 
thinkers who had emphasized the conversion of non-Muslim rulers who would then islah’a 
[correct, purify] the society. Kashmir had had Muslim rulers since the 1320s, but it was not until 
Hamdani that Islam truly became embedded.37  
                                                 
36 Taqi-a-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE) born near Harran, close to the present day Syrian-Turkish border, was an 
iconoclastic Sunni theologian and logician who decried the accumulation of non-Islamic practices among Muslim 
societies. He had defined “un-Islamic” as anything that did not conform with the teachings of the Quran and the 
practices of Prophet Muhammad.   
37 The first Muslim ruler had been a Ladakhi convert from Buddhism, Rinchan, who had waded into Kashmir’s 
chaos when the ruling Hindu Lohara dynasty came under threat of a Mongol attack in 1320 CE. He had converted 
after meeting with a Muslim sufi, Bulbul Shah. Rinchan married a Hindu noble woman to gain acceptance among 
Kashmiris but was attacked and died of his wounds in 1323 CE. For a few years, the old Loharas returned. Then in 
1338, Rinchan’s Hindu widow, who had married a Lohara, became the queen. In 1339, a Muslim general in her 




Central to our history has been a desire for knowledge. Sultan Zainul Abidin had alm-i-
zauq [passion for knowledge]; he brought scholars of Sanskrit and Persian together. But the 
Mughals, who overtook Kashmir through deceit, humiliated the Kashmiri Chak rulers and 
changed our social nature. We were fiercely independent-minded, but they turned us into being 
slavish. A tragic fact of history is that it was a few sectarian Sunni alims [scholars] who invited 
Mughals to Kashmir. Mughals were Muslims, but their character had a stain: they never kept their 
word. When Afghans came, they treated us like beasts of burden. Dogra rule arrived as a qayamat 
[catastrophe]. They imposed the death penalty for cow slaughter. For a murder, a Muslim would 
receive the death penalty, but a Hindu could just pay 12 rupees, out of which 2 would go to the 
victim’s family, and 10 into the royal treasury.  
The arrival of Islam in Kashmir had brought great progress: our handicrafts, our art, and 
our culture saw a renaissance. We became Iran-e-saghir [Little Iran]. By the time the Dogras 
were finished with us, we didn’t even have trousers left in our culture anymore.38 Now India tells 
us don’t eat beef. We accept it. We don’t even ask why.   
Ghulam Qadir Lone is an Arabic scholar from Rafiabad in North Kashmir. Author of 
several books, which include an exegetical composition on Sufi thought and a comparative work 
on philosophers Muhammad Iqbal and Friedrich Nietzsche, he speaks regularly to his devoted 
followers in Fallah-u-Darien, an Islamic charity group in North Kashmir.39 A few months before 
his talk had been video-recorded by members of Falluh-u-Darein, the government had arrested 
                                                 
38 One of the stories about Dogra rule goes that they had barred Kashmiris from wearing trousers—but maybe this 
was more a result of the general penury the Dogras had caused. Even in pre-Dogra eras, men and women wore long 
tunics with no trousers. 
39 Dr. Lone’s works are in Urdu: Mutala e Tasawuf: Quran wa sunnat ki roshini mein (“Meaning of Mysticism: In 
the light of Quran and Sunnat”], Iqbal aur Nietzsche ["Iqbal and Nietzsche”], Qurun e wusta mein Musalmaan 
sciencedaanon ke kaarname ["Achievements of Muslim Scientists influenced by the Quran”], Hazrat Khizer: 
tehkeek ki roshni mein [“Hazrat Khizer: in light of research” (2012)], and, Iqbal ka Jahan e aadam wa Iblees 





him, charging him, as is common under the occupation, with supporting the boycott of state 
elections.  
Lone’s historical narrative depicts Kashmir’s history as a series of trials and tribulations 
of Islam. His recurring trope is the strengths and weaknesses of Islamic fundamentals in society. 
Whatever does not fit into the logic of his view of Islam is an extraneous influence that needs to 
be removed. In naming Hamdani’s mission of spreading Islam as “Tehreek,” Lone draws a much 
longer view of the movement than is popular among Tehreek activists. Yet, for several 
contemporary groups, especially those supporting a merger with Pakistan, “freedom” will come 
when Islamic principles are firmly established. 
Clearly, Lone’s historical narrative of Kashmir excludes the history of both pre-Islamic 
pasts as well as that of non-Muslim peoples who have inhabited Kashmir. One can, however, 
detect an anti-sectarian streak in his narrative. Lone is himself sunni, yet excoriates medieval 
sunni alims for inviting a foreign power (Mughals) to conquer Kashmir out of spite for 
Kashmir’s indigenous Chak dynasty which followed shi’a Islam. Additionally, the geographic 
reference for his perspective is Kashmir and not the larger, geographically fluid Islamic world 
that the Islamist ideologues often invoke. Lone’s narrative is firmly emplaced in Kashmir. Yet, 
his view of the history of Kashmir remains closed in on itself. Could a historical narrative that 
covered a broad swath of Kashmir’s past truly have an inclusive pivot? Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din’s 
account provides a speculative beginning to an answer.  
“Origin stor(ies)” 
Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din (1928-2001) was a Kashmiri short-story writer, who had developed 




a house in Srinagar, Mohi-ud-Din noticed workers come across small Neolithic artifacts.40 He 
cleaned and preserve them for archaeological analysis. With growing excitement about 
archaeological finds at the nearby site of Burzahom (3000-1000 BCE),41 Mohi-ud-Din began to 
take a critical look at the myths about Kashmir’s past that had passed for historical facts. The 
Dogra state had enthusiastically authorized historical accounts centered on Hindu mythology, 
and British colonial officials, who dabbled in history and Sanskrit philology on the side, had lent 
credibility to such pursuits. Post-1947, the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), an old 
colonial-era institution, gave these originary myths a scientific veneer by supporting projects that 
would conduct “empirical research” in light of Hindu epics and myths. In survey after survey, for 
instance, the ASI focused on locating pre-Islamic Hindu artifacts in Kashmir, taking as its guide 
such literary texts as the epic Mahabharata.  
In response to this lack of institutional openness toward any alternative narrative of 
Kashmir’s past, Mohi-ud-Din decided to write his A Fresh Approach to the History of Kashmir 
(1998). A small monograph, it sought to reinterpret and revise Kashmir’s past by marshalling 
evidence from new advances in the study of Kashmiri language and archeology. Determined to 
upset the traditional gatekeepers of Kashmiri historiography, Mohi-ud-Din raised playful doubts 
about the predominant “origin story” of Kashmir (see below). For him, origin stories were tales 
that the dominant told the dominated. Taken to their extremes, however, these stories could 
become exclusionary and violent. Nevertheless, the seriousness of his purpose aside, Mohi-ud-
Din sought to open a conversation about possible “other histories” rather than to assert 
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 Conversation recorded with Azhar Hilal in August 2014. 
41 The prehistoric settlement of Burzahom was first excavated in 1939 by a joint Yale-Cambridge expedition, and 
during the 1960s further excavation was done by the Archaeological Survey of India. Most of the finds have been 




“objectivity” against the mythic, dominant account. The dominant origin story of Kashmir went 
something like this:42 
First, there was a lake called Satisar. Sanghraha, the chief of daityas (opponents of Aryan gods), 
saw the Aryan god Indra cavort with his wife Sachi on the banks of the lake. In a fit of passion for 
Sachi, Sangraha released his semen into the lake. From this semen was born an evil demon 
Jalodbhava (literally, “the water-born”), who the snake-worshipping community of Nagas raised. 
Jalodbhava did penance and earned immortality from an Aryan god, but soon began to devour 
humans (the Aryan children of Manu inhabiting its four varnas). A conference of the Aryan gods, 
which the itinerant sage Kashyapa had called, decided to kill the demon. The Naga chief Nila was 
taken into confidence. Afraid of the Aryan gods, but confident of his immortality, 
Jalodbhava jumped into the lake and remained hidden beneath water. Kashyapa ordered the 
Himalayas around the lake to be broken with a plough. As the water poured out, and Jalodbhava 
came into view, the Aryan god Hari fought Jalodbhava and cut off his head. As a penalty for 
raising Jalodbhava, Kashyapa ordered Nila’s Nagas to live among the Pisćasas (the cruel, lowly 
race of meat eating half-humans) for a four-fold epoch (or chaturyuga), after which they could 
live among the Aryans. Kashyapa assured everyone that Pisćasas would always remain weak and 
dominated. The dried lakebed became Kashmir, after Kashyap-Mira. 
To Mohi-ud-Din, the classic justifications for the caste order, its associated notions of 
purity and impurity, and the sexual anxieties of the Brahmin overlords was obvious. But this was 
no ordinary story of good versus evil. It set forth a complex narrative matrix upon which 
contemporary politics in and on Kashmir had remained bitterly divided. Before Mohi-ud-Din, the 
tale had never been challenged. A few medieval Muslim chroniclers had incorporated elements 
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of this myth in their Persian accounts. Since, the origin story had been propagated mostly in 
Sanskrit and Persian texts, with strong references to Vedic culture, it was not part of the oral 
tradition among Kashmiris (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 30).  
In my own repeated attempts to get a sense of how popular this story was, I hardly found 
anyone, even among older people, who could narrate it in full or even in part. Instead, I often 
heard people refer to the story of Sheikh Nooruddin (“Nund-reosh,” 1377-1440 CE) and Lalla 
(“Lal Ded,” 1320-1392 CE). Nund-reosh and Lal Ded, popular among both Muslims and Hindus 
of Kashmir, are the patron spiritual saints of Kashmiris. They are the first ones who elevated the 
Kashmiri language (or “Koshur”) to a literary-poetic status. Nund wrote his verse as shroks, Lal 
had written hers as vatsun. Both shroks and vatsun are inflected by Shaivite and Sufi thought.43 
Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus claim both as their own. Muslims see Lal, a Brahmin renouncer, 
as the founder of the Rishis as well as a spiritual mother to Nund. Hindus see Nund, a Muslim, as 
a yogi in his own right. Neither denies the impress of others’ faith in their poetry and spirituality. 
Only in recent years, have some Muslim and Hindu intellectuals in Kashmir begun to emphasize 
Nund’s Muslimness and Lal’s Hinduness (Hoskote 2011, xxviii-xxx).44 Despite their efforts, 
however, the Nund-Lal story, a delicate, composite tradition—like a Kashmiri shawl—remains 
inextricably interwoven into popular memory.  
Indian nationalist historians have, nevertheless, maintained the Kashyapa story as the key 
origin story. Even those who claim to be “secular” remain beholden to it, and read any attempt to 
                                                 
43 Shaivism, a monist metaphysical tradition involving yogic practice to attain mokhsha, emerged in Kashmir around 
850 CE. Sufism goes back to the early years of Islam in the 8th CE. Formalized as doctrines centuries later, it 
established spiritual practices to pass through four stages of purification (suf) to arrive at haq. Sufism arrived in 
Kashmir around the time Lal was reaching her poetic maturity and Nund was a young boy. 
44 Despite his dispassionate discussion of this narrow politics of appropriation, Hoskote is himself keen to place Lal 
within a Sanskrit cultural world and thought, instead of the Kashmiri one in which Lal wrote, and for which she 
remains popular. Hoskote, questionably, suggests that contemplating poetic, spiritual thought in Kashmiri must have 




question the myth as a sign of “Muslim communalism,” or even, strangely, a fall into the evils of 
“objectivism.” For Mohi-ud-Din, there was no logical, aesthetic, or ethical reason to believe that 
the Kashyapa story was a “historical truth,” and, especially, no reason not to speculate about 
other possible stories, which if nothing else could at least pluralize the Kashmiri narrative 
tradition.  
Instead of challenging Brahmins for sacralizing myths, which he rightly thought was no 
crime, Mohi-ud-Din took on British colonial historians who had overly relied on Sanskrit texts 
and presented myths as history (1998, 40). Prominent among these was Aurel Stein, a 
Hungarian-British archaeologist, a “Great Game” strategist, and a translator of Rajatarangini.45 
Rajatarangini, or River of Kings, a 12th CE kavya (long Sanskrit poem) written by Kalhana, 
presented a chronology of kingly events in Kashmir and an imaginative account of Kashmiri 
geography. Parts of the poem, most importantly the origin story, were probably drawn from an 
eighth century Sanskrit text called Nilamata Purana, which falls into the genre of the Brahmin 
oral and textual tradition that records the legends of gods and goddesses, among other things. 
Aurel Stein hadn’t been interested in simply translating the classic text, as Mohi-ud-Din 
realized. He had set out to unearth the cultural world to which Kalhana had belonged, and which, 
Stein thought, had become subsequently “polluted.” To do this, Stein took the twelfth-century 
place-names from Rajatarangini to locate their correlates in twentieth-century Kashmir. In doing 
this, Stein almost pre-figured to a letter the ASI’s program in Kashmir half a century later, only 
this time ASI’s archeo-nationalists would be armed with a different poem, the Mahabharata. 
What surprised Mohi-ud-Din was that Stein had always been able to definitively locate the place-
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names found in Rajatarangini, although in a “corrupted” form. It was as if Kashmir’s history in 
the aftermath of “classical Sanskrit” times had just been a long period of stasis or cultural 
degeneration; as if nothing had moved fundamentally, everything had just collected dust and 
grass. For Stein, scholarly work meant separating what was “pure,” Sanskrit or deva bhaśa 
(language of the gods), from what was “corrupted,” Kashmiri or loka bhaśa (language of the 
commoners). Kashmiri Muslims, in Stein’s scheme, were sitting atop a vast Sanskrit culture, 
which had to be recovered and its primacy reestablished. Rajatarangini was to be the guiding 
map. This was sweet music to the Dogra maharaja’s ears, who was keen to consolidate his 
reputation as a Hindu king ruling over a sacred Hindu domain—even though more than three-
quarters of his subjects were Muslim.  
While Mohi-ud-Din saw Stein’s entire approach as flawed, he took issues with Stein’s 
“shoddy” methods. Stein had, according to Mohi-ud-Din, been quite casual in his research, going 
to Kashmiri villagers and asking questions to which the latter would have no way of providing 
valid answers. With generous help from his Pandit informants, Stein mostly asked about place-
names and then “twisted” his findings enough to make what he had heard sound like names he 
had read in the Rajatarangini (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 42-62). Here is what Mohi-ud-Din had to say:  
We Kashmiris are generally intelligent conversationalists…But when it comes to spinning yarn, 
God bless us! …I wonder how it happened that Sir Aurel Stein always got the right answers to his 
queries, or was it that his subordinates prompted the interviewees to say exactly what was 
palatable to their Bod Sahib (the big colonial boss)? (1998, 77).  
The Pandits had found in their Bod Sahib not only a sympathetic listener, but one who 
went beyond their interest in maintaining a myth, to being a zealous defender of the mythic 




by making the Rajatarangini available to a much larger audience, but at the same time he had 
done a disservice to Kashmir by contributing to turning a mythical story, which was part of 
Kashmir’s cultural repertoire, into an ideological project. Interestingly, Romila Thapar, who sees 
Rajatarangini as a historical kaavya rather than a fictional kaavya, claims that Aurel Stein had 
wrongly argued that the text was intended to be for “didactic religion and not history.” 
According to Thapar, while Kalhana had called his writing kaavya, this should not be treated to 
be a disclaimer for his writing to be seen as history. She even approves of the view that 
Rajatarangini’s historical nature could be attributed to a “demarcation of Kashmir, suggesting a 
sense of nationalism at the time” (Thapar 2013, 598-599). It is, however, a mistake to treat all 
parts of Rajatarangini as historical in nature—except the part where Kalhana was writing about 
his own era. It is an even bigger mistake to talk about a “sense of nationalism” in 12th century 
Kashmir, even though one can clearly state that a sense of Kashmir as an autonomous geographic 
realm may very well have existed. Kalhana himself did not associate his work with the masses, 
whose language he saw as a “vulgur speech fit for drunkards” (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 30).  
To present an alternative “origin story,” Mohi-ud-Din sought inspiration from two major 
sources. First, he read George Abraham Grierson’s A Dictionary of Kashmiri Language (1898). 
Upturning conventional wisdom that Sanskrit was the mother language of all others, Grierson 
had argued that Kashmiri had more likely emerged from an older group of subcontinental 
languages closely related to Dardic. Second, Mohi-ud-Din had closely followed the latest 
archaeological discoveries at sites such as Burzahom in Srinagar as well as the analysis of 
artefacts found in Indus Valley Civilization sites. These new findings indicated that the Indus 
Valley Civilization, which preceded the Aryan arrival/invasions into the subcontinent in 1500 




around archeological sites in Srinagar to collect terracotta figurines and pottery shards, and 
interpreted his findings with remarkable sophistication to support his new arguments (1998, 63-
82). All of this was enough grist for Mohi-ud-Din to speculate on an alternative origin story. 
To begin with, Mohi-ud-Din argued that there was a deeper culture that lay buried 
underneath the so-called “Sanskritic culture” Stein had been searching for, and the remnants of 
this deep culture had survived in Kashmiri cultural unconscious. There may have been a vast 
lake, he wrote, but the demon story was just a latter-day myth woven around what was 
essentially an invasion of Kashmir and the domination of its natives. Mohi-ud-Din also pointed 
out that Nagas (“snake-worshippers”) and Pisćasas (“meat-eaters”), described in Sanskrit texts as 
two distinct groups, were in fact one people. “Nagas” and “Pisćasas” described only their 
religious and cultural (their meat eating) practices, respectively. Drawing from Grierson, Mohi-
ud-Din wrote, these people spoke a language close to Dardic, which itself may have been part of 
a language from which Dravidian languages emerged (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 10).  
Mohi-ud-Din was confident that the people of the ancient urban civilization of the Indus 
Valley spoke something close to Dravidian. The nomadic Aryans, who arrived/invaded from the 
northwest around 1500 BC and may have destroyed the remnants of the Indus Valley 
civilization’s urban centers, took a few centuries before crossing the mountains into Kashmir. By 
this time, Mohi-ud-Din argues, the Aryans had lost some of their early aggression, even though it 
had not prevented them from relegating the natives of Kashmir to the position of sub-humans, 
who could not speak a “proper” language and were fit only for annihilation. Yet, much of this 
pre-Aryan population remained, and was absorbed into caste hierarchy as “low castes.” 
After an early period of domination, Mohi-ud-Din wrote, the popular turn to Buddhism in 




preaching through beautiful stories, parables, and fables, in their (common man’s) own tongue” 
(1998, 26). Buddhism in Kashmir appears thus to be a subaltern rebellion against the 
Brahminical caste order. The subaltern cause was helped by the conversion of the Mauryas, the 
dynasty that ruled Kashmir around that time, and of which Ashoka was the most powerful 
proponent, to Buddhism. According to Mohi-ud-Din, fragments of Buddhist stories and parables 
narrated in non-Sanskrit languages are still in cultural use in Kashmir, even though their origins 
have been forgotten. He gives the example of svod bror and bodh bror, two cats who appear in 
Kashmiri folk tales as wise sages, often sitting under a tree (Kashmiri: kulis tal), and who resolve 
crucial ethical dilemmas that arise in these tales. The two cats, in Mohi-ud-Din’s view, are 
one: svod is Siddhartha and bodh is Buddha, two names of Lord Buddha, who is often pictorially 
represented as meditating under a tree (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 84).  
Brahminism returned in full force around 600 CE when Brahmins from South India, who 
arrived in Kashmir from the Konkan region, made common cause with the ossified Buddhist 
clergy in Kashmir. But even then, the pre-Aryan cultural practices and beliefs continued to exist, 
Mohi-ud-Din argues. The common Kashmiri beliefs that serpents guard springs (springs are 
called “Nag” in Kashmiri language) and are not malevolent, folktales in which “the snake can 
assume human form on Earth (snakes live in talpatal, or the ‘nether world’), and even fall in love 
with human females,”46 and Kashmiri practice of putting cups of milk in front of snakes, all 
indicate the continuity of a distant past in the present (Mohi-ud-Din 1998, 11-12). He even 
argues that the 8th century Kashmiri philosophical traditions and spiritual wisdom, including 
shaivism and tantra, had their origins in pre-Aryan systems of belief comingling with Sanskrit 
traditions. 
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 There is a famous folktale, called “Heemal-Nagiray,” that professional Kashmiri singers still sing on occasion. The 




In Mohi-ud-Din’s view, the revival of Brahminism, which lasted six centuries, produced 
great cultural achievements, but the return of the oppressive caste system created the perfect 
opportunity for a new faith to make its way into Kashmir. Like Buddhism had earlier, Islam 
answered this need in the 14th century. Unlike Lone, however, Mohi-ud-Din’s central thread was 
the common people’s struggle against the oppressive social order, not an establishment of 
Islamic fundamentals. In Mohi-ud-Din’s alternative account, then, the driving force of Kashmiri 
history has always been the lengthy interplay of forces between the subaltern reactions to the 
structuring hierarchies of Brahminism and its revival.47 This history could be traced back all the 
way to the entry of the “Aryans” into Kashmir.  
Mohi-ud-Din’s Fresh Approach may just be another story, but it is a more plausible one 
than the Brahmin-Stein origin story. His narrative begins to explain how Kashmir may have 
swung from one religion to another. More importantly, Mohi-ud-Din also emphasizes locating 
historical resources that Kashmiris might employ to build a plural, accommodative cultural 
foundation for their politics of liberation. It came as no surprise to me that Mohi-ud-Din was 
quite sympathetic to Tehreek. In the early 1990s, he returned a major literary award given to him 
by the Indian government. He even joined the Hurriyat for some time.  
Could Mohi-ud-Din’s account become the grammar for a new historical narrative? Could 
the fractured Kashmiri past be sutured coherently enough to create the ground for a new 
Kashmiri political subjectivity that will assert both its right to be and demand rights? 
Communalist accounts, both Hindu and Muslim, have been subtractive in orientation. Hindu 
historiography sees Hinduism as the underlying cultural matrix of Kashmiri history. It ignores 
                                                 
47 Huma Dar, a Kashmiri scholar, has told me that the Persian term “azadi” derives from a combined root “a-zadi” 
where “zadi” is a variant of an Indic term jati or caste-community. Azadi is then “without-jati” or a struggle to 




the pre-Brahmanic pasts in Kashmir and sees Islam as an interruption. History, in this view, has 
been thrown off course and can get back on track when Kashmiris cast off “foreign” Islam. 
Islamic historiography sees Kashmiri history as the gradual establishment of Islamic 
fundamentals, which, in this view, could only happen at the cost of Kashmir’s pre-Islamic 
culture.  
Despite Mohi-ud-Din’s renouncing of Brahmanic hierarchies, one can see his notion of 
Kashmiri identity more as accumulative than subtractive. All the previous pasts and their 
contradictions continue to be present; none has been totally replaced. Brahmanism may have 
subjugated indigenous communities in Kashmir, but it could not eliminate them, their languages, 
or their practices. Buddhism may have become the dominant faith around 300 BCE, but it could 
not remove the power of Brahmanism. Nor could Brahmanism later, with its revival in the 8th 
century, remove the influence of eight hundred years of Buddhism in Kashmir. Islam may have 
become the religion of the court and the masses in medieval times, but it could not subdue the 
Brahmanical and Buddhist cultural sensibilities or practices. In the present, neither Hindu 
historiography nor the Islamic one appear close to the cherished purist visions they propound.  
  Yet, an accumulative notion of identity that could provide Tehreek a pluralist 
foundation is tragically upended by the subtractive logics of interstate politics in South Asia. 
Mohi-ud-Din’s account is essentially a historiography that presumes Kashmir as a unified, 
independent realm. The cultural or religious dialogues, even with their occasional frictions, 
happen between the the indigenous peoples and Brahmins, between Buddhists and Brahmins, 
between Brahmins and Muslims, and between Muslims and newer communities of Sikhs, 
Christians and others (including new schools of Islamic thought), within Kashmir. This is not an 




become part of Kashmir, their mutual interchanges are internal to Kashmir. Mohi-ud-Din’s 
Kashmir is, thus, a place where contradictions exist, but they are not resolved through the 
removal of one or the other. A balance is reached through accommodation. Yet, this balance 
comes under distress when Kashmir is longer a realm of its own.     
 
To imagine such a Kashmir under the present circumstances is a tough intellectual task. Writing 
an alternative history of the present would involve different symbolic and practical economies 
than the ones mandated by the state. How is one to enunciate the alternative, often interrupted, 
history of “resistance” without subsuming the amorphous category of “people” into the logics of 
the state and power? What does it look like to write about the past from a perspective that has 
been historically suppressed? These questions, which Tehreek history-writers ask of themselves, 
turn their acts of writing into an agonistic struggle: To excavate elements of political subjectivity 
from the past and rearrange them for the purposes of the present. In Zahir-ud-Din’s work, some 
of the contours (the beginnings, the themes, the sources, and the voices) of their alternative 
histories have become increasingly visible, as I show below. Zahir-ud-Din’s work also reveals 
the challenges the labor of writing under occupation has involved. 
Writing history under occupation 
History does not forgive anyone; we must take people to the witness box. 
         —Zahir-ud-Din  
The people and the “resistance” 
Zahir-ud-Din’s writing has an exhortatory and inspirational function. “To make people 




intellectual one. We need to present a perspective on the past that is different from what the state 
has imposed on us.” Drawing, thus, a seamless relationship between history and struggle, Zahir-
ud-Din feels that a “truthful history,” would necessarily move his readers into political action. To 
me, this view about the function of history-writing didn’t seem far from how Pierre Bourdieu, for 
instance, sees “historicization” as neutralizing the effects of “naturalization” and giving people a 
“critical political experience”—which Bourdieu defines as “suspend(ing) the suspension of doubt 
as to the possibility that the social world could be other than what is implied in the experience of 
the world taken for granted” (2000, 173-182).  
Yet, a commitment to re-writing history and the actual task of doing so have not proven 
to be the same. There are both practical and conceptual difficulties involved in Zahir-ud-Din’s 
work. At the practical level, for instance, Zahir-ud-Din’s human rights activism puts severe 
limits on his access to the state archives—of which, in any case, hardly anything of substance 
remains in Kashmir. Most of the government archival material has gradually been moved outside 
of Kashmir (to Jammu and New Delhi). The miniscule part left behind remains in a dilapidated 
condition.48 But more worrisome to him is the gradual loss of the men and women who had 
participated in political events since 1931. “An entire generation is dying without having told 
their stories,” he says. At another level, as already indicated, he feels his work is delimited by the 
space of discourse established by the official historical narrative. Zahir-ud-Din, and other 
Tehreek history-writers, feel forced to spend much of their time challenging intricate details that 
form part of the dominant official narrative, instead of being able to work on their more 
ambitious, “people’s history” projects.  
                                                 
48 The Jammu and Kashmir State Archives in Srinagar is housed in an old wooden building. Very few official 
documents are present in the premises. During the floods of September 2014, the first floor of the building was 




Conceptual difficulties for his project, says Zahir-ud-Din, are presented by the fact that 
he finds no models of history-writing on modern Kashmir worthy of emulation, nor a distinct, 
non-statist account around which a new history could be written. Several times during our 
interviews he sighed, and remarked, “We have just begun to write,” suggesting that any Tehreek 
history-writing on Kashmir would have to begin with a clean state. Such an endeavor—writing a 
people’s history from a clean slate—presents an obvious dilemma. If the “people” are the only 
legitimate subject of history then one must construct the people as one writes. And, if the events 
of 1989-90 are the scene in which Kashmiris had arrived as a people (as both Bakshi and Zahir-
ud-Din believe), then these people would have to be plotted both as new as well as historic 
subjects. Since there isn’t a previous model of a people’s history in Kashmir, Tehreek history-
writers would need to make the decision to deploy memories in a specific way; indeed, 
differently from the way the state accounts do so, but no less strategically.  
In this regard, the choice of key tropes in Tehreek history-writing resonates with the 
people’s experiences in the present. Zahir-ud-Din considers “suffering” and “resistance” as 
continuous themes of Kashmir’s political history. In his view, “suffering” expresses the Kashmiri 
experience under the different powers that have ruled them (the Dogra state, the Indian 
government), and “resistance,” the disposition people have had toward these powers. As such, in 
his writings, the main actors, whom Zahir-ud-Din either calls “heroes” or “collaborators,” are 
individuals who had, respectively, stood against the state or with it. He writes especially about 
people who were “tortured,” “exiled,” or “killed” because of their political stance. He has been 




I have seen old men with iron marks on their backs; some are still alive. It is from the mouths of 
these people that Kashmiris must know the truth. These are people who suffered, who were 
exiled, who were imprisoned, who were tortured, and who participated in this struggle. 
According to Zahir-ud-Din, the history of suffering and resistance, however, goes farther 
back, and demands recognition. “Kashmiris have always offered resistance,” Zahir-ud-Din says,  
We fought the Mughals, and when they prevailed, we poured sarcasm over them; we fought the 
Sikh onslaught, and later our shawl-bafs (loom weavers) were the first to organize the worker’s 
meet on April 29, 1865; it is sad our trade union leaders would rather celebrate May 1 as the 
Workers’ Day and not April 29.  
While this may accord well with Mohi-ud-Din’s key insight, in emphasizing resistance as 
an “essential part of Kashmiri history,” Zahir-ud-Din is also responding to the traditional view 
that Kashmiris, except on a few occasions, had been incapable of fighting their oppressive rulers. 
The notion that Kashmiris are “docile” or zulm parast (worshippers of cruelty) is common, and I 
have heard it several times from those who comment on the so-called “Kashmiri psyche.” At 
times Kashmiris jokingly say as much about themselves. The Dogra rulers had thought so too, 
which is why they seemed surprised when Kashmiris revolted in 1931. Indians believed it, 
enough to be caught a bit complacent in 1989-90. Even the Pakistani establishment, which some 
Tehreek activists consider a “friend” of Kashmiris, expressed the same view when in 1965 
Kashmiris failed to rise in revolt on Pakistan’s call (in contrast to Afghans who did rise against 
the Soviets later), even though, according to some Islamist groups, Pakistan was “ready to go to 
war with India for Kashmir.”49 The new persistence of the narrative of “resistance,” therefore, 
                                                 
49 Pakistan had sent guerrillas in 1965 to help launch an insurgency, but according to the Indian government there 
was little response in Kashmir. But as stated earlier, the burning of Batehmalyūn indicates there might have been 
some support. Eventually Pakistan did go to an inconclusive war with India, which if anything, weakened the 




hides a more complex story in which resistance hasn’t always figured so prominently, but it has 
not been absent either. 
 
While this genre of historical writing is still in the process of taking shape, it is in 
writings like those of Zahir-ud-Din’s that a wide section of Kashmiri youth first heard a panoply 
of names, events, and places that had remained silenced. For instance, figures like Akbar Khan 
who was a leader of the worker’s strike in the Government Silk Factory in 1924, or Subhan 
Naed, a local barber, who protested the state’s legalized practice of trafficking of young girls for 
prostitution in 1934, or Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, who had declared the short-lived state of Azad 
Kashmir in 1947. These names entered the public sphere and were celebrated.  
The case of an unlikely figure named Robert Thorp is also illuminating. Thorp was a 
young British military officer who, having written a critical report, Cashmere Misgovernment, 
about the Dogra state in the late 19th century, had died soon after, probably from poisoning. 
Zahir-ud-Din writes that Thorp was poisoned at the maharaja’s behest, and celebrates him as a 
“hero.” In fact, not only did his book on the heroes of Kashmiri history, Flashback, begin with 
Thorp’s story, Zahir-ud-Din also declared Thorp to be the “first martyr” in Kashmir.50 While the 
fact of Europeans writing about Kashmir in the 19th and early 20th centuries is well known, the 
mention of Thorp as a “martyr” was intriguing, and had piqued my curiosity. As Thorp’s own 
writing became available and was increasingly circulated (Thorp 2011), Tehreek history-writers 
located his grave in Srinagar, and started to visit it annually to honor Thorp’s memory on his 
death anniversary. One local human rights organization even instituted a “Robert Thorp Award,” 
                                                 





which was annually given until its funds were exhausted.51 Nevertheless, as we will see in 
Chapter 6, the importance of Thorp and his writing emerged from an era in Kashmir to which he 
had become a quintessential witness, the era that led to the events of 1931 and thus remains 
critical to understanding the formative elements of Kashmiri political subjectivity.  
The empire continues 
Among those in Kashmir who look to the past to find the sources of Kashmiri selfhood, 
Zahir-ud-Din is a paradigmatic case. His work attempts to respond, like the writings of several 
others who I have called Tehreek history-writers, to the sudden rupture the 1989-90 uprising 
produced in Kashmiri political culture. Primarily, these events destabilized the postcolonial 
consensus in India that claimed 1947 as the moment of freedom from colonialism. Indeed, for 
people in India, the year 1947 symbolizes, in however limited a sense,52 the moment of 
independence. For Kashmiris, like Zahir-ud-Din, however, it represents the opposite: the “year of 
colonization.” These feelings extend beyond Tehreek history-writing circles. In Kashmir, India’s 
Independence Day on August 15 has always failed to evoke any positive enthusiasm, unlike in 
India where the day is publicly celebrated. Especially since 1989-90, the day has been observed 
as a day of protest in Kashmir. And while Kashmir shuts down in protest on August 15 every 
year, the Indian authorities, as if to affirm the troubled legacy of the date, impose a curfew. 
Beyond the symbolism of the year, the dissonance around 1947 extends to the way 
approaches to history writing have diverged in India and Kashmir. For many Indian intellectuals, 
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52 In Pakistan and India intellectuals and poets have asked if 1947 truly did bring “freedom,” or if it was merely a 
“transfer of power” to a new elite. Even during the early days of national independence, poets like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, 
had felt that freedom from colonialism had either been incomplete or distorted. The bloodshed of Partition had 
besmirched the idea of freedom for many, like Saadat Hasan Manto, another subcontinental poet, who like Faiz 




on the left as well as the right, 1947 represents, with the achievement of the nation-state, a sort of 
historical closure. Marking an end to the project of national liberation, the year gives a vantage 
point to Indian historians to write teleological accounts of India’s nationalist struggle. From this 
perspective, no major events on the scale of 1947 shall take place, nor are such events necessary 
any longer. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, had inaugurated this feeling 
clearly when he declared on August 15, 1947: “A moment comes, which comes but rarely in 
history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a 
nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.” Tehreek history-writers of Kashmir, by contrast, 
neither see history to have ended, nor do they believe the passing of sovereignty from the Dogras 
to the Indian state represents stepping from “the old to the new.” If anything, 1947 marks a 
moment of imperial continuity rather than one of a radical rupture with the past. “Power had 
simply passed from one set of illegitimate rulers (the Dogra state) to the next (the Indian state),” 
says Zahir-ud-Din.  
For Tehreek history-writers, rewriting the past is essentially about exposing this 
continuity and to remember its originary violence. In their view, the meaning of azadi for 
Kashmiris was not limited to freedom from the Dogras, but was in being able to determine the 
future of Kashmir. Problematically, despite the popularly articulated view in Kashmir that 1947 
is not the moment of “independence” for Kashmiris, academic historiographical traditions that 
begin from precisely such a presumption remain.53 Such presumptions have led to 
simplifications, misinterpretations, or uncritical acceptance of state accounts of political events 
in Kashmir. For instance, Zutshi reduces the 1931 movement into a communalist mobilization 
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(2014, 211). This view feeds into a false understanding of the contemporary Tehreek as “Islamic 
fundamentalism,” or even “terrorism,” as if the movement has no political content. Popular in 
India, such narrow perspectives emphasize religious false consciousness, manipulation by 
religious conservatives, as well as the notion of an inherent extremism within Islam, as 
explanations behind the rise of Tehreek (Singh 2000). As I have tried to show, however, the 
central argumentative structure that materializes from Tehreek history-writings is not religious or 
communalist, but lends political support to the claim of the right to self-determination. At the 
same time, the year 1947 does not represent the event of freedom, but a violent interruption of 
the people’s aspiration for popular sovereignty and rights within a free Kashmir state.  
Koshur Mussalman 
Clearly, the pitfalls of essentializing or reifying identity are obvious (cf. Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000; Scott 2001). Several Tehreek intellectuals invoke Koshur Mussalman (“Kashmiri 
Muslim”) as the identity that primarily defines them. “Kashmiri Muslim” is both a historic 
construction, and a name around which several Tehreek groups have organized their politics, 
even though they demand self-determination for all the peoples of the historic (pre-1947) state of 
Kashmir. Tehreek history-writers see Kashmiri Muslim as an identity that has arisen historically 
from the experience of “living under one foreign rule or another,” and through “state practices of 
discrimination” against Kashmiri Muslim subjects/citizens. In their writings, there is neither an 
imagined “glorious past” nor a concept of “pure blood.” Tehreek history-writers do not invoke 
the idea of “collective memory” as some seamless or uncontested ground that could give fixity to 
an essential or coherent identity in Kashmir. If anything, Kashmiri Muslim as an identity is often 
deployed in strategic, yet self-consciously ironic ways to destabilize the dominant Indian 




account of Indian nationalism, but asserts “Indian” to be the predominant and solely valid 
national identity. In this sense, Tehreek history-writings do not mirror Indian nationalist 
historiography, either in form or purpose. They remain as alternative histories, which, as one 
Tehreek history-writer put it, reveal what has been “concealed within the official accounts.”  
In another sense, by re-membering the past, Tehreek history-writers account for the 
collective trauma in the present. While repeated transitions from “one foreign domination to the 
next” have turned Kashmir into a space of disorder, both in a political as well as a psychological 
sense, history itself takes the form of trauma. Here “trauma” is a form of experience felt as an 
obsessive and repetitive wound inflicted from the outside, or as Cathy Caruth has defined the 
term, “an event experienced (each time) too soon to be fully known” (1996, 3-4). Within this 
context, the work of Tehreek history-writers assumes a rather therapeutic value, one that 
reconstructs the events from Kashmir’s past to make sense of the dis-membered present.  
Conclusion 
Entanglement with history 
In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which Tehreek history-writers understand 
what they see as major events in the modern political history of Kashmir, and the importance 
they place on re-interpreting these events in terms of “resistance” and “struggle” for Tehreek. 
Through their writings, Tehreek history-writers decenter what are officially authorized accounts 
of the region’s political status (accounts which axiomatically see Kashmir as an “integral part” of 
India or view Kashmir primarily as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan) as well as 
popularize alternative histories of Kashmir’s modern politics. They emphasize Kashmiri people 




I have focused primarily on the perspectives of Tehreek history-writers because their 
writings have, since the historic events of 1989-90, acquired a wide and receptive audience in 
Kashmir, despite persistent state attempts to marginalize their voices within a repressively 
controlled space. Through an analysis of their viewpoints, I have sought to show that 
contemporary intellectual engagements with the past in Kashmir reflect a distinct new political 
subjectivity in Kashmir. I have argued that this subjectivity can be understood in terms of an 
“entanglement with history” in its multiple senses.   
In the first sense, the 1990 uprising produced a sudden rupture in Kashmiri political 
culture, throwing the order established in 1947 into disarray. This rupture allows Tehreek 
history-writers to open new narrative possibilities and build alternative histories. All four 
history-writers I discuss—Shakil Bakshi, Zahir-ud-Din, Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din and Ghulam Qadir 
Lone—wrote in the aftermath of 1990. I have also argued that if the 1990 uprising opened 
historical-narrative possibilities, it is through the tedious work of re-writing history—or as Zahir-
ud-Din called it “stitching together the fragments”—that these Tehreek history-writers attempt to 
consolidate political subjectivity, or, in other words, form a “new people,” an idea they believe is 
necessary to keep the movement going.  
In the second sense, the “entanglement with history” resonates in Tehreek history-
writings in a contradictory way; it relates to a concern with the loss of agency. These writers 
regularly invoke a sense of “betrayal” and “denial of voice” in their narratives. This is, for 
instance, evident in Zahir-ud-Din’s description of the events of 1947, or in Tehreek accounts of 
the politics surrounding the last Dogra monarch and Kashmiri nationalist leaders, like Sheikh 




contestations with the Indian National Congress’s politics of “unitary India” and the Muslim 
League’s claim of being “representative of all South Asian Muslims.”54  
In the third sense, “entanglement with history” must be understood in the way writing a 
“people’s history” has shaped not only the historiographical imagination but also the political 
culture of Tehreek history-writers and activists. Despite their emphasis on the notion of 
persistent struggle, Tehreek history writers sense Kashmir’s history as tragically cyclical and 
repetitive, instead of one which is linearly moving forward. Events from one era resonate with 
events from a different era; the past gets continuously folded onto the present.  
Yet, if history is a traumatic trap, these writers see their task as reconfiguring the 
historical narrative in a way as to simultaneously connect and untangle the present from the past. 
For them, Tehreek represents the desire to escape the cycle of history, and move toward a future 
of azadi (freedom). From this perspective, azadi is an event-to-come, an event that will break the 
recurrence of their ongoing gholae’mi (servitude). This is what Tehreek activists mean when 
they demand the resolution of the masla-e-Kashmir (“Kashmir question”), a resolution of this 
entangled history. 
The work of Tehreek history-writers, often silenced in the din of Indian nationalist 
narratives on Kashmir, illuminates the implicit assumptions and the structure of the officially 
authorized accounts. They do not systematize or make coherent the past (despite the desire to do 
so, as is evident from the now-widely remembered “historical timeline”), but they do disturb the 
official coherence. Their work illustrates how a contested understanding of historical events has 
shaped the political subjectivity in the region. It suggests that Kashmiri historical consciousness 
                                                 




has not emerged out of the “need” to have “a history”55—as the region has long had a history 
writing tradition—but rather as a contestation with that prescribed and authorized by the 
occupier state. Nevertheless, this mode of engagement with history reflects a shared desire to 
represent the self, not to “launch the struggle for power” (cf. Chatterjee 1993, 76). That struggle 
has been ongoing on in Kashmir since 1931; Tehreek history-writers are trying to make sense of 
it.
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VISIBLE/INVISIBLE: FLOOD, MILITARY HUMANITARIANISM, AND THE 
“POLITICS OF IMAGES” 
 
Disasters can make the invisible visible. Carefully managed facades fall apart, revealing 
the desires, mechanisms, and structures underneath, even if momentarily. It happened in 2014 in 
Kashmir, when the flooded Jhelum river swept away the physical as well as the ideological 
screens that had hidden from public view critical aspects of the military occupation. The flood 
devastated civilian settlements along the river and its tributaries, leaving tens of thousands 
homeless and desperate. It also laid bare the innards of major military bases and defenses, as well 
as the militarized infrastructure overlaying the civilian spaces. If the flood brought to the surface 
the spatiality of the occupation, it, almost magically, made the “state” disappear. There were no 
ministers, legislators, bureaucrats, soldiers, police, judges, or even low-level clerks to be seen for 
days. The government had, it was believed, lost all contact with its agencies, including with the 
officials of the State Disaster Management Authority, which is mandated to respond to and 
minimize the impact of hazards such as floods. Government offices were under water, the courts 
lost case records, the information ministry’s decades-old newspaper collections were washed 
away, and the revenue department discovered later that it could not find its land records. 
Kashmir’s chief minister, speaking to a news-channel, a week after the flood hit Srinagar, said: 
“I had no government… I had no cellphone and no connectivity. I am now starting to track down 
ministers and officers” (NDTV 2014).  
From the start, the flood became a center of, what many Kashmiris called, a “politics of 
images.” However, there was just one privileged participant in this “politics”—the news media 
from New Delhi—taking pictures and defining the terms under which the flood was to be 




above, often appeared juxtaposed next to images of Indian soldiers wearing orange safety-vests 
paddling boats and distributing relief. Television experts in New Delhi framed this “flood relief” 
as an exemplary case of “military humanitarianism” (Khalid 2016). Struggling to cope with the 
losses, with all telecommunications disrupted, Kashmiris had no comparable means to visually 
represent their experiences of the flood nor their own efforts at relief and rehabilitation.  
For the most part, the occupation in Kashmir has remained concealed from global 
publics, in comparison to other similar spaces. Kamala Visweswaran has described sites such as 
Kashmir as “hidden or masked occupations,” and their visibility or invisibility as an index of the 
“power of mediatization and its skewed operation” (2013, 7). Historically, the Indian state has 
allowed international media very limited general access to Kashmir, and even less to its security 
infrastructure and counterinsurgency operations in the region. In early 1990s, just before a series 
of public massacres of Kashmiris at the hands of government forces started taking place, foreign 
press—especially photojournalists—was barred from entering Kashmir (Crossette 1990). Until 
the earthquake of 2005, which killed thousands of Kashmiris along the highly-militarized Line of 
Control, the border regions were essentially out of bounds for non-resident non-military 
personnel. That year, however, Kashmiri journalists and human rights activists followed in the 
tracks of humanitarian aid groups from India and abroad, and discovered thousands of unmarked 
mass graves strewn across these regions (Burke 2009; IPTK 2009). As the news of the graves 
began trickling into the international press, the Indian government sealed access to the border 
once again.  
So, when the flood came in 2014, the Indian government appeared ready to ward off any 
unwanted attention it might bring. Not only was the media based in New Delhi rapidly 




which could have been used for rescue efforts, at the service of Delhi-based TV channels—to 
make sure the reports presented the Indian military in a “favorable” light (Khalid 2016, 9). 
However, this attempt to turn the “disaster” in Kashmir into a political victory for Indian 
military’s “humanitarianism” was not instantly manufactured. Since the end of the last major war 
between India and Pakistan, which was fought in the mountainous heights of Kashmir in 2001, 
much effort has been made to change the image of Indian military presence in the region from 
primarily being a “security” force to being a force for “civilian development.” As Ravina 
Aggarwal and Mona Bhan show in their analysis of Indian military’s Operation Sadhbhavna 
(“Goodwill”) in Kargil district (Kashmir), adoption of this “development paradigm” is intended 
to “legitimize Indian military’s role in the region’s governance and civil society” (2009, 519). 
But beyond this logic of military governance, which Indian military euphemistically calls “civic 
actions,” there is the less challenged rationale of “military humanitarianism.”  
 Historically military humanitarianism has been a key component of the 
counterinsurgency doctrine according to which counterinsurgency is as much about “winning 
hearts and minds” as about war against insurgents (Dixon 2012). Natural hazards represented as 
“disasters” become key occasions to put this component into practice. During the 2005 Kashmir 
earthquake, Indian military and humanitarian agencies came together in a reciprocal relationship 
of dependency, with Indian military providing security and access to the latter and humanitarian 
agencies duly acknowledging the positive role of the Indian military.1 As Didier Fassin and 
Mariella Pandolfi argue, “disasters and conflicts” have become “embedded in the same global 
                                                 
1 The earthquake and its effect was more centered on the Pakistani-controlled side of the LoC, where the Pakistan 
military developed a similar relationship with aid agencies. While media and humanitarian agencies eventually saw 
the disaster relief on both sides as a “failure” because of the prevalence of the “military turn of mind” in India and 
Pakistan, the humanitarian agencies were forthcoming in using the infrastructure of occupation created by the two 




logic of intervention,” where “humanitarianization of intervention implies” a “form of 
naturalization—or depoliticization—of war” (2010, 9-15). Essentially, military humanitarianism 
continues the war by other means. For the military to claim a humanitarian role in a region, 
however, it either represents the region as bereft of societal structures of sustenance, or enters the 
picture as a “humanitarian force” after it has bereaved the place of such structures (Dawson 
2011). In Kashmir, the flood, having swept away the civilian government (which is, nevertheless, 
subservient to the logics of the occupation), presented the military opportunities to showcase its 
effectiveness as a humanitarian force, even while it threated to expose its repressive apparatus. 
This opportunity was amplified by the images of Kashmir under water.  
I argue that, to understand the dynamics of the politics of images, it is crucial to 
recognize how Kashmiris understood the flood as an event. What was this moment that had 
suddenly torn through the screen in Kashmir? How did those caught in the flood come to 
understand the nature of the state? While the politics of images succeeded in reaffirming the 
overwhelming support Indian publics lend to the military control in Kashmir, in Kashmir it 
appeared to have little impact on the public perception toward the military, and even accentuated 
the fear and suspicion of the military. Kashmiris, who come face to face with the physical 
architecture of military control in their neighborhoods, continued to see Indian military as an 
“army of occupation.” To Tehreek activists, the politics of images, if anything, was the Indian 
government’s race against time to make the military occupation invisible again, even as it sought 
to hypervisibilize its military’s humanitarianism.  
This chapter is primarily based on the experiences of a group of people trapped in the 
flood for several days in September 2014. My fieldwork, during this time, was restricted to the 




wait. Yet, our collective predicament brought to the fore the political underpinnings of the 
occupation, and how human life becomes hierarchically valuated during difficult conditions, 
especially under regimes of undemocratic control. The house itself was in a neighborhood that 
became a key prism to understand the image politics centered on the disaster and military 
humanitarianism. Days later, when I could move out, especially to the countryside, and take note 
of the devastation the flood had caused, the larger import of how the flood had reshaped the 
Kashmiri understanding of the state became obvious.  
As will become apparent, the politics of images was not simply about how the flood was 
represented or image-harvested for state propaganda, but how a contested space of understanding 
was opened and closed by a dramatic event, heightening the rift between the state and the people. 
Beyond the politics of images, there were acts of solidarity, with individuals, communities, and 
religious organizations self-organizing for relief and rehabilitation work, pooling resources to 
rebuild life in the aftermath of the flood. Towards the end, I will briefly look at the work of a 
local religious charity in a southern Kashmiri town to examine how acts of solidarity eventually 
came to undercut the politics of images, at least among Kashmiris. These acts of solidarity 
sought to overcome fault lines that have emerged in Kashmir over the years, especially between 
the downtown youth sympathetic to Tehreek and the suburban upper middle-class closer to the 
establishment. But in other places, some hierarchies remained, throwing light on multiple forms 
of invisibilizing within Kashmiri society itself.      
Premonitions  
Early on Sunday, September 7, 2014, Jhelum’s waters gushed into Rajbagh. The river, it 
looked like, had changed its course, and there was no escape for the thousands of people who 




from the south of Kashmir, to pass by Rajbagh—like the floods always had, at least for as many 
years as anyone could remember. Looking back, it was a disaster waiting to happen, a flood the 
coming of which had been frequently foretold. 
For long, I had heard Kashmiris speak about an impending catastrophe. They often did so 
within the grammar of eschatology. “There are too many gunah (sins) now,” I would hear people 
remark, “The suffering shall follow.” The prediction, while drawing from the Quranic/Biblical 
story of the Great Deluge, was based on what would be obvious to anyone who cared to look 
around. Over the years, forests had disappeared, flood plains were encroached, and a two-story 
high railroad was built through the heart of the valley that would block floodwater from flowing 
out. Meanwhile, the Jhelum itself had been allowed to shrink. Hydrologists and engineers at the 
Irrigation and Flood Control department had regularly warned that Jhelum’s “carrying capacity” 
had decreased to a critical level (Kashmir Life 2011). The government paid no heed. Even dire 
reports on an imminent flood, as Kashmiris would come to know later, had been stashed away.  
Prone to extreme flooding, the only major government intervention to reduce the river’s 
intense overflow had been the construction of the Flood Spill Channel under the British 
Residency in 1903. Next steps were taken after 1959, when a newly-established Flood 
Mechanical Division began systematic dredging in the lower Jhelum basin in the northwest to 
hasten the flow of water out of the Kashmir valley. Then, the Indian government banned 
dredging in 1984 and all the equipment either drowned or was lost to rust. Under the orders of 
Governor Jagmohan in mid-1980s, one was dismantled and taken away to “beautify” the Dal 
Lake. “There is just one large dredger now,” one official had told me, and then added, stolidly, 
“For the last twenty-four years, it has been dredging Kashmiri bodies out of the Jhelum.”   




pursuit of ma’ashiyat (materialism) people had forgotten the sacrifices of the thousands who had 
died during Tehreek—in the resistance against the Indian control—and that was “the biggest 
gunah of them all.” And sometimes, they would pause to reflect, and lament asi mah chu paanas 
taam (but it is not our hands, is it?). “If we controlled our lives and our affairs, we would care for 
Kashmir.” Whatever the causes, the flood made little distinction between the pious and the 
sinners. Entire villages, which the Indian government had suppressed brutally over the years, 
were washed away. On the other hand, Rajbagh, with “practically no role in Tehreek,” as a 
young relief worker stated disdainfully—except, perhaps, in housing the offices of a few 
“moderate” Tehreek parties—also drowned.  
If the premonition of a divine vengeance/justice expressed a shared political stance on the 
“sinful” present, deeper cultural memories and conflicts over them resonated in the way some 
Kashmiris spoke about the impending event. “This country came from water, and to water it will 
return,” an ageing houseboat owner on the Dal Lake in Srinagar had once told me in frustration 
with the government forbidding him from renovating his boat.2 Renovations of houseboats were 
banned under a plan to clean up the lake. The plan was really pushed by moneyed hoteliers on 
the lake’s shore who did not like the Hænz-owned houseboats. Houseboats, often grandiosely 
named after European royals and cities, were great attractions for tourists, giving competition to 
their hotels. The Hænz had resisted a government offer of relocation to the dry ground away 
from the lake. Without renovations, the government hoped, the wooden boats would just rot 
away, destroy the Hænz’s livelihoods, and compel them to leave. “These ministers don’t know 
we are the progeny of Jalodbhav,” he had said to me, jokingly, “If they drive us out of this lake, 
                                                 
2 Kashmiri houseboats are elongated floating homes and hotels made entirely of cedar wood. While primarily meant 
for tourists to stay, they are owned by lake-dwelling members of the Hænz community whose families live 




the lake will come into their homes.”  
The man was referring to one of Kashmir’s originary myths, surprising me not only with 
his knowledge of a story that is hardly ever told or remembered outside of specialist circles, but 
also with his Sanskrit rendering of Jaladev as “Jalodhbhava.” (Indeed, the old man had heard it 
from an Indian student of Kashmiri history who had once stayed on his boat). There are multiple 
versions of the myth, but the one written down by Sanskritists and Indologists is connected to a 
legend of a Brahmin named Kashyap. In this version, Kashmir was one big lake. Along its shores 
lived the indigenous Nagas and the troublesome, half-human Piśaćas. Kashyap, a member of the 
newly arrived Aryan tribe, fought and killed a lake-dwelling Piśaća demon Jalodbhava, who had 
been protected by the Nagas. (Jalodbhava literally means “the water born”). The Brahmin then 
miraculously opened the mountains in the northwest to let the lake’s water out and Kashmir 
emerged from underneath. The Piśaćas were killed, the Nagas punished, and Kashmir became 
the land of pious Brahmins. In the less well-known versions, Nagas and Piśaćas are the same 
people, who were subjugated by the incoming Aryans. Many of them survived as lower castes 
within the new social stratification that Aryans imposed on the land. Jalodbhava was their local 
king or deity, or, as a student activist accompanying me to the Dal Lake that day had quipped: 
“Jaladev was probably a youth activist of the primeval era.”3  
Political geography in my field of vision 
Many consider Rajbagh an upscale neighborhood in Kashmir’s capital Srinagar, but it 
presents nothing remarkable. A maze of narrow and wavy lanes course through its breadth, some 
of which grow even narrower until they reach dead ends. Perhaps Rajbagh’s fame came from its 
                                                 
3 See chapter 2 for more on this. “Aryans” probably arrived in Kashmir between 1000 BC to 500 BC. As Akhtar 
Mohi-ud-Din suggests Nagas and Piśaćas were the remnants of the broader Indus Valley Civilization that once 




large mansions that belong to high-ranking bureaucrats and large business families. There is a 
host of guesthouses as well, and, because of its proximity to the touristy areas of the city, some 
house owners lease portions of their houses to vacationers at slightly exorbitant rates. In July 
2014, I decided to rent the top floor of a three-story house there. It was close to several 
neighborhoods where the offices and homes of Tehreek parties and activists are located, and with 
whom I needed to meet regularly for my research work. Yet, Rajbagh also provided (in my 
mind) a distance from Tehreek’s internal rivalries, and a space where I could remain (again, in 
my mind) under the threshold of surveillance of the Indian agencies. Never had I imagined that 
this neighborhood was soon going to become one of the most unlivable in the city, and prove to 
be a critical window on the politics of occupation in Kashmir.   
Rajbagh looks like a peninsula. As the Jhelum meanders, south to north through Srinagar, 
it curves around Rajbagh’s three sides: the south, the east, and the north. In the south, before the 
river touches Rajbagh, the Flood Spill Channel breaks off, rather abruptly, that then envelops the 
neighborhood on the west. The channel reconnects with the Jhelum much further downstream. 
For all practical purposes, therefore, one could call Rajbagh, along with its adjoining 
neighborhoods to the west, an inland island. On a normal day, when the water of the Jhelum is 
low and calm, a flood is the last thing on the minds of the residents of this island. But as it turned 
out, a flood should have always been the first. 
Rajbagh is built on a reclaimed floodplain, much like most newly inhabited marshes and 
dried up lakebeds around this medieval urban agglomeration that is now Srinagar. Till about the 
middle of the last century, vegetable gardens and apple orchards dotted the land, and the area 
was considered an outlying wilderness, where, as the local baker—who had heard from his 




prices rose, many rich-folk left the congested downtown districts and built their mansions in 
Rajbagh. But the investments of the rich were based more on a desire to keep a distance from the 
coarse, hardworking downtown culture than on soil testing. By the time the rulers and 
governments of different eras finished building the Bund, the parallel-running high embankments 
of the Jhelum and the Flood Spill Channel, Rajbagh had become a bowl-shaped depression. And 
since then, Rajbagh’s fate had depended on the number of days it rained in the river’s catchment 
area in southern Kashmir. More days of rain than normal during the summer months—when 
glaciers melt faster and the grassy slopes of the mountains retain very little water—and the river 
rose dangerously high all around Rajbagh. Yet, it had never really occurred to its inhabitants that 
the river could one day spill right into their upscale bowl.   
Beyond the river, to the northeast of Rajbagh, is the Zabarwan mountain range. Its jagged 
peaks rise to form a carapace around the Dal, the shimmering lake about which many tales of 
Srinagar’s legendary natural beauty have been told. Just south on this far bank of the Jhelum is a 
verdant stretch between the river and the mountain, pockmarked by a series of official 
residences, military barracks, and “secret” facilities. Known as Gupkar Road and Badamibagh 
Cantonment, these highly fortified zones are the nerve centers of Indian control in Kashmir. 
They lie huddled in a tight embrace. 
Gupkar Road, a narrow pass between the Zabarwan range and a hill called Takht-e-
Sulaiman, is home to the India-loyalist Kashmiri political establishment. The Abdullahs and the 
Muftis live there. They are the two main political families that today act as “Kashmiri sheaths on 
the Indian bayonet,” as one Tehreek activist remarked on their role. Papa 2, which was a prince’s 
palace before 1947, when the Dogra dynasty ruled Kashmiris with a zealous cruelty, and then 




home to the Muftis. This changing of hands for the property, many say, has been smooth and 
natural. It is said that before the Muftis moved in, the walls were painted several times over to 
hide the blood stains on them, and a mound of severed fingers and toes was cleared from the 
backyard to make it level for a badminton court. In the adjoining Abdullah residence, murderous 
intrigue is woven into the daily life of its politics quite as smoothly. A couple of years back, an 
old man, a party worker of the Abdullahs, went in to meet the latest scion of the family and was 
brought out bloodied and dead. The incident had threatened to destabilize the government run by 
the Abdullahs, but, as the deathly conditions in Kashmir go, an old man’s death is a threat to no 
one. The Abdullahs, running the National Conference, and the Muftis, running the People’s 
Democratic Party, are ostensibly fiercely opposed to each other. When not speaking to the press, 
however, they live rather amicably on the Gupkar Road, under the protective watch of the Indian 
military. 
Badamibagh, which once used to bloom into endless acres of almond orchards, is the 
headquarters of the Indian Army’s 15 Corp, a quarter-million strong military formation that 
tightly controls the nooks and crannies of the Kashmir Valley. It also directs the political “puppet 
show” on the Gupkar. The Gupkar and much of Badamibagh are safely perched on the slope of 
the Takht-e-Sulaiman hill and the Zabarwan Range respectively. On a clear day, one can see 
long, garish green and white buildings of Badamibagh stretched along the foot of the Zabarwan. 
On top of these mountains, above the headquarters, is a string of pickets and surveillance 
installations, which become visible at night when the lights glow on the ridges. Atop one of the 
ridges, which faces Srinagar, this city of more than a million Kashmiris, the army has hoisted a 
huge Indian flag, “a triumphalist gesture toward a subject population that will not concede defeat 




The only other structure visible above the line of my vision from the terrace of my rented 
place in Rajbagh is the Shankaracharya Temple, which was built on top of the Takhte Sulaiman 
hill in the ninth century CE. When the flood came, my first thoughts unwittingly traced this 
complex political geography of my surroundings. Only the Indian military, their main Kashmiri 
clientele, and a Hindu temple, popular among Indian tourists, looked safe in the deluge.   
A missing government  
 On Saturday evening, the day before the flood washed into the city, my friend Parvaiz, 
who had rented the ground floor of the same house, decided to drive his car up to the Bund for 
safekeeping. Our friend Aijaz, who lives in the adjoining Jawahar Nagar locality, and I 
accompanied Parvaiz. The water was quite high. Houseboats on the Jhelum normally float much 
lower than the level of the road atop the Bund, but that evening they were standing eerily aligned 
with the road. 
Near Zero Bridge, one of the major bridges crossing the river in the city, people had 
assembled to monitor a weaker embankment that was beginning to give way. This narrow strip 
of the embankment, made mostly of mud, was not part of the main Bund. It connected the bridge 
and the main Bund at a point where the Bund curved backward from the river, and on sunny days 
offered walkers a chance to avoid the busy Bund Road. The threat to Rajbagh was real but not 
immediate. The Bund, which is a much sturdier stone and gravel embankment, whose cross 
section would look like a giant trapezoid, would act as a buffer, it was believed, in case the 
narrow embankment strip breached. In the end, this weak part remained stable; the main Bund 
breached, and precisely where it was not expected to. 
The flood arrived first in southern Kashmir, where my parents live on the banks of one of 




from them before their phones went dead, was that the water had climbed into the lawn and the 
backyard of their house. That was Thursday evening. After desperate attempts to connect all the 
Anantnag contacts in my phone book on Friday, and failing, I was finally able to reach someone 
who had climbed to the fifth story of his house and managed to catch a signal. The water had not 
climbed “much further” than where it was on Thursday evening, he said, as he quickly cut his 
phone to preserve its dying battery. This was hardly a consolation, for never had the waters crept 
up so high in Anantnag, not even in 1988 when a flood was close to wiping out the town. I was 
seven then and remembered that event as terrifying. Our family had to move out of the house. 
And with the water even higher, I thought, it was sure to lay waste to everything that lay in its 
path. 
To reach Srinagar from Anantnag, the swell of water should have taken around eight 
hours. The real surge in the water was, however, expected to come on Saturday evening, as a 
radio presenter announced. Parvaiz’s brother, an engineer who understood the seriousness of the 
flood well, called us several times to warn us. He asked us to pack the essentials and drive to his 
home, which was in a part of the city that was relatively safer. We did pack a few things and left, 
but returned midway, unsure of what was “essential” and what could be replaced. There was too 
much that we would be leaving behind, we thought.   
We stayed. But as a precaution, I asked Parvaiz, Aijaz, and their assistant, Mughal, to 
relocate to my rented apartment on the second floor. On the first floor of the house lived the 
Hakims, the house-owners. They were an old couple and kept mostly to themselves. Their 
daughter-in-law and grandson lived with them, but I rarely saw them around. Their housekeeper 
Omais, a boy from Jharkhand in India, lived in a room on the terrace of the second floor. The 




afterthought. I shared the open terrace with the Hakims. During the day, I had seen the Hakims 
drive their cars away, and thought they were planning to leave. Omais, too, had been busy 
bicycling back and forth from the Bund. 
Before relocating, we rearranged Parvaiz’s books from the floor level bookcase to the top 
of a cupboard. If the flood came, we reasoned, the books would be spared. Half-heartedly, we 
rolled a large hand-made rug from the living room and put it on top of the dining table. We left 
the rest untouched. Mughal, not so romantic about books, carried some bedding, blankets, and a 
few items of clothing upstairs. We finally moved up, opened the windows, and, huddled around 
an old radio set, waited for the flood. 
The night fell; the flood had still not come. Friends called to say that the water was rising, 
but it was still contained within the cusp of Jhelum’s banks. We were past midnight at that point, 
and instead of thinking about the flood, we chatted about how the Indian media, instead of 
providing any useful news, had turned the disaster in South Kashmir, where many villages had 
been submerged, into a public relations campaign for the Indian army. Indian army had rescued a 
few trapped Kashmiri villagers, and, on NDTV, a New Delhi-based English language news 
channel, the host of a popular show asked, not without a hint of disdain, if Kashmiris would, 
after what the Indian army had done for them, show some gratitude. “Sure, why don’t we just 
forget the eighty thousand the Indian army has killed since 1990!” someone tweeted in response. 
Sometime later, we heard a muffled siren in the distance. A vehicle passing quickly along 
the main road made an inaudible announcement, which we came to know later was the 
government asking people to leave. But where could people go in the dead of the night with their 
children and elderly folk? The government didn’t say. Which area was safe? Did the government 




a flooded Srinagar? Had any one in the government even thought about these questions? 
Despite clear flood warnings, the city was unprepared. There were no boats kept at the 
ready, no ambulances parked strategically, no disaster control personnel positioned in vulnerable 
areas. The one picture that had exemplified the nature of Kashmiri politicians’ priorities was that 
of the chief minister, the head of the civil government in the state, a descendent of the Abdullah 
dynasty, walking down the tarmac at Srinagar’s airport holding an umbrella to protect the 
visiting dhoti-clad Indian home minister from rain. This was on a day when South Kashmir was 
reeling under the worst floods in the region’s history. In the picture, the Indian home minister is 
holding up his loincloth, taking giant leaps, with the chief minister gormlessly trying to catch up. 
On social media, where the image was circulating, people were angry. “Even though no one 
expects any better from the Kashmiri civil government, some indignities pinch more than 
others,” Aijaz had said, looking at the picture. The picture represented, as Parvaiz put it, a 
“craven Kashmiri elite shielding their Indian masters from their Kashmiri subjects.” People were 
feeling they had been left to fend for themselves. 
After midnight, we heard occasional slogan-shouting coming from the east and the south. 
It was unclear what it was, but it sounded like a protest. One of Aijaz’s contacts had called 
earlier to tell us that the water had begun to climb into parts of Badamibagh, and the army was 
out on boats trying to breach “our side of the Bund” to protect their own installations. “Could 
they do it?” we asked each other. A breach would submerge a huge portion of the city. It could 
have just been a rumor, but since it existed as a real possibility—especially in a situation where, 
as Parvaiz said, “India’s long war on Kashmiris has been veiled from the world, and from which 
the world itself looks away”—we feared the worst. 




morning. “I will stay up for a while and keep watch,” Aijaz said. I could barely sleep, though. 
The noises from the outside increased, and then there were yelps of desperation. I could hear 
“Khudayo, reham kar” (God, show some mercy), and “Allah u Akbar” (God is great). Amid 
these frightening cris de cœur, I fell asleep, only to be woken moments later by Aijaz’s loud 
bangs on the door.  
“Junaid, wake up, wake up! There is no flood, after all!” I heard Aijaz announce. “You 
can sleep now. The Jhelum has stabilized.” He sounded suspiciously nonchalant, like a boy in the 
middle of a mischief. 
“Why, I was sleeping already!” I muttered, a bit aghast at being robbed of a few winks of 
badly needed sleep. 
No way out 
Rubbing my eyes, I went to the living room and looked out from the window. The dawn 
had just broken. What I saw shook me out of my half-daze. The water was gushing almost waist 
high through the front lane. Its speed was unnerving, and it carried deadly debris: broken logs of 
wood, large paper boxes filled with god-knows-what, plastic bins and water tanks, mangled 
sheets of tin, and upturned furniture. A couple of cars floated by, carried by the current. They 
crashed clangorously into walls and electricity poles in their stubborn movement forward. 
Ten minutes or so later, the water broke open the main gate and flooded our compound. 
As if under a spell, we looked on at the rising water in total silence. The delicately manicured 
lawn in front of the house, in which I had often seen Mr. and Mrs. Hakim direct Omais to pick 
up dead hyacinth leaves or bright yellow marigolds and languid narcissus, was submerged under 
the turbid waters. 




standing on top of their first floor-porch, anxiously watching the flood. Mr. Hakim asked me 
how high the water was going to climb. “Can’t say, sir, if there is a breach in the Bund, then the 
water will climb high.” Having listened to Aijaz and Parvaiz the whole night, I felt confident to 
state my own opinion on the subject, even though I had absolutely no basis to back up my claim, 
and even regretted depressing old Mr. Hakim. Since there was no way out of Rajbagh by then, I 
suggested they move their belongings upstairs. Fortunately, the Hakims didn’t ask any more 
questions. The urgency in my tone caused them to jump back inside to salvage their belongings, 
and, as soon as they did, Parvaiz and Mughal turned their attention toward their own belongings 
on the ground floor. Since the front door from the driveway was flooded by that time, they went 
through an internal kitchen door that connected the ground floor with the first floor. Watching 
this sudden flurry of activity, which was turning the order in the house upside down, I worried 
that if the flood didn’t climb high everyone was going to blame me. Sadly, however, the 
prediction turned out to be correct.  
Around that moment, Aijaz and I saw a calf float through the broken gate into the 
driveway. Only its snout and eyes were above water, and it was gasping for breath. The calf was 
at the mercy of the turbulent waters, and it circled in the whirlpool that the water was creating. 
“Are we going to risk our lives to save a dying calf?” Before we could even debate the point, 
Aijaz jumped chest high into the water to catch hold of the calf, and I pulled it up onto the 
staircase. Aijaz was surprised by how cold the water was. The calf was in death throes, with its 
eyes rolled upward. Its body was rigid with hypothermia, and the belly was bloated with water. 
Aijaz patted the calf to revive its heartbeat, as I dashed upstairs to heat up water. It must have 
been just about three months old. We poured warm water on its body, and it seemed to work. 




stand up, the wall behind us collapsed. It narrowly missed us, but a torrent of water poured into 
the compound. We pulled the calf further up on to the porch, trembling with the sudden 
realization how weak the walls of the compound were. 
I went upstairs to heat some more water, and then saw Parvaiz and Aijaz carry the calf up 
to the second-floor terrace. Seeing them there, I came down to join Mughal who was retrieving 
food items from the ground floor kitchen. When I looked down from the staircase, the water was 
already chest-high inside the ground floor. Utensils and gas cylinders were floating in the water. 
As soon as I waded into the flooded kitchen, hard objects under water hit my shins. Even though 
benumbed by the frigid water, my legs felt excruciating pain from these impacts.  
Parvaiz’s place looked like a horror house. The refrigerator, which Mughal had earlier 
piled on to a bed, was floating and banging against the window, trying to find an escape. 
Inanimate objects, as if having acquired the first stirrings of life, were moving about aimlessly. 
Nothing was in its right place. Utensils were floating in the office, and books were floating in the 
bathroom. Mughal and I managed to reach the living room, and I don’t know why but all we 
could think of saving was the handmade rug that we had kept on the dining table earlier, and had 
now gotten soggy. We walked out of the water, the heavy rug held above us, onto the inner 
staircase. As I closed the door behind me, Mughal’s eyes welled up. His kitchen, where he used 
to cook his delicacies, and which Parvaiz, in appreciation of Mughal’s culinary skills, would call 
“Mughal’s Sultanate,” was gone. 
When we reached the second floor, we saw the Hakims were already bringing their 
belongings up to the terrace. We went down to help. The water was rising sharply and beginning 
to trickle into the first floor. I had lived upstairs from Mrs. and Mr. Hakim for only about two 




house was. It looked like a luxuriously furnished houseboat with a narrow passageway, but with 
rooms on both sides. The Hakims seemed to be in a quandary, what to save, what to leave 
behind. While the grandson, who was in his early twenties and whose name, I came to know 
later, was Taham, looked shaken, his mother appeared to have a good presence of mind. She was 
picking up the essentials. Mughal and I emptied their kitchen and the deep freezer. As the water 
rose knee high, Mrs. Hakim was still carrying up her own and her husband’s clothes. It was 
tough to convince the elderly Hakims that the time had come to abandon that floor. Although we 
pleaded that saving their life must come first, I was not sure what life meant for an old couple 
bereft of all that they had built over a lifetime. They watched helplessly, as the water consumed 
their belongings, and so many memories associated with them. 
The Hakims’ house 
The phones were down. There was no electricity. The local radio station, the only 
government institution which had proved of great help over the previous few hours, sharing 
information about the situation in Srinagar, stopped their broadcasts about 8 am. Stating rather 
dramatically that the “time has come to save our own nears and dears,” the presenters bid an 
emotional adieu. Listening to their end-of-the-world somber tone, Mughal, who was already 
crest-fallen, became desolate. I patted his back, “We will be fine.” Aijaz and Taham had 
salvaged a solar light and some wires from the first floor, which came handy in the coming days. 
Outside, Rajbagh looked like a lake, and the houses in it stood barely above water. Since 
most of the houses are two or three stories, several disappeared under water, while others only 
had their roofs visible. What were colorful corrugated roofs of large houses would appear, to 
someone watching from above, like splotches of red, green, and silver grey on a vast muddy 




waterscape. Dark clouds, which had poured rain for the previous six days, were still hanging 
low, hiding the Indian flag on the ridge. 
Water was still rising, and if it continued to rise at that rate, we figured, it would only 
take a few more hours to enter the second floor. The first option was to climb onto the roof, but 
that would mean leaving all our supplies behind. How long could we sustain ourselves there? 
Our immediate neighbors, the Jamwals, who were standing on their second-floor balcony, looked 
strangely calm. Mr. Jamwal, a staid figure, said he was sure the Indian army was going to begin 
rescue operations soon. He looked out toward the Gupkar, and then turned toward me, forlorn 
and bitter, to say that, before 1947, his father, a close aide to Kashmir’s Hindu Maharaja, had a 
house there, until the “shikaslad (pauper) Abdullah” forced the Jamwals to vacate the land so the 
Abdullahs could build their own house there. He was referring to Sheikh Abdullah, the 
grandfather of the current chief minister, who M. K. Gandhi had bestowed with the sobriquet 
“Lion of Kashmir” and who, as Parvaiz sniggered, “in return endorsed the accession with India.” 
Abdullah had in the pre-1947 era led a successful anti-monarchical campaign and, subsequently, 
implemented an influential program of land reforms. But Mr. Jamwal believes the reforms were 
as much about improving the lives of landless Kashmiri peasants as about helping the Lion 
himself to a prime piece of Srinagar real estate.  
No rescue was in sight, however. Rajbagh was eerily quiet, except for the deathly hum of 
the flood, which was occasionally interrupted by a loud thud of a collapsing house. “How sturdy 
was our house?” We didn’t want to ask Mr. Hakim and panic him even more. Parvaiz said the 
house was probably built about fifty years ago. But the “original house,” he said, had been 
smaller. As Rajbagh became commercialized over the years, the Hakims began adding 




one on the second) and kept the middle floor for themselves. Extensions meant the house had 
“variable structural strength” at different points. That was not reassuring knowledge. Aijaz, 
however, pointed toward the main walls and said they were quite thick, and would likely sustain 
the pressure. Taham, the grandson, said the walls were all cement and brick, except on the 
second floor where the Hakims had used clay. If the water reached the second floor, he said 
matter-of-factly, those walls would turn into mud. 
We looked out into the large backyard of the house, where the Hakims had a small 
orchard. The top branches of the trees bearing ripe pears and apples still stuck out from the 
water. The tin roofs of the garages and storage sheds had separated from their stilts and were 
floating in the water. Electricity poles had prevented these potential rafts from floating away. “It 
would be hard, but we could jump onto these if need be,” Aijaz said. If the house collapsed under 
us, however, it would create a strong inward pull, from which only those might reemerge who 
could hold their breath long enough and swim out toward the rafts. 
In the distance, a few street dogs had managed to climb on top of floating roofs, and were 
squealing in terror. A dog in our sights kept running from edge to edge looking for a way out of 
the water. Even though dogs are good swimmers, there was nowhere to swim to. Between the 
dog and us there was a strong current, and the icy water would have washed him away.  
As we anxiously monitored the water through the day, we noted that it was still rising but 
at a much slower rate. By late Sunday evening, the water finally stabilized at around twenty-two 
feet (our collective estimate). It looked like the swollen Jhelum had filled to the brim all the 
spaces that lay in its path. It was likely that the river had leveled with the Dal Lake, Parvaiz said, 
and now the only way left for the water was to leave town. It was quite plausible. I wondered 




utter silence of this flooded, rebellious city mean to them? Did they finally turn off their 
surveillance equipment, and take a break from their constant watch of every move in the city? 
    As soon as we announced that the water had stopped rising, the Hakims and the Jamwals 
heaved a sigh of relief. Any good news was better than what we had been witnessing since early 
morning. Our attention shifted to planning for the night. We had not eaten much since the 
previous evening. The normally quiet second floor began buzzing with activity. I made room in 
my rented apartment for nine people. The calf—Aijaz named him Sultan—was given some old 
rugs to sleep on. I jokingly called those gathered on the terrace “Internally Displaced Persons,” 
as I announced who was sleeping where, and then pinched myself. It was too soon for humor. 
 Mughal got busy cooking in my kitchen. It seemed to calm his nerves. Omais helped Mrs. 




Hakim rearrange her stuff. Rearranging her stuff seemed to calm Mrs. Hakim’s nerves. At times, 
it looked like Mrs. Hakim’s movements, picking things up and putting them in different places, 
emerged from her muscle memory, from years of organizing a home. Mr. Hakim kept taking 
nervous strolls on the terrace, while oddly, I thought, taking time off in-between for his naps. 
Reminding us that we were suddenly not all one family, their daughter-in-law quickly created a 
kitchen of her own on the terrace. Her makeshift kitchen looked better organized than mine. 
While Mughal and I looked enviously at her kitchen, it also unnerved me a bit. During such 
crises as floods or wars, makeshift should look like makeshift. Her kitchen, however, looked like 
she was preparing for a long haul. 
 The night was calm. The clouds withdrew, and the moon came out. The submerged 
Rajbagh began to shimmer in its glow. The squeals of the dog on the floating roof were subdued 
by then. How long could it have lasted, we thought. Over the years, the open urban spaces for 
street dogs in Kashmir had shrunk as people built high walls around their compounds—both a 
psychic and a practical imperative for a people pegged under a violent military occupation. Older 
cultural practices of leaving the first portion of the meal at the door for the dogs had become 
scarce. As a result, the rummaging habits of dogs, whose population had exploded due to 
absence of any sterilization program, became precarious. They returned human aggression with 
their own aggression. I doubted if people were going to go out of their way to help a marooned 
dog. 
The first and the last sign of the government 
            The next morning, the water had reduced, but only by a few inches. At this rate, we 
thought, it would take several weeks to completely drain. We also knew that—because Rajbagh 




Even that could take weeks. We assessed our supplies. We had sufficient drinking water to last 
several days. The food could also last. We had brought up some rice, flour, and pulses. We also 
had enough gas to cook. But there were nine mouths to feed, and Sultan was consuming our fruit 
liberally. 
Later that morning, a boat carrying policemen came. It remained at a distance. Four cops 
rowed it quietly, and when Mr. Jamwal asked if any help was coming, they replied that a “rescue 
plan was under consideration.” The officialese didn’t sound convincing, at least not to us. They 
were still considering a plan! The boat came to a house, and a man, a woman, and their little son, 
got on through the second story window. Then the boat went away. That was the last sign of the 
government we would see for the next four weeks. Parvaiz said the man they evacuated was a 
“senior police officer.” 
Another boat came, but it was a “private” one. It went straight to a guesthouse across the 
lane from our house, evacuated tourists, including a Western couple, and then never showed up 
again. Later in the afternoon a few flimsy rowboats came. They carried no water or food. Young 
men rowing them plucked fruit from the treetops and distributed them to different houses. They 
looked at us with a morbid pity, as if they knew something about our precarious existence that 
we didn’t. One of them threw a few pears toward us. We managed to catch some, while others 
crashed into the roof and turned into mush. We fed the mushy pears to Sultan, who had by that 
morning gained enough strength to stand up on all fours and grunt some moos. He happily 
gobbled them down. 
During the day, we busied ourselves with pulling stuff out of the water with a long hook 
that Taham and Aijaz built. Although it was only the second day of being marooned in the flood, 




morning, no one had thought so much about the things they had lost, perhaps except the elderly 
Hakims, who lost the most. But as the water stopped rising further, Parvaiz and Aijaz (who knew 
that his own ground-floor apartment in Jawahar Nagar was by then fully under water) reminisced 
about lost books, documents, diaries, computer hard drives, and photo albums, things that were 
irreplaceable. There was a three hundred-year-old handwritten Quran, medical records of 
children, and memorabilia of dear ones who were no more. There were passports, which are 
difficult to get in Kashmir, and usually take months to replace. 
Moments of activity were interspersed by longer periods of silence. But there were also 
times when our old “argumentative selves” took hold of us. Aijaz kept up the spirits with his wry 
comments on how India was going to respond to the flood. “Was it an opportunity for India to 
wipe out the freedom movement?” “Had the flood resolved the Kashmir question in ways that 
would become visible in the coming years?” At one point, Mrs. Hakim almost sneered as the 
men blathered about international politics around ISIS, Iran, and Israel. But she did make cups of 
salty nun chai for all. Amid the passionate arguments, we often sneaked momentary glances at 
the water all around us, the water whose immense weight could at any moment crush the floor 
under our feet. I caught myself wondering what kind of sound the collapse would produce. 
As darkness fell on Monday, we started untying Sultan from his daytime spot on the edge 
of the terrace to his nighttime home under the canopy which protected the water tanks, when 
suddenly a bearded man drenched from the chest down arrived on the terrace. “Where had he 
come from?” The man, who turned out to be Mrs. Hakim’s relative, was in a hurry and in no 
mood to answer. He spoke agitatedly to the Hakims, asking them to get out of the house with 
him. He had brought a boat with a boatman, he said, and it was waiting next to the living room. 




their in-laws) hitting him at the wrong moment, announced he was going nowhere, and that he 
would prefer to live or die in his own house. But the drenched man thundered that he had “no 
time for such bluster.” The houses are collapsing all over, he said. They had to leave. This was 
not good news for the rest of us for whom no boat had come. Finally, the daughter-in-law put her 
resolute foot down, announcing she, her son, and her mother-in-law were leaving with the man. 
Amid all this, the man’s eyes fell on Sultan. He paused, scowled in surprise, and then silently 
dragged the Hakims to the window, from where they were lowered, a tad roughly, onto the tiny 
rowboat. 
With Omais, along with more luggage than suited the dire situation, we felt there were 
one too many people on that little boat. A jerky movement could send them all down into the 
frigid, roily waters. It was dark, but the full moon provided some visibility. The electric and 
telephone cables that lurked underneath and above the water were going to make the boat ride 
harder. Mr. Hakim kept looking back at the four of us—Parvaiz, Aijaz, Mughal and I— 
remorsefully, as we watched them leave. We were worried for him and his family, and he was 
sad he was leaving us behind. Yet, despite the rickety boat they were all perilously piled on, we 
knew they had a decent chance of reaching dry ground. Soon the Hakims were out of our sight, 
and the man who had brought the boat for them shouted from a distance that he was going to 
bring back the boat for us in the morning. We closed the window behind us, and went back to the 
terrace to eat dinner. 
The Hakims had left behind some food for us. I missed the little community that had 
begun to form on the terrace. In an impulsive moment on that lazy Monday afternoon, my 
anthropological training had led me to briefly wonder how a community of two strange groups, 




share, might negotiate everyday norms of Kashmiri social life. Aijaz missed Taham’s company. 
They had struck a chord. Taham had appeared skilled in the “practical issues of basic survival,” 
qualities Aijaz admired in men. 
My thoughts returned to my family. I wondered if my parents in Anantnag were safe, and 
if they knew about my situation. Did my wife and little daughter in New York, who had had no 
contact with me for the previous three days, know that I was trapped in the flood? The last time 
we spoke, on Saturday, I had only told them that my parents’ house in Anantnag, which stood on 
the banks of Arapat stream, was under threat from the flood.    
A differential value of life 
Tuesday was spent in bitterness. We cursed India, and distributed drinking water to our 
neighbors. The water had receded by a couple of feet, but almost half of the second story was 
still submerged. 
Early that morning, giant military helicopters flying low over our neighborhood awoke 
me. The rug Mughal and I had saved from Parvaiz’s house, and had left to dry on the rooftop, 
flew off from the tornado that one helicopter’s rotors generated and landed on the railing of the 
terrace. Mughal managed to catch a hold of it just in time, and pulled it back. The house shook 
violently. We ran out on the terrace, and tried to shoo the helicopter away. 
The helicopter had not come to evacuate us or drop any supplies. It just made several 
rounds and went southward. It stopped over a military camp near the Flood Channel, and began 
airlifting soldiers. Several more helicopters arrived on that spot until all the soldiers were taken. 
Then the helicopters stopped at a paramilitary camp to the west of us, and began another airlift. 
By early afternoon the military had airlifted its own men. 




they had very little expectations from an army they considered as an “army of occupation.” Yet, 
at some level, there was also a belief that during a calamity, like the one that had just befallen 
Kashmir, humanistic considerations might override nationalistic antipathies. But it quickly 
became obvious that in the minds of the authorities there was a clear hierarchy of the value of 
life in Kashmir. They appeared to know who needed to be rescued and who to be left to the 
elements. After the military camps, the helicopters stood above hotels and guesthouses, and 
began airlifting Indian tourists. Once the tourists were taken away, the helicopters didn’t return 
until the next day, even though it was quite possible to airlift many stranded Kashmiris that 
evening. Some neighbors made flags and kept waving at the helicopters. Mughal made one as 
well. The Sikh “domestic help” of the Jamwals made a large red one; its irony as a symbol of 
communist insurrection atop the house of erstwhile feudal lords was not lost on us. He waved it 
vigorously long after the skies had become silent. 
No boats came on Tuesday, except a little one that came late in the afternoon and was 
rowed by four young Kashmiri men. They had come from the old downtown area. Downtown, 
according to them, had not been submerged. “Our ancestors were wiser,” said one of them, “they 
built on higher ground, and let the river have its way.” The men told us that there were thousands 
of evacuees stranded and cold under the open sky at the foot of the Takht-e-Sulaiman hill, and 
there was no more space or food left. The locals from the neighborhood there, who had been 
feeding these evacuees, had run out of supplies. Were we better off where we were, in this house 
that still had some drinking water and a bit of food left? Perhaps, but how long could the house 
stand? We worried that the water was slowly loosening the foundations of the house, and it could 





The young men had no supplies with them, but they were helpful in carrying water from 
one house to another. We sent drinking water to a few neighbors, who had gestured from a 
distance that they were running short. We requested the young men to cut off a few leafy 
branches for Sultan from the tops of the weeping willows and the mulberry trees still visible 
above water. Sultan, who had recovered well, cocked his neck above the terrace railing, crooned 
out a moo, and self-pityingly lowered his long kohl-colored eyelashes in several rapid 
movements. The young men couldn’t help but fall into Sultan’s trap, and despite one neighbor 
angrily shouting that they ought to be helping “human children” instead of animals, the men 
fetched enough branches to last till the next morning. Sultan had a feast that night. He was picky 
even, choosing the mulberry leaves over the willow. 
Sultan was generally quiet, but his searing gaze appeared to beseech conversation, and let 
it be said, in full disclosure, that we all spoke to the calf. During their conversation, Parvaiz 
watched Sultan animatedly as the calf pushed its long, greyish pink tongue into its nostrils to 
clean them. Sultan had endeared himself to us, so much so that when Mughal patted the calf’s 
back harshly to make him move, Aijaz frowned at Mughal. In his defense, Mughal explained to 
us newly minted cowherds that that is how it is done in the village. 
“Sirji, leave! Leave,” 
By Wednesday morning, we all had clear physical signs of fatigue. We wanted to leave 
the place as soon as possible. The water had receded further, but again just by a couple of feet. 
With the vacuous government unable to even register its presence anywhere during the crisis the 
possibility of removing the water mechanically looked remote. 
The previous night, we had decided that two among us should get on the first boat that 




begun to emerge from under the water. Then a boat could be arranged and all of us could leave. 
By Wednesday, when the rush of evacuations would have calmed, we reasoned, it would be less 
daunting to find a boat willing to take four men ashore. But we didn’t want to leave Sultan 
behind. While we had devised all different strategies for making an enclosure full of food for 
him, neither would his instinct allow rationing the food, nor would the food remain edible for 
more than a few days. It would be impossible to regularly check on him. And then there was 
always the looming terror of the house collapsing. 
At 9 am a boat came and after some negotiations its occupants were willing to carry Aijaz 
and Parvaiz to the Bund. Phones were still out so there was no way to communicate. I told the 
two of them that if they were unable to manage a boat, Mughal and I would wait for another two 
days and then we would attempt to leave by early morning on Friday. In the meantime, we would 
store as much food for Sultan as possible. 
When they left, the house seemed all the more threatening. To keep busy, Mughal and I 
made some rotis. Mughal said if only we could get Sultan out on the Bund, he would take him to 
his home in Kupwara, where Sultan could have a decent life in the hills. He promised he wasn’t 
going to sell Sultan off to a butcher. 
In the afternoon, the helicopters returned and flew low above the neighborhood. 
Again, they didn’t evacuate any residents, nor drop food or water. By then only a few neighbors 
were waving flags. It seemed the rest had resigned to the fact that they would have to wait for 
help from fellow Kashmiris. From one helicopter, a TV crew was taking photographs. It circled 
above the houses several times. Angry, a few men from a neighboring house, who, we came to 
know later, were Kashmiri policemen, gestured lewdly at the TV crew. Several other neighbors 




officer turned to me and said, “Kashmiri lives mean nothing to India.” Not a bad wake-up call, I 
thought, for a cop who serves the same repressive apparatus that the Indian government uses to 
control and render Kashmiri lives expendable. 
Mr. Jamwal came out on his balcony in the afternoon, and said they had found some 
kerosene for their little electric generator, and they were planning to start it to see if their TV 
worked. We had had no news of the world beyond the Bund. He wanted to know, for one last 
time, if we should be waiting for an evacuation at all. Their Sikh helper had found a place on the 
same boat as Aijaz and Parvaiz in the morning, and was out inquiring on the Bund. He returned 
in the afternoon panicked. He told us he had gotten separated from Aijaz and Parvaiz, and had 
managed to return with great difficulty on top of a small raft. 
“Sirji, leave! Leave,” he hollered from the balcony, and then ran indoors. Hearing this, 
Mughal grew even more miserable. “We should leave sooner than Friday,” he said. I agreed.   
There were things we needed to take care of before we could hop on a boat willing to 
take us. On Tuesday, several men on one boat had said they were chasing thieves with boats. 
People had been caught breaking into abandoned houses, they said. Several neighbors had 
decided to stay even if rescue came because they feared they would be robbed as soon as they 
left. Mughal had nothing to lose. He had managed to save nothing of his own from the ground 
floor. I packed some of my stuff, mostly my fieldnotes, recorders, and books, in a bag, and 
Mughal and I pulled it up into the dusty, low attic through a trap door. Any intelligent thief 
would first hit the attic, I knew, but every thief would have to pass through my second-floor 
apartment to reach the attic. Why not make it a bit harder for the thief, I thought.     
As evening fell, the neighborhood buzzed with the whir of Mr. Jamwal’s generator. They 




shared with neighbors. I had untied Sultan and was bringing him under the canopy when Mughal 
came running from the living room hysterically announcing that Parvaiz had brought a boat. I ran 
to the living room window and looked out. Indeed, there Parvaiz was, on an inflatable boat, 
larger than I had expected, waving at us! There were five more men on the boat. Parvaiz shouted 
from a distance that we had “two minutes” to get out. It was clear that a lot of negotiation had 
gone into convincing the volunteers with the boat, and Parvaiz wanted to appear like he meant 
business. Looking at the boat, I asked if we could take Sultan. Parvaiz had, perhaps, not 
mentioned Sultan to the men. Rightly, I thought. But he asked the men finally, and to our 
surprise all they wanted was to see how big Sultan was, and if he could fit. Sultan was brought 
down to the first-floor porch where the water was low, and the men, seeing Sultan was just a 
baby, said he could come along. We could barely suppress our delight. 
Shortly thereafter, we were out on the boat. For the first time, I saw the house surrounded 
by water from the outside, and the neighborhood beyond what the view from the living room 
window and the terrace had allowed. Rajbagh looked ghostly. Putrid smells wafted from the 
water. Sides of some houses had fallen off. The destruction underneath the water was yet not 
visible. There were dead dogs on top of floating roofs. But the dog we had heard howl was not 
there. Had he finally jumped into the water and swum to safety? I hoped he did. 
There was very little light, and even the moon was blanketed in clouds. Beneath, poking 
through the water, were tips of electricity poles, barbed wires, and sharp-edged corrugated tin 
roofs. It took quite a bit of maneuvering to move the boat forward. As we were nearing the Bund, 
our inflatable boat suddenly got stuck on top of a pole, threatening to poke a hole in the middle. 
Everyone was told not to make any rapid movement. Thankfully, Sultan sat motionless. We had 





Distraught city  
As the Bund became visible, I saw it was full of people. A few men, managing the rescue 
efforts, saw us coming, and guided us to a makeshift landing pad. One man gave me his hand, 
and I stepped off the boat. Parvaiz, Mughal, and Sultan disembarked after me. The mood was 
glum all around. There were noises of desperation, pleading, and mutual comforting. The famed 
Rajbagh was ruined. 
Sultan trotted on the Bund, as the rest of us began looking for Aijaz. We were told he was 
waiting at a distance. People stopped us to ask about Sultan, some even rudely joking that he 
would make tasty kebabs. A few little boys took pictures with their cell phones. We had no idea 
where Sultan had come from, but here he was, days after he had been pulled out half-dead from 
frigid floodwaters, soaking up all the attention.   
We finally found Aijaz, and saw several other friends were waiting on the Bund. Nawaz 
had been coming to the Bund over the previous few days to see if he could arrange a boat, but he 
wasn’t sure if we were in Rajbagh at all. To get rescuers to agree to help and row a boat for 
hours, and then not find us, would have been a great act of “insensitivity.” Parvaiz’s brothers had 
been coming to the Bund too, to see if there was any news of him. The Indian military had 
announced on their “flood relief webpage” that they had evacuated Parvaiz on Monday. Did the 
Hakims on their way out tell the army that we were still trapped in the house, and they just 
included Parvaiz’s name in the evacuee list without confirming if he had been evacuated at all? 
Parvaiz’s brothers, however, had heard nothing from him. Quite rightly, they didn’t believe the 
army. 




were still travails ahead, and as soon as we learnt about the extent of devastation the flood had 
caused all over the city, our hearts sank. The coming days were going to be the toughest ones, I 
would soon learn. We walked past the submerged working class district of Maisuma where the 
houses are old and wobbly. Several of my research informants lived in these houses. Entire 
families waited on the Bund praying so their houses could remain standing. Tehreek activists had 
organized rescue operations there, as they consoled those who still had relatives stranded in the 
area. One senior Tehreek leader had sent relief boats into a Hindu dharmath, and rescued the 
priests from there. His own house in Maisuma was under water, and he looked a bit desolate. “I 
know in the end my poor neighborhood will be left alone to rebuild, for now it is important that 
we all stand together,” he said to his JKLF volunteers.  In the distance, Hænz men were rowing 
tourists in their boats from the half-submerged hotels on the Dal Lake to the dry road toward the 
airport. Hotel owners who had often resented Hænz and their houseboats were looking quite 
grateful for the critical help Hænz men were providing. 
Further ahead, a dozen pregnant women, due anytime, held their bellies up in their arms 
and walked in file. Distraught and silent, they had been evacuated by Kashmiri volunteers from 
the submerged Lal Ded Hospital, Kashmir’s largest child and maternity facility. We had also 
seen many women with their newborns camping on the Bund outside the hospital. A few, I was 
told, had been born out in the open. We learnt about deaths from capsizing boats and collapsing 
houses. Several families remained buried under the debris of their homes for days to come. A 
young photojournalist, trying to save a trapped family, had been washed away.  
There was desperation, and there was anger. On Budshah Bridge, young men were 
running from end to end, sending tractors to areas where people needed to be saved. They were 




helicopters pointing their cameras at desperate people. Those on the bridge taking pictures had 
their phones snatched and flung down into the water. They felt helpless, and didn’t find taking 
pictures to be sensitive, or urgent. Local photojournalists huddled by the curbside respectfully 
agreeing not to take pictures. Youths were also yelling at helicopters for throwing “expired 
biscuits” at the bridge. Several young men and women had been injured from falling biscuit 
packs.   
On Thursday, wading through a three-mile stretch of waist-high water from Qamarwari 
to Rawalpora, Parvaiz, his brothers and I found hundreds of bloated dead cows strung to the 
fence of a dairy farm that supplied the Indian army. Contorting his face at the smell, one of 
Parvaiz’s brothers quipped that if the Indian army didn’t even save these cows, which are “holy 
and practical,” how could we have stood a chance? Alongside us walked disconsolate mothers 
and fathers, carrying their children on their shoulders, going in both directions, searching for a 
safe place.   
Images of solidarity, images of control 
But if we saw immense destruction all over, those areas where water had not entered also 
provided glimpses of selfless acts of solidarity and support. There were community kitchens all 
over the downtown for people fleeing the waters. On the Bund along Maisuma alone, I counted 
fourteen langars. While the flood had washed away the government, local communities in 
Srinagar and people from villages, who had trudged dozens of miles loaded with gunny bags full 
of rice and vegetables, demonstrated that Kashmir was not going to drown. 
Amid the leveling and immersion that the city experienced, many paramilitary pickets 
and bunkers had also been washed away. The “fortified” walls had given way and the guts of the 




paramilitary camps, embedded deep in the densely built and populated parts of the city, where 
aerial evacuation was not possible, the soldiers had shed their pants, and, even while continuing 
to hold fast on to their machine guns, were pouring water out with buckets and tin pots. At other 
places, Indian military quickly erected perimeter posts where walls had stood and draped cloth 
screens on them to prevent curious Kashmiris crowds from peering inside the camps.      
In downtown’s narrow lanes, people listening to Indian radio shook their heads in anger. I 
found a group of people assembled outside a tea-stall watching news on TV. The TV was 
broadcasting aerial shots of Srinagar with a Hindi caption, Wo Jo Kashmir Tha (“The Kashmir 
That Was”). I asked one of them how many people had died according to the government. There 
was no government, he replied, adding that the Indian newscasters were reading obituaries for 
Kashmir. “The helicopters are helping only their own people, and throwing expired biscuits at 
us,” another man said. In another part of the downtown, a man stood up facing the square and 
cursed India. A couple of Kashmiri police officers on duty were within earshot, but gauging the 
mood, they just nodding in agreement.  
That evening, we arrived at one of Parvaiz’s brother’s place, and watched news on an 
Indian TV channel. The newscaster berated Kashmiris for their “ingratitude” toward the Indian 
army. Apparently, at a couple of places people had thrown stones at the helicopters flying 
overhead. According to yet another newscaster, Indian army had saved countless Kashmiri lives. 
“How could Kashmiris pay the Indian army back like that!” he bellowed. Kashmiris could no 
longer justify their “separatism” when their very lives depended on the Indian army, a panelist on 
his talk show grumbled. 
Indian news reporters had been flown into the Srinagar airport, and were reporting from 




in the helicopters, and from high and far they had captured irresistible videos of a city under 
water. These videos were edited and beamed back to the TV studios in New Delhi, where the 
Indian political pundits endlessly speculated whether this was the “decisive victory” for India in 
Kashmir. It was clear that “this” referred not to the help they believed the Indian army had 
provided to the Kashmiris, but the flood itself.  The flood was a godsend weapon of war, which 
the TV pundits believed, was going to win the Kashmir war for India. 
Many in Kashmir complained that the “communication blackout” in Kashmir during the 
flood was deliberate and was meant to prevent Kashmiris from telling their story of the flood. 
They thought the prolonged outage of telephone lines and the Internet was a deliberate move to 
give the flood a spin in favor of the military, and to prevent international scrutiny of their actual 
role. Reminding the world that Kashmir was India’s “internal matter,” the government in New 
Delhi had declined offers of help from several countries, and barred the flow of international aid. 
The Indian government argued that it could handle the crisis on its own. All it showed it was 
capable of, however, was to watch Kashmir drown while unleashing a public relations campaign 
to resurrect the image of its military, a military that had been regularly criticized by international 
agencies for human rights violations in Kashmir.  
The much-touted “financial aid package” for disaster relief, announced by the new Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, turned out to be spectacularly measly (even by the estimates of 
the loyalist local government, which sends taxes collected from Kashmiris to the Union 
government that are then distributed back to the States). Not surprisingly, even from that sum it 
was reported that the India’s Defense Ministry had helped itself to a clean one-third cut of about 
$90 million, as the bill for “air dropping and rescue operation” called “Operation Megh Rahat” 




houses in the flood said they had received bank drafts from the government for 3000 rupees (= 
$50) each. 
Solidarity, fault lines, and military humanism in the villages 
A week after the flood hit Srinagar, I found a way to reach my home in Anantnag. Much 
of the town had come under water, but because of its higher altitude, the water had flowed out as 
soon as it arrived. Some of the lower parts of the town had seen damage, but the worst was 
suffered by villages along Jhelum and its tributaries. I saw volunteers from Syed-us-Sadaat 
Foundation (SSF) distributing rice, pulses and blankets in the town, and decided to help them 
assess the damage to help run their relief work efficiently. Along with a couple of their 
volunteers, I travelled widely in the region to understand the full impact of the flood and if the 
government had been able to reach the affected areas. As Bari, the SSF general secretary 
described it, the foundation was a local “religious charity” run on non-sectarian lines. SSF had 
started off as young men from a neighborhood in Anantnag donating money and volunteering 
time to help “widows and orphans” through monthly allowances. It ran a sewing workshop for 
young women and included religious teaching for children. On the side, SSF also had an active 
mountaineering club.  
Bari said the flood had expanded SSF’s work and they had been stretched thin for 
resources. The government had blockaded material sent by expat Kashmiris working in the Gulf 
states. Even materials collected by Kashmiri students in New Delhi was lying at the airport, with 
government unwilling to allow it to pass through. SSF had jumped into flood relief the moment 
the banks of Arapat nallah breached, flooding parts of town. Their volunteers had saved lives, 
and brought people to safety. By the time, I joined their meetings and efforts, their work had 





By mid-September, flood had left behind not only ruins but also severe danger of disease 
outbreak. Several local chemists in Anantnag opened supplies in their stores to help with 
chlorination. A water bottling company gave their stocks to SSF to bring clean water to the 
villages. People donated their clothes, beddings, and grains. Some pooled milk powder from 
their homes for hungry babies. Doctors banded together to set up medical camps, where 
medicine was freely distributed. Imtiyaz and Nazim, two SSF volunteers, set up round-the-clock 
ration distribution center in the town, where affected people could come get food grains, oil, and 
pulses. It was all in all a remarkable collective societal effort in a place shattered by years of 
splintering occupation and violence. Anantnag, a town that had been at the heart of the armed 
rebellion of 1990 and then turned by the state into the center of violent Ikhwani 
counterinsurgency, where thousands had died and disappeared over the years, was resilient at 
precisely the moment when it needed it the most.   
I visited villages, there was still no trace of the government. In HP Tavela, more than two 
hundred homes had been washed away. Sara, a middle aged woman, was in the grieving period. 
In a recent road accident, she had lost her three sons, her only sources of support. Sara and her 
daughters had been woken by the rushing water in the middle of the night. She tried to save her 
only cow, but lost her belongings and grains in the process. Spending the next few days drinking 
salty water on the top floor of a nearby mosque, she said she had been left with just tshod zu 
(“bare life”). No one from the government had visited Sara and her daughters, even a month after 
the flood. 
In Beighpora, straddling the thirty feet high railway track that had been built a few years 




blocking the flood water from flowing out.4 An old lady, Raja’s sons had saved a boatful of army 
soldiers from the water. But when the flood water finally receded, the soldiers came back with 
dredgers to dig up the village road to find the weapons they said had fallen into the water, 
increasing the difficulties for the villagers already dealing with fallen structures all around. 
Raja’s sons came under suspicion and were harshly interrogated.  
                
 
If the government and the military had been absent or insensitive in HP Tavela and 
Beighpora, in other places, the army and the police competed for media attention. In Lelhar, a 
                                                 
4 See also (JKCCS 2015), on the role of militarized infrastructure during the flood. 




flooded village along the Jhelum further downstream, villagers were desperate for clean drinking 
water. This desperation had resulted in old fault lines between the village’s cultivators 
(zamindars)5 and the fishing community (hænz) to accentuate. The dominant zamindars took 
most of the drinking water that non-Kashmiri aid groups brought into the village. The fishing 
community were forced to drink turbid Jhelum water. When I visited Lelhar, I noticed an army 
water-tanker pulling in. A local pro-India politician and a TV crew from an Indian news channel 
were closely following the tanker. Villagers lined up to get water, as the politician gave a speech 
in self-praise. A TV cameraman took videos of men and women carrying copper vessels full of 
water with Indian soldiers bending and moving at just the right moments to be seen helping. 
Later, when SSF conducted a turbidity test on the water army had brought, it turned out to be 
more turbid than the Jhelum waters. Mughali, an old woman from the fishing community, who 
had been living with her three little grandchildren on a small boat on the Jhelum since the flood 
receded, was sad she had lost her small mud and brick shack on top of the bank, and bitter at the 
cultivators for not letting her grandchildren take water. When an SSF volunteer told her about the 
turbidity of the water the cultivators were drinking, she laughed. We laughed too.  
I witnessed similar societal fault lines becoming accentuated in Dehrun, a quaint village 
on the roaring Brengi tributary, where flash floods destroyed the lower inhabitations of people 
mostly from Mochi community—traditionally associated with removing hides from dead cows 
for the leather industry. Hanifa and her daughter Ruby said that a truck had arrived from the 
Indian state of Rajasthan carrying grains and blankets. I had seen the truck parked on the higher 
side of the village with banners from the Indian National Congress party. The upper-caste Pirs 
                                                 
5 These were small landholders, beneficiaries of the Land Reforms of the early 1950s, and not big landowners, 





had taken over distribution and were selectively giving relief to cultivators and denying it to the 
Mochis, who had been the ones most hit by the flood. Waiting in their makeshift shed, Hanifa, 
Ruby and Ruby’s three small children had gone hungry for days, until villagers from the 
cultivator community took pity. Local Tehreek activists had also intervened on behalf of the 
Mochis to resolve the situation.         
In Aadi Gatun, a village leveled by the flood, Sayeeda had lost everything except the 
“rags on her old back” as she described it. Volunteers from Jama’at-i-Islami, a religious-political 
organization, had helped her build a temporary shelter. When I arrived, trudging along miles of 
washed away roads and bridges, Jama’at volunteers were distributing food and blankets. Jama’at 
had for years been part of Tehreek, even though since late 1990s they had kept a low-profile. A 
police party arrived and urged villagers to come to their “relief camp” instead, which they said 
they were just about to set up. Jama’aat volunteers wrapped up and left, promising to return the 
next day.  
Soon an army contingent arrived in Aadi Gatun, and took over a distribution center, 
where a few school teachers had volunteered to distribute rice collected from adjoining villages. 
The officer told his men to “clear the area.” The soldiers asked the people to form a line outside, 
and the distribution resumed, except now it was the soldiers distributing. A photojournalist from 
India was encouraged to take pictures, which he happily did. A mini-military coup. The original 
volunteers stood by at a distance, waiting for the photojournalist to finish and leave. 
Wherever I visited, alone or with the SSF team, women, the traditional center of socio-
economic activity in Kashmiri homes, were sharpest in their criticism of the government, and 
most forthcoming in describing the difficulties they had faced after the flood. Unlike the young 





women urged me to take pictures of their damaged homes, soiled grains, dead cattle, and even 
include them in the pictures. (Since I didn’t carry a camera with me, it was easier to recuse 
myself from such requests). It was clear, Kashmiri women, despite their anger at the government, 
wanted to get back to rebuilding their lives and families, instead of protesting against the state. 
Yet, as Sara from HP Tavela said, “rebuilding our homes without government help will be a slap 
on their faces.”  
 
Threshold of the visible 
A couple of months after the flood, the state officials suddenly became active. Patwaris 
(land record officials) began visiting villages assessing flood damage, and district administrative 




offices opened their gates. Villagers, who had lost pukka (red brick) houses, were given checks 
for 75,000 rupees (USD 1100) each, and those who had lost kuccha (raw clay brick) homes 
received 40,000 rupees (USD 600) each. The break-up hardly made any logical sense—or 
difference in the lives of the people affected—but the government could claim it had “done 
something.” For weeks before these checks arrived, prime-time experts on Indian news-channels 
had been calling Kashmiris “free-loaders.” These experts were tapping into a common discourse 
in India that Kashmiris were dependent on Indian dole. This discourse is also internalized and 
promoted by Kashmiri parties that take part in elections. Kashmiri intellectuals and activists, 
however, held a differing view on the subject, as was evident in a public meeting on “Kashmiri 
Economy” held a few months before the flood. Indian state not only collects taxes from 
Kashmiris, but, as several participants claimed, the state acts like “a monopoly colonial 
corporation.” For instance, while disbarring foreign investment in Kashmir’s “energy sector,” 
Indian government generates hydroelectricity in Kashmir at “very cheap prices.” And then it 
sells the same electricity back to Kashmir at multiple times the cost of production (Umar 2016; 
Ganai 2016). Clearly, Kashmiris were not the ones profiting from this relationship, or at least 
that was the perception common among sections of Kashmiris intelligentsia.       
In many respects, the flood was part of an overall “regime-made disaster.” Ariella 
Azoulay, writing in the context of Israeli occupation in Palestine, defines regime-made disaster 
as when one population (citizens, privileged) imposes a disaster (which could include 
“expulsion, dispossession, and destruction,” or in case of Kashmir persistent state violence as 
well) on “others,” but is unable to see it for what it is or to think themselves responsible for the 
outcomes of the disaster (2013, 550). Occupation in Kashmir has become invisible to most 




Refusing to listen to the perspectives of Kashmiris, Indian media confirms these beliefs 
incessantly. But to Kashmiris, the impact of the occupation on their life-worlds is palpably 
destructive and dramatic, especially during grave events like the 2014 flood. Not only had the 
militarized infrastructure, especially the high railroad in places like Beighpora as well as military 
occupation of karewas (high grounds) in Kashmir, directly led to drowning of dozens of villages 
and urban neighborhoods, but the absence of the government during the critical initial weeks had 
also turned a natural hazard into a catastrophe (JKCCS 2015). Given this context, the politics of 
images that I had been witness to was not just about who controlled the images, but about 
“differential visual rights”6—who decides what is to be made visible or invisible, and who gets 
to see from which position within the hierarchies of power. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Gil Hochberg (2015), writing in the Israel-Palestine contexts, shows how Israeli concealment, surveillance, and 
even acts of visual witnessing produce mechanisms for denying Palestinian political subjecthood. 





Over the years, the camera had been systematically used by Indian news media to 
obscure the occupation, and keep its violence under the threshold of visible (and outrage). 
During the previous twenty-five years of military occupation, it had hyper-visibalized Kashmiri 
Muslim “extremism” and Indian military’s humanism, while invisibalizing the occupation and 
the state of violent emergency under which it had put Kashmir. Human rights activists in the 
region, for instance, had long been denouncing Indian media’s blackout of stories of enforced 
disappearances, mass graves, and torture. And even though news from Kashmir was staple on 
Indian TV, the focus was intensively fixated on the “disorder” that the Tehreek demand of right 
to self-determination had supposedly caused. The flood was, therefore, not only an opportunity 
to accentuate that focus, but the disaster could also be image-harvested to frame Kashmir as an 
Indian dependency without a viable independent future of its own.   
Yet, on the ground, the flood had also made a “non-governmental viewing” possible. The 
physical and the ideological structure of the occupation became visible. The military’s tightly-
knit infrastructure of control was momentarily exposed, and the discrepancy between the 
circulating images on the TV and the actual realities on the ground became too glaring. The acts 
of solidarity, the individual and collective efforts in localities and beyond them, stood in sharp 
contrast to the background of circulating images. If there were differential visual rights that 
marked the politics of images, the non-governmental viewing also exposed the hierarchy of the 
body politic: whose lives were worth saving, and whose were not. In the larger schema of the 
occupational order, things may have remained the same as before—the military and the state did 
bounce back from the disruption—but its hegemony had come unhinged. For Tehreek 




countryside like never before. In many cases, youth activists and volunteers began taking 
renewed interest in history of these fault lines—between the cultivators and the fishing 
community, the landed villagers and the landless Mochis, the city and the countryside. The flood 
had exposed another differential body politic that stood alongside the body politic created by the 
occupation.    
Back to the business of normalcy 
It took several weeks for the communications to be restored, but as soon as Kashmiris 
caught their breath and began telling their story of the flood, the Indian TV had moved on. It was 
time to switch to something else, something that has become a way to undercut the popular 
demand for the right to self-determination: elections. Not a month after the flood devastated 
Kashmir, and displaced tens of thousands, the Indian government decided that it was time to ask 
Kashmiris to vote. A supposed tool of democracy, in Kashmir elections are used as a weapon 
against Tehreek parties, who ask people to boycott elections and are unable to contest because 
that would require them to endorse India’s sovereignty over Kashmir, a position with which they 
don’t agree. More than choosing representatives, therefore, it is the “voter turnout” in elections 
that matters. India exhibits a higher voter turnout in front of the international press as proof that 
Kashmiris have chosen to live under “Indian democracy.” If the turnout is low, India ignores it, 
and no political or moral lessons are learnt. Based on media-generated “goodwill” (sadbhavna) 
for the military’s relief work—earning goodwill is part of military’s more elaborate “Operation 
Sadbhavna”—India’s Kashmir experts hoped to rev up the turnout. (Some Kashmiris, I noticed 
were using the word goodil instead of “goodwill,” which in Kashmiri means “fraud”).  
Brought to their knees, I wondered if Kashmiris will be able to see through the flood of 




would bring them to voting booths. But, then, gut feelings, cultivated through a history of protest 
and resistance, are impervious to even neatly packaged propaganda. In a town square in 
Anantnag, I saw a large hoarding put up, with an oversized picture of an aspiring pro-India 
politician. Wearing a spotless white salwar kameez, the man was standing ankle deep in muddy 
flood waters, handing out money. Out of sync with the tragedy all around him, the politician 
sported a big smile into the camera, and the caption read “Vote for Change.” 
A grandma, waiting for bus, looked at the hoarding, sighed, and then laughed. 
“Photoshop,” I said, absentmindedly.  
“Awah photooshap.” She knew.
CHAPTER 4  
STATE OF EMERGENCY, STATE OF ELECTIONS: THE SOCIAL MEANINGS 
OF “DEMOCRACY” IN KASHMIR 
 
It is November 2014, the beginning of winter in Kashmir. The Indian government has 
announced that the elections for Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly will be held in 
December. Hardly two months have passed since the catastrophic flood destroyed dozens of 
villages, submerged towns, and left the local economy in ruin. Thousands have been displaced 
and are without shelter for the typically harsh Himalayan winter. Electricity has been disrupted 
and water is contaminated in many places. With long stretches of roads missing and bridges 
swept away, post-flood Kashmir is a broken landscape. There is a pervasive sense of 
helplessness. In September, when the flood hit, the state government—then in its last months of 
power—had found itself utterly unprepared, and has since failed to provide relief to flood 
victims. Its civilian officials claim that the Indian government, on which the local authorities 
depend for disaster funds, has not released an “emergency package.” But now, some of these 
officials are taken aback that the Indian government is ready to spend valuable resources on 
conducting elections, instead of reconstruction. “True, elections were due,” one local official, 
conducting damage survey in Srinagar, says, “But things need to be restored to some degree of 
order before people can even think about elections. Isn’t it?” But Tehreek activists argue that 
elections in Kashmir are intimately tied to the “state of emergency”—and “disorder”—and have 
very little to do with “democracy.”  
To understand this intertwining of elections and emergency in Kashmir, let us briefly 
return to the early 1990s, when Kashmir erupted into a mass uprising and an armed movement, 




Kashmir’s civilian government, suspend the constitutional rights of the people, and appoint a 
new governor, Jagmohan, who would be responsible directly to the Indian government in New 
Delhi. The appointment of Jagmohan was central to the imposition of an emergency order.1 With 
all the executive authority now vested in his office, Jagmohan represented not only the 
administrative face of the emergency, but also articulated its ideological underpinnings (Brass 
1994, 225). A career bureaucrat, he had previously served under Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi’s emergency regime (1975-77), and was in-charge of a “beautification” program in old 
city Delhi. Under Jagmohan, the program had led to forcible mass sterilization of men, large 
scale demolition of poor neighborhoods and evictions of urban poor, and, at least, one public 
massacre—all of these affecting the city’s Muslims disproportionately (Tarlo 2003, 39).2 Given 
full authority to deal with the Tehreek uprising, when Jagmohan arrived in Srinagar in January 
1990, he saw Kashmir as a “valley of scorpions,” where, he said, “the bullet is the only solution” 
(Anderson 2012, 175).3 Drawn to using medical metaphors during his televised utterances, he 
once dramatically claimed: “Kashmir is sick, and I am its nursing orderly. My job is to 
administer medicine when it is needed.” Jagmohan intended to instill in Kashmiris, what he 
euphemistically called, the “rationality of fate” and the “resignation to order” (Newstrack n.d.). 
For the next four years, first under Jagmohan, and then his successor, Girish Saxena, 
militarization became the dominant paradigm of state control.4 Jagmohan instituted punitive 
                                                 
1 While Jagmohan’s full name is Jagmohan Malhotra, in public life and in his writings, he only uses his first name. 
2 The massacre known as Turkman Gate massacre took place on 19 April 1976, when Jagmohan, as the Vice 
Chairman of Delhi Development Corporation, accompanied by the prime minister’s son, let loose police against 
Muslims protesting forcible sterilization and demolition of homes. His Kashmir stint was his second one. 
3 At one point, to justify his wider crackdown, Jagmohan had gone on to say: “Every Muslim in Kashmir is a 
militant today.” See also Schofield (1996). 
4 I describe this process of militarization in Chapter 5. Drawing on Michael Geyer (1989), Catherine Lutz sees 
“militarization” as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the 
production of violence.” Lutz argues that militarization involves “intensification of labor and resources allocated to 
military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals.” She points out that 




measures against public expressions of Tehreek, which led to extensive restrictions on civilian 
life, killings (including several public massacres), enforced disappearances, incarcerations, and 
torture (Human Rights Watch 1993). But instead of subduing Tehreek, militarization served to 
increase the number of Kashmiri youth joining the rebel ranks. The movement not only became 
further entrenched but also spread to a larger geographic region beyond the Kashmir valley 
(Bose 1997; Kazi 2010). Within a few months, as international criticism over public massacres in 
Kashmir rose, Jagmohan was recalled, and replaced by Saxena. However, the change was 
superficial. Saxena had also been an advocate of “tough military action.” Under his 
administration, violence under policies like “Catch and Kill” intensified, creating widespread 
fear, especially in the countryside.    
By late 1993, however, the Indian government decided that the answer to the armed 
revolt in Kashmir was not to be a purely military one. A “political process” was to be restarted as 
well, as Rajesh Pilot, the federal minister in charge of Kashmir affairs in New Delhi, prominently 
announced to the press. Governor Saxena was replaced by General K.V. Krishna Rao, who was 
to start “secret talks” with Tehreek militant leaders. Prominent elements of the old civilian 
government, which had been dismissed in 1990, were to be brought back from their self-imposed 
exile. Bureaucracy was to be “revived” in a way that could “respond to people’s grievances.” 
There was talk of reviving “the economy,” which would mean, as openly admitted by 
government’s advisors, pumping cash into the region to purchase loyalty. All of this was to 
culminate in the conduct of elections for the state assembly, which would give Kashmir a 
“semblance of normalcy” (Baweja 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). 
                                                 
leadership)—all in all militarization glorifies and legitimates “military action” (2004, 320; Geyer 1989, 70). While 
Lutz analyses this process in the US at the societal level, in Kashmir the process was specifically carried out at the 
level of the state, primarily through militarization of public spaces and introduction of emergency laws. See also 




In the first indication of this shift, the Indian government’s discourse changed markedly 
from describing Kashmiri armed militants as the “enemies of the state” to describing them as the 
“enemies of peace.” Unlike previously, when all Kashmiris were considered potentially 
subversive, which to the state officials justified militarization and the suspension of civil rights, 
now Tehreek activists were to be differentiated from the larger Kashmiri population. 
Accordingly, a new purchase was put on the idea of “return to peace” instead of simply “law and 
order,” and peace was symbolically connected with the conduct of elections.  
In truth, however, elections were not so much about democracy as about the image of 
democracy. None of the emergency laws were withdrawn, nor was the military pulled from 
civilian spaces. Conducting elections in Kashmir had a three-fold purpose. First, elections were 
expected to wean away a section of Kashmiris from Tehreek and cause fissures in it. Second, 
they would create a local face of the government to execute the will of the Indian state, instead of 
having a New Delhi-appointed (unelected) governor do so. And, finally, elections would present 
a “soft” image of Indian rule in Kashmir to the international community (that is, to the Western 
governments critical of human rights abuses in Kashmir), demonstrate that Tehreek was not 
popular, and that Kashmiri participation in elections was a sign of their trust in the Indian 
government.  
This “new thinking,” as it was called in government circles, raised an obvious question 
among state strategists: how to make Kashmiris participate in the elections? In 1989 and 1991, 
there had been enough hints of potential wide-spread boycott that no scheduled elections were 
held in those years. But by 1994, Ikhwan, a counter-insurgent militia funded and armed by the 
state, had arrived on the scene to solve the issue of “participation.” I will tell the story of Ikhwan 




elections that eventually took place in 1996, and they left a mark on all subsequent elections as 
well, long after the armed dimensions within Tehreek had declined. 
Given this background, I will explore below the contemporary social meanings of 
“democracy” in Kashmir, especially among youth activists. Elections broadly evoke varied 
responses in the region that range from a limited excitement and resigned neglect to public scorn 
and strenuous opposition. This is in marked contrast to most of South Asia, where elections have 
become a spectacular mode of participation in politics, especially in India’s public life in which 
elections occupy a “sacrosanct place” (Banerjee 2007, 1556-1562). Elections split Kashmiri 
youth activism, if in a limited way, between those few who veer toward “electoral politics” and 
the rest who emphasize “resistance politics.” Based on ethnographic engagement with the work 
of activists involved in election campaigning and those involved in election-boycott campaigning 
in 2014, I analyze the modes through which the idea of elections itself comes to be contested. 
 As stated above, Tehreek activists tend to see elections as intimately tied to 
counterinsurgency. Indeed, not only have elections and emergency worked in tandem in the 
region, but the state’s instrumental use of elections and the popular mistrust in the process 
perpetuates the crisis of representation that has been left open by the historically unresolved 
demand for self-determination, the key principle that undergirds the Tehreek movement. 
Especially, since 1994, elections were used to create new social relations of power in Kashmir, 
mediated by what I call an uncivil society. However, the normative contradictions that elections 
under emergency bring forth, also shed light on the incongruities that are present in Tehreek’s 
own claims of representation of Kashmiri aspirations. While I focus on the elections that took 
place in the winter of 2014, I also draw from my previous observations and experiences, 




An election is announced, and no one is happy 
“This announcement is a cruel joke,” Hussain, a Kashmiri relief and rehabilitation 
worker, tells me in Srinagar, the city worst hit by the flood. “They will spend crores of rupees on 
the tamàsh’e (drama, spectacle), but have nothing for people in distress.” The Indian 
government, tight-lipped about “emergency package” that its local functionaries (the National 
Conference government in Kashmir) have been promising, insists “democracy” will “heal the 
wounds” of Kashmir. For a while now, the Indian government’s position on Kashmir has been 
that people need bijli, sadak, paani (electricity, road, water) and not azadi (freedom or 
independence). This has been its argument at least since 1994, when a return to elections and 
civilian rule was proposed to defeat Tehreek, then in its fifth year.  
Several Kashmiri politicians and groups had emerged or were revived in response to the 
possibility that elections would be their way to acquire power over the administration of civilian 
affairs in Kashmir. Those elections took three years to materialize, and finally happened in 
1996—nine years after the last time such elections had been held, in 1987. “All civil 
governments in Kashmir come with promises of change,” says Hussain. He lists these promises: 
reduction of military violence, demilitarization of public places, AFSPA removal,5 development, 
and jobs for youth. “But they all forget when the election is over,” he says:  
The flood was the final test. Not only for the civil government in Srinagar, but for the government 
of India too. Now when people need bijli, sadak, paani most urgently, the Indian government has 
shown no sense of urgency.  
                                                 
5 AFSPA stands for Armed Forces Special Power Act, which was an emergency legislation imposed in Kashmir in 
1990, under which military personnel were granted extra-ordinary powers in the region. There has long been a 
demand for repealing the AFSPA, but the military and the government in New Delhi has refused to debate the 




Hussain is not so much outraged as baffled. “How will people vote, when they have no 
documents left or are displaced from their homes?” Incorporating the discourse of 
counterinsurgency into his own speech, he says, “They talk of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in 
Kashmir, and this was their opportunity.” When I ask him why the government didn’t help, 
Hussain starts by putting the blame on khalkh, the people. “It is part of the absurdity of politics in 
Kashmir,” he says. “People don’t see themselves as shehri [citizens], even though the Indian 
constitution has declared Kashmiris as citizens.” Before the flood hit, Hussain had been a “civil 
society worker,” who had volunteered with a New Delhi-based non-governmental organization 
to “educate Kashmiris about their civic rights.” He laments:  
People often don’t make demands on the government, not even those basic ones that citizenship 
minimally grants. Even though the government collects taxes from them, people are inclined to 
see what the government occasionally does for them more like a favor done to the ri’ayaa [the 
subjects]. 
After a brief pause, however, Hussain suddenly backtracks and his tone becomes 
plaintive:  
We are living under an occupation. We don’t have rights, despite what their constitution says. 
You are a subject. Sometimes Kashmiris protest lack of basic services, but the government treats 
these protests as violations of law and order, not as legitimate demands. The people protesting 
power-cuts or shortage of drinking water are met with police and paramilitary actions, even 
though the government keeps hiking the prices for these services. Asking for water or a road is a 
crime against the state here. They will arrest you, and say you were waging war against the state. 
The protestors sometimes turn to azadi [pro-independence] slogans, but often because soldiers 




In his remarks, interspersed with content from emergency laws in force in Kashmir, 
Hussain had diagnosed his dilemma well. The schizo-politics of elections under the military 
occupation is marked by the split in Kashmiri polity along the citizenship-subjecthood 
difference. Hussain’s use of the terms khalkh (people), shehri (citizen), and ri’ayaa (subjects) 
also hints at this split. What could electoral democracy mean in a place where the state privileges 
elections but denies the popular demand for the right to self-determination, and where, therefore, 
democracy is made to adjust to the imperatives of the military occupation? The Indian 
government insists that the real Kashmiri aspirations are centered on “issues of everyday life,” 
which the elections alone could resolve. Yet, as Hussain insists, the government violently 
circumscribes the arena in which the issues of everyday life could be expressed, fearing that 
opening this space of politics will take it out of its control.  
The obverse of this position is to be found in the Tehreek argument, which insists that 
only an evental politics of “plebiscite” and “azadi” will address Kashmiri aspirations; and that 
“suffering” is a natural consequence of the occupation. While Tehreek activists call for sabr, or 
patience, they realize that the movement cannot run on a promised “future” alone. To its clear 
disadvantage, however, Tehreek cannot match the state’s ability to address everyday needs of 
society, which partly explains its insistence on “resistance” and “struggle” over elections. So, 
while state authorities see conducting elections as a test of its power and authority, Tehreek 
parties frame the success of the election boycott calls as a test of their popularity.  
Hussain tells me that before the flood he had often argued with the residents of the city: 
“The election might help if everyone voted for morally upright representatives.” His audiences 
had laughed, wondering how much he had been paid to preach the values of democracy. But 




upright” representatives could achieve much. Hussain had minimally expected the elections to be 
deferred, so that “for a moment, everyone could move beyond politics to help in relief and 
rehabilitation.” The election announcement suggested to him that the dissonance between what is 
“morally upright” and the “reality of the occupation” will haunt even a major disaster, like the 
flood. Standing on the teetering foundation of a washed away house, he remarks, “It is as if the 
flood didn’t even take place. What was the hurry in calling for the election?”   
To be clear, the “wounds” the Indian government invokes in the context of the election 
announcement are not the wounds inflicted by the flood. The wounds are those that several 
liberal Indian commentators call “alienation” of Kashmiris from the Indian state. Indian state 
does not see its presence in Kashmir as a military occupation. If there is alienation, the state 
officials claim, it has been deliberately fostered by Tehreek organizations. But Kashmiris view 
Indian control as jabri qabzeh, or “forced occupation,” a word which seems to have appeared in 
political discourse as soon as Indian military arrived in the region in 1947. Nevertheless, as 
Tehreek activists describe it, “wounds inflicted by the occupation” remain invisible to the state.  
In 1994, the government was subduing an armed movement, and the election discourse 
then had concentrated on returning Kashmir to “normalcy”—which apparently meant a return to 
the pre-1990 position. By 2014, however, the armed movement has largely faded into the 
background. Yet, while the government is suddenly abuzz with preparations for the election, 
there is no talk either of demilitarization or the withdrawal of the draconian AFSPA, which have 
caused immense misery. There is also no talk of a return to normalcy. The occupation itself has 
become normalized.  
The elections must go without any major snag, insist state officials to the media. Since 




and the Kashmiri desire to stay with India, the picture must be perfect. The “voter turnout” is a 
key statistic the government uses to measure the success of elections: the higher the turnout, the 
better the picture. Photographs of Kashmiris lining up to vote rounds up the success.  At the end 
of the 2008 elections, then Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh had underscored this 
overall meaning the state attaches to the elections in Kashmir, when he said: “Large turnout is a 
vote for democracy, a vote for national integration” (Kak 2014, 40). To manage the event, or the 
tamàsh’e —the “drama” of election—as the dejected Hussain describes it, therefore, hundreds of 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) paramilitary companies have been dispatched from 
mainland India to bolster the already bloated security infrastructure in Kashmir. Many of them 
have been housed in schools and other public buildings in Srinagar and across Kashmir. This is 
again a well-established pattern. The same story was repeated in 2014 Parliamentary elections. 
As Sanjay Kak, who witnessed those elections, writes:  
Every part of the Kashmir valley was flooded with troops. To supplement over half a million 
soldiers deployed as part of the permanent security grid, additional paramilitary forces were 
flown in from all over India—452 companies of a hundred men each…In Gurez [a smaller region 
in Kashmir] …each voter could literally have been assigned four armed minders” (2014, 46). 
The 2014 Assembly elections will take place in five stages, and a “curfew plan” has been 
drawn up to go with it. The “stages” indicate which districts in Kashmir will be “open” during 
the elections and which ones will be under military lockdown. Curfew-plan means you can move 
about only if there are elections in your district (and only if you are going to vote), and you will 
be under curfew if there are no elections where you live. The curfew will remain in effect on 
election days, which are spread over a month. The rationale of this process appears obscure, and 




common complaint I hear, however, is that children will have to miss long stretches of school 
days, because school teachers have been given marching orders to assist the military in the 
“smooth conduct of the polling process,” and would be relocated from one district to another. 
The real reason behind the curfew-plan, a government official tells the press, is to “prevent 
(Tehreek parties) from mobilizing people on a large scale and disrupt the elections.” He adds: 
“We take extreme precaution.”  
Hussain laughs, when I show him the clip on my phone, but is unable to hide his scorn: 
“They have seven and a half lakh soldiers (three-quarters of a million) in Kashmir, in a valley of 
sixty lakh people (six million), and they can’t conduct an election within a day!” He tells me to 
notice the difference between the pre-election and post-election government discourse. Before 
the elections, Hussain says, the local electoral parties vehemently claim the election has “nothing 
to do with the larger questions of self-determination,” and the Indian government remains quiet. 
But after the election, the India government asserts, like Prime Minister Singh’s statement above, 
that election participation represents “a desire for integration with India.”  
“Extreme precaution,” I realized, is not an offhand remark; it precisely means what it 
suggests. For instance, as Hussain had also noted, the government has a “deliberate strategy” in 
planning to start elections in the far-flung areas of the countryside, where people can be made to 
vote more easily, and where the focus of the pro-government media can be concentrated. By the 
time the elections reach urban areas, where people largely heed the Tehreek parties’ call to 
boycott, the government would have already framed the elections as “successful.” The “strategy” 
was repeated in 2014, when elections first took place in a placid Bandipora, where elections can 




Meanwhile, Tehreek activists and “other miscreants” have been arrested in daily raids 
and put in prison—to remain there until the end of the elections in January 2015. In Baramulla, 
Kulgam and Pulwama districts alone, more than three hundred youths are arrested to “ensure 
peaceful polling” (Greater Kashmir 2014). News media personnel from New Delhi have arrived 
alongside the CRPF to cover the elections. “If it would help their military objectives in Kashmir 
to help people affected by the flood, they would have helped,” Husain tells me, “Elections help 
the Indian story in Kashmir—that ‘India is democratic’—and their media is here to tell it to the 
world.” He adds, “In the end, elections in Kashmir are a counterinsurgency tactic.”  
Hussain’s remarks turned my attention to 1994, when the government in New Delhi first 
announced that elections would be held in Kashmir that year, and the civil government would be 
reinstated. The announcement had appeared quite odd to many Kashmiris then. It was the peak 
of the armed movement, and thousands of people were dying each year. How could an election 
be held in a political vacuum? Who was going to contest? Who was going to vote? But the 
elections were held, in 1996, with the aid of the counterinsurgent Ikhwanis, who not only 
suppressed the Tehreek armed groups in the countryside, but also fielded their own candidates in 
the election.  
History of elections and the politics of “plebiscite”  
The idea of elections in Kashmir was complicated from the beginning. India took 
Pakistan to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1947 over what Indian leaders had 
described as Pakistan-backed “tribal invasion” into Kashmir. After lengthy debates, the UNSC 
passed Resolution 47(1948), which called for a ceasefire, and a step-by-step demilitarization of 
Kashmir by both India and Pakistan. The resolution also recommended a “free and impartial 




disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir” according to the “will of the people.” While this 
resolution was not to Indian liking, its recommendations were not enforceable by the Security 
Council, which allowed India enough elbow-room to gradually freeze the “dispute.” When India 
announced that it was going to hold elections in Kashmir in early 1950s, which would determine 
the future of Kashmir, Pakistan protested this at the UN. The UN passed Resolution 91(1951), 
which stated that elections in Kashmir were no substitute for the Plebiscite. This idea of 
“plebiscite,” then, would become one of the central political planks for Kashmiri politics in the 
years to come. Haq hamara, Rai-shumari (“Our right, Plebiscite!”) became the quintessential 
Kashmiri cri de cœur.  
Ironically, “plebiscite” was first taken up by the National Conference, a Kashmiri party 
which had supported Kashmir’s accession to India. The party used the rai-shumari slogan as a 
political expedient, though, primarily to negotiate the return to power of its leader Sheikh 
Abdullah who had been arrested in 1953. Once India rehabilitated Abdullah to power (in 1975), 
the National Conference dropped the slogan. Tehreek voices grew louder around the plebiscite 
slogan later, but replaced it with a less ambiguous, if equally daunting, idea of haq-e-khud-
iradiyat, or the “right to self-determination.” The claim that there could be “no real democracy 
without self-determination” became a strict political principle for Tehreek. This principle, 
however, limited Tehreek’s own political choices. For instance, to show their representative 
character, Tehreek politics had to devolve into street agitations, demonstrations, strikes (hartals), 
and election boycott campaigns. 
But long before Tehreek parties decided to boycott, elections had already become a 
discredited phenomenon. Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din (1928-2001), one of the most popular writers in 




contracts for publicly funded projects. In his short story, “Election: The Kashmir Kind,”6 written 
in early 1960s, Mohi-ud-Din tells the story of two rival Srinagar-based political families rousing 
a crowd of people against each other. The Dars, who hope for the Green Flag party to win in the 
elections, incite the crowd to throw stones at the house of the Kacchroos, who hope for the Red 
Flag party to win. When the Red Flag party wins, the Kacchroos rouse the same crowd of people 
to throw stones at the Dars’ house. In the end, Kacchroos win major contracts from the 
government, and the Dars are reduced to doing “illicit” trades. But more important than the 
mutual squabbling between the two families is the “hidden hand” in the entire game. Writes 
Mohi-ud-Din, barely concealing his contempt for the National Conference (the Red Flags) and 
their main Islamist opponents (the Green Flags) in Kashmir, “Who will win and who will lose 
had already been decided. But, then, it was important to make a big show.” Fearing government 
reprisal, a common enough threat to Kashmiri intellectuals in the post-1947 era, Mohi-ud-Din 
leaves unsaid who has already decided the election. For his Kashmiri readers, however the hint is 
conveyed unambiguously (Mohi-ud-Din 2009). 
Given the widespread resentment against Indian control, especially over the question of 
the plebiscite, the state made sure that those who came to power in Kashmir remained loyal to 
India. The history of democracy in Kashmir, accordingly, became one marked by election 
riggings, rejection of the candidacies of those suspected of “pro-azadi” (pro-freedom) 
proclivities, appointments of India-loyalist Kashmiri politicians to positions of power, and 
persecution, arm-twisting, and arbitrary dismissals of those seen critical of the Indian policies 
(Kak 2014, 33-51; Bose 1997; Lyngdoh 2002). The “hidden hand,” which Mohi-ud-Din writes 
about, was, of course, this systematic manipulation of politics in Kashmir.  
                                                 




For India, despite the UN resolutions, elections (and their manipulation) were the perfect 
political formula to evade the question of plebiscite. Indeed, the military had always remained as 
the back-up, even during peacetime—at least until 1990, when in response to the Tehreek 
movement, the military came out of their barracks and took direct control. In the aftermath of the 
events of 1947, when war between India and Pakistan bifurcated the erstwhile semi-independent 
state of Kashmir, and the two countries occupied its two resulting parts, the Indian government 
had publicly accepted the idea of plebiscite. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had himself made 
public promises to crowds of National Conference supporters in Srinagar that the plebiscite 
would be held upon cessation of hostilities with Pakistan (Noorani 2014). But references to 
plebiscite dropped as soon as elections were announced. The National Conference won the 
election “unopposed” in almost all places, giving India confidence that there was no further need 
to talk about the plebiscite. 
By 1953, three years after the end of the India-Pakistan war, India had completely 
backtracked. This frustrated Sheikh Abdullah, who was then the Prime Minister of Kashmir. 
Abdullah had lent India support in the uncertain post-1947 period with the hope that, once the 
military conflict with Pakistan had ended, a plebiscite would be held to give an international as 
well as a popular legitimacy to the political order, and to his own authority. He had promised as 
much to his supporters in Kashmir. Instead, in 1953, Nehru’s government arrested Abdullah on 
charges of hatching “conspiracies” with the help of “foreign” powers (Bose 2003, 66). Abdullah 
was until then considered a key ally of India, not to mention a personal “friend” of Nehru’s 
(Guha 2007, 76). Abdullah had already felt unnerved by the right-wing Hindu agitations in India, 




infringement of Kashmir’s “autonomy” as enshrined in the 1947 Instrument of Accession.7 
Nehru replaced Abdullah with Ghulam Muhammad Bakshi, a minister in the deposed Abdullah’s 
Kashmir cabinet. Bakshi happily agreed to bury the plebiscite question and denounced Abdullah 
as an agent of “imperial powers.”  
Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest led to a crisis of representation in Kashmir. India’s Congress 
party leaders, especially Nehru, with whom the National Conference had tethered its fate, had 
without batting an eyelid “betrayed” the National Conference. The National Conference had till 
then carried the mantle of Kashmiri nationalism, and believed India would respect Kashmir’s 
autonomy, but its greatest bet had backfired. The 1953 events also set the precedent for a series 
of Indian interventions to dismiss dissenters and install favorites as administrators in Kashmir. 
As an old, former legislator, a Kashmiri who had been part of the civilian government in the pre-
1990 era, told me in an interview, “Many in Kashmiri politics soon learnt that the key to entry 
into the state assembly was to represent Indian interests in Kashmir, instead of Kashmiri interests 
to India.”  
Principally, this meant, as the former legislator clarified, “silence over the question of the 
plebiscite.” And those who did not agree with the silence? “They were debarred from contesting 
elections, or their candidacy was rejected on flimsy grounds.” Election rigging became a 
common practice. However, he was quick to point out: “But the idea of the plebiscite did not 
die.” He explained how during the two decades of Abdullah’s “political arrest and exile,” the 
slogan was taken up by “his loyalists.” These loyalists formed the Plebiscite Front, which was 
                                                 
7 The Instrument of Accession was the document signed by the erstwhile monarch of Kashmir, and which India 
claims to be the “legal” basis for its legitimacy in Kashmir. It was signed in October 1947 between Kashmir’s Dogra 
autocrat, Hari Singh, and the Indian government, to allow Indian troops to enter Kashmir, ostensibly to defend 
against the “tribal invasion” from Pakistan. The accession was meant to give India legal cover for, what many 
Kashmiris consider, was in fact an invasion to pacify the anti-Dogra revolt by the subjects of the state. Nevertheless, 
the document had envisaged that India would control only three areas of Kashmir’s public life: defense, external 




immediately proscribed, while their main party, the National Conference, remained “hijacked” 
by a small section of “pro-India” Kashmiri politicians. Years later, in 1975 after Abdullah made 
“compromises” on both the plebiscite and the autonomy, and signed an “accord” with Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi of India to accept a much-weakened position of chief ministership,8 
elements from the Plebiscite Front would combine with the older opponents of the National 
Conference and religious parties to form the Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF contested 
elections in 1987. The elections that year were again rigged, but instead of business-as-usual, the 
idea of “self-determination” emerged as the lightning rod of the 1989-90 uprising that followed.  
The “election formula” had worked until 1987—at least no sustained or organized 
movement had emerged in Kashmir with the ability to challenge the political order established in 
1947. Even the Plebiscite Front had chosen a less confrontational path of parleys, negotiations, 
and court battles. But when elections were conducted in 1987, and the MUF alliance found it had 
been defeated despite its “considerable public support,” its activists took to streets, intensifying 
the general discontent with elections. Incidentally, many Kashmiris remember people coming out 
to vote enthusiastically in 1987. Wherever MUF had fielded candidates, the “turn-out” had been 
a historic high. However, an alliance of the National Conference and the Indian Congress was 
declared winner with an overwhelming majority. As the former legislator said, “Even some 
within the winning alliance were embarrassed by the size of their victories!” 
As it turned out, the rigged 1987 elections became the prominent background to the 
Tehreek movement for independence. The leaders of Tehreek had either contested as MUF 
candidates or been its polling agents. Even before the election results were announced, many of 
                                                 
8 The designation Prime Minister had already been changed to Chief Minister in the 1960s. While the former had 
symbolically and nominally acknowledged Kashmir’s separate status (or what some call “special status”) vis-à-vis 




these MUF workers were arrested. After their release, several crossed into Pakistani-controlled 
western areas of Kashmir, received training in guerrilla warfare, and came back to lead the 
armed Tehreek. Among these, the name of Yusuf Shah, an MUF candidate in a Srinagar 
constituency, is prominent. Shah was likely to win, but before the election results were 
announced, he was arrested. After his release, he escaped Kashmir to become the head of the 
Hizb-ul Mujahideen (Group of the Mujahids), the largest of the armed organizations. Another 
prominent name is that of Yasin Malik, who was an MUF polling agent. He was also arrested 
(and, some of his associates say, “tortured”) on the eve of the elections. Malik would later 
become the chief of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the most popular armed group.9 
Some have argued that the armed movement was a “response” to India’s 
“mismanagement of elections” and the “institutional decay of democratic institutions” (Ganguly 
1996). While this contention, as I have also suggested above, is not entirely amiss, the question 
of democracy in Kashmir goes deeper than the elections. Tehreek, according to its ideologues, 
had been a result of the larger “crisis of representation” in Kashmir. The movement’s aspirations 
were undergirded by a popular vision of Kashmiri independence, the vision to which none of the 
electoral parties had shown fidelity, including the National Conference.10 The MUF had been, in 
the words of one of its surviving activists, the “last ditch effort to create an alternative to the 
National Conference.” The alliance had brought together secular as well as religious formations 
in Kashmir, all seeking Kashmir’s right to self-determination, or even outright independence. 
“The rigging of the 1987 elections was,” the activist says, “the proverbial last straw.” It was not 
                                                 
9 The two groups eventually became fierce rivals, setting the stage for the 1996 elections. I explore these rivalries 
further in the next chapter. 
10 National Conference, the most prominent of these parties, had started off before 1947 as a party representing the 
popular goal of establishing an independent, republican state. While National Conference had supported 1947 
limited accession to India, it had demanded that India conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir to allow Kashmiris to 




the last straw because the MUF’s hopes for a fairly elected civilian administration had been 
dashed, but because it convinced many of its constituents that the politics of independence could 
no longer be carried out through electoral or “democratic” means.         
By January 1990, when the armed rebels acquired mass momentum, even those five 
MUF candidates who had won (or had been “allowed to win” in the words of the MUF activist), 
resigned from the state assembly, and organized the political front for the movement. The Indian 
authorities, finding the state government unable to take “tough action” against the almost-daily 
processions and protests, dismissed it. It was the same local government that had come to power 
in the aftermath of the “rigged” elections of 1987. During the next four years, as the military got 
busy suppressing Tehreek, there was no talk of elections. The pro-India politicians mostly fled, 
and Kashmir was under direct rule from New Delhi. Yet by late 1993 election talk would be 
revived, but this time—since the militarization and Tehreek resistance had fundamentally altered 
the situation in Kashmir—the elections would be assembled from completely new elements. The 
Indian government deployed radical new tactics to achieve this objective. The election itself, as I 
argue, was neither meant simply to produce a civil government per se, nor even to maintain the 
traditional form of control over Kashmir (through electoral manipulation), but was instead 
geared toward a restructuring of Kashmiri society itself.  
In 1994, however, India’s counterinsurgency war in Kashmir was still going badly, and 
restarting the “political process,” as Minister Rajesh Pilot had announced, became less of a noble 
ideal it was purported to be, than a liability. The Indian government had set forth a parameter of 
“success” in Kashmir—the early conduct of elections—which its military was having a difficult 
time achieving on the ground. It was in this context that the government started investing in 




ground of the political process, one that could bypass the much larger but recalcitrant subject 
population altogether, yet claim to represent the whole. The “image of democracy” in Kashmir 
that the government wanted to project required a constituency that would, just by existing, 
diminish the politics of the plebiscite and the right to self-determination. At least this is how 
Tehreek activists perceived it. According to a former member of the MUF who had actively 
campaigned for his party in 1987, and then become a fervent opponent of the elections in 
Kashmir, “India wanted a sort of ‘democracy’ in Kashmir that could live comfortably under the 
state of emergency.” The election, in his view, would produce a civilian government, but one 
which would not govern in the “interest of the people.” This government would itself be 
governed by the “Indian state’s agenda.” To him, the “agenda” involved the “destruction of 
Tehreek” and the “permanent integration of Kashmir into India.”  
When elections were finally held in 1996, the government presented it as a “game 
changer.” The election did not transform people’s sentiments toward the state. It, however, set a 
new tone for the government’s discourse on Kashmir. Despite an abysmally low voter 
participation in urban Kashmir, the government declared the election a “victory” for its position 
on Kashmir.11 Since the 1996 election, the militarized process of conducting elections became a 
routine. Its components included heavy paramilitary deployment, mass arrests of Tehreek 
activists, multi-stage polling, starting polling from far-away places and moving into more 
populous areas toward the end, tactical use of curfews, and using intense but selective media 
                                                 
11 According to the government’s own records, in all of Srinagar’s assembly constituencies (the most populous and 
significant region in Kashmir), for instance, between 10-20 percent of all the registered electorate voted. In most of 
these constituencies only around 12 percent voted. In the Kashmiri countryside, which is easier to control, between 
30-54 percent were declared to have voted. In the 2008 election, the polling rose only marginally higher, but in 
2002, which some of my interviewees see as less militarized, as Ikhwan had just begun to be officially dismantled, 
the polling dropped to single digits in almost a dozen constituencies, some reporting as low as 4 percent, including 




reportage to declare every local election as signifying “Kashmiri desire for integration with 
India.”    
A more profound impact of the 1996 elections was felt in Kashmir in the time to come. 
Not only had Ikhwanis, between 1994 and 1996, pacified the political ground on which elections 
could be conducted, Ikhwanis themselves became the center of an amalgamation of political and 
social actors who together constituted a new polity in Kashmir, an “uncivil society.” This term 
was, in fact, used by an ex-Ikhwani operator during an interview with me. He used “uncivil 
society” as a bitter pun on the idea of “civil society,” which he had often heard his military 
handlers using to describe him and his fellow Ikhwanis. He sounded bitter because he and his 
fellow Ikhwanis had been abandoned by the government as the elections in the next decade 
became less dependent on Ikhwani violence. But I also have a logical explanation of why I use 
the term, which I will explain toward the end. Suffice it to say here that this “uncivil society” 
circumvented the larger subject population of Kashmiris altogether. It could be tactically 
mobilized by the government to provide an appearance of legitimacy to the elections, despite the 
“alienation” of the broader Kashmiri population from the “electoral process.” 
But what about the Tehreek boycott campaigns? In some respects, staying away from 
elections has given the movement an aura of respectability. Not participating in elections in the 
aftermath of the 1990 uprising has led many Kashmiris to see Tehreek leaders as somehow 
“incorruptible” and committed to the “Kashmir cause,” even though the occasional rumors fly 
about their “hidden properties” and “black money.” On the question of Tehreek’s relationship 
with the elections, one activist told me in Srinagar on the eve of the election in 2014:  
Perhaps India would prefer us to fight elections and hope that we lose. We will lose because 




that is self-determination]. But if we were winning, India would do an Eighty-Seven [1987] all 
over again, and make us lose. 
Having debated the question with his fellow activists several times at their party 
headquarters, the activist found the dilemma to be unresolvable. “India would only allow us to 
participate if we lose. They would allow us to win if we commit to their sovereignty,” he says, 
and adds, “But why should we, if all our politics is fundamentally opposed to the occupation?”  
On the other hand, the former legislator’s words about the “silence over plebiscite” as a 
“key to power,” produces its own dilemmas for those who participate in the elections. The 
popular memory of elections as a “big show,” to use Mohi-ud-Din’s phrase, has led the local pro-
state politicians and parties to occupy a nebulous zone between the Indian state and the Kashmiri 
people, the khalkh. Several Kashmiris, whom I interviewed during the election period, tended to 
see these pro-state formations as “representatives of the Indian state” rather than as 
“representatives of the Kashmiri people.” I came across statements like, “They don’t possess our 
pain,” “They only listen to their aaqās (masters) in Delhi,” and “We only have God with us.”  
Were these statements just made in the context of the lack of flood relief, as Hussain, the 
relief worker in Srinagar, had told me? It was hard to determine, but at some places where I 
attended election related activities in the winter of 2014, I also heard views that did not fit the 
larger Tehreek narrative on elections. Below I will present one such instance from a village in 
southern Kashmir, where a significant election contestant spoke in a market place. Later, I will 
also describe another instance, at a university, where student activists gathered to talk about 




Dilemmas of party work: election campaign in the countryside 
I met Shafi and Ashraf in their village, Poore, almost by accident. It is early December, 
and I am visiting Gām and Poore with a local youth group that is assessing the flood damage for 
a local charity. The election is two weeks away, but there is hardly any visible campaigning. 
There are no rallies, no public speeches, no local TV debates. Hardly any contesting party has 
come out with a “manifesto” or an “agenda.” On a different song altogether, the Indian media 
has dedicated “special coverage” for the elections. The first three phases of the elections have 
been held, and the Indian media has been repeatedly claiming that the “election turnout is a 
defeat for Tehreek separatists.” There has been no mention of the curfews in this media 
coverage. Because the district, under which Gām and Poore fall, is going to polls next, there will 
be no curfew. The entire district, however, is full of paramilitary soldiers, who have set up camps 
and mobile patrols. As I explain to a few soldiers at the entrance of the village that I am not a 
“trouble maker” (that is, a poll boycott campaigner), Shafi and Ashraf come to my rescue. They 
seem to have an in with the soldiers. That is how I meet Shafi and Ashraf for the first time.   
Poore is a smaller settlement adjoining a larger village, Gām. Shafi and Ashraf are part of 
a large family that has lived in Poore for at least nine generations. Their oldest remembered 
ancestor had received a tract of land during the late 19th century land reforms, which were led by 
a British survey commissioner. The land had belonged to a Hindu landlord, who, as Poore’s 
elders claim, did not protest the loss of the flood-prone part of his much larger estate. When the 
National Conference government initiated land redistribution reforms in 1947-53, the family, 
having grown, was given no new land. Over the years, land holdings became even smaller, and 
the family developed anti-National Conference sentiments. The family had also supported the 




Kashmir’s accession to India and competed with the National Conference for support in the 
countryside.  
The elders believe the National Conference, with considerable influence in Gām, didn’t 
forgive Poore for its defiance. After Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953, Poore took an about-turn, 
and instead of opposing Kashmir’s accession to India, started supporting the anti-Abdullah 
Bakshi government and then India’s Congress party. A small “pro-India” enclave amid National 
Conference’s larger “pro-plebiscite” region, Poore should have received many favors from the 
Indian establishment. But, as Shafi and Ashraf believe, the family had been ignored. The 
National Conference, by giving up the plebiscite slogan in the 1970s, would make families like 
the one in Poore irrelevant in the larger game. Yet, the family continued to remain loyal to the 
Congress, and when the 1990 events happened (which, among other things, also led to a violent 
reaction against the National Conference), Poore refused to participate in Tehreek.  
For Poore’s residents, as I came to understand, these party loyalties had not been based 
on an acceptance of party ideologies, but on personal connections with the party representatives. 
While saying “We should just settle for India,” they would also say, “India will never let us be 
azad (independent),” or “We can’t fight them, India is too big.” It is hard to read this resigned 
tone as an endorsement of the “Indian position,” however, many people in Gām and beyond, had 
come to see Poore as “pro-India.”   
Shafi and Ashraf, now in their late-thirties, belong to a generation that came of age 
during the 1990s. But both would become an oddity among youths in the larger Gām, where they 
went to high school. Instead of joining Tehreek politics or rallies, like youths in Gām often did, 
they remained aloof, and later started going to small events organized by a new party called the 




Congress party, formed the PDP in the early 2000s. The PDP also included others who sought an 
electoral alternative to the National Conference and would, therefore, contest elections, unlike 
Tehreek parties. To create a base, the PDP appropriated several prominent Tehreek symbols and 
slogans, including using an “inkpot” as the party symbol on the ballot paper (a similar inkpot had 
been used by the MUF in 1987 as its election symbol), displaying rock salt at rallies to woo “pro-
Pakistan” crowds (rock salt is also called “Pakistani salt” in Kashmir, and is contrasted with the 
sea-salt that comes from India), and raising demands like “self-rule.”  
If Ikhwanis had helped the National Conference in 1996, some in Kashmir believe the 
remnants of the Hizbul Mujahideen helped the PDP in 2002 (Kak 2014). PDP came to power in 
alliance with the Congress party that year, replacing the National Conference government that 
had won in 1996. In 2008, the PDP found itself stuck with a limited number of seats again. 
While Shafi and Ashraf believe the “hung verdicts” in 2002 and 2008 indicate “lesser 
interference from India in elections,” others told me “Indian intelligence” supported the PDP 
with the intent to fracture even the limited electorate that voted in Kashmir, and to force 
Kashmir-based parties to ally with Indian national parties. The latter would keep both the 
National Conference (which occasionally still called for the “pre-1953 autonomy”) and the PDP 
(which raised the slogan of “self-rule”) from taking a line that went against the larger purpose of 
“national integration.”    
Shafi and Ashraf are second cousins and have no college education, even though several 
members in their families, even older ones, boast at least an undergraduate education, enabling 
them to find government jobs. Tehreek supporters in Gām claim these jobs are a favor for not 
joining Tehreek. Indeed, as many Poore elders happily concede, their asar rawoos 




government jobs. Poore residents are regularly branded as gadhaar (“traitors”) and ken’mut 
(“sell-outs”). Shafi and Ashraf have no jobs, and they believe if they work for the PDP with 
“dedication” they will get jobs.  
For decades, government jobs have been the only source of regular income in Kashmir, 
especially in the countryside, where farm work is seasonal and unrewarding. These rare jobs, 
even if not always well-paying, provide a degree of economic and social uplift. Many of these 
jobs can pay as low as USD 25 a month, but the average monthly salaries are around USD 300, 
which provide for a middle class living. Those who get government jobs often find it easier to 
find a woman from a “good family” to marry; and, if a woman has a job, to find a man with a 
well-paid job or one from an even better family than her own. After marriage, a salaried man can 
build a house. A house and a “good wife” are two signs of social standing in the Kashmiri 
countryside. Shafi is not married, and Ashraf, who had recently married, had to settle for a 
woman several years older to him, which often invites sharp taunts from his friends and family.        
The flood had washed away a small wooden bridge in Poore, and Shafi and Ashraf claim 
that when their party forms the new government, the village will get a “cement culvert” and a 
“macadam road.” They tell me election campaigning has been going on quietly. “People are 
upset,” says Shafi, “It is risky for politicians to run into crowds of resentful people.” They tell me 
their party’s “higher-ups” have informed them that a prominent party leader will make a quick 
stop in Gām, and that they “must bring as many people from Poore as possible” to the Gām 
market square. No one else is supposed to know. The leader will reach the venue, give a quick 
speech to the assembled crowd from Poore, and by the time larger Gām will come to know, he 
would have already left. I am not told when, but am simply asked to be ready and that I would 




A couple of days later when I receive the call, the party’s plan has worked almost to the 
letter. In Gām’s central market place, several Poore residents have been milling around, 
pretending to be innocuous. Then, suddenly, a flurry of military and police vehicles arrive, 
securing all the entry points, and positioning snipers on rooftops. Another flurry of vehicles with 
black tinted windows quickly follows. The leader has squeezed his upper body through a roof 
opening in one of the vehicles. Poore residents gather around his vehicle, surrounded by soldiers, 
and cheer and raise party slogans. Others in the market, a bit dazed by this sudden shift of mood, 
look on. The leader gives a short speech, laced with promises of “development,” “jobs,” 
“keeping the BJP out of Kashmir” (Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian Hindu rightwing party that 
is contesting in Kashmir), and “removing the military from civilian areas.” Surrounded by a sea 
of soldiers, the irony of the last “promise” is not lost on anyone. It sounds bizarre, but the 
soldiers don’t understand Kashmiri, or they already know too well. And, then, everything that is 
going on is bizarre. At one moment, some people start running, causing a brief commotion. The 
leader slumps back into his vehicle, and the vehicles speed away. I hear Tehreek slogans from 
the back of a building and look for Shafi and Ashraf, but they have slipped away too.  
Later, I meet Shafi and Ashraf back in Poore, who describe the event as a “success.” 
While both think their presence at the event had been noted by the party seniors, which will help 
them develop asar rawoos in the party, Ashraf feels less sanguine about the leader’s speech. “He 
should have mentioned the flood.” Soon, however, both forget the speech, as they shift 
conversation to occasions when they had used their party connections to help their acquaintances 
get out of police cases. In police cases, above all else, the party connections come in handy. 
While it appears to delight them that the police, which is a source of fear among others, is 




far. They tell me about other youths from Poore, who had grown “tired” of party work and had 
chosen to move to Srinagar to find odd jobs. Shafi is more critical of the Indian parties 
contesting. He tells me these parties had brought “truckloads of expired biscuits and dirty 
blankets from India” and were giving them to poor people in flood-affected areas to garner votes. 
Ashraf interrupts Shafi to ask if that was worse than their own party, which he says, “has done 
nothing.” Shafi replies by blaming the National Conference, which was in the government when 
the flood took place. At one point, both Shafi and Ashraf agree that “it [electoral politics] 
benefits those families most who are also involved with other things, and not ordinary people 
like them.” These “other things” include big government contracts, supplying provisions to the 
army (an extensive business by itself), and the land and the forest mafia.  





Some of this is usual staple discourse on democracy in South Asia. Yet, in conversations 
like these, I see a fracture both within the Tehreek discourse as well as the Indian state discourse. 
Considerations of livelihood, and individual aspirations of “a government job, house, and 
marriage,” tend to push youths in a place like Poore to work for electoral politics, even at the 
cost of drawing resentment from the larger population. But this work often fills them with self-
doubt. Ashraf and Shafi indicate that “boycotting elections is not helpful” because “daily issues 
cannot wait for azadi,” but they say they often have “khadshaat (doubts)” about what they are 
involved in, and they increasingly question the wisdom of their elders for having permanently 
marked Poore as “pro-India.” Their involvement is driven by a combination of that older legacy, 
their individual aspirations, and their engagement with everyday problems in Poore. 
Nevertheless, their involvement of Shafi and Ashraf remains limited, and cannot be see as 
“participation”, far less an “endorsement for integration.”  
What the “campaign event” of the day (which was the typical form such events took in 
the 2014 elections) and my interviews with Shafi and Ashraf, and with several others from 
Poore, indicate is that under the state of militarized emergency in Kashmir, “elections” have 
acquired a quality that is more (in Hussain’s words in Srinagar) “counterinsurgent” than 
“democratic.” As an instrument of counterinsurgency, elections become just a way to 
delegitimize Tehreek politics, without allowing people an alternative space for political 
expression. The elections, then, produce a fractious space within the larger politics of 
independence, which splits youth political subjectivity in Kashmir. They give rise to accusations 
of “betrayal” against people who vote or support electoral parties, and among those who do vote 





Invoking the dead against the elections: students organize a boycott event 
If the event in Gām was highly planned and structured, the event I witness on the campus 
of a university in Srinagar, where students gathered to give a boycott call, is by comparison 
almost spontaneous, if equally tense. The university’s Students Union is banned, and several 
years back its office building was bulldozed by the university proctor’s officials in the dead of 
night. Only months previously, Students Union had been allowed to hold elections. The last 
election had taken place before 1990. Despite the ban, and bereft of an office space, the office 
bearers of the Union have continued to work clandestinely. Most students still consider the 
Union a legitimate student representative body. In place of the elected Students Union, the 
university authorities have encouraged Indian and Kashmiri electoral parties to run their “student 
chapters.” Yet, even though high profile Indian and Kashmiri politicians visit the campus to 
recruit new members, these student chapters have found almost no support. By contrast, the 
Students Union, which unofficially aligns itself with Tehreek, draws a strong following.  
I receive an invitation to a Students Union event over Facebook. It is a “closed invite,” 
which means the event is not public. But one can’t be sure if “closed” means the event page is 
not under state surveillance. While there are options to indicate, by clicking, if one is “going,” 
“interested” or “not going,” the text accompanying the event page on Facebook advises invitees 
to not click on any option. If invitees do click, especially “going” or “interested” they would be 
doing so at their “own peril.” The organizers, whose names have not been announced, also argue 
that in case the event attracts too many “going” clicks, the authorities might prevent the event 
from taking place. The event is titled “Student Talk: Elections.” There is no further description, 
apart from the location. I don’t click anything, but decide to go. I received the invitation because 
I know two students, Arif and Zarqa, who were part of several focus group meetings on 




Paramilitary vehicles are parked outside the main gate of the university, which I come to 
know is a permanent presence. I arrive a little past time, but see no sign of any activity related to 
the event, which is to take place in front of the library. Slowly female students gather under a 
tree in the front lawn, from five or six to a few dozens. Then male students, many coming out of 
the library, gather. Some students pull out banners from inside their jackets and hold them on the 
periphery. Soon, more students arrive, and the crowd grows to a few hundred. Students are 
passing piles of pamphlets from one to another. I am handed one pamphlet. A young masked 
man gets up, comes to the front, and starts giving a speech. He begins by asking his audience to 
remember “our martyrs,” “the resistance,” and “the sacrifices of lakhs of Kashmiris.” His 
gestures are animated, as he urges students to tell their parents and neighbors not to vote in the 
elections. His speech is short and is followed by a young woman, who has a naqab on her face, 
through which she is barely audible. A few seconds later, she lowers the naqab. There are smiles, 
followed by loud cheer. She talks about her brother who she says has been “forcibly 
disappeared.” The mood grows melancholic. She also finishes her talk by urging an election 
boycott. Several more students follow, and almost all of them invoke the “blood of martyrs” and 
“sacrifices.”  
Amid these emotive appeals, the university police have surrounded the gathering. The 
police are armed. Their chief, the Proctor, asks students to wind up the meeting and clear the 
area. The students have no choice, but as they leave they raise rhythmic Tehreek slogans for 
azadi, clapping and moving their bodies in harmony. Zarqa has found me. She leads me to Arif, 
and we return to a canteen. I read the pamphlet in my hand. It is titled: “Student Talk: Discourses 
Beyond Elections in Occupied Jammu & Kashmir.” It calls the elections a “farce” and a “sham.” 




military rule and act as emissaries of Indian military occupation,” who want to “kill…our 
movement of(sic) Right to Self Determination, nourished by the blood of lakhs of martyrs since 
last 7 decades.” But the pamphlet sees voting as “provid[ing] consent for military occupation,” if 
not an “endorsement for integration with India,” which is how the government frames voting.  
 
This points to the dilemma of the election boycott campaign: to keep people away from the 
election, they attach too much value to the act of voting. In my interactions in Poore and 




elsewhere, voting had appeared to have little to do with “integration” or “providing consent” to 
the military occupation.  
Zarqa and Arif are from Srinagar. They attend Tehreek-related events when they can. 
They tell me events on campus connected to Tehreek are furtively organized, and the student 
response is always spontaneous. They want to separate the “ideal” of democracy from the 
“reality” of elections. Says Arif, “if they use so many resources to conduct elections for the 
assembly, why can’t they allow students to conduct elections on the campus?” “They know 
students will always elect a pro-Tehreek body,” answers Zarqa, “which they don’t want.” Years 
ago, when the rebellion broke out many students had joined the armed Tehreek groups, which 
gave the government an alibi to shut down student unions.  
The Gām event and the university event were similar in some respects, yet had key 
differences. The Gām event was almost surreptitiously organized in fear that people might harm 
the politician, which is why soldiers were deployed. The event was meant to give an appearance 
of an electoral campaign, but it prevented people from participating, thus undermining the 
rationale behind campaigning. The university event had to be discreetly organized in fear of the 
authorities disrupting it. Nevertheless, it ended up leading to a large, spontaneous participation. 
Soldiers had to be deployed in Gām to protect the politician, but at the university, armed police 
mobilized to disrupt the meeting. For Zarqa and Arif, these differences point to an antagonistic 
relationship between “the state” and “the people,” and which is why they believe the elections to 
be “absurd.” Shafi and Ashraf in Poore are forced to question their own place within this 
dynamic, but they realize that in their under-developed countryside, the state and the politicians 




Zarqa and Arif all similarly feel trapped in the present situation. “If Kashmir was free, I would 
contest elections,” says Zarqa. Arif laughs, “We can live without a government too!”  
 
 
The December 2014 elections take place, and follow the script perfected over the years. 
In the countryside, people vote. In the urban centers, more people boycott. The results produce a 
“hung verdict,” giving Shafi’s and Ashraf’s PDP fewer seats yet again than are required to form 
the government. In a stark contradiction to the pre-election promises, the party forms a coalition 
with the Hindu nationalist BJP. The party leader who had claimed his party was fighting against 
the BJP making “inroads into Kashmir” justifies his volte-face by claiming “flood-affected 
Kashmir needs to have good relations with the party in power in New Delhi.” This seems to 
Figure 13. Early December 2014, people gather spontaneously to listen to the leaders of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in a 




vindicate the words of the former legislator, the one who had been part of an electoral party 
before 1990, about the “key to power in Kashmir.” For Shafi and Ashraf, the about-turn doesn’t 
mean anything in terms of “ideology.” Hesitatingly, they insist it is “good for development.” For 
Zarqa and Arif, it is “frustrating” to see that “people who vote can’t see what these politicians 
represent.”         
Elections under occupation: theatre of the absurd   
The last time assembly elections were held in Kashmir, in 2008, I was in Anantnag. 
Elections had been announced in the aftermath of a long Tehreek agitation against a 
controversial “transfer of public land” to a quasi-governmental body that intended to create 
“permanent facilities” for Hindu pilgrims. For Tehreek activists, the land transfer had come as a 
blow, because they had already been demanding the removal of the military and release of the 
land.12 The land was also located in an ecologically fragile zone. After the summer 2008 protests 
and the five-month long harsh clampdowns, many were surprised that the government wanted to 
hold elections. The long months of curfew had exacted a heavy toll, not only in terms of lives 
lost and people injured in paramilitary shootings, but also the suffering of those whose 
livelihoods depend on an uninterrupted daily activity: the hawkers, shopkeepers, daily wage 
earners, laborers, etc. Hindu activists had imposed an economic blockade on Kashmir, which 
caused a severe shortage of supplies for around a month.  
Within this context, the election announcement had sounded like a “cruel joke,” just as 
Hussain in Srinagar would describe the 2014 election announcement. But by late November and 
December, the months in which the elections were to be held that year, an unusually large 
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valley occupy a staggering 125,000 acres. The formal acquisition of yet another piece of public land was incendiary” 




number of people decided, or were mobilized, to contest. Remarkably, there was even a distinct 
buzz of election campaigning in the air. I took some notes on the polling day’s events, which I 
reproduce below in full, to give a sense of what election day had felt like:13 
It is nine in the morning. Overnight drizzle has darkened the winter bare trees. The hill, 
around which the town is wrapped, has disappeared in the mist. I look out onto the road in the 
distance to see if anyone is moving. There was an explosion a couple of hours ago. It must have 
been somewhere close. A few police jeeps can be seen moving fast every few minutes. I am 
curious to see if people are going out to vote. My parents advise me to stay indoors. We have 
been without electricity since last evening. I use this fact as a pretext, and announce that I am 
going to go out to get it fixed. I see large boot prints in our mud-spattered kucha. Soldiers must 
have been moving about in the night. It is the day of election in Anantnag, and the bandobast is 
tight.14  
A few meters ahead, after a bend in the kucha, two people from the neighborhood, father 
and son, are looking dejectedly at the electric transformer that supplies our neighborhood. The 
father turns to me and says: “Every soldier in this cinema has a heater and a boiler of his own. 
They get two phases. And the rest of us get one. It can’t take this load.” He is talking about the 
cinema hall in our neighborhood, which was taken over by the paramilitary almost eighteen years 
ago, and turned into a camp. It houses more than three hundred soldiers. The neighborhood has 
around thirty houses. The electricity transformer was installed way back in the 1980s for these 
thirty houses and the cinema. Each night of the winter the fuse blows.  
An elderly man has come out of his house with pieces of aluminum wire in his hand. “To 
hell with them, and if it wasn’t, why would they be here!” he blurts out in Kashmiri. We laugh. A 
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military helicopter comes out of nowhere. It flies low overhead. Our laughter is drowned in the 
sound. Both the laughter and the helicopter disappear quickly.  
We can see the main road from where we are standing. Soldiers deployed on the road 
stop a car. They make gestures for the driver to come out. He is apparently showing some papers. 
One soldier flings his door open. As soon as the driver steps out, another soldier lands his heavy 
muddy boot on the driver’s belly. “Oh, no, they have just destroyed his perfectly clean pheran. 
How will he wash it now in this cold winter with no electricity?” quips the man standing next to 
me, and then giggles at his own dark sense of humor.15 One of his own relatives was beaten blue 
and black two months back. Soldiers had dug a hole in his arm with a screwdriver, which took a 
surgery to fill. The driver receives a rain of blows, and soon passes out. The soldiers drag him to 
the side. The man standing next to me “bets” the driver is pretending to be unconscious. He is 
right. One soldier kicks him hard in the belly, and the driver is up. He limps back to his car and 
drives away. 
Two trucks packed tightly with sullen and frozen Kashmiri men move down the main 
road. A young man, who has joined us, says wryly: “They are bringing people from outside to 
vote. They don’t need our vote.” A cab is moving toward us slowly. We are alert, and ready to 
dart back into our homes. It is a Kashmiri driver, therefore safe. He stops near us. A thin vein of 
blood is issuing from the corner of his mouth.  
“These berrahgodhs pulled me out of my home in the night, and asked me to ferry troops 
to Kadipora. They gave me a paper telling me no one would ask me questions on my way back. 
But at every checkpoint they stop me and hit me, even after I show them this blasted paper.”16  
“Hatta haz, they have no sympathy, no humanity,” says the elderly man, consoling him. 
I return home to write. 
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16 Berrahgodh is a typical vulgarism some Kashmiri men use. The term is almost untranslatable, and its sound does 




For the last two months, the elections have been taking place. Kashmir’s assembly 
elections are happening in six phases. Anantnag is the fifth one. Srinagar will be last. Today, like 
in all other phases, the rest of Kashmir is under curfew. It reminds me of Dr. Aziz in Midnight’s 
Children examining the body parts of his future wife through a perforated sheet, one by one.17 
Beyond the regular election-day restrictions, people have been barred from going out on 
Fridays as well. No prayers have been offered in Jami’a Masjid, the largest mosque in Srinagar, 
for the last six Fridays. People are not allowed to assemble. The main preacher at Jami’a Masjid, 
and head of the Hurriyat Conference (a Tehreek coalition), Mirwaiz Umar, is under house arrest. 
Thousands of Tehreek activists have been bundled into jails. The Indian government has slapped 
many of them with the draconian Public Safety Act (PSA), which means they will be put in 
prison for the next six months to two years without trial. Once you have one PSA against you, it 
is tough not to have several more. 
In Anantnag, last month, a hundred parents were picked up randomly by the police and 
the paramilitary, and were told to warn their sons not to get involved in the pro-independence 
campaign. Many young men have already been beaten up, and warned to stay indoors. A friend 
who works with a local newspaper was threatened, and his younger brother beaten, for reporting 
on police atrocities. He was told to do “favorable stories” about the election. He is following the 
orders to the word, he tells me. He doesn’t want to give up his job, for they don’t come easily. 
Pro-government Ikhwani militias, which are funded and armed by the Indian state, and who 
wreaked havoc on Anantnag for a full decade, have been reactivated. Many of the militiamen, 
who were integrated into the army, wander about the town in civvies and harass people. 
A lot of people it seems want to vote, if not in Anantnag town, then in the villages. They 
need MLAs [Members of Legislative Assembly] to relieve them from the tremendous pressure 
the Indian state puts on them. During the past few months, thousands were arrested. They had no 
                                                 




one to go to for redress. Governor’s rule meant one inaccessible Indian bureaucrat controlled 
everyone’s life in Kashmir. A legislative assembly would mean, at least, that they could go to 
people who might have some say. That is what the contestants are promising. People in jails shall 
be released. The level of military oppression will be brought down. Government militias will be 
reined in. Major parties, like the People’s Democratic Party and the National Conference, are 
saying, “this vote is not a vote for India.” And thrown in between are several others who have one 
or the other motivation to contest, and none of which is loyalty toward India. One contestant, who 
I’ve known since childhood, told me privately that he is contesting to get special papers and a 
residence in Jammu so that he can take his ailing mother away from Kashmir. 
In New Delhi, however, pundits are claiming elections to be a victory over “Kashmiri 
separatists.” Indian newspapers and TV channels are gloating over the turnouts: sixty-eight 
percent, fifty-one percent, and fifty-seven percent.18 The numbers encouraged even India’s prime 
minister Manmohan Singh to come to a village in Anantnag a few days back to support his 
party’s candidate from there. The village he visited is surrounded by hills full of bombs. The 
Indian military has built one of its largest ammunition depots in those hills. Last year the hills in 
Khundru exploded into a huge ball of fire and consumed dozens of Kashmiri lives. The military 
asked villagers in fifteen villages surrounding the depot to vacate so that the depot could be 
expanded. No word was spoken about that. To the Kashmiris that he addressed, Prime Minister 
Singh said, “India would defeat terrorism soon.” He was talking about Mumbai. 
Across the stream that runs behind the house I am staying, young men from the 
neighborhood who led stone-pelting battles and the protests against Indian soldiers over the 
summer and the autumn are playing cricket. The stream almost dries up in winter, leaving a little 
plain island behind. Soldiers can’t see it.  
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It is almost three in the afternoon, and I haven’t seen anyone go to vote, yet. But there are 
two more hours to go, and who knows. 
What these notes from almost nine years back reaffirm is an interwoven pattern of 
elections and violence. They suggest that while elections may appear to give people a choice of 
carrying on everyday social life over falling for the evental narrative of azadi, everyday life itself 
remains deeply enmeshed with a state of emergency. Could elections lead to demilitarization, as 
residents of Poore thought it might? Or do elections only reinforce the military occupation in 
Kashmir and give abnormal a semblance of normalcy, as the students at the university claimed? 
As it is, the violence of the occupation and the dynamics of everyday life remain inseparable. 
Elections, instead of alleviating the effects of militarization, have become its key constitutive 
component.    
Conclusion: uncivil society 
In Jose Saramago’s novel Seeing (2007), polling officials find out that most voters in the 
municipal elections in the capital city have returned blank votes. After the voters do the same the 
second time in a week, the government calls the electorate unpatriotic and views their actions as 
a threat to the legitimate authority. As a result, an emergency is imposed. When the residents 
remain defiant, the government shifts the capital, leaving the residents to fend for themselves 
(which the latter do handsomely). In contrast to Saramago’s unnamed city, where a certain kind 
of elections, one that does not yield “desired results,” leads to an emergency, in Kashmir, the 
emergency is itself turned into a condition of possibility for the elections to be held. If voting a 
certain way leads to a suspension of civil rights in the former, in Kashmir, suspension of civil 
rights becomes the precondition under which one can vote. In both cases, however, the 




In this chapter, I have explored the social and historical meanings of elections in 
Kashmir, and through these meanings hinted at the interrelations that emerge between the state 
and the people. But there is the in-between space occupied by elements that together constitute 
what I have above called “a new ground of the political process.” Unlike the residents of Poore, 
who have been voting since before 1990, but remain in the minority, this “new ground,” 
emerging in Kashmir since 1994, constitutes an unfamiliar phenomenon for Kashmiris in 
general, and for Tehreek in particular. Let me preface this rather amorphous notion of “new 
ground”—which I hope will become clearer in the next chapter—by drawing on Antonio 
Gramsci’s notion of “civil society.” 
In its ordinary sense, “civil society” is an amalgamation of individuals and private 
associations (“the ensemble of organisms”), which occupies the nebulous space between the state 
and its subjects (Gramsci 1971, 12). It keeps in check the arbitrary use of coercive power by the 
state, and demands rights for the state’s subjects in the name of law and the constitution. It 
demands that the institutions of the state honor their legal mandate. And, under democratic 
regimes—where alone a civil society might even properly emerge—the institution expected, and 
valued, above all to honor its mandate is the institution of Elections. Unlike political parties or 
revolutionary organizations, civil society claims “neutrality,” which gives it an aura of 
legitimacy outside the structures of the state, even though it works strictly within the same legal 
limits it seeks to uphold. So, even if civil society “operates without sanctions or compulsory 
obligations,” as Gramsci noted, it gathers enough legitimacy to “exert a collective pressure and 
obtain objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, 




alongside the emergence of the modern state (which he designated as “political society”), and 
functioned to maintain the overall “hegemony” of the state.  
Theoretically, civil society crumbles under a “state of emergency,” which might well be 
defined as the disappearance of civil society altogether. The state of emergency is marked by a 
legal suspension of the legal order, leaving neither the space, nor the raison d'être for civil 
society. But a state of emergency is not to be confused with anarchy or disorder, one that exists 
prior to the establishment of the order or political society.19 There is still order, as Giorgio 
Agamben (2002) has argued, but one which emerges because of the suspension of the legal 
order.20 I am tempted to call it an “ordered disorder,” and to argue that, in Kashmir, elections 
have become a key instrument in its maintenance. 
Conceptually, the space between the Indian state and Kashmiri people should be 
designated as the “civil society,” if only in the sense that this society seeks to build the 
hegemony of the state. Yet since this phenomenon has emerged in Kashmir around the Ikhwanis, 
a violent militia, and paradoxically with the suspension of the legal order itself, rather than with 
its establishment (contra Agamben), I use the term, uncivil society. I describe “uncivil society” in 
Kashmir as those socio-political groups and forces whose origins, as well as mode of 
functioning, lay in illegality itself, acting as violent intermediaries between the state and its 
subjects. This “uncivil society” came to be hinged principally around a group of 
counterinsurgents, called Ikhwanis, and their instrumentalization by the state. The rise of this 
                                                 
19 Carl Schmidt points out: "The state of emergency is always distinguished from anarchy and chaos and, in the legal 
sense, there is still order in it, even though it is not a legal order." Schmidt cited in Agamben (2002). 
20 As Agamben’s analysis of Schmidt’s concept of “state of emergency” shows, “The state of exception is not the 
chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension” (1998, 18). Given this split 
between order and legal order, Agamben (2002) suggests that Schmitt’s theoretical challenge was to “show that the 
suspension of law still derives from the legal domain, and not from simple anarchy.” A civil society may still 





uncivil society was a result of the state declaring a punitive emergency, even though, as I will 
argue in the next chapter, its conditions of possibility were created by the larger crisis of 
representation in Kashmir.        
The story of electoral democracy in Kashmir in the post-Tehreek era is intimately 
entwined with the story of Ikhwan violence. But while many from Tehreek still tend to see the 
elections as a part of the counterinsurgency campaign, there is a difference too conspicuous to be 
ignored. The difference between the 1996 elections and the 2014 elections was the absence of 
the Ikhwanis. They had been instrumental in earlier elections. It is this absence that brought me 
to the Ikhwanis—at least to those who have survived—not only to tell through their accounts the 
story of how an “electoral democracy” under occupation was manufactured, but to tell the story 









Th(e) desire for simplification is justified, but the same does not always apply to simplification...the network of 
human relations inside the Lagers was not simple: it could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and 
persecutors.  
Primo Levi (1989, 37) 
The Gray Zone 
The elections of 1996 in Kashmir were held in a context of generalized violence. The 
number of Tehreek armed groups had at one point grown into an alphabet soup of around a 
hundred, though by the end of 1994 only a few remained in the fight, including most 
predominantly the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (also known as the Hizb). Yet, in the early years of 
Tehreek, the government, even with its ruthless military campaigns and harsh legislations, 
including the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA),1 had failed to break the movement. 
By early 1994, the government began contracting violence out to fringe Kashmiri groups and 
individuals who either volunteered or were coerced into becoming part of the counterinsurgency. 
These included village defense committees (especially in districts under Jammu province in the 
south), special operations group, special police officers, and, most devastatingly, the “Ikhwanis,” 
who broke ranks with Tehreek and turned their guns against the Hizb and its patron party, 
Jama’at-i-Islami. These formations acted semi-autonomously, and, even though they were not 
legally covered by AFSPA, they secured immunity for their illicit acts within the larger 
counterinsurgency apparatus by demonstrating their effectiveness in spawning a culture of fear 
                                                 
1 In 1990, the Indian Parliament had passed colonial-era emergency laws, like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 
(AFSPA), that gave wide-ranging powers and immunity to the military to eradicate the movement (Duschinski 
2009). AFSPA was accompanied by several other draconian legal instruments, including Public Safety Act (PSA), 




and draconian reprisals. On modest state payroll, these groups more than made up for their 
meager salaries with income through extortion, illegal land grabs and constructions, and forcible 
takeover of people’s personal belongings and properties.2  Occasionally, they also received 
monetary rewards for killing or arresting Tehreek activists, which incentivized their overall state-
permitted criminality.    
In the coming years, the thoroughly subjectivized and unaccountable exercise of violence 
facilitated under the AFSPA regime seeped into everyday life of Kashmiris, which, combined 
with the civilian contracting of violence, created a monstrous new reality. Under this new reality, 
what Walter Benjamin calls the “spectral mixture” of “valid” violence—both its paradigmatic, 
“law-making” military violence, and its “law-preserving” threat of violence (1986, 286-287)3—
was no longer limited to the state, or its central institution, the police, but had spilled into the 
intermediate space between the state and its subjects, creating a zone of quasi-sovereign power 
within the state. It appeared as if the state was not interested in the “monopoly of violence,” 
which is a critical feature of the modern state.4 State officials had in fact worried that the police 
(which consisted mostly of Kashmiri officers) was holding the “law-preserving” threat of 
violence against the state itself. In 1993, for instance, more than two thousand police officers 
revolted and laid a protracted siege to their own headquarters in Srinagar. They were demanding 
                                                 
2 Many ex-Ikhwanis have told me that they were paid 1500 rupees per month (USD 30/month). While this salary 
figure seems arbitrary, it is in line with the later governmental policy of employing many people in government 
positions on a meagre and temporary salary. There is no publicly accessible record whether Ikhwanis were paid 
directly from state payroll or from the operational funds of the counter-insurgency campaign. 
3 Writing on violence, Benjamin says “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving. If it lays 
claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all validity” (1986, 287). The “lawmaking” aspect of violence takes 
the form of military violence, which is paradigmatic as it seeks to achieve an end, for instance, to establish a “new” 
order. The law-preserving aspect of violence is exercised as the “threat of violence” to assert legal claims. Both 
these aspects are present as a “spectral mixture” in the institution of the modern state—the police, which not only 
asserts legal claims but also determines what the legal ends should be (Benjamin 1986, 286-287). 
4 As Benjamin writes: “Law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the legal system. 
Law’s interest in monopoly of violence vis-a-vis individuals is explained by the intention in preserving law (not 
legal ends), for when not in hands of law, law is threatened not by the ends violence may pursue but by its mere 




a return to “lawfulness and accountability” (Baweja 1993b). The revolt had started off in reaction 
to the death of a police officer in military custody. The Indian government responded by sending 
troops to quell the police, a bizarre situation, which brought even Tehreek groups to express 
sympathy with the police. Yet it was not so bizarre, if we consider that at several places Indian 
soldiers had killed local police officers and armed militants almost without discrimination.  
What the state authorities seemed interested in creating—in place of the regular police—
was a nebulous sphere of action, a non-state acting like a state, to which it could outsource 
violence. This non-state sphere would obviously bolster state’s own coercive power in Kashmir 
but also provide it with plausible deniability. The state of emergency imposed in 1990 was thus 
muddled by a “civil war” by mid-1990s, in which violence became amorphous. Giorgio 
Agamben’s argument about the mutual coalescing of the “civil war” and the “state of 
emergency” fits this situation well. He writes:  
One of the elements that make the state of exception so difficult to define is certainly its close 
relationship to civil war, insurrection, and resistance. Because civil war is the opposite of normal 
conditions, it lies in a zone of undecidability with respect to the state of exception, which is state 
power’s immediate response to the most extreme internal conflicts. Thus, over the course of the 
twentieth century, we have been able to witness a paradoxical phenomenon that has been 
effectively defined as a “legal civil war” (Agamben 2005, 2). 
The expansion of this zone of quasi-state power, waging a “legal civil war”—which I call 
the “gray zone”5—was linked to the state’s shift in policy in 1993 under which the government 
sought to hold elections in Kashmir. As examined in Chapter 4, the question of “elections,” 
                                                 
5 I use this term from Primo Levi’s essay “The Gray Zone,” in which Levi calls for a less passionate, yet critical 
understanding of the phenomenon of the so-called “privileged-prisoners” at Auschwitz. He writes: “It is a gray zone, 
poorly defined, where the two camps of masters and slaves both diverge and converge…The harsher the oppression, 




which was claimed to be part of the government’s “new thinking,” posed some obvious 
questions for the authorities: Will Kashmiris participate in elections? Will militants allow it? 
Who would be allowed to contest? To these questions, there was a singular answer: “Ikhwan”—a 
force that the state had always hoped to create but had never truly succeeded. Ikhwan was 
unleashed on the Kashmiri society to create “conditions” for the election by neutralizing the 
power of the Hizb, disrupt the over ground Tehreek workers, and, if nothing, themselves jump in 
the fray and contest.  
Propping up elements from within the insurgent movements to break them is a classic 
counterinsurgency tactic. In standard COIN manuals, this goes alongside tough military 
pacification as well as creating a local face of the government through a “political process” (Nagl 
2005; Kilcullen 2011; Hussain 2011). The process is, for the most part, about managing 
perceptions.6 While the end objective of the political process in zones of occupation remains 
military in nature (the strategic defeat of the insurgency), its success ultimately hinges on the 
state’s ability to turn the “native on native” (Lee 2010) and to use the “co-ethnicity advantage” 
against the counterinsurgents (Lyall 2010).7 Both the decision to hold elections and the 
emergence of Ikhwan were conjoined parts of precisely these logics that came to define the gray 
zone in Kashmir.   
The Indian government had already had a long history of counterinsurgency,8 and had 
deployed the “native on native” tactic elsewhere. For instance, during Punjab’s Sikh Khalistani 
                                                 
6 For instance, US Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which has become a standard, states, “Managing 
expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is 
improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government 
is a key to successful COIN operations.” This apparent good intention is a “psychological operation,” as the manual 
states, “In other cultures, exorbitant promises are normal and people do not expect them to be kept” (US Department 
of the Army 2006, 1-25). 
7 Lyall (2010) argues that using locals as counterinsurgents is more effective than regular armed forces.  
8 In fact, the first time AFPSA was invoked in post-1947 India was in the early 1950s in the country’s northeastern 




militancy in the 1980s, Joyce Pettigrew writes, “Several militants became informers…(several) 
indulging in rape and extortion, creating confusion, disorder, and discreditation of the militant 
cause” (2000, 216). While the counterinsurgency did appear to deliver what it envisioned—a 
split Tehreek in Kashmir—it is simplistic to assume that a few turned insurgents could have 
fatally divided a popular movement such as Tehreek.9 Often such assumptions smooth over 
differences within the insurgent movements themselves, and treat the state as an all-pervasive 
actor.  
In his theorization of “pro-state paramilitaries,” which is based on a case study of the 
Ikhwan phenomenon in Kashmir, Paul Staniland (2012) argues that “ethnic defection” in 
insurgencies—some co-ethnics flipping to side with the enemy state—results from insurgent 
fratricide, or when one insurgent group tries to dominate others. Ikhwanis, according to 
Staniland, joined the Indian forces because the Hizb tried to dominate them through fratricidal 
fighting. Ikhwanis had, however, retained enough organizational cohesion to neither crumble 
away nor merge with the Hizb. Instead, they joined the Indian side to take on the Hizb. Staniland 
is right in emphasizing Hizb’s campaign for dominance as a reason for fratricide among Tehreek 
groups, yet, the fratricide was not in itself a reason behind Ikhwani “defection.” Staniland’s 
dismissal of ideological differences and state policy as “secondary factors” in the Ikhwani 
defection is a vital shortcoming in his account. He considers ideological differences as absent 
because “political debates were rare” and sees the state as having only provided “protection of 
defectors” rather than triggering defection (Staniland 2012: 21). 
 
                                                 
9 In Algeria, for instance, the COIN doctrine was a success “tactically” but a failure “strategically” (Heggoy 1972; 






Having laid out above some of the state policy context (especially the start of the 
“political process”) in which Ikhwan arose, I will describe in the pages ahead how Ikhwanis, 
who individually came from diverse factions of Tehreek or from outside the movement, clearly 
Figure 14. In the aftermath of militarization, public massacres at the hands of Indian soldiers took place at several 
places. On October 22, 2014 Tehreek activists commemorated one such event that took place in 1993 in a town 




understood their ideological differences with the Hizb. These differences were often expressed in 
the language of sectarianism as well as of distrust of the foreign (Pakistani) control over the 
movement. As the accounts of former Ikhwanis show, fratricidal conflict played a part in their 
decision to defect, but “fratricide” was neither a “given,” one-way system of killing (as Staniland 
assumes) nor was it as intense before the defection as it became afterwards. There had indeed 
been skirmishes between the Hizb and the Ikhwan before Ikhwan “turned” in 1994. These were, 
however, insignificant compared to Hizb’s dramatic one-way assault on another organization, 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a large secular pro-Independence group. Yet, JKLF 
with a much more coherent organization, political vision, and popular support did not turn.10 
It is commonly understood in Kashmir that turning insurgents11—or as the government 
officials would describe it, “Bringing the gumrah nawjawan (misled youths) into the national 
mainstream”—was often achieved “through money as well as abduction and torture” (Lalwani 
2011, 7). This perspective also fits well into Tehreek discourse of seeing Ikhwanis as 
“collaborators.” There is, however, a more complex story behind the rise of Ikhwan, which 
involves intricate questions of identity, differences over political goals, and contestation over the 
control of the movement. This chapter argues that the conditions for the rise of the Ikhwan and 
Ikhwanism were created within Tehreek itself. The state exploited the ideological differences and 
the resultant fratricidal violence to its advantage at a moment when the state policy was shifting 
from an outright military pacification to adopting “political process” as a counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
                                                 
10 Staniland suggests JKLF did not have a “cohesive” organization, which he gives as a reason behind its inability to 
effectively defect. This is inaccurate and looks at JKLF’s state of organization only in 1994. Hizb’s assault on JKLF 
had begun in 1991 already. JKLF had continued to be strong organizationally even until late 1993. By comparison 
Ikhwan and Muslim Mujahideen, two groups that defected, were very small, dispersed, and without much 
“cohesion,” whatever that means.  
11 When Kashmiris speak about those among them who joined the counterinsurgency, they use the term phearun, 




Ikhwanis were an all-pervasive presence in Kashmir from 1994 until about 2002-03, but 
their real influence was centered on a few towns and a few dozen villages in North and South 
Kashmir. In the capital, Srinagar, and most other major towns as well as the countryside more 
generally, Ikhwanis could only operate as “embedded” within Indian forces. Nevertheless, many 
in Tehreek acknowledge that Ikhwanis almost single-handedly destroyed the armed movement, if 
not Tehreek itself. Yet, now, Ikhwanis have been cast out of public consciousness, almost like a 
bad memory. To tell their story is to illuminate a crucial aspect of the recent Kashmiri past that 
has remained concealed. Ikhwanis are the “intimate other” within Kashmiri society about whom 
people don’t like to talk or invoke without a tinge of pain. Even for loyalist politicians in 
Kashmir, who spoke to me, Ikhwanis were an “embarrassment,” something they hoped would 
become a “forgotten chapter of history.” Ikhwanis, however, are not just a story of the state 
manipulating a section of people to turn against their own. Feared for their violent tactics and 
locally despised for switching sides to the Indian military, Ikhwani trajectory and quick rise were 
co-terminus with Tehreek’s ideological crisis and a pre-existing internal conflict.  
My account will not sit well with either the state’s official story or with Tehreek’s 
counter-narratives. For the state, counterinsurgency has been about “re-establishing democracy 
and normalcy.” In this account, the military is lionized, Ikhwanis are omitted, and, predictably, 
Tehreek is the disruptive force. In Tehreek accounts, in contrast, it is Ikhwan which is depicted 
as the violent disruptive element: they are seen to have interrupted the forthright “struggle 
between domination and resistance,” between the “Indian military occupation” and the 
“Kashmiri peoples’ movement for self-determination.” The account I tell is indeed laced with 
Ikhwani violence, carried out under the overall regime of military occupation, but Tehreek 




is the constitutive element in this account. I move away from the prism of “collaboration” which 
has so far underpinned the popular understanding of the Ikhwan phenomenon in Kashmir, but I 
also don’t take their defection as conscientious "ethical acts.”12 For many Ikhwanis the decision 
to defect (or to join the defected Ikhwan) was made based on a complex mix of state threats and 
torture, Hizb’s dominance agenda, ideological differences with pro-Pakistan elements, personal 
circumstances, or even a desire to acquire social power. 
What follows, then, is the story of Kashmir in the mid-1990s, when years of armed 
insurrection against the Indian state, beginning 1989-90, had left very little buffer between the 
coercive state apparatus and its Kashmiri subjects, and violence had become the primary relation 
between the two. I will first trace the rise of the Ikhwan in this period. It will become clear that 
the key dynamic of Tehreek was not limited to the question of Kashmir’s relation with India, but 
with Pakistan too. The Pakistan question, as it emerges from the accounts of former Ikhwanis, 
had already split the movement from within, which allowed the Indian state to widen the 
fractures within Tehreek and turn some of its elements. These accounts suggest that the 
dilemmas of the movement (in its relationship with Pakistan) had seeped into debates about 
Kashmiri identity, bringing violence to the old questions of the “religious” (Muslim) and the 
“regional” (Kashmiri), the aetiqad (heterodox belief in shrines) and the shari’at (orthodox 
interpretation of the Islamic texts), and azadi (independence) and the “merger with Pakistan.” 
The accounts also reveal how accusations of “betrayal” or “treason” are contested and re-
contextualized amid articulations of identity and political projects. Drawing from interviews with 
former Ikhwanis, accounts of victims of their violence (those who claim to have suffered either 
                                                 
12 On the theme of “collaboration” and the complexities which underlie acts of collaboration, see for instance the 
essays in Thiranagama and Kelly (2009). While Thiranagama and Kelly emphasize collaboration or treason as 
“ethical acts” within the contexts about which they write, it is hard to establish Ikhwani defection as ethical acts, 




directly or indirectly), and my own memories of living in a town which the Ikhwanis had 
dominated for years, Ikhwanism emerges as a “split” in the Kashmiri political subjectivity. 
However, I argue that this split cannot simply be described in terms of contesting narratives of 
identity. It must be diagnosed in the way these narratives came to shape the perspectives of those 
involved, their understanding of their actions and personal transformations, and how interactions 
and interrelations between people were restructured. Here violence is both a result of a 
disjuncture in discourse as well as generative of its own justificatory mechanisms. 
The rise and fall of the Ikhwan 
Often, when I ask Kashmiris about their memories of the early Tehreek years (1989-93), 
most can vividly recount the major and even mundane events, their own circumstances, and the 
public discourse of the time. It is a much-storied and memorialized period. But, for the same 
people, the period between 1994 and 2003 is rather blurred, as if it has been excised from public 
memory. I often hear words like an’gaet alam (“blind-dark condition”) or toofan (“tempest”) that 
are used to describe the time. “Some got rich,” is a constant refrain; so is, “A few were minting 
money, while people were dying.” This is meant literally. Many remember neighbors or relatives 
printing money at home. Indeed, it was believed that much fake currency was circulating in this 
period. The rise of the nouveau riche—those who jumped class from poor or lower middle to 
upper middle class—becomes a way of signifying the moral corruption of the period.  
For many, “unspeakable events” took place. At the center of this “blind-dark condition” 
was the Ikhwan, whose collusion with the official counterinsurgency became part of a Kashmiri 
“public secret.” Michael Taussig describes “public secret” as that which is widely known but 
cannot be publicly stated. Writing about the dealings between the paramilitary death squads and 




‘knew’ we ‘knew’, but there was no way it could be easily articulated, certainly not on the 
ground, face-to-face” (Taussig 1999, 6). Yet, Kashmiris openly referred to Ikhwanis as 
“renegades” or “sarkari (government) militants,” and in certain places in central Kashmir as 
“naabid” (because many Ikhwanis active in that area came from the village of Naabidpora, but 
naabid also has a pejorative ring to it).  
Ikhwanis rose as a counterinsurgent group in 1994 in parts of North and South Kashmir. 
Allying themselves with the Indian military, Ikhwanis turned violently against Tehreek, of which 
they had previously been a part. Ikhwan’s emergence coincided with a drastic new posture of the 
Indian state vis-à-vis the Kashmir question. In February 1994, India’s Parliament unanimously 
passed a resolution on Kashmir, which declared, “The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is 
and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country 
will be resisted by all necessary means.” The resolution was prompted by statements by U.S. 
government officials calling into question India’s standpoint on Kashmir as well increased 
Pakistani diplomatic activity at the United Nations to condemn India on human rights violations 
in Kashmir and pass resolutions in favor of Kashmiri self-determination (Indian Express 1994a, 
1994b).13  Not only did the 1994 Parliamentary resolution violate the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions on Kashmir, which deemed the political status of Kashmir as “disputed,” it also 
contravened inter-governmental agreements between India and Pakistan, which had envisioned a 
resolution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral negotiations.14 On the ground in Kashmir, it had 
two immediate and interrelated effects, which directly contributed to the rise of the Ikhwan.  
                                                 
13 The lead editorial in a major Indian newspaper stated that the “historic show of unanimity in Parliament over 
Kashmir (as) a clear demonstration of national resolve” would reassure the troops that “some cynical politician will 
not barter away their sacrifices” (Indian Express 1994a). Another article in the same newspaper (Indian Express 
1994b) expresses frustration with the India’s “listless efforts” of stemming international condemnation of its human 
rights violations in Kashmir at the UNHRC (Indian Express 1994b).     
14 One such agreement was signed between India and Pakistan in the Indian city of Shimla in 1972, at the end of the 




The first had to do with the Indian government’s new policy of starting a “political 
process,” which was to culminate in the state assembly and federal parliamentary elections, as 
well as reviving the bureaucracy and a “civil society.” In the face of an entrenched armed 
movement, the government had been unsuccessful from 1990 to 1993 in limiting the influence of 
the militants, and the bureaucracy had become disorganized and fragmented. Even as the 
architecture of military occupation had tightened, Tehreek armed groups had continued to enjoy 
widespread support. By 1993, the Indian government replaced its top official in Kashmir, 
Governor G. S. Saxena, the face of the “law and order approach,” with General K. V. Krishna 
Rao. Rao was presented as the face of a new “humane approach.” Under this new approach, 
elements of pro-India politics in Kashmir, like the former chief minister Farooq Abdullah (whose 
coalition government, a result of the “rigged” elections of 1987, had been summarily dismissed 
in early 1990), were to be gradually recycled back into the public sphere. Briefly, the military 
paused its punitive pacification campaign, which had been marked by an extensive use of urban 
arson and civilian massacres, indicating that it was willing to allow government’s talks with 
leaders of the armed groups. But the “humane approach” sputtered and stopped soon thereafter. 
This did not surprise the leaders of Tehreek, who had seen the government “feelers” about talks 
simply as an attempt to widen mistrust among different factions within the movement.  
By 1994, the objectives of the “humane approach” became clear when its key policy 
components began to fall into place. The “civil society,” which was to be constituted, was not a 
civil society per se, but rather a lawless local auxiliary force meant to destroy Tehreek from 
within. This involved “co-optation and transformation of insurgents into local assets,” who were 
                                                 
resolutions, which give primacy to Kashmiris as the primary party whose will needs to be determined in a plebiscite. 





to be recruited from surrendered militants, militants in prisons, or those disgruntled elements 
within Tehreek who had personal scores to settle (Lalwani 2011, 5-9). A report by Human Rights 
Watch indicted India for using tactics like “forcibly recruiting former militants into Ikhwan by 
detaining members of their families as hostages until (they) agreed to work with the security 
forces” (1996). The report also claimed an extensive use of torture to make jailed or surrendered 
militants comply.  
The second and more disastrous effect of the Parliament’s 1994 resolution was the 
exacerbation of already existing tensions within Tehreek. Most prominently, there had been 
ongoing internecine fighting between the pro-Pakistan Hizbul Mujahideen (Hizb) and groups 
like Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which supported the independence of Kashmir 
from both India and Pakistan. This fighting had split Tehreek in the middle, even though JKLF, 
the more popular of the two, had been trying hard to present a united face. In the post-1993 
“humane approach” phase, the Indian government had attempted to discredit JKLF several times 
by leaking to the press that it was engaged in “secret talks” with the group’s leaders to end the 
conflict and to aid JKLF to take on the Hizb (Baweja 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). While public denials 
by JKLF commanders, like Javed Mir, staved off suspicions of treachery on the street, Hizb used 
these press reports to push for a violent campaign to decimate the JKLF and to emerge as the 
singular representative of Tehreek. Hizb achieved this goal almost completely in the countryside, 
where it was backed by the strong network of Jama’at-i-Islami, an Islamist party modelled on the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, Jama’at provided an ideological backdrop which had 
fatally split Tehreek politics long before the Indian Parliament resolution.  
 Jama’at-i-Islami was cadre-based and strictly disciplinarian, and its primary base was the 




Kashmir must be traced to the “changing social contexts” of the period 1948—90, in which “a 
more assertive and activist expression of Islam came to be increasingly articulated by sections of 
a newly-emerging Muslim Kashmiri middle-class” (2002, 706). Jama’at arose amidst the 
declinist narratives of Islam that had grown in South Asia since the 1857 revolt against the 
British and then with the end of the Ottomon Empire in early 1920s. Jama’at’s intellectual 
founder was an Indian Muslim scholar Maulana Abu Ala Maududi, who believed that Muslim 
political revival was closely connected to the reform of Islamic practices toward a firm 
establishment of the Islamic code, or sharia, as well as the creation of an Islamic state (or states). 
While Jama’at was established in Kashmir in 1942, it separated from its parent body in India in 
1952.15  
Jama’at reform in Kashmir centered on education and a turn against Sufi shrine-centered 
Islamic devotional practices, even though it took care not to dismiss Sufis as such, attempting 
through an intense production of revisionary literature to find its orthodox message within the 
Sufi teachings. Jama’at, nevertheless, took a stance against what it called kashf (illumination) 
and karamat (miracles), which had traditionally been popular in Kashmir as part of the Sufi lore 
(or tazkirat).16 However, as Jama’at influence grew, its youth formation, Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulba 
(Islamic Students Union, established in 1977) took an increasingly divergent stance. Instead of 
rooting itself in the specificities of Kashmir’s social history (as Jama’at had tried to do), Jamiat 
sought its roots in an imagined community of the global Muslim ummah. It was inspired by the 
                                                 
15 The original Jama’at Islami was formed in 1926 by Abu Ala Maududi. The party split in 1947 into Jama’at-e-
Islami Hind (India) and Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan. Other Jama’at parties, all based on Maududi’s thought also 
emerged in Afghanistan and Bangladesh.  
16 Though critical of shrine-related practices, Jama’at had remained firmly non-sectarian, when it came Shia-Sunni 




Iranian revolution of 1979 as well as the US-Saudi-Pakistan facilitated Afghan jihad against the 
Soviet Red Army.  
Jama’at had maintained a distinct identity from its larger Pakistani and Indian fraternal 
chapters. Nevertheless, it had always sought to cultivate a fervent Pakistani nationalism in 
Kashmir, even while ideologically dismissing “nationalism” (especially Kashmiri nationalism) as 
an “unIslamic” idea. This political viewpoint tied well with its “shari’ah-based” reformist 
agenda, which was critical of the place-based Islamic devotionalism. While, visibly, its 
institutional power in Kashmir lay in its network of schools and charities, from its inception, 
Jama’at had remained ideologically interested in the capture of state power.17 Over the years, 
however, its repeated attempts to gain power through elections had resulted in failure, and in 
many cases, were thwarted by rigged elections. By then, however, Jamiat was a force all by itself 
and frustrated with Jama’at’s quietist politics. 
When the Kashmiri armed Tehreek began in 1989-90, Jama’at initially sought to distance 
itself from the movement led by the JKLF. But when the movement suddenly gained mass 
popularity, Jama’at attempted to become Tehreek’s sole political face. Its first act was to 
appropriate the fledgling Hizb as its “military wing,” with many Jamiat youth taking the 
leadership positions. With a strong backing from the Pakistani state in the coming years, Jama’at 
took a prominent role in shaping Hizb’s campaign to dominate other Kashmiri armed groups. 
These groups included JKLF, the largest one, whose secularized Kashmiri nationalism presented 
the main challenge to the pro-Pakistan ideology in Kashmir—as well as to India’s secular 
nationalist ideology. 
                                                 
17 Some have argued that Maududi’s inspiration to create his Jama’at was the Leninist communist party. But Jama’at 




Pressure from the Indian military’s years of the “Catch and Kill” policy18 (which had 
continued even through the “humane approach” phase), as well as from Hizb’s domination 
campaign, which included a violent disarming of the JKLF cadre, eventually forced the JKLF to 
announce a “unilateral ceasefire” with India in 1994.  JKLF’s chief, Yasin Malik, now released 
from jail, vowed to persist in the struggle for independence through non-violent means, even 
though his cadre continued to face backlash at the hands of both the Hizb and Indian military. In 
an interview in 2014, Malik told me that more than six hundred of his fellow fighters had been 
“murdered after the ceasefire.” With JKLF out of the way and its idea of independence in 
abeyance, Hizb had no serious material or ideological rivals left within Tehreek. Flush with 
weapons and armed fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan, however, Hizb’s leaders continued 
their campaign of domination, turning their attention now to smaller groups that had existed 
alongside the JKLF, including ones sharing their pro-Pakistan ideology. Among these groups 
were the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen (IuM)19 and Al-Jihad.  
Given these internal splits, the 1994 resolution of the Indian Parliament represented a big 
setback to Tehreek, whose main constituents had expected the Indian government, after four 
years of war in Kashmir, to come to the negotiating table. The setback especially threw into 
disarray the calculations of the Jama’at-i-Islami and the Hizb, both hoping to be the last ones 
standing among the alphabet soup of armed groups, and to negotiate the future of Kashmir 
exclusively—of course, with Pakistan at its back. But their campaign of domination proved 
                                                 
18 The policy had included laying extensive sieges to villages and towns, “crackdowns,” and summary killings of 
Tehreek suspects or sympathizers. 
19 Ironically, the name Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen was the taken from the Arabic name for the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Egyptian party on which Jama’at-i-Islami was both ideologically and organizationally modeled. Perhaps Egyptian 
Brotherhood activists would have been shocked to hear that in Kashmir two groups, one, having taken its name, and, 




costly, especially with the emerging new skirmishes with the IuM. It is important to remember 
that amid this troubled era, Jama’at and Hizb had continued to push sharia- 
IuM had its roots in armed student factions that arose in the late 1980s, and which had 
once hesitantly worked alongside the JKLF. By the early 1990s, it resented JKLF for their pro-
independence stance, yet the relations between the two had remained non-violent. With a few 
hundred fighters, IuM was prominent in the southern Kashmiri town of Anantnag. Its leader then 
was Sajad Kanue, a resident of the town, and who many within Tehreek recall as an “educated” 
and “pious” commander. Until 1993, he had been leading IuM from his jail cell, but his control 
over the group had slipped gradually, and second-rung leaders consolidated their own power 
within the organization. Then in June 1994, Qazi Nisar, a prominent preacher and a pro-
independence politician in the town, was abducted and assassinated. While the Hizb didn’t take 
any responsibility, it was widely believed that the group was behind the killing. Nisar had been 
central to the formation of Muslim United Front, an alliance of pro-independence and pro-
Pakistan parties (including Jama’at-i-Islami) that stood in opposition to the governing National 
Conference—Congress coalition in the 1987 elections. Nisar’s assassination consolidated the 
already growing anti-Jama’at and anti-Hizb sentiments in Kashmir, especially in Anantnag, 
where the Hizb were rumored to have circulated “hit lists” of prominent pro-independence 
activists.20 The second-rung IuM leaders found a perfect opportunity to change sides and join the 
Indian counterinsurgency campaign, to which they had been lured for a while. Apparently 
disturbed by the reports of defection, IuM leader Kanue escaped from prison in 1994 and formed 
a new group. He was unsuccessful and was killed by his ex-colleagues in 1996.      
                                                 
20 The “hit lists” were both real and imaginary. Often, they would appear outside mosques warning named 
individuals with “severe consequences” for their “anti-Tehreek activities.” These activities could include 
“collaboration” with the government or taking a pro-independence stance. In many cases, however, “hit lists” didn’t 




Even before IuM’s emergence as “the Ikhwan,” Hizb’s campaign to dominate Tehreek 
had faced an intra-organizational opposition. In north Kashmir, several senior Kashmiri 
commanders had split from the Hizb to form Muslim Mujahideen (MM). Among these 
commanders was Nabi Mir, who was originally from a small village in south Kashmir but had 
operated for several years in the north. A former police officer, he had joined the Hizb in the 
early 1990s and risen through the ranks. According to his former colleagues in the MM, Nabi 
Mir formed the new group because he did not agree with Hizb’s domination campaign or with 
Jama’at’s influence on the Hizb. Furthermore, MM had gradually moved to a pro-independence 
position. As an “internal traitor” of the Hizb, Nabi Mir topped their “hit list,” while his family 
came under attack as well. Four of his brothers were killed, one after the other, but he survived. 
For help, Nabi Mir turned to his former enemy, the government, which readily offered it. When 
he returned to his village with a few dozen MM cadre to establish the village as his new base, the 
villagers hesitantly welcomed him. Within a year of his return, Nabi Mir and his fighters became 
the nucleus of the Indian state’s counterinsurgency campaign, which had till then floundered. 
Nabi Mir’s village became the Jama’at’s and the Hizb’s worst nightmare, where dozens (and 
probably hundreds) of their activists were tortured and killed.  
Meanwhile, Ikhwan had also come under Nabi Mir’s influence, but it was mutually 
decided that the Ikhwan would control Anantnag town, while the MM would fight the Hizb in 
the countryside. Learning a lesson or two from the fate of the much larger JKLF, both Ikhwan 
and MM “took the fight back” to the Hizb and the Jama’at, as one ex-Ikhwani militiaman 
described to me. In the aftermath of Qazi Nisar’s assassination, Ikhwan found some support 
among Anantnag’s residents. Even this support gradually thinned, however, as Ikhwan openly 




militants were released on condition that they would join the Ikhwan. Many were regularly 
harassed by the Indian forces until they joined. But as we will see, in several cases, the pressure 
on released militants or ordinary youth to join Ikhwan ironically came from the Hizb itself.  
Between 1994 and 1996, the Ikhwan (which eventually became the common designation 
for IuM and MM) and the Hizb fought a devastating civil war, which left both sides weak and 
exhausted. If there was one victor, as Tehreek activists like to say, it was India. Ikhwan 
entrenched itself in towns and villages, as it killed Hizb’s top commanders. The most devastating 
blow was dealt to the Jama’at, whose activists were abducted, tortured and killed, leading to a 
mass migration of Jama’at families to the relative safety of Srinagar.  
By 1997, Jama’at publicly severed its ties with the Hizb and claimed a halt in all its 
political activities. While this decision seems to have been made to protect its leadership and 
cadre from further Ikhwani attacks, it had an unintended positive consequence for the Hizb. As 
soon as Jama’at separated from the Hizb, Hizb’s support among Kashmiris began to grow, as if 
people had solely suspected Jama’at to be behind Hizb’s domination campaign. Hizb not only 
turned the tide against the Ikhwanis, but also visibly ended its policy of fighting with other 
Tehreek groups. By the early 2000s, Ikhwan was scattered, its tactics deeply despised across 
Kashmir, and its activists starting to feel “betrayed” by their patrons within the Indian 
establishment. Those among Ikhwanis who survived the Hizb’s counter-assault, either joined the 
Indian army and shifted out of Kashmir, or took on a quiet, low profile.   
Meeting the Ikhwanis: Shabbir and Riyaz 
In his short story titled “My Lips are Sealed” (2009) the Kashmiri writer Akhtar Mohi-
ud-Din (1928-2001) describes a cunning milieu that had emerged in mid-1950s Kashmir.21 It was 
                                                 




a period, he writes, when the government was consolidating its control in the region with the 
help of its “local quislings.” The story is about Qadir, a rowdy city hustler, who works 
alongside Indian paramilitary forces, picks up fights and causes trouble. One day, Mohi-ud-Din, 
the eponymous narrator, witnesses Qadir pick a fight and beat up an innocent passerby in a 
crowded Srinagar street, and as soon as people assemble to intervene, Indian paramilitary forces 
dressed as Kashmiri policemen ruthlessly cane-charge the crowd. The next morning’s 
newspapers surprise Mohi-ud-Din. Uniformly, all newspapers report that a “savage mob of 
Kashmiris” had pounced upon and beaten Qadir, a “respectable citizen,” and it was only through 
the “timely intervention” of the Indian-trained police that “a ghastly lynching” was 
prevented. Mohi-ud-Din decides to make inquiries and find the hustler’s home. After much 
search, he locates it in a dingy part of the city. It turns out that Qadir is a broken man at home 
with no job and a huge family to feed. It is, in fact, some local pro-India politicians who had 
blackmailed Qadir to do their bidding, in lieu of keeping an accidental death that Qadir had 
caused under wraps. “My Lips Are Sealed” is an early account about “collaboration” in Kashmir, 
in which Mohi-ud-Din uncovers how “local quislings” remain key to Indian rule in the region. 
But it clearly distinguishes between those whose circumstances are exploited and are made to 
become enforcers of illegitimate state power on the streets and those who acquire political power 
on the backs of such enforcers. The story stresses that to rebuild trust within Kashmiri society 
one must understand how the gray zone works at the personal and micro-political levels.  
“Nothing puts a pause on counterinsurgency in Kashmir, not even a khudayi-qahar 
[natural catastrophe],” Shabbir tells me, when during one of our last interviews I read him Mohi-
ud-Din’s story. He was referring to the September Flood, but quickly grasped the historic import 




“Ikhwani” (“Eckwaen” in local parlance, which twists the Arabic “Ikhwan” to give it a derisive 
tone) from having joined MM, when the MM was already involved in the counterinsurgency and 
come to be known as Ikhwan. He doesn’t like being called “Eckwaen,” or even “Ikhwani,” by 
the villagers, at least not anymore. Yet, he uses it when he meets government officials or 
politicians to ask for a government job or for a loan. On both counts, however, he has been 
unsuccessful. He and his fellow Ikhwanis played an instrumental role in holding elections, 
especially in 1996. “I can tell you that because without us the elections in 1996, or the ones 
afterwards, could not have happened,” Shabbir declares. When I met Riyaz, another Ikhwani, he 
would repeat Shabbir’s assertion: “One hundred percent!” he claims, “Government could not 
have conducted elections without us.” Riyaz, however, was more active during the 2002 
elections.  
I met Shabbir and Riyaz in 2015, several years after their militia lives had ended.22 I was 
introduced to Shabbir over the phone by one of his former associates who knew me. Shabbir was 
part of the Ikhwan between early 1996 and late 2001, after which he joined the Kashmir Police’s 
semi-official Special Operations Group. Riyaz was introduced to me by an ex-Ikhwani who 
himself didn’t want to talk. Riyaz, initially associated with a pan-Islamist armed group, Harkat-
ul-Ansar, joined Ikhwan in 1999, and remained a part of it until 2006. Shabbir and Riyaz gave up 
militia lives when they got married, in 2005 and 2006, respectively. At the time I met them, 
Shabbir was unemployed, staying home with his mother and his wife in his village, while Riyaz 
worked as a day laborer in Anantnag. Both were in their early forties, living troubled lives. 
                                                 
22 Not only have I changed their names, I have also removed the nature of the roles they played or positions they 





While, over time, I met and interviewed several other ex-Ikhwanis, Shabbir and Riyaz became 
my main interlocutors.  
Meeting ex-Ikhwanis is fraught with interpersonal risks for researchers, especially if the 
researcher happens to be a Kashmiri, like myself. Having lived much of their lives harassing and 
hurting people, Ikhwanis worry their victims will someday return to take revenge. When I 
contacted Shabbir and Riyaz, I did not have to establish my research credentials as much as my 
residential/family ones. Later, they would tell me separately that before agreeing to talk, they 
both had to make sure that no one in my family had suffered “takleef (pain)” at their hands. Even 
then, when I began visiting and interviewing them, I was initially met with a refusal to talk, 
except about their economic difficulties. At one level, I interpreted this reticence as a lack of 
desire and awkwardness about bringing up a time about which I might have already known 
several things; at another level, like everyone else, the Ikhwan era is also a difficult time for 
them to grapple with personally. As Shabbir would tell me later: “Everyone knows about us, it is 
not hidden from anyone. I try to forget, as if it was not me but somebody else who was doing 
these things. But memories come, and they hurt.” Perhaps, the fact that I was no longer based in 
Kashmir helped me to secure my first meetings. 
In the beginning, I had to clarify that I was not a journalist. While ex-Ikhwanis are 
circumspect about revealing their former lives, they speak profusely if they sense talking might 
potentially lead to a government job. I had noticed that it was easier for Indian journalists to 
interview Ikhwanis, for Ikhwanis see the Indian media as an effective platform to voice their 
emotive appeals. For Indian TV reports, Ikhwanis often spoke about having been “used,” 
“betrayed” and “left behind” by the Indian establishment, and demand government jobs in return 




occasionally comfortable interviewing Ikhwanis as the news of the latter’s atrocities in Kashmir 
had become a subject of criticism from international human rights organizations (Human Rights 
W atch1996). In a report telecast in 2002 on an English-language TV news channel in India, for 
instance, Ikhwanis were given credit for “breaking the back of the Kashmiri militancy” for 
“meager salaries,” but the report also suggested they might be involved in “extorting money” 
from the locals who lived under fear (NDTV 2002). Another news video shows the interviewer 
stating, “Ikhwanis created a secure environment for voters,” and even lamenting that the voters 
had not come to vote in 2002, because the Ikhwanis “had been restrained” (Video Volunteers 
n.d.).  
I was not unaware of the history of the Ikhwan. I had known about them from almost the 
moment IuM joined India’s counterinsurgency campaign, and, instead of pretending that I knew 
nothing about them, I decided to make this knowledge available to Shabbir, Riyaz and other ex-
Ikhwanis beforehand and as openly as possible. While the resultant tension between us formed 
the overall intersubjective context in which meaning was shared and contested,23 it helped make 
an incision upon the typical veils of secrecy drawn on shared memories of violence. Openness 
about what I remembered from my early years about Ikhwan eventually helped open a space in 
which ex-Ikhwanis could intervene with their own understanding of the events we recalled, and 
which helped to complicate popular notions of violence, commitment, and betrayal in Kashmir. 
Finally, there was the fragile question of the difference between informants and 
informers.24 In anthropology, we are accustomed to treating native experts as anthropological 
                                                 
23 On how meaning is co-constructed in intersubjective contexts, see Crapanzano (1980). 
24 Miles Richardson sees the difference between the “informer” and the “informant” as critical. Informer informs the 
authorities about illegal activities that might lead to legal proceedings, while an informant acts as a local 





informants. But the ex-Ikhwanis who became my “informants,” had once inhabited the space of 
“informers” as well. Even in the present, sometimes, they were unable to mark the difference 
between the “interview” and the “interrogation.” This problem emerged in a curious manner 
during our conversations. Questioning or interviewing was a form of address/inquiry to which 
ex-Ikhwanis had learnt to respond in a peculiar way. Riyaz, for instance, seemed eager, and 
without any prompting, to give extended details about how he had crossed the border and the 
mountains to reach the militant training camps in Azad Kashmir (the western part of the region 
under Pakistan), the routes he had taken, his guides, the locations of camps, and, especially, the 
role of the Pakistani intelligence officers in his arms and ideological training. While former 
Tehreek militants, who gave up arms but did not join Ikhwan, have also talked to me about their 
journeys to the training camps, their narratives are more often laced with claims of “courage 
amid hardship,” as well as a romantic nostalgia for “camaraderie in the camps,” but no more than 
that. In some interviews, it was typical for some ex-combatants, who had spent time in 
“interrogation centers” and jails, to remain discreet about their training and armed operations. 
But others would volunteer to give copious accounts, indicating a rehearsed pattern—which, I 
figured, they must have learnt well to escape torture from their interrogators. Riyaz appeared to 
be among the latter. Incidentally, the more I heard accounts which offered such “information,” 
the more I realized that by the mid-1990s torture must have become ineffective in terms of 
obtaining useful information as all captured militants appeared to possess the same knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the torture had continued.   
It is not possible to give a full account of what drove Ikhwanis to “turn,” as few have 
survived and many refuse to speak, but one can trace the larger context in which they emerged, 




remains classified. In Kashmir, as in other unstable places, many rumors and conspiracy stories 
circulate, and theories abound. My own image of Ikhwanis was shaped by living a significant 
part of my life in Anantnag town, which they had dominated twenty years ago. I will give a brief 
account of my own memory of the Ikhwan, which will help give an overall context within which 
my conversations with Shabbir and Riyaz took place.     
Memory in a time of counterinsurgency 
For several years, Ikhwanis had come to closely inhabit my own daily life. I grew up in 
Anantnag. My high school was in the center of the town, where Ikhwan had their “headquarters.” 
Sometimes when coming out of my school, I would encounter armed activists of IuM. One of 
them, who was the older brother of my classmate, was later shot by Indian troops, just before 
IuM became the India-allied “Ikhwan.” His death caused my classmate trauma—yet some relief 
too. Before her brother’s death, soldiers would regularly come to harass her family. Till 1994, 
IuM had remained inconspicuous; it was just one among many guerrilla groups.  
Then an incident around that time made me, and possibly some others, take note. I was 
walking back from school, when I saw two Kashmiri gunmen openly enter an Indian military 
post. I remember being startled, but also intrigued. I couldn’t believe Kashmiri militants could 
enter a military installation like that, for it would mean a certain death. I waited for the sputter of 
gunfire to begin, but nothing happened. I would come to know soon that the IuM had defected to 
the government side, which is why I heard no gunfire. 
Tensions in Anantnag had been running high. Qazi Nisar, the town’s main preacher, had 
been assassinated in June that year. There were angry protests against the Hizb and the Jama’at, 
whose hand was seen in the killing. In mourning, Nisar’s followers kept the body for display in 




strong force in the town, in the adjoining villages it was predominant. A week later, Hizb cadres, 
accompanied by Jama’at activists, marched through the town in a procession of their own. They 
were carrying bodies of their fallen colleagues, who had died in a gun fight with the Indian 
military. They raised slogans supporting Pakistan, and challenged Nisar’s followers. The 
procession, as much about mourning the dead, was also an assertion of Hizb’s power. To 
underline their message, they buried the bodies close to Nisar’s grave. I had witnessed both, the 
processions and the counter-procession. For the moment, it seemed as if the Indian military had 
somehow dissolved into the background, while an internal schism had replaced the hitherto clear 
distinction between the military and the resistance.  
In the coming days, I would see Ikhwanis packed in army vehicles patrolling Anantnag’s 
streets. Reports of raids in surrounding villages were coming in. They rounded up, killed, and 
burnt the houses of Jama’at members. Public talk had been poisoned by mistrust and threats for 
long, yet within intimate circles people still spoke to each other. Tehreek politics, for instance, 
had from the beginning been everybody’s business, at least in the early years—in homes and 
storefronts, or around the bakers’ ovens, common people would regularly discuss resistance 
politics and tactics, which would annoy the government and irritate even some of its opponents. 
However, in the aftermath of the rise of the Ikhwan, a dark silence fell over the town. People in 
Anantnag would not mention attacks on the Jama’at and the Hizb. It was a stolid stance, if not an 
approval. But some would justify Ikhwani attacks by claiming that the Jama’atis had used the 
Hizb to settle personal scores in their localities, and that it was their own violence that had come 
back to haunt them. Senior Jama’at members, it was claimed, would hold shari’at courts where 
summary justice was issued to people. In this, it was claimed, the Hizb had acted as the executors 




While the town was under Ikhwanis, the countryside came to be split between villages 
controlled by the Ikhwan and those under Hizb influence. Hundreds died from both sides during 
skirmishes along these unprecedented new “borders.” People from one village became suspects 
in another. These borders interrupted previous forms of interdependence and exchange in the 
countryside. Most precarious were those who had kinship relations in villages under opposing 
sides. In this fight, eventually, the Hizb lost its former power, as many Jama’at families, which 
had acted as the Hizb’s support base, escaped to Srinagar. As their primary targets thinned, 
Ikhwanis had little raison d'être left, so they turned against even those who had quiescently 
accepted their presence. Anyone who questioned their authority in the town became a target. 
While public discourse was muted, stories of women’s abductions, torture, and people being 
forced to pay money circulated quietly.  
With power had come a transformation in the Ikhwani self-presentation, and it sharply 
diverged from their previous “mujahid (militant) looks” that had emphasized an ascetic 
appearance. Many had noticed the change in the way Ikhwanis had begun to dress and walk, and 
to the youths of my age it was especially hard to miss. The traditional militant outfits, consisting 
of the loose fitting shalwar-kameezs were replaced by jeans, lengthy beards were shaved off, or 
styled in the way the Indian military prescribes for some of its troops. It was a symbolic 
inversion of the militant ideals of “piety.” Not only did they suddenly begin to carry shiny new 
weapons, but they also acquired shiny new cars to carry them in. To spite the residents, the 
Ikhwanis had said they were going to rename Anantnag “Ramnagri” (a Hindu name, “City of 
Ram”). The town’s residents fondly called and remembered their town as “Islamabad,” after an 
18th century governor of Kashmir under Afghan rule, Islam Khan, who had, as the legend goes, 




billboards with “Islamabad” written on them, for they thought the name had a religious 
significance. If a soldier asked you, “Where are you from?” and you accidentally answered, 
“Islamabad” instead of “Anantnag,” it would result in a thrashing. People, who had gradually 
become used to “Anantnag,” a Sanskrit name the Dogra rulers in the late 19th century had given 
to the town, feared this second possible change of name.   
The Ikhwanis established camps in three separate places in their “Ramnagri,” all three in 
large abandoned Hindu Pandit houses. The one in Kadipora was closest to my school, and would 
reek of blood and liquor. The school principal and teachers would often have a hard time keeping 
Ikhwanis out of the school premises. All three Ikhwani camps became fearful spaces, the vicinity 
of which was best avoided. Apart from the systematic torture and harassment, Ikhwani violence 
had taken on a berserk character. Mundane incidents would turn ugly. In one incident, an entire 
team of cricketers and the two umpires were roughed up in the town’s stadium, when a member 
of the opposing team, with connections to the Ikhwan, claimed that he was falsely given an out. 
It is the bloodiest cricket match I have ever watched.  
With much cash available, Ikhwanis started building and occupying properties in the 
town. Many vacated Pandit properties were occupied and some were bought at “distress” prices. 
One prominent Ikhwani built “shopping complexes” on public land. First, he built an ugly 
structure in the middle of a bus stand. Then he built another in front of the district court, 
apparently as an open challenge to the judges inside who had dared issue a “stay order” on his 
previous illegal structure. Another top Ikhwani joined pro-India politics. He had a large house 
built for himself in a posh residential area generally reserved for senior government bureaucrats. 
He started his own political party to contest elections in 1996, and which until a few years back 




For many, the trauma of Ikhwani violence became almost something one could not 
mourn. As a crisis of the Kashmiri self-identity, there were no easy dichotomies left to process 
the losses, no language of “sacrifice” or “martyrdom” to deal with death. Yet, as one 
acquaintance from those times said, “‘Our own people,’ is nonsense! Once they defected, they 
were no longer our own.” I thought about this phrase “Our own people.” Ikhwan in Arabic means 
“brotherhood.” In Anantnag, the “brothers” wreaked havoc. The brutal irony of the brotherhood 
is probably illustrated by the case of the three brothers from the town, which my old 
acquaintance recalled, “The eldest one was a popular JKLF commander, released after sixteen 
years in prison, and then shot dead by Ikhwanis a month later. His younger brother was burnt 
alive by the army camping on the hill. And, the youngest brother, seeing all this, became a 
vicious Ikhwani... ‘Our own people’ is nonsense!” It is fissures like these that made it hard to 
maintain a coherent political or social position on critical issues in everyday conversations. The 
result was silence and generalized violence.  
When I met ex-Ikhwanis in 2015, this past hovered around my inquiries. It was hard to 
firmly establish if I had suffered takleef from Ikhwanis. Not directly, I thought. Yet, in some 
ways, everyone had, one way or the other—and from all the combatants, state and non-state. 
Nevertheless, in stating my memories to Riyaz and Shabbir upfront, we moved to have a 
dialogue over the nature of events and the meaning of actions, rather than reproduce a litany of 
grievances, accusations, and counter-accusations. 
Political projects, maslaq, and violence: Shabbir and his village 
I drove slowly on the narrow, snow-covered road towards Shadepoor, remembering the 
fear the name of this village used to evoke in the post-1994 era. Although it was only one among 




significant because it had been the home as well as the “headquarters” of one of Ikhwan’s main 
commanders, a man who, when he was alive, was considered by the Indian security agencies as 
the “pillar” of their counterinsurgency campaign. Growing up in Anantnag, a large town only a 
few miles from the village, Shadepoor had loomed large in our imagination. For years, stories 
had circulated about locals, mostly Tehreek activists, being picked up and taken to the village, 
never to return. Passersby preferred long detours and circumventing Shadepoor rather than 
passing through it. Strangers who passed were harassed or physically assaulted, and often ended 
up paying a “toll tax,” which was part of a series of extortion mechanisms deployed by the 
Ikhwanis. There were also reports of Ikhwanis regularly raiding those villages that had a 
significant number of Jama’at families to “confiscate” cash and valuables that they believed 
could “aid the insurgents.” Not only did the Ikhwani discourse and practices mimic the state’s 
functions and the counterinsurgency discourse, but these practices also appeared to be 
overlooked by the state. I had also heard, during those early years, about Hizb militants 
launching counterattacks on villages like Shadepoor. Both sides lost cadres, producing a violent 
deadlock that ground them down.  
That was almost twenty years ago. A lot has changed since then. In 2015, the Hizb had no 
more than a few dozen active combatants in small pockets across Kashmir, and the Ikhwan had 
disbanded after its leader Nabi Mir’s assassination in 2002. Not many Ikhwanis survived; those 
who did either joined the Indian military formally or found themselves jobless. Meanwhile, three 
years of sustained pro-independence popular protests swept across Kashmir, from 2008 to 2010, 
re-igniting Tehreek.25 These protests not only signaled the beginning of a new, non-armed phase 
                                                 
25 These protests had started in 2008 over a land dispute, and quickly led to months of protests and curfew. The next 
year, two women were found dead, with signs of sexual assault, near a military camp, which again provoked a series 
of protests and clampdowns. Then in 2010, for months Kashmir witnessed massive protests and stone-pelting duels 




of the self-determination movement, but also emboldened a few of those subdued by the Ikhwan 
for years to question its surviving members, and socially mark them as “renegades.” In this new 
phase, Shadepoor again became synonymous with “betrayal” and with fraternal violence. 
Despite all this, however, much has remained the same. A canopy of bare branches of walnut and 
willow trees covered the road, its pot-holes barely hidden by the ice formed in them. While new 
metaled roads had come up in Kashmiri villages in recent years, as part of government schemes 
to build roads and generate “rural employment,”26 it seems Shadepoor had not received much 
attention—which surprised me, given the crucial role it had once played on the government side.  
I parked near a community water pump at the entrance to the village. The women talking 
animatedly with each other while waiting in line to fill their copper vessels with water grew 
silent and closely watched my moves. A few older men in the distance glanced toward me, looks 
that lasted longer than usual. A young man came over and asked me who I had come to meet. He 
spoke in broken Urdu, probably gathering from my clothes that I was not a Kashmiri. I didn’t say 
who I had come to meet, but smiled and greeted him in Kashmiri, mostly to avoid answering his 
question. But he quickly replied that he had mistaken me for a journalist. I asked him if he was 
expecting a journalist to visit, to which he shook his head and said, “Many have come, so I 
thought you might be one too.” Asking such direct questions from strangers, like who one was 
meeting or where one was going, is not unusual in Kashmiri villages, where traditionally few 
secrets are kept and anyone’s business is everyone’s business. But I noticed that he had 
proceeded to pat my backpack, in an awkward mix of returning my greeting and feeling its 
contents.  
                                                 
26 In 2014-15, during my fieldwork, I came across many villages where government schemes, like the road building 
scheme in villages called Prime Minister’s Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) and the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), were being talked about, mostly in terms of a promise of “development,” and in a few 




Shabbir, the man I had come to meet, tells me that his neighbors were apprehensive that 
the village might still face reprisals. “Outsiders see the village as a mukhbir gaam (village of 
informers),” he says. Hizb’s attacks had in fact stopped in 2002, after the assassination of their 
bete noir Nabi Mir, who had led Ikhwan for eight years. When he died, Ikhwan melted away and 
the villagers felt a bit relieved, despite their “tainted image.” The Shadepoor villagers’ unsettling 
curiosity about my presence was a result of an instinctive scrutinizing of strangers coming into 
the village as either possible Hizb attackers or Indian journalists—and, like Hizb militants, the 
journalists had also lost their interest in the village after 2002. While this mode of scrutiny 
during my subsequent visits gradually came to a stop, I chose to meet Shabbir outside the village. 
Shabbir blames the reputation of Shadepoor on himself and his fellow Ikhwanis. As a result, he 
had been trying hard to earn his keep in the village. “They dislike me,” he says, “but they tolerate 
me because I go to the mosque five times a day, and try to help with odd jobs in the village.”  
Shabbir had joined MM in 1995, because, as he describes it, local Hizb and Jamaat 
activists frequently harassed him and his friends. He says there was no particular reason why 
they did it, but agrees it may have been because they felt “offended by the way we moved around 
with masti (boyish nonchalance).” However, he also says he joined because “Picking up gun was 
a nashsheh (addiction).” This addiction does not have a negative connotation for Shabbir; it 
suggests the lure of weapons and the power it brought.27 He became a close associate of a top 
commander, who he thinks was “good initially” and was even “welcomed” by the villagers, but 
“then he started doing bad things.” Shabbir says the commander got Jama’atis of his own village 
killed, which most villagers did not like. Shabbir was often ordered to round up Jama’atis from 
the villages around Shadepoor. He followed the orders up until 1997, but then he “couldn’t bear 
                                                 
27 Saiba Varma (2016) in her study of Drug De-addiction Center in Kashmir, which is run by Kashmir police, has given another 




watching people being shot like that.” He switched to a different commander, and then, in 1999, 
formed a “Special Task Force” with the police, and relocated to a different village. Part of the 
reason Shabbir left Ikhwan was that he did not see any reason to continue the civil war with the 
Hizb. “We were tired,” he tells me, “We didn’t know how long we had to fear them and they had 
to fear us.” Had the violence become “banal” in the sense that carrying out violence had become 
normalized and no longer required an intention?28 Why was there such an ease with which 
violence was carried on, I ask him. Shabbir ponders over the question for a while, and then says: 
“The fight was really about maslaq, which is why we had to kill the Jama’atis.”  
In Islam, maslaq is a school of jurisprudence. There are four well-known ones: Hanafi, 
Shafi, Maliki, and Hanbali, all named after prominent medieval Islamic jurists. Most Kashmiri 
Muslims are Hanafis, which certain Islamic preachers see as more tolerant toward heterodox 
practices. Jama’at-i-Islami, however, is not easy to categorize in any of these, as it is more of a 
political rather than a religious organization. Yet, Jama’at activists regard heterodox practices, 
like supplication in shrines, as bidah, or “religious innovations,” which must be discarded in 
favor of an orthodox interpretation based in shari’ah. Despite these injunctions, heterodox 
practices had remained common in Kashmir. More importantly, however, such religious ideas 
often translated into certain kinds of political projects. Shabbir sees an emphasis on orthodoxy as 
connected with Jama’at de-emphasizing a “Kashmiri identity” in favor of a “Pakistani one.” 
Shabbir tells me that MM had started off as an internal rebellion in the Hizb precisely over the 
question of “total azadi (independence)” versus “merger with Pakistan” as the political goal of 
Tehreek, yet maslaq was at the center of it. “People used to say that MM (and then Ikhwan) was 
                                                 
28 Discussing Hannah Arendt’s notion of “banality of evil” in Eichmann in Jerusalem, Judith Butler argues that 
Arendt did not see the crime committed as banal (in Eichmann’s case, it was “exceptional”), but committing crime 




the ‘Army of the Dastgeer’ or the ‘Army of the Hazrat Sultan.’” Dastgeer and Hazrat Sultan are 
the titles given to an eleventh century Iraqi jurist and Sufi practitioner called Abdul Qadir al-
Jilani, in whose name a popular shrine exists in the heart of Srinagar city. He was also the 
founder of a Sufi order called Qadriya, which has a large following in Kashmir. Abdul Qadir 
never visited Kashmir, but his two-hundred-year old shrine has been a center of religious and 
political activity among Kashmiri Muslims. Many Kashmiris see Sufi orders, like Qadariya, and 
the local Rishi traditions, like the one founded by Sheikh Nooruddin, as the “foundations of 
Kashmiri Muslim identity.”  
Questions over maslaq and over religious practice, and subliminally the political projects 
assumed to go with these questions, had not remained confined to public debates, but in the 
context of the Hizb-Ikhwan (MM) civil war had acquired a tangible power of violence. 
According to Shabbir, Jama’atis were of two kinds: the “moderate ones” and the “kattar (deeply 
ideological) ones.” The latter, if caught, were not spared, but the “moderate ones” would be 
given a “choice:” If they could invoke the name of a Sufi shrine or sing a “Dastgeeri manqabat” 
(a devotional poem in praise of the Dastgeer), then they would be let go with just a beating or 
after they had paid a “bond.” The kattar ones met a terrible fate. He says people initially 
appreciated that the Ikhwan was “defending” this “Kashmiri tradition,” but “later they didn’t 
accept that so much violence was required for such a defense.” 
  In Shabbir’s accounts about identity and tradition, however, several memories emerged 
in which violence had not taken place, and which he often wanted to talk more about than 
incidences of violence. Shabbir was certain that Ikhwan’s aetiqād (belief in the power of Sufi 




enthusiastically narrated were those that hinted at the lack of appetite for violence. Here is an 
incident he narrates about his aetiqad:  
I was leading eight of my men in W village. It was winter, and we had been going each day house 
to house to get firewood from people. One day, an old woman engaged me in a conversation, and 
suddenly, behind my back, several Afghans appeared. They cocked their weapons ready to shoot. 
The woman pleaded with them not to kill me but give me a sound thrashing for stealing her 
firewood. As I looked around, my men had scampered off. I also made a desperate dash for my 
life. The Afghans were running after me and shooting wildly. I jumped into a pond, but it turned 
out to be a mud pond, and I got stuck in the freezing mud. They surrounded me and asked me if I 
was a commander. A few local Hizb men were also with them. I was scared, but I didn’t call for 
anyone, except Dastgeer—not Khuda (God), not family, not my men. I said, “My Dastgeer, if 
they slaughter me in this mud-pond, it will bring shame to your name.” [Dastgeer means “One 
who holds one’s hand in tough times”]. Then I lost consciousness momentarily and found myself 
out on dry ground, as if angels had lifted me out of the pond. Then I told the Afghans, “You and 
your Pakistan cannot kill me anymore.” I ran and commandeered a car passing on the road 
nearby. I returned to W village later with dozens of our men, but the Hizb people had departed. 
Because he is an aetiqadi, Shabbir believes the hidden help from Dastgeer had saved his life. Did 
the Hizb activists let him go and he was ashamed to tell that to his colleagues? If he had been let 
go, it would also have made him suspicious among other Ikhwanis. He insists the Hizb militants 
did not let him go, and says it was all Dastgeer’s work. While he acknowledges that they should 
not have been stealing people’s firewood, he sees the incident as “Dastgeer’s āzmaeish (test)”: 
“Will I stand firm in my faith at my worst time?” Yet occasionally Shabbir would also talk about 
how he had let go a young woman, who was a Hizb “OGW” (over-ground worker), after he 




fondly, had let his men go, he recounts. He also says one of his Ikhwani commanders had 
allowed a Jama’at activist who had fled from her village to return “if she gave up her activities.” 
Such incidents had increasingly taken place toward the time he was about to break from 
Ikhwan’s commanders. These narratives show constant calibrations of exchanges of violence, 
even while the fire of maslaq and political projects kept the parties fighting.            
Shabbir and his colleagues were each paid fifteen hundred rupees a month (about USD 30 
by late 1990s exchange rates). But for killing Hizb activists or capturing weapons, they would 
get bonuses of ten- or twenty thousand rupees (USD 200 or 400). “Army gave some supplies, 
like house provisions,” Shabbir says, “but that is all.” Often, then, his men were “forced to loot.” 
Questions of economic difficulties, however hard to avoid, kept returning. But in them I detected 
Shabbir’s disappointment with the political choices he had made. “Our commanders were useful 
to the government,” he tells me, “because, unlike the army, they knew very well who fed the 
militants, who gave them shelter, who supported them.” These Ikhwan commanders had 
themselves at some point in the past been fed, sheltered and supported by those same people. To 
defeat the Hizb was to first defeat its support base, and with their intimate knowledge, the 
Ikhwanis had achieved what had eluded the large Indian counterinsurgency forces.  
Yet, once the Hizb was weakened and the Jama’at pushed out from the countryside, 
Ikhwanis were no longer necessary. “All our surviving boys are dar-be-dar (jobless, idle, 
hopeless)” says Shabbir, “They all regret what they have done.” The government would call on 
them “only at the time of elections to threaten election boycott wallahs,” which also became an 
unpredictable source of money over the years for Shabbir. “I used to make some money around 
the election time,” says Shabbir, “but not anymore.” His niece sometimes shows him YouTube 




Have you seen those thin birds cleaning the crocodile’s teeth? They show it on the YouTube. 
Think of us like that. Army was still killing in large numbers. We just picked up small pieces, but 
made them look clean.  
That the government had discarded them had caused bitterness, but the real pain was 
caused by how Ikhwani lives had become permanently marked, even after they had left the 
militia. As Shabbir describes it, no one was willing to give their daughter in marriage to him. 
Then, after four years as an Ikhwani and six years working for the Special Task Force, Shabbir’s 
mother finally found him a girl to marry. The girl’s parents had put “dropping the gun” as a pre-
condition for Shabbir. He did that in 2005. His problems, however, had not stopped, even though 
he had taken a great risk by giving up his unit’s protection. It took immense effort, and finally 
the military’s help, to leave his village and bring his bride home:  
My wife’s village had to be fully cordoned. A military commander I knew agreed to deploy a 
company-strength force until the ceremony was over. None of the villagers came to the bride’s 
home for lunch, to which they had been invited. My in-laws were also upset that I had brought the 
army.    
Torture, madness and aetiqad: Riyaz’s turn 
I met Riyaz in Anantnag. He works intermittently as a day laborer and has a meager, 
irregular income. He had just sold off his auto-rickshaw, which he had bought from selling a 
piece of ancestral land around the time he stopped working with the Ikhwan. Among all the ex-
Ikhwanis I had met, Riyaz had been unusually eager to talk. While others often had a life 
trajectory similar to Shabbir’s, Riyaz had come to Ikhwan quite late and then through a curious 
path. What also intrigued me about Riyaz was his ability to tell stories that had apparently gotten 




told me about himself over the series of our interviews and meetings may have been made-up. I 
had often heard ex-Ikhwanis personalize elements of the larger stories circulating among them, 
as if each of them had taken part in all the events connected with the Ikhwan. Yet, certain key 
elements of Riyaz’s account remained consistent. I was also as interested in the facts of his life 
as I was in how he made sense of his life with the Ikhwan.  
Unlike Shabbir, Riyaz’s life began with Tehreek. At sixteen, in 1993, he crossed into 
Azad Kashmir to get arms training. He had been sent across by the Hizb, because of his “own 
shoakh (desire),” but once there he found another group more inviting. This group was called the 
Harkat-ul-Ansar, a pan-Islamist group, which had not been directly under the influence of the 
Pakistani government, unlike the Hizb. Riyaz tells me, “There was no respect in Pakistan for 
Kashmiris. Hizb was also disrespectful toward us. Pakistan had kept Kashmiri migrants in 
backward conditions in the camps.” “Harkat,” according to Riyaz, “supported independence and 
not Pakistan.”29 He returned to Kashmir in 1996, but after only a year he was arrested by the 
Indian military. Riyaz spent the next six months in a Joint Interrogation Center (JIC), after which 
he was given a light sentence of one year in jail. JICs are known among Kashmiris as “torture 
centers,” but Riyaz says he faced no torture. “A good officer, whose trust I had earned, saved 
me,” he says, and adds “They gave fabulous rice, special chai, four times chai, two big plates of 
rice!” The man who had spent four years in the wilderness of the militant training camps and as a 
guerilla fighter, had suddenly found himself a full year-and-a-half of eating and rethinking.  
When Riyaz was released, he tells me, the bus carrying him met with an accident, which 
broke his arm. He finally reached home and waited for his former Harkat comrades to show up. 
                                                 
29 In fact, Harkat’s view of independence was quite different from that of the JKLF. Harkat had a panIslamic agenda, 
and did not believe in Pakistani nationalism (which the Hizb and the Jama’at did), but neither did they believe in 
Kashmiri nationalism, unlike the JKLF. Harkat’s idea of independence was the “liberation of all Islamic lands,” and 




They arrived a month later and asked him to return to “the field.” But Riyaz told them that his 
arm was broken and he needed a surgery. They gave him a month and some money. In between, 
Riyaz, who no longer wanted to be a militant, found support in his family. “Before I was 
arrested,” he says, “the military would come and take my three brothers for interrogation and 
spill all our stored grains.” His family feared the same would happen again, if he joined the 
Harkat. “My mother would cry and say, ‘Save yourself; Go with the Ikhwan; Don’t go with the 
Harkat.’ She was scared.” The good officer, the broken arm, and the mother’s words were all 
components of “the story” that Riyaz needed—or had constructed—to cross over into becoming 
an Ikhwani. It had also helped that Harkat was more lenient toward surrendered militants than 
the Hizb.  
That was in 1999, almost at the end of the Ikhwan-Hizb civil war. Hizb had recouped 
some of its strength and was taking out major Ikhwani commanders. Riyaz first joined a rural 
MM commander named “Pinn Jinn,” but the latter didn’t last long. In 2002, Riyaz and his 
colleagues then turned to the urban Ikhwanis, who were only too glad to accept them. As Ikhwan 
was beginning to wind down across Kashmir, and not many were joining the militia anymore, 
Riyaz had entered the most violent phase of his life. His resentment toward the Hizb and the 
Jama’atis was more palpable than Shabbir’s, even though, unlike Shabbir, he had no personal 
reason for that resentment (except perhaps the “disrespect” he had felt in Azad Kashmir).  
“Jama’atis,” according to Riyaz, “had poisoned everything.” He asks me rhetorically, 
“Before 1989, we were azad (free) to pray nimaz (Islamic prayer). Did anyone stop us? By 
fighting with India, haven’t we put an axe to our own feet?” Riyaz talks about several shrines 
that the military had given funds to renovate. It was probably true; I had also noted billboards of 




To Riyaz, then, Jama’atis were the main culprits. “Just being Jama’ati was enough crime,” he 
asserts, and in a third person voice, adds, “As soon as they found a Jama’ati, he would be hung 
by the bridge in the evening.” While his initial disagreement had been over the question of 
independence versus a merger with Pakistan, under Ikhwan he had even started questioning the 
logic behind the need for independence. At a different point, Riyaz had also suggested that the 
“traitor” label for Ikhwan was unfair: “Jama’atis are the ones who betrayed Tehreek. We hurt the 
movement only later. And if we hurt the movement one rupee, they harmed it at least eight 
anna.” (One rupee is sixteen annas in old currency system).   
Unlike Shabbir, Riyaz seemed keen to talk about “torture.” His casualness toward 
“torture” was apparent in the way he spoke about it. He tells me the story of a young woman, 
girlfriend of his former commander Jinn, who had informed the Hizb and gotten Jinn and his 
several Ikhwani associates killed. “After torture-worture, we came to know it was she who had 
tipped off the Hizb,” he says. He speaks about his “favorite techniques”— “Power-touch” 
(electric shocks passed through wet bodies), “Aab parade” (waterboarding with water mixed 
with chili powder) and “Awezaan” (hanging naked by the feet). He adds, however, that he had 
learnt these techniques in the Pakistani training camps, but got to use them working for India. 
Riyaz’s experience with the Harkat had made him appreciate the Ikhwan life. “Militancy 
was jail, Ikhwan was freedom,” he says, “In Harkat, life was short and strict; everyone was just 
waiting to die, to become a shaheed (martyr). There was lots of money, but you neither spent it, 
nor felt like spending.” Additionally, there were no women. “You couldn’t even look at women,” 
he says, “If a woman complained against you, the Harkat commander would just shoot you right 
there.” Under Ikhwan, things became dramatically different. “You could spend money,” he says, 




picking Jama’atis, confiscating their properties.” He mentions doing “drugs” and taking 
“sharaab (liquor),” but quickly adds, as if anticipating my next question, “The army never gave 
it to us. We just found it.”  
Despite Riyaz’s appreciation for Ikhwan’s easy life, I noticed that he described his 
commanders in the Harkat with more reverence than his Ikhwan commanders, and had a more 
vivid memory of his Harkat associates than his Ikhwani ones. He described his Harkat 
commander Javaid Dabrin’s death in an explosion as guzreov (passing away) and as shahadat 
(martyrdom), but the death of Nabi Mir and Pinn Jinn as moodh (died or killed), which is 
considered a disrespectful way of describing someone’s death. He was also unable to hide his 
contempt for his Ikhwan commander “Uncle S,” who after torturing the woman involved in the 
Jinn case, offered her to marry him “to save her life.” He laughs, “With Pinn Jinn out of the way, 
Uncle S got the woman, and the game was over!” Riyaz is particularly bitter that the senior 
Ikhwan commanders who survived had joined Indian political parties, contested elections, and 
made big money, while those like him were cast out. In contrast, Riyaz fondly recalled his 
Harkat comrades who had been killed by the military. He spoke about their “courage” and 
“piety.” A Harkat comrade had even donated blood to Riyaz’s mother, who had needed blood 
infusion during a surgery when Riyaz was not available. Despite these memories of his earlier 
comrades, Riyaz had chosen to avoid them, as he says, to save his family.     
Hizb, Riyaz tells me, had also fought with the Harkat, and which had pushed his 
commander Dabrin to come closer to Nabi Mir. “Although, we were on the opposite sides of the 
fight,” says Riyaz, “before my arrest I would often spend time in Nabi Mir’s village.”30 That was 
also the reason perhaps why the Harkat had not questioned his family when Riyaz joined the 
                                                 
30 It turns out Javaid Dabrin and Nabi Mir had been high school mates, and had continued their contacts even after 




Ikhwan. Working with Ikhwan, Riyaz had rather quickly acquired a faith in shrines. This new 
development would become crucial as well as traumatic for him in the time to come. Harkat’s 
religious outlook had been even more puritan than the Hizb’s, but people would say Harkat was 
less interventionist than the Hizb in the society’s everyday life, including on the question of 
maslaq. In 2006, Riyaz found a woman to marry. He had applied for a job in the army, but 
returned disappointed. He sold his land to buy an autorickshaw that he drove around to make 
ends meet. He had distributed posters in the town’s mosques asking for forgiveness from the 
community. His maefi-nameh (apology letter), he says, was also published as a local 
advertisement. “I wrote: If you walk with a saint, you become a saint; if you walk with a bandit 
you become a bandit.” He had publicly hinted at his affirmation of faith in shrines, but also 
recognized that the Ikhwan had been a wrong company to keep.  
To atone for his wrongs, Riyaz received a wazifa, a Muslim prayer practice performed 
with an intent to acquire Allah’s help in a personal worldly pursuit. “Wazifa,” Riyaz tells me, “is 
a vulnerable time. If anything goes wrong one can become possessed, or even grow mad.” And, 
this is precisely what happened to Riyaz. He couldn’t finish the wazifa and became possessed by 
“five jinns.” “I became mad, and would beat up my wife,” Riyaz says, “I broke up things at 
home, and even broke my mother’s arm.” Then his family made offerings at the Reshmoal Saeb 
shrine, and a Pir (a mystic, faith healer) gave him a ta’wiz (an amulet). Riyaz gradually grew 
better. “Now jinns run from me. Because I have dokh (spiritual backing).” Riyaz’s life had come 
full circle, and the transition from being a Harkat guerilla to an Ikhwani counterinsurgent, had 
been complemented by a transition from a puritan to an aetiqadi.   
Both Shabbir and Riyaz see their “turn” a result of unavoidable circumstances (Shabbir’s 




though they had made the choice of adopting militant/militia lives based on their own shoakh 
(“desire”) or nasheh (“addiction”). Once they became Ikhwanis, however, they had accepted the 
dichotomy of tradition (“aetiqadi”) and orthodoxy (“kattar”), which had then become the 
ideological justification for gruesome violence. They had not only come to construct themselves 
as the defenders of what they saw as “Kashmiri tradition,” but based on their experiences also as 
its personal bearers/agents.  
Both Shabbir and Riyaz acknowledge the harm they have done, but they put the blame 
for the background circumstances and violence singularly on the Jama’at-i-Islami, even though 
Jama’at had really played significantly smaller roles in their personal lives. Yet, while the 
ideology of tradition/orthodoxy provides a justification in their eyes for their violence against the 
Jama’at, they are discomfited by the idea that they had joined the Indian government. If they 
could have taken on the Hizb on their own, ex-Ikhwanis assert, they would not have joined the 
government. (But then again, Riyaz had gradually come to accept the “pro-India position” on 
Kashmir). Were they “pawns” in the hands of the government, as Tehreek activists assert, or did 
they tactically use the government’s help for self-preservation? It is an unresolvable dilemma 
that for the surviving ex-Ikhwanis remains central to their present and about which they are 
constantly reminded by others around them. Shabbir’s and Riyaz’s lives have passed through 
phases of violent antagonisms, and their efforts at leaving their past behind have been painful 
and ultimately unsuccessful, for they continue to remain socially shunned.       
Conclusion: The split subjects of occupation 
In Mirza Waheed’s novel “The Collaborator” (2011), the narrator, an unnamed young 
Kashmiri man, is working for a foul-mouthed Indian military officer, Captain Kadian. Living in 




possessions from the bodies of dead militants or civilians, who find themselves in the crosshairs 
of the Indian military ambushes, and whose bodies lie strewn across the wooded mountains. The 
narrator, whose four village friends have suddenly disappeared, perhaps to join the militants, sees 
his job under the captain as an “accountant of the dead.” The novel is centered on edgy dialogues 
and agonizing meetings between the narrator and the captain, whom the narrator realizes is 
“twisted” with a penchant for piling up dead mangled bodies. The narrator is morally troubled, 
and contemplates killing Captain Kadian. He is a reluctant collaborator, who seeks redemption. 
While the novel explores in intimate detail the personal traumas of “collaboration,” it also 
captures a publicly shared concern in Kashmir about the dilemmas presented by Kashmiris 
working for the state. If the state sees Kashmiris as “seditious” for demanding the right to self-
determination or “treasonous” for sheltering Tehreek activists, Tehreek discourse also sees 
Kashmiris working for the state as “collaborators.” Like other such situations, however, the 
internal complexities get easily papered over. 
During my conversations with Tehreek activists, I had often heard the assertion that the 
Ikhwan was merely a “state creation,” or that Ikhwanis were simply instruments of the state. 
Shabbir’s and Riyaz’s accounts, however, suggest that such an assertion is only partly correct, 
and, I would argue, reveal the inability of Tehreek activists to account for ideological differences 
within the movement. The state certainly facilitated and provided logistical support for Ikhwan’s 
creation, but the internal split within Tehreek itself, especially on the questions of respect for 
local traditions and the goals of the movement, played a major role. Indeed, the state marshaled 
the potent symbols of identity (respect for shrines) to fuel less ideological, localized power 
battles into an effective counter-insurgency tool. It used narratives of identity, especially 




imagery of the “docile Kashmiri,” as a tool of violence and betrayal. But, on other hand, there 
were also groups like Jama’at-i-Islami trying to enforce an Islamic solidarity and an erasure of 
theological ambiguity, and who, as a result, found themselves faced with deadly fellow Muslims, 
and an irreconcilable contradiction within its conception of nationalism (Pakistani versus 
Kashmiri). It is important to remember that the debates over “identity” had been an ongoing 
phenomenon in Kashmir, but they turned violent in a space where the state’s hegemony was 
destabilized. This destabilization allowed the possibility for a consolidation of alternative sources 
of sociopolitical power. Violence (including state violence) went hand in hand in forcibly 
establishing narratives of identity – the state, the Ikhwanis and the Hizb (and Jama’at) all used 
violence to set the terms of the identitarian discourse. These identitarian discourses became lethal 
precisely because of their ideological inflection by the pro-Indian and the pro-Pakistani political 
projects. 
Ikhwanis were not mere cogs in the counterinsurgency machine—at least, not initially—
but were conscious of the choices they had made or were making. In recounting their militia 
lives, Shabbir and Riyaz uncover how their acts as Ikhwanis became charged with ideological 
conflicts. For some, the consciousness of these conflicts had been the key reason for “turning,” 
for others this consciousness developed gradually. Ikhwan had come to construct its enemies as 
“anti-tradition” and as “anti-Kashmir,” and itself as “a defender of Kashmir’s aetiqaad (belief in 
the power of shrines).” (Albeit with so much violence, this façade was hard to maintain). Yet, if 
initially the violence was inflicted as ideologically charged retribution, later it became 
increasingly banal and arbitrary. While it was clear Ikhwan had come to detest the idea of 
“merger with Pakistan” (a transformation from its pro-Pakistan IuM days), its new stance on 




with India” as a political solution, which Ikhwan leaders came to support, remained limited to 
vague notions, like “Kashmiris have freedom to pray,” as Riyaz would describe it. Toward its 
end, Ikhwan really represented no traditional political stance in Kashmir (pro-Pakistan, pro-
Azadi, or even pro-India). With its “enemies” subdued, it just devolved into becoming an 
auxiliary of the counterinsurgency machine, and as such it couldn’t even maintain its usefulness 
to the Indian state as a spoilsport in Tehreek discourse, except at the time of elections.   
In a broader sense, the civil war that Ikhwan was a part of was not so much a clash of 
subjectivities—between traditional heterodoxy and puritan orthodoxy, or religious and 
regional—as much as a split within the Kashmiri political subjectivity itself. What was publicly 
believed in 1990 to be a “short journey to azadi,” had by mid-1990s become a stalemate, which 
began to cause public fatigue. Many had become weary of Hizb’s domination campaign. As 
several Kashmiris, who had witnessed that time in the mid-1990s described it: “People were 
feeling spent,” and that is why there was “less shock expressed at Ikhwan’s turn.” From the 
height of the revolutionary emotional upsurge in 1989-90, some had begun to question the 
efficacy of the armed movement, and others even felt azadi was ultimately unachievable. In 
many ways, the counterinsurgency, aided by the internal fighting among Tehreek groups, had 
succeeded in consolidating the seeds of political doubt. Kashmiris, who had seen the events of 
1989-90 as emancipatory—as a return of the Kashmiri masses as historical-political subjects—
were now unsure of future political possibilities.  
On the phenomenon of late-colonial occupation, Mbembe writes, “Sovereignty meant 
occupation, and occupation meant relegating the colonized into a third zone between subjecthood 
and objecthood” (2003, 16). Kashmiris had precisely come to occupy this “third zone” between 




projects. In this, Riyaz and Shabbir were not only the agents of disruption, but had themselves 
become the quintessential split-subjects of occupation. Both appear broken between waiting for 
the promises of recompense for their labor of violence and their fall into madness and a sense of 
emptiness in the absence of a political project.  
What I called the “monstrous new reality” in the beginning, was the result of the 
government’s effort to create an in-between space—a “gray zone” between Tehreek and the 
state—as a response to the crisis of Tehreek politics in Kashmir. Its ground was prepared by the 
occupation, whose core elements were the emergency laws and the extensive militarization of the 
region. This gray zone was to be inhabited by the Ikhwanis and other civilian contractors of 
violence, who together constituted what I have previously called an uncivil society (Chapter 5). 
This term was first used by an ex-Ikhwani operator during an interview with me as a bitter pun 
on the idea of “civil society,” which he had heard his military handlers using to describe him and 
his fellow Ikhwanis.  For me, however, the idea of “uncivil society” has an analytic significance 
as well: it helps to understand the relationship between the occupation, elections, and the 
unaccountable, generalized violence. This understanding can be stated as follows: The 
organizing logic behind uncivil society, as it emerged in Kashmir, rested on creating a new 
“image of democracy” shaped by a new vocabulary of “pacification,” “identity,” and “political 
process” but was managed on the ground through the outsourcing of violence to quasi-state 









Early on November 22, 1868, a body was found in a wooded part around Sulaiman Hill, 
midway between the seat of the Dogra rule in Kashmir and the old districts of Srinagar city. It 
was a young male body with telltale signs of poisoning. In those days, the Dogra maharaja had 
barred the British from staying in Kashmir beyond the summer months, especially after the 
harvesting season, when the revenues were collected. The man had clearly overstayed his 
vacation. This man, however, was no ordinary vacationer; he was Robert Thorpe, a lieutenant in 
the British Army, who had been visiting Kashmir since 1865, and, more importantly, was writing 
scathing reports on the Dogra “misgovernment.” He had become too inquisitive for the Dogras to 
take lightly.  Just a day before his body was found, Thorpe had been tied to a bed and carried 
away by Dogra soldiers on foot to be delivered to the British authorities at the southern border of 
the Kashmir state. The soldiers later reported that Thorpe had managed to give them a slip; but it 
is possible he was never even taken out of Srinagar. His body was buried in the city’s main 
Christian cemetery in Sheikh Bagh on the banks of the River Jhelum. The inscription on the 
grave read: “Robert Thorp, aged 30, who sacrificed his life for Kashmir on 22nd November 
1868.”      
Thorp remained buried for more than a century before Kashmiri Tehreek activists 
brought him back to life. In early 2000s, when Thorp’s book Cashmere Misgovernment was 




was instantly anointed a “martyr.”1 Zahir-ud-Din, a Tehreek history-writer, declared Thorpe to 
be the “first martyr” of Kashmir, while an anonymous columnist described him as “a chronicler 
of Kashmir’s pain.” Thorp’s work was “shining light into the darkness” and his voice was 
“sympathetic” to Kashmiris when none were. Some Tehreek leaders started visiting Thorpe’s 
grave each year on November 22 to lay flower wreaths on it. A Srinagar-based human rights 
advocacy group even instituted a Robert Thorp Award to be given annually to the defenders of 
human rights.  
Yet, there are others who believe Thorp was just an “imperial agent” who had been 
dispatched to destabilize the Dogra government and make a case for the British annexation of the 
princely state. According to the Dogra government, Thorp had not died of poisoning, but of a 
ruptured heart. Intriguingly, the imperial agent’s death had provoked no reaction from the British 
colonial government. In any case, for an odd British critic of the Dogras, there were many other 
British, in much more powerful positions than Thorpe, who defended the Dogras. The mystery of 
his death will probably remain unresolved, but as Tehreek history-writers like to say, what 
matters is what he left behind: a detailed description of the nature of the Dogra state during the 
time he was visiting. 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that in Kashmir, political subjectivity has emerged in contestation with the 
official Indian accounts, and in the post-1990 Kashmir Tehreek history-writers have sought to 
consolidate this subjectivity through an engagement with history. I described Tehreek history-
                                                 
1 Cashmere Misgovernment was first published in 1870 in Britain by Longmans, Green and Company. In 1973, the 
book was included in a volume called Kashmir Papers, which also included books on Kashmir by Arthur 
Brinckman and Sir William Digby. Then in 1980, Gulshan Publishers in Srinagar printed Thorp’s book under the 
title Kashmir Misgovernment, which was reprinted several times in early 2000s. In 2011, Gulshan Publishers 




writers as non-professionalized autodidacts who engage with Kashmir’s past through writing 
practices and an argumentative disposition opposed to the official state positions. They produce 
accounts that counter the state’s official interpretation of historical events, and support the 
Kashmiri right to self-determination. What the chapter sought to show was that if there has been 
a history of dates, dynasties and domination in Kashmir, there is also a popular memory of 
sentiments, people, and resistance, all forming elements of a political subjectivity which Tehreek 
history-writers are invested in both revealing and giving shape. Yet, to fully understand the roots 
of Tehreek in Kashmir, it is crucial to understand the formation and nature of the pre-1947 Dogra 
state and its relationship with its subject population.  
In this chapter, I will outline key aspects of the Dogra state to historicize the Kashmiri 
Muslim identity. I tentatively use the term “Kashmiri-Muslim,” and not simply Kashmiri, as the 
former captures the intertwining of “religious” and “class” difference that has marked this 
identity. Here, religious difference refers to the communal identities of different religious groups 
within the Kashmiri subject population. These communal identities are more political than 
religious; they are based on perceptions of political interests of communities rather than simply 
differences in beliefs or practice. Class difference refers to the differential relationships among 
Kashmiri communal groups, between communal groups and the state, as well as the differential 
economic position the communal groups occupied during the Dogra era. As will become clear, 
“Kashmiri Muslim” is the name around which politics in the region became historically 
organized.2 But this name has always remained an unstable referent in Tehreek politics, which 
                                                 
2 Simon Critchley, citing Gramsci, has argued that the problem of political subjectivity is a question of naming: to be 
able to name a collective of people, and then organize around it. By this he means, that politics involves identifying 
a “determinate particularity in society and then hegemonically constructing that particularity into a generality that 
exerts a universal claim.” This could be “workers,” “the peasant,” “the immigrant,” or “indigenous people” 




seeks self-determination for all the people who were subjects of the state before 1947. At the 
same time, none of the “communal identities” is internally coherent, which implies a politics 
based on such identities is fraught with contradictions, and possibly violence. 
What follows then is a brief account of the formation of the Dogra state and its chequered 
relationship with the Kashmiri Muslim subject population. I argue that the Dogra state, through 
its extractive and repressive practices, created a differential body politic in Kashmir, producing 
communal fault lines based on religious identity which have continued to underpin the politics 
around and in the region. The history of Dogra state practices has remained embedded within 
public memory. Tehreek history-writers invoke this memory to call into question the legitimacy 
of the Dogra ruler’s signing of the Treaty of Accession with India in 1947. I will survey the 
Kashmiri communal identities that may have older roots, but became politicized during the 19th 
and the early 20th centuries. These identities were sharpened under a state which, as historian 
Mridu Rai has argued, became a veritable “Hindu state.” Finally, I will briefly examine the 
political mobilization that gave rise to the events of 1931 and drove Kashmir toward the tragic 
events of 1947.  
While I draw parts of my account from Thorp’s work and those of his contemporaries, it 
is important to reiterate that some of the British writings on Kashmir from the 19th century which 
are critical of the Dogras seem to be modelled on the trope of “oriental despotism.” Romila 
Thapar, a prominent historian of early India, describes Oriental Despotism3 as a mistaken 
“belief” among British historians of the colonial era that “there was no private property in land in 
pre-British India,” and “extraction of a maximum percentage of surplus from village 
communities enabled the despotic ruler to live in considerable luxury.” Accompanying this belief 
                                                 
3 Oriental Despotism as a trope had greatly influenced the G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of history as well 




was the cultural evolutionist notion that such societies were “unchanging” and had nothing to 
contribute to the “rational development of civilization” (Thapar 1979, 4-9). Bernard Cohn 
explaining the trope also describes how the early British colonial officials viewed India as 
“lawless” and ruled “arbitrarily.” They believed that “during his (despot’s) life, his pleasure is 
the law” (Cohn 1996, 62-64). It is true, as Thapar says, that it was the “exigencies of (colonial) 
administration that had impinged on (colonial) historiography” (1979, 5), and it would be unwise 
to uncritically accept colonial writings as an impartial source for writing history. Additionally, as 
Mridu Rai, an important historian of the Dogra-era Kashmir, points out, some British critics of 
the Dogra rule “perpetuated the oppression attributed to (Dogras) by actually using to their 
benefit some of its consequences,” like forcible use of “coolie” labor from Kashmiris (2004, 65-
66). 
Yet, it is would also be a mistake to dismiss the writings of people like Thorpe, who 
seemed to have gone out of their way to write about the life of Kashmiri peasants and artisans 
under a state which clearly displayed elements of “despotism”—even by the standards of its own 
time. This is especially important concerning writings about a time (1846-90 CE) when hardly 
many detailed sources on the life of ordinary Kashmiris are available, and in most cases British 
had rather chosen to ignore the plight of Kashmiris under the Dogras.  In the account below, I 
also draw from official Dogra reports, as well as from emerging new scholarship on the Dogra 
period, to give a broad picture of how the Dogra state must have appeared to its subjects. My 
objective is not give a full account of the Dogra state as such,4 but those of its aspects which later 
provoked a political mobilization against it as well as shaped the Kashmiri Muslim identity.  
                                                 
4 As already mentioned, for a comprehensive account on nature of the Dogra state, see Mridu Rai’s Hindu Rulers, 




The Dogra state 
“Treaty of Amritsar” and the sale of sovereignty 
At the time of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir was a 
princely state ruled by the Dogras, an upper caste Hindu clan from the hills of Jammu province 
south of Kashmir. Most the subject population, however, was Muslim (77 percent), even beyond 
the populous Kashmir valley, where more than half of the total population was concentrated.5 
The founder of the Dogra dynasty, Gulab Singh was a “raja” (feudatory) of the Sikh kingdom 
based in Lahore. The Sikhs had conquered Kashmir from its previous Afghan overlords in 1819. 
During the Anglo-Sikh Wars of the1840s, Gulab Singh decided to switch sides at a critical 
moment in the war. When the Sikhs lost in 1846, the British East India Company,6 through the 
Treaty of Amritsar, allowed Gulab Singh to pay war indemnity on behalf of the defeated Sikhs, 
but in lieu of which he was given control over Kashmir. Some historians, missionaries, and poets 
later described the Treaty of Amritsar as a “sale deed.” Arthur Brinckman, a missionary in 
Kashmir in 1867, appalled by the actions of the British corporation described the Treaty of 
                                                 
5 The Kashmir Constitutional Reform Conference, appointed under the presidency of B. J. Glancy after the events of 
1931 in Kashmir, came with the demographic figures in its 1932 report which showed that across the State there 
were in all 24,02,000 Muslims (77 percent of the total), and 7,00,300 Hindus (22 percent), and a small number of 
Buddhists and Sikhs. In Kashmir province, the Muslims were more than 95 percent of the population, while Hindus 
(mostly Kashmiri Pandits) were about 4 percent. In Jammu region, Muslims were 54 percent, and Hindus were 46 
percent. Here Muslims were much more numerous especially in Mirpur and Reasi, a considerably large minority in 
Jammu and Udhampur districts or wazarats, while Hindus were predominant in the Kathua wazarat. In mountainous 
Frontier Province, which included Ladakh and Gilgit, and was territorially the largest, there were more than 82 
percent Muslims, 17 percent Buddhists, and practically no Hindus. The Buddhists were mostly concentrated in 
Ladakh area, where they constituted 20 percent of the population, while 79 percent were Muslim. Gilgit had 94 
percent Muslim population (Report of the Kashmir Constitutional Reform Conference, 1931). This composition of 
population had remained unchanged till 1947, despite the population growth, and was altered only in Jammu 
province from where Muslims were evicted through ethnic cleansing during the fateful months of September and 
October 1947.      
6 Till 1858, the East India Company was the sovereign power in the subcontinent. The British trading company had 
consolidated their empire in the subcontinent through a century of conquest and annexation, and which was taken 




Amritsar in these words: “We have been called a nation of shopkeepers, the most cruel bargain 
we ever made was selling the souls of men” (2011, 25).7  
As a reward for his role in the war, the indemnity demanded from Gulab Singh was 
halved than what was demanded from the Sikhs, which, reveals that the British had already 
decided that they wanted Gulab Singh to rule the hilly and the mountainous regions in the north 
(Rai 2004, 26). The East India Company, having been squarely defeated by the Afghans a few 
years earlier,8 had realized that while maintaining a permanent military presence on the British 
Indian Empire’s northern flanks was strategically important, especially in the wake of the 
perceived fear of the Russian Empire trying to expand south (“The Great Game”), the costs of 
doing so were too high. It was better to have a friendly military in Kashmir than pay to station 
one’s own, especially for a commercial-military regime like the East India Company whose 
primary goal was to establish “rising sources of profit” through exploitation of raw materials, 
opening access to markets for manufactured goods, and acquiring exclusive or favorable trading 
rights.9 Another strategic aspect of the Treaty was that the British wanted to create, what Rai 
describes as, “a Hindu buffer to prevent a uniting of Muslim interests, Kashmiri with Afghan, in 
the north-western ‘entrance into India’” (2004, 142).  
                                                 
7 Poet Mohammad Iqbal wrote of the Treaty thus: Their fields, their crops, their streams / Even the peasants in the 
vale / They sold, they sold all, alas! / How cheap was the sale (cited in Rai 2004, 19).  
8 Between 1839 and 1842, the British invaded Afghanistan to affect a regime change by replacing the ruler Dost 
Muhammad Khan. Khan was believed to have sought Russian help to reclaim Peshawar from the Sikhs. The British 
invasion turned out to be a terrible mistake for only person from the invading army of more than ten thousand 
returned—to tell the tale of the British defeat.  
9 Bernard Cohn points to the debate in Britain about the precise status of the East India Company, if it was just a 
private company run solely for the profit of its stockholders, or did it have responsibility for the subjects in the 
territories it controlled. By 1785, Cohn states, a principle of “dual citizenship” had been established which allowed 
the Company to “administer its territories in its own name for the profit of its stockholders—but under regulations 




Gulab Singh duly paid “seventy-five lakhs of rupees (Nanukshahee)”10 to the British. 
This was not hard to do, because toward the end of the Anglo-Sikh War he had carried away 
with him the Sikh treasury from Lahore. It was the treasury that, in a historical irony, was filled 
with the wealth extracted from Kashmiris during the previous twenty-seven years of the Sikh 
rule. Gulab Singh was given the title of “Maharaja” and even bestowed with a “Rajput” (kingly) 
lineage.11  
But, as was to become part of the resistance lore in Tehreek narratives later, when Gulab 
Singh sent his troops to takeover Kashmir, they faced resistance and defeat at the hands of 
Kashmir’s Muslim governor Sheikh Imam-ud-din, who had been appointed by the Sikhs. The 
anxious governor probably knew a few things about Gulab Singh, whose infamy as a cruel and 
opportunistic man had reached Kashmir even before his troops had arrived.12 This image of the 
new ruler had only become substantiated with his acts of treachery against the Sikhs. Gulab 
Singh appealed to the British for help in securing his reward, and the British did so by 
threatening Imam-ud-Din with an invasion. Imam-ud-Din gave up, paving way for a hundred 
years of Dogra rule, which, according to Zahir-ud-Din, “remains burnished in the Kashmiri 
collective memory as a catastrophic period of tyranny, exploitation, and repression.” Several 
reports and personal journals from the period, mostly written by Western travelers, clergymen, 
and wives of British officers vacationing in Kashmir, paint a picture of distress and decrepitude, 
                                                 
10 Nanukshahee was the Sikh rupee. The amount Gulab paid was probably equivalent to £6.8 million of the time.  
11 To rule a kingdom in the subcontinent was not anyone’s “divine right,” nor could fear alone command obedience. 
One had to have a kingly lineage to make such a claim, and to be accepted. While Gulab Singh, at the time he 
acquired Kashmir, sponsored histories that could invent his natural aristocracy from antiquity, the British seem to 
have simply bestowed on him a “Rajputness” or kingly lineage (Rai 2004, 66-67).    
12 Writing about Gulab Singh (and the British), twenty years after the Treaty of Amritsar, Thorp had this to say: “For 
purposes entirely selfish, we deliberately sold millions of human beings into the absolute power of one of the 




whose traces, Kashmiri intellectuals believe, continue to infuse the everyday terms of Kashmiri 
language and even the bodily practices of the people. 
No provision for a responsible or a fair government, or for public welfare, was made in 
the Treaty of Amritsar. The treaty had been signed with Gulab Singh (and “the heirs male of his 
body”), and not with the rulers or the state of Kashmir—that is, the Sikhs of Lahore. Gulab Singh 
had purchased sovereignty over the territory of Kashmir, and over its people from the East India 
Company, which did not rule or own Kashmir. This effectively turned Kashmiris into a part of 
the estate of their new ruler. From the way Gulab Singh and his descendants ran the state, they 
had seen the terms of the treaty in exactly those terms. The only “limits” placed on Gulab Singh 
included the following: he would refer to the British in dealing with his neighboring states; he 
would not change the limits of his territories without the British government’s concurrence; and, 
if required, he would be ready to militarily aid the British troops in the hilly areas nearby.  
While Gulab Singh acquired almost full control over a territory as large as Britain itself, 
as a token in “acknowledgement of the supremacy of the British Government,” he was required 
to “present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed 
(six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.” He didn’t mind this payment, for 
into his hands had fallen Kashmir, which had been known, even to the rulers before the Dogras, 
as a “workshop” and a “treasury” (Rai 2004, 61)—for the wealth it created through the industry 
of its peasants and artisans, and the ease with which that wealth passed into the hands of those 
who controlled Kashmir.  
 While the previous Afghan or Sikh rulers had not been any more “enlightened” than the 
Dogras, the arrival of the Dogras in 1846 appears to have been registered as a critical event. By 




intellectual, who had first heard stories about the Dogra period from his grandparents, had this to 
say:  
The Dogra Raj left behind zehni zakhm (“psychic wound”) among Kashmiris. It may appear like 
we have come a long way from that time, but the zakhm is still fresh. If you scratch the zae’hiri 
(deceptive surface), you will see the imprint of that time on all of us. 
Does his assertion have substance? What was the nature of this “psychic wound?”  
Apparatus of capture  
As soon as Gulab Singh got hold of Kashmir Valley, he began a bloody campaign against 
small Muslim hill communities in the surrounding mountains. Under the benign gaze of the 
British, he invaded smaller autonomous principalities in the region and brought them under his 
control. Gulab Singh also terrorized Kashmiri tribes in the north, especially the Galwans, who 
resisted the Dogras, but whom he had presented as “plunderers” and “arsonists.” Most 
consequentially, though, he set about to establish a repressive revenue collection regime. As 
Thorp acknowledged, the regime of heavy taxation had, in fact, been created and imposed by the 
previous Sikh rulers. Finding this system already in place, Gulab Singh intensified its operations 
with swift measures. First, he introduced a new rupee, Chilkee, which was twenty percent higher 
in value compared to the previous Nanakshahee rupee (also called “Hari Singhis”) in use under 
the Sikhs (Thorp 2011, 65). Second, instead of reducing the taxes in view of this appreciation in 
the value of the rupee, he increased them to even higher levels. Third, he almost doubled the 
prices of grain, which was exclusively sold from government-run depots, with critical 




These monetary and tax fiats were part of an elaborate apparatus of capture designed to 
extract maximum surplus, way beyond quickly recuperating the sum “he had paid the British.” 
Gulab Singh made Muslims the exclusive victims of his apparatus, while exempting the 
Kashmiri Hindus (or, the Pandits) from it or very lightly assessed.13 The Pandits were, in fact, 
inducted into the apparatus of capture itself as revenue collectors and other petty officialdom. In 
the eyes of ordinary subjects, this made the Pandits the “visible face of the Dogra state,” as some 
Tehreek history-writers claim. This differential treatment of two religious groups, whose 
everyday lives had previously been much more interdependent and culturally composite, opened 
a communal fault line which could not heal again. I will discuss this fault line ahead. 
Distressed to see the condition of Kashmiris, Thorp, who was visiting Kashmir twenty 
years after the establishment of the Dogra state, wrote a stinging report about the Dogra rule. 
Unlike the critical writings of Christian missionaries who sometimes saw religious ideology as 
the reason behind the harsh policies of the Dogras, Thorp’s report does not indulge in cultural 
indictment. He also did not advocate dethroning the maharaja or calling for British military 
intervention, but sought “reform.” He sent letters to the government in Britain canvassing 
support to put pressure for reform on Maharaja Ranbir Singh, who had succeeded his father 
Gulab. In his report, Thorp highlighted the “villainy” of the nobles (diwans), ministers (wazirs) 
and the revenue officials, but not the maharaja himself.  
In Cashmere Misgovernment, Thorp draws a detailed picture of the Dogra tax 
administration and its functions. In the countryside, he wrote, the system consisted of revenue 
collectors (tehsildars), crop-account keepers (kardars), land-record keepers (patwaris), grain 
                                                 
13 It seems among the Muslims the tiny minority of Pirs—those who claimed to be the descendants of 14th-16th 
century Sufis who came to Kashmir from Central Asia and Iran, were also exempt from some taxes. It is not clear, 
however, if the beneficiaries were all the Pirs or just those in charge of different Khanqahs (Sufi hospices), ziarats 




weighers (taroughdars), the police (thanedars, hurkuras) and their local networks of informers 
and enforcers (surgowls, mukadams, shugdars). Taxes were imposed on all kinds of produce, 
from paddy to livestock (including on the sale of livestock) and from forest products to dairy. 
These taxes were taken in kind (about two-thirds of total rice, maize, honey or wheat, and three-
fourths of all the fruit) and a tax in cash was imposed on whatever was left with the peasant 
(Thorp 2011, 51-52; Rai 2004, 151). Additionally, the peasantry was required to directly support 
the entire tax and police apparatus by sending supplies (rassad), and paying an “additional 
portion” of the taxes to the officials. There were other taxes too, for instance, a “Hindu temple 
(mandir) tax” and a “Sanskrit tax” for maintaining temples, priests and Brahmins; and a 
“Maharaja’s guest tax,” which basically provided for the hospitality extended to His Majesty’s 
guests. These taxes didn’t include the separate, extra-legal exactions that the officials forced on a 
population with no realistic means of complaint redress, or hope for justice (Thorp 2011, 54-56).  
While gradually some of these taxes came marginally down, any resultant benefit was 
offset by the introduction into the system of revenue speculating contractors (chakladars) in 
1860 CE. These contractors would assess taxes based on average production of three years. This 
led to rural ruin during drought years. After Thorp’s death, another revenue extracting instrument 
izad-boli would be introduced. The practice, started in 1882, consisted of publicly auctioning 
villages for tax collection purposes. Izad-boli allowed and encouraged successful bidders to 
extract revenue maximally from the auctioned villages to increase their margin (Rai 2004, 151-
52). 
In Srinagar, and other bigger towns of Kashmir, the apparatus of capture was embodied 
in the “Dagshali.” Dagshali was an all-purpose government revenue collection, certification, and 




them were Pandits. To aid the Dagshali was the police system centered on kotwals, or district 
officers, whose primary purpose was to capture tax evaders, and make an example out of them. 
The entire Muslim population in the towns was taxed; the shopkeepers, the shawl merchants, the 
karkhandars or loom owners, the prostitutes, and the boatmen. But the worst fate fell on shawl-
bafs, spinners, and sada-bafs. Shawl-bafs were weavers (all male) contracted by karkhandars and 
provided with threads of wool to weave shawls. Spinners (all women) spun raw pashm into 
pashmina threads. And sada-bafs (all male) were shawl weavers without contracts.  
The loom owners, for instance, were required to pay the Dagshali heavy taxes on all 
individual weavers in their employ (from 36 to 47 rupees per shawl-baf), as well as on the shawl 
at different points of its production. The loom owner couldn’t sell the shawl without Dagshali’s 
final stamp, for which he was required pay a tax amounting to close to thirty percent of the total 
value of the shawl. After adjusting the taxes, he would be typically left with a meager couple of 
rupees to give to the contracted shawl-baf (Thorp 2011, 65). Given that weaving a shawl usually 
took a typical shawl-baf several months of hard labor, he was practically a slave even with his 
unique skills.  
Thorp, appealing to the “British conscience,” in which he retained his belief despite his 
horror at the British being principally responsible for the Treaty of Amritsar, wrote about the 
condition of the shawl-baf: 
A shawl-baf may become blind, as many of them do from the nature of the work; he may contract 
other diseases which the sedentary life and the foetid atmosphere of the low rooms engender and 
ripen; he may long to take up some other employment, which will permit him to breathe the fresh 
air, to recruit the unstrung nerves, the cramped sinews, and the weakened frame; and to prolong 




can release him from his bondage, since the discharge of a shawl-baf would reduce the 
Maharaja’s revenue by 36 Chilkees a year (2011, 68).  
The Kashmir “workshop”, which produced “cashmere” shawls famous in the West,14 had 
surely been built on the misery of Kashmiri artisans before 1846, but the Dogras turned it into, 
what Thorp calls, “looms of sickness and suffering” (2011, 68).  
Mechanisms of control 
The Dogras had realized that to maintain high levels of tax extraction it was important to 
keep the subject population under tight control and check any sign of resistance. The pivotal 
component of the Dogra state’s control mechanism was grain control. The government actively 
prohibited trade and barter between the towns and the countryside. The peasants couldn’t sell 
their produce in the city (of course, after taxes taken in kind there was hardly anything left to eat, 
far less to sell), and the urban dwellers were only allowed to purchase a very limited amount of 
grain, and that too from kotas, or the state-run depots (Thorp 2011, 57; Rai 2004, 152). The 
excessive taxation in the countryside and the unavailability of grain in the towns throughout the 
year kept the peasant poor and the artisan and worker on the brink of starvation (Thorp 2011, 
57).  
In 1885, under pressure from the British, who had finally begun to take note seventeen 
years after Thorp’s death, a “Durbar Proclamation” remitted some of the customs duties on the 
rice peasants might bring into Srinagar for sale. But in early1890s, the government, the principal 
grain dealer and fixer of grain prices, began selling rice at a reduced rate in the city kotas, taking 
away any possible benefits to the cultivators from the tax remission. Reduction in grain price was 
                                                 
14 As one legend goes, Napoleon gave a “Cashmere shawl” as a present to Empress Josephine, who turned Cashmere 




apparently done to sustain the shawl-bafs, who brought “bountiful profits” to the treasury. But, 
as Rai argues, the main beneficiaries of the system were the Pandits, who “having grown used to 
obtaining cheap rice…were among the few who did in fact obtain shali (rice) at the state rate, 
while most of the poorer classes in Srinagar often paid twice as much” (2004, 153). 
The prohibition of trade between the countryside and the towns, in the long run, led to 
their economic, political, and social separation. As a result, towns and the countryside in 
Kashmir could not build organic connections with each other, leading to the lack of effective 
solidarity at critical junctures in the coming decades. In the short run, it produced the devastating 
famines of 1877-1879, which led people desperately to try and escape Kashmir. 
The apparatus of capture, however, was also an open prison. The state had decided that 
no Kashmiri artisan or peasant must leave their occupation, or run away to the plains of Punjab. 
Shawl-bafs were prohibited by law from changing their occupation, while the tax levied on the 
sale of land by a peasant family wishing to run away was equal to the value of the land itself. No 
one paying taxes could escape, not even those sold to brothels. Since prostitution brought high 
revenues to the state, not only was the “sale of young girls in Cashmere to established houses of 
ill-fame…protected and encouraged by the Government,” but the victims of prostitution were 
also “prohibited from relinquishing their profession or marrying” (Khan 2013, 115; Preliminary 
Return of the Census in India 1891, 355). Thorp reports that “Some nautch girls pay 80-100 
Chilkees a year,” (2011, 80-83). 
By 1880, there seem to have been close to 18,750 registered sex workers in Kashmir, 
many them living in Srinagar, an extraordinarily high number in a city of 125,000 residents. 
Mostly from the Watal community of Kashmiri Muslims, hundreds of them were young girls 




was required to pay from 10 to 40 rupees annually as tax, dependent on which “class” she fell 
into: Ist, 2nd or 3rd. The state derived a large percentage of its annual revenue from the gaaens, 
but most lived and died in misery. Widespread contraction of venereal diseases was an unspoken 
aspect of the Srinagar life, especially among the higher social classes. A report of the Srinagar’s 
Mission Hospital states that during the period 1877-1879, the hospital had treated 12,977 new 
cases of venereal diseases (cited in Khan 2013, 92, 115). 
Reflecting on this bondage, Thorp reminds his imagined reader “the English traveler,” on 
his pleasant journey to Kashmir from the Indian plains, who while crossing over the beautiful 
mountain passes might encounter “the pale, worn figure hastening past him,” to not mistake him 
as anyone but the industrious shawl-baf who “flies like a hunted felon” and whose “only crime is 
poverty.” At several places on the passes, the Dogra soldiers would carefully hang the dead, 
fleeced bodies of Kashmiri peasants and artisans as odious examples for others attempting to 
flee. Yet, hundreds of Kashmiris would escape each year early in spring, as soon as the snows 
melted on the mountains (Brinckman 2011, 15).  
The only time Kashmiri peasants stopped working in their fields during the cultivation 
season was when Dogra officials rounded them up for begar, or forced labor. The military logic 
of the Great Game had required the Dogras to station troops across the northern mountains. 
Kardars were tasked to bring men from the countryside to the Bandipora depot in north Kashmir, 
from where these men were fully loaded with supplies and sent across the treacherous, icy passes 
beneath the Nanga Parbat to Astore and Gilgit, garrison towns deep in the Karakorum ranges. Of 
the system, which ensured Muslim peasants paying constant bribes and remaining submissive to 




In a still vastly underpopulated territory where labour was scarce and valuable commodity, the 
Dogras had made an art of obtaining it for free. How to escape begar was a constant 
preoccupation for the Kashmiri cultivator… (2004, 154). 
There was a payment for this labor, equivalent to next-to-nothing yet symbolic of the 
apparatus of capture. For a journey, from which it typically took a peasant almost fifty days to 
return, he was paid 4 to 7 Chilkees. If he ate from his load, which he invariably did—with the 
full load on his back there was no room for his own supplies—the value was deducted from his 
wage. To receive their meager Chilkee rupees, the peasants would have to present a receipt from 
the Governor of Astore. Few returned from these journeys.  
Only those Muslim peasants were relieved from begar who worked on the fields of 
Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, jagirdars (landlords), and the dharmarth department.15 Urban artisans, 
much too profitable for the exchequer working on the looms, and peasants working on prominent 
Muslim Pir lands were also exempt. This left a large majority of peasant households, which were 
already on the brink of collapse, losing able bodied men to either slavery on the fields of the 
ruling classes or slavery on the mountain passes.  
Thorp, who had travelled on the mountainous paths peasants took, asks his “moral 
readers” in England to imagine the typical “scene of death” of a Kashmiri peasant under begar:  
Picture to yourself, oh reader, those desolate scenes where the Cashmeree zamindars (cultivators) 
had to lay down their lives! None save those who have seen such can fully realise their horrors. 
No imagination is powerful enough to realise them; the waste, hopeless aspect of the unbounded 
stretch of snow, the intensely keen blast of the wind, which strikes you with the force of an 
eagle’s wing as it sweeps down upon you through the ravines; above and around you are snowy 
                                                 
15 Dharmarth was a state-funded body which functioned like a ministry, and managed the construction and 




peaks and summits, and precipitous slopes of rock, upon whose edge sits the avalanche waiting 
for his prey (2011, 76). 
 The combination of heavy taxation and the general wastage of humans on the looms, in 
paddy fields, and on begar, took a heavy toll on Kashmir’s population. At the same time, floods, 
epidemics, and fires became a regular occurrence in Kashmir. Lack of drainage in urban 
conglomerations, a constant concern of the residents, led to waterlogging, producing conditions 
for the spread of cholera. Late 19th century also saw a series of vast fires destroy several poorer 
neighborhoods in Srinagar, where people lived densely in their crumbling wooden houses. A 
willful lack of government support during famines, floods and fires that ravaged Kashmir, or 
during the regularly occurring cholera epidemics further exacerbated the dire situation.16  
Also witness to some of this destruction, Arthur Wingate, a British civil servant deputed 
in 1887 as revenue settlement officer in Kashmir, claimed that during the seventy years of Sikh 
and Dogra rule half of Kashmir’s population had vanished from unnatural causes (cited in Digby 
2011, 142). Wingate’s observation is cited by William Digby as an instance of unfair criticism of 
the Dogras. Digby (d. 1904) was a journalist, a supporter of Indian Congress, and generally 
critical of the British Indian government’s role in impoverishing the Indian peasants. For this, he 
gets mentioned as a “humanitarian” in some circles. In case of Kashmir, however, Digby had 
decided to lobby for the Dogras against Kashmiri peasants; he was a paid lobbyist for the Dogra 
maharaja in London. 
In defense of the Dogras, Digby claimed that while Wingate’s assertions were true, the 
situation was not better in directly controlled British territories, and therefore it neither warranted 
                                                 
16 Eventually in 1902, a devastating flood kept a large part of Srinagar inundated for months. Many European 
vacationers were trapped. They forced the British Resident to intervene, and finally with the help of British 




questioning the ability of the Dogras to administer Kashmir nor was it a sufficient case for 
intervention. (Wingate was not in favor of intervention). Digby’s assertion about the condition of 
peasants in British India was quite correct, especially in Bengal Province where the 1877 famine 
had wiped a large part of the native population. Yet, the specific claim of population reduction in 
India wasn’t true in general or as a pattern. The survey of 1891, for instance, had shown an 
increase of more than nine percent in population across British India since 1881. 
The apparatus of capture continued to function deep into the new century. There were 
some instances of public protest, but all of them were quickly subdued. The most significant of 
these protests was the revolt of 1931, which not only had its roots in the extractive regime of the 
Dogras, but also in its religious discrimination. 
Plurality and division in Kashmir  
Sects and ethnicities 
As already indicated, the Dogra state systematically discriminated against its Muslim 
subjects, who formed the clear majority of the population. Muslims of Kashmir region, from 
whose labor (as cultivators and artisans) the state derived most of its revenue, faced not only an 
exacting tax structure, forced labor, and grain control, but severe restrictions on their religious 
practices as well. The systemic nature of these restrictions was built into the way the Dogra 
monarchy, as Rai has argued, functioned ideologically, and sought to fashion itself, as a “Hindu 
state” (2004, 113). When Kashmiri towns erupted in revolt against the Dogra state in 1931,17 the 
authorities described the events as “communal riots,” that is, borne out of religious antipathy 
against the Hindus,18 even though the targets of the protests were almost exclusively the tax 
                                                 
17 See more on 1931 events in Chapter 6.  




administrators. Yet, if there was a “communal” element visible in the protests, it was the state 
itself which had produced the conditions in which religious identity had become politicized.      
 In 1931, the Muslim population stood at more than 77 percent in the entire state (and 95 
percent in the Kashmir Valley),19 and it can be safely assumed that at no point during the entire 
Dogra rule (1846-1950)20 was this number lower.21 Muslims in the state had varied regionally in 
their language and cultural practices. Even Muslims of Kashmir Valley, who predominantly 
spoke Kashmiri, did not quite have a coherent or a politicized identity at the time of the Treaty of 
Amritsar in 1846. It is possible, yet hard to establish, that the non-Muslim rule in the country 
since 1819 (when the Sikh kingdom of Punjab took Kashmir from the Afghans) may have begun 
to give the previously regionally expressed discontent against the imperial Mughal rule from 
Delhi (1586—1753) and the Afghan rule from Kabul (1753—1819), a fledgling religious turn 
among Kashmiri Muslims. Yet, the Muslim religious identity, if there was any, was not 
expressed as part of a public/oppositional discourse before 1846, or at least no significant 
evidence of it remains.   
Among Kashmiri Muslims, there were the majority “Sunnis” and a small minority of 
Shi’as,22 who had historically seen periods of social tensions between them. Always confined to 
urban Srinagar, though, during the rule of the Chaks (the pre-Mughal 16th century Muslim rulers 
of Kashmir) these tensions resulted from different Sufi sects competing for royal patronage, 
                                                 
19 See footnote 5 in this chapter. 
20 Dogra rule didn’t end officially in 1947, but in 1950 when the crown prince abdicated. 
21 In fact, there is every reason to believe the number was even higher. First, the Muslims in the state were dispersed 
far and wide into mountainous valleys hard to survey. Second, the growing Kashmiri Muslim diaspora of escapees 
in Punjab were not included when B. J. Glancy came out with his report (see footnote 5). Finally, as stated before, if 
Wingate’s argument that the population of Kashmir had decreased by half over the previous seventy years was even 
half way correct, then Muslim population in Kashmir had diminished substantially through adverse government 
intervention.  
22 Although Shi’a Islam had a history in Kashmir dating back to 1450 AD, the number of Shi’a seems to have never 
risen more than five percent among the Muslims. The Shi’as were mostly residents of some old city localities in 




control over khanqahs (Sufi hospices), and growth in their following (Zutshi 2014, 29), as well 
as from the instability of the Chak rule, which was marked by a civil war, internal feuds, and the 
imminent threat of Mughal invasion (Khan 2013).  
In the latter half of the 19th century, the tension between the sects flared up again, when 
the decline in the shawl industry led to incidences of violence between the mostly Sunni weavers 
and their Shi’a karkhandars, or loom owners and traders (Rai 2004, 39). But, since the lot of the 
Sunni weavers and their Shi’a karkhandars was not markedly different under the Dagshali 
system, in the 19th century these sectarian identities remained mostly depoliticized. This is 
especially true among the more numerous Sunni Muslims, among whom the term “Sunni” (or 
any of its equivalents) was never explicitly used—and still isn’t—as a self-identifying term.  
Yet, sectarian identities were not absent. Contests over the correct practice of religion—
despite a consensus on Islam’s fundamental beliefs—had remained a source of rupture and 
division throughout. These claims and contests often centered on theological disputes between 
the orthodox Islamic scholars or ulemas (and the moulvis schooled in the seminaries) and the 
heterodox sufis preachers, among different orders or silsilas of Sufism (some of which were 
more orthodox than others), or, between reformists influenced by sufis from Iran and the Central 
Asia and those part of the indigenous Kashmiri reshi (mystic) tradition. Yet, such sectarian 
contests never consolidated into political identities the general populace. The disputes, as local 
legends go, even provided occasions for engagement with each other, and moments of 
acceptance of the others’ influence.23 Sectarian identities crystallized in the 20th century, as the 
                                                 
23 Of these occasions, for instance, Kashmiris often tell the story of the encounter between a Kashmiri reosh 
(practitioner of reshi tradition) offering a cup of tea filled to the brim to a sufi master from Iran who had come 
visiting. Taking the hint that the reosh by offering a full cup was suggesting that there was nothing the sufi could 
offer spiritually or intellectually to Kashmiris, he put a thread of saffron in the cup, pleasantly changing the flavor of 




increasingly reformist schools of Islamic thought, led by new movements emerging in the 
Arabian Peninsula and India, actively sought to recruit followers, like the sufis had done before 
them. 
Among those who fell into the category of “Sunni” at the beginning of the 20th century, 
there were the “Hanafis” and the “Ahl Hadees,” designating two self-conscious sectarian 
categories. The Hanafis, followers of a prominent school of Islamic jurisprudence, had 
incorporated some heterodox practices, especially the ones centered on shrines of the sufis and 
the reosh, into their religious observances. Ahl Hadees, inspired among others by the newly 
arrived teachings of 18th century Arab preacher Ibn Wahhab, were purist in orientation. They 
saw the shrine-related practices as bidat or “innovations” against Islam, and therefore fit for 
removal. They also sought to expunge South Asian cultural influences from among the Muslim 
societies, toward a more Arabic-cultural orientation. During the latter part of the 20th century, 
even among the more numerous Hanafi Kashmiri Muslims, two 19th century Indian schools of 
Islamic thought, Deobandism and Barelvism, had begun to sharpen the division on shrine-related 
practices. Barelvis expend considerable effort in defense of these practices, while the 
increasingly influential Deobandis tend toward “purification” and advocate missionizing work. 
However, more potent than sect, as a source of social division among Muslims in the 19th 
century Dogra state, was “ethnicity” based on regional and linguistic variations. Ethnic 
differences had widened primarily because of the difficult mountainous terrain preventing 
mutual interactions between people of the Kashmir Valley and those in the surrounding 
mountainous areas, like Kishtwar, Neelam Valley, Poonch, Baderwah, Gilgit and Ladakh. 
Indeed, contact was neither absent nor slim, especially in the summer months, when the snow 




frequently visiting the capital Srinagar, and even a few intermarriages, before and after the Dogra 
consolidation of the state,24 had created a loosely connected cultural-political space, at the center 
of which was the populous Valley of Kashmir. Yet, this space was still held together through 
force by the Dogra apparatus of capture. People living in the surrounding regions probably 
resented being ruled from Srinagar, but the resentment was directed against the rulers, who had 
mostly been non-Kashmiri.25 
Caste 
Arguably, caste differences had a more significant impact on power relations in 
Kashmir.26 The notion of “caste” was not codified but based on differences in, and social 
valuations, of hereditary occupations, as well as on the divergent narratives of clan origin and 
belonging. In fact, the way social stratification in Kashmir was represented in official records 
and in colonial writings holds an important point about the nature of caste in Kashmir.  
                                                 
24 After 1846, the hilly southern regions of Jammu became part of Kashmir, while a Dogra general in the Sikh army 
had conquered Ladakh region in 1834.   
25 In the later part of the 20th century this resentment has turned against the Kashmiri Muslims themselves. Its causes 
mostly lie in Indian political parties whipping up a campaign against Kashmiri Muslims who are falsely seen as the 
predominant force in the government. In the recent assembly election (2014-15), BJP, the governing party in India, 
negatively campaigned in the hilly regions on the line that the party will diminish the “power” of Kashmiri Muslims 
in the State, especially that of the Sunnis. 
26 While I use the terms “ethnicity” and “caste” here, I agree with Pierre Bourdieu’s caution that “a model of reality” 
should not be confused with “the reality of the model.” What he calls “classes on paper” or “theoretical classes”, if 
they are at all to be named, must be recognized for explanatory purposes, for they don’t exist as such. They often 
correspond to similarities in the material conditions of life, and bring together “agents” with “common dispositional 
properties (habitus).” Hence, they possess a certain propensity to come together in reality, to constitute themselves 
into real groups. For a real group to emerge requires political work of mobilization and organization (Bourdieu 
1990, 117-118). For the social groups that I present here—additionally—using cross-cultural categories of 
classification (caste in particular) tend to produce and accentuate the differences that the categories try to explain. 
Aware of these problems, I use the terms sect, ethnicity, and caste quite broadly without claiming such categories to 
have actual or more meaning compared to others. For instance, “sect” in the anthropology of Muslim societies is 
often used to describe the “Sunni” and “Shia” difference, which had both political and theological origins. 
“Ethnicity” is also quite an elastic term that often tends to label equally elastic communities, which apart from 
attributes like language, sense of belonging to a place, may also share stories of origin, and even shared historical 
memories and experiences—but unlike “nations” these communities don’t make explicit claims of seeking a state or 
self-government (see Smith 2010). Caste in South Asia is often associated with Hinduism, yet within South Asian 
Muslim societies, certain occupational, hereditary hierarchies have clearly retained and produced relations as if part 




Much of what we know about Kashmiri social stratification comes from the writings of 
Walter R. Lawrence, a late 19th century land settlement commissioner in the employ of the 
British Residency in Kashmir.27 Lawrence, whose taxonomy of the Kashmiri society many 
scholars take for granted, classified Kashmiri Muslims into Shaikhs, Saiyads (or Pirs), Mughals, 
Pathans, Gujars, Bakarwals (Rai 2004, 38), and the socially marginalized Doombs and Wātals, 
with the largest majority of Kashmiri Muslims consisting of the Shaikhs.28 Some of these 
categories, like Pirs, Doombs, and Wātals, had actual meaning in the lives of the people it 
described. While Pirs saw themselves as bearers of the Prophetic tradition, and therefore, 
superior to other Muslim, the categories possessed actual “social meaning” for the Doomb and 
Wātal Muslim groups. The two groups were vital for the socio-cultural life of Kashmiri Pandits. 
They carried out “polluting” services for the Pandits, whose Brahmin creed proscribed them 
from carrying out such work on their own (Madan 1990).29 The Pirs, however, used the services 
of the Doombs and Wātals without even such creedal justification. Apart from these, however, 
there was no lived, symbolic or material content that the term “Shaikh” could designate for those 
classified as Shaikhs.30 
                                                 
27 Walter Lawrence was a British civil servant tasked to survey and carry out land reforms in the last decade of the 
19th century. He had succeeded Arthur Wingate, who also wrote a report on land and had called for radical changes 
in the tax regime. While in Kashmir, Lawrence wrote his famous book, The Vale of Kashmir (1895).  
28 Lawrence believed Mughals (not the royal dynasty) and Pathans (remnants of the Afghans) to be the more recent 
immigrants into Kashmir. There were also Gujars (cow or buffalo herders) and Bakerwals (goat herders) who were 
mostly seasonally migrating, and sometimes even settled, endogenous communities (Lawrence 1895).  
29 Problematically, as Mridu Rai points out, Madan sees extraction of such work as “mutual dependence” and 
provides an “idealized model of a society extricated from its quotidian functioning and emptied of history” (Rai 
2004, 40). In Jammu, Dalits formed a considerable section among the Hindus, who occupied a structurally similar 
position as Watals and Doombs in Kashmir. 
30 The term itself is also quite confusing. Unlike “Shaykh” among Arabic speaking peoples, Sheikh in Kashmir is 
not a title, but a surname. Wātal communities use “Sheikh” as a last name, but those who distinguish themselves 
from the Wātals use the same term but as a prefix in their name—so that, “Sheikh Abdullah” would mean something 
different than “Abdullah Sheikh.” Notice Cartier-Bresson’s caption in the Introduction, where he uses “the Sheikh 
Abdullah” instead of Sheikh Abdullah. Clearly, Cartier-Bresson had mistaken Abdullah as a religious-political 




Lawrence, who had no knowledge of Koshur (the language Kashmiris spoke), had chosen 
to classify Kashmiri Muslims in this manner because he had depended for his work on a select 
group of local informants. Dogras, it appears, had actively discouraged European missionaries or 
officials from seeking assistance in learning Koshur, forcing them to rely on the court languages 
of the subcontinent they understood: Urdu, Persian, and Sanskrit.31 Pandits spent considerable 
effort to learn the Dogra court language Urdu, which assured them government jobs. Some 
Pandits also learnt Sanskrit, the language Dogras had spent considerable sums to promote. Pirs, 
though not quite as favored as under pre-Sikh Muslim dynasties, could still speak Persian. It is 
likely that most of Lawrence’s local informants were the Pandits, and, in certain places, the Pirs. 
Therefore, the classification Lawrence arrived at was a distillate of how these two social groups 
viewed the Kashmiri society: divided between those who claimed pure ancestry and religious 
authority (Pandits and Pirs) and those who performed low-level occupational services.32  
Pandits and Pirs 
Bernard Cohn has argued that the British invested some of their local informant groups 
with a “discourse of differentiation” to cultivate loyalty among them toward the empire and a 
stake in its preservation (1996, 21-22).33 In Kashmir, this discourse was in some respects already 
present, and cultivated by almost all rulers. Both the Pandits and the Pirs saw themselves as the 
quintessential representatives of their respective faiths (Hinduism and Islam) in Kashmir. The 
                                                 
31 It was a practice among European officials in British India to employ a munshi to teach them local languages, and 
acquaint them with native cultural practices. 
32 Lawrence’s goes into detail describing the “character” of various social groups in Kashmir, most of whom are 
presented in a very poor light. Some of these perspectives are still being ploughed into the public space by Indian 
journalists writing about Kashmir.  
33 The British had employed natives (mostly Brahmins) into their service as local informants and interpreters, and 
then through a “discourse of differentiation” invested this new class of clerks and babus with an incentive to 
maintain British power in India. While Lawrence was attempting no such thing, he was following the established 




two may have, on occasion, contested each other’s version of history, and their valuations of 
historical figures, but they essentially shared the same form of narrative of Kashmir’s pre-
modern past. Their valuation of rulers and figures of different eras was centered on written or 
orally passed-down memories of how these rulers treated Pandits or Pirs respectively. For 
instance, Pirs saw the Sultanate period (1338-1526 CE) as a golden period of Islam, valorizing 
the zealous Sultan Sikandar and the sufi preacher Sayyid Ali Hamdani, who they consider as the 
most important cultural and religious figure in their tradition. The Pandits despised the sultan for 
his “fanaticism” and disapproved of Hamdani’s influence in Kashmir. The Pandits, on the other 
hand, were ardent defenders of the Dogra state, while the Pirs were critical of it—yet, afraid of 
losing the few measly privileges the Dogras had granted them, their criticism was muted. These 
modes of evaluation seeped into forms of historical conscious as well.34  
While there is no easy way to trace the roots of these social relations, one can only 
provide a provisional hypothesis. The ancestors of Kashmiri Muslims had been resident in 
Kashmir as a mixture of pre-Islamic communities or zaats. A Brahmin would have classified 
these zaats as lower- or untouchable caste communities. As the sufis from Iran and Central Asia 
(the supposed ancestors of the Pirs) started preaching Islam in the region at the end of the 14th 
century, these zaats gradually converted to Islam.35 Eventually, only the “upper caste” Kashmiri 
Brahmins, or the Pandits, didn’t convert. Pandits derived their social capital, in the sense Pierre 
Bourdieu has conceptualized the notion,36 in later years from having maintained their Hindu 
                                                 
34 See more in Chapter 2. Almost all historical accounts of the past are either written by Pandits or by Pirs. 
35 Islam had a slightly older history in Kashmir though. Rinchen, a Buddhist from Ladakh, was likely one of the first 
convert to Islam. Rinchen had become king of Kashmir in 1320 CE amid the chaos and infighting of the previous 
Hindu Lohara rulers. Believed to have been denied permission to become a Shaivite by the Brahmins, Rinchen 
converted to Islam under the influence of a preacher Bulbul Shah. 
36 Bourdieu defines “social capital” as the “aggregate of the actual and potential resources which are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 




faith. Pirs drew their social capital from being the harbingers of a new Islamic faith. As Bourdieu 
has argued, while most people belong to one or the other social group, with access to some form 
of social capital, a dominant social group is designated under the sign of a “great name.” For 
Kashmiri Hindus, the name “Pandit” or more commonly “Bhatta” functioned as a great name. 
Both terms signified a mastery of religion, knowledge of religious texts, and purity of lineage. In 
the same way, “Pir” or “Sayyid” was the great name that signified intimate association with 
religion and pure ancestry.      
It was not hard to convert this social capital into societal power. The Pandits, as already 
mentioned, were the proximate face of the Dogra state in Kashmir. They occupied most of the 
high and middle-ranking positions in different government departments. Before the Dogras, 
other rulers—the Mughals, the Afghans, and the Sikhs—had also employed Pandits heavily. 
Receiving a government job was both a desired life-goal as well as a prominent part of the Pandit 
life-world—to the extent of centrally defining the identity of the “Karkun” Pandits.37 Pandits 
jealously guarded the domain of government jobs for themselves, agitating for protection of their 
privilege when perceiving a threat.38 Significantly, in the late 19th century, when the British 
Resident opened a new road connecting Kashmir with Rawalpindi, leading to an influx of 
Punjabi Hindus (mostly merchants, but ready to serve as government officials), Pandits 
perceived the move as a threat. It led Pandit leaders to famously petition the Dogra ruler to 
establish the principle of “Kashmir for Kashmiris” in jobs. While this demand was couched in 
                                                 
its collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to ‘credit’—in the various senses of the word” 
(1986, 54).  
37 Although now seen as representing a uniform group, the Kashmiri Pandits are not homogenous. All of them were 
Brahmin, indeed, but there were the more influential and numerous Karkuns (those who vied for government service 
and were part of the revenue administration), the Gors (the priests), and Buhers (mostly grocers and confectioners). 
These were all strictly endogamous sub-groups (Rai, 37-38). 
38 Rai has argued that most Pandit “religious” reform movements, starting late 19th century, were primarily focused 




new claims of “indigeneity” (mulki), and in principle included Muslims, the fear of losing their 
own privileged access to jobs was central. Kashmiri Muslims, denied formal education by the 
state, had no such privileged domain to defend in the first place.39  
If Pandits increasingly deployed the discourse of indigeneity to protect their interests, the 
Pirs used the opposite discourse: tracing their roots in the purer, older heartlands of Islam—Iran 
and Central Asia. Pirs claimed to be the guardians of Islam in Kashmir, as “their ancestors” had 
had a longer association with the religion. They acquired exclusive control over religious 
establishments, like khanqahs, ziarats, darsgahs, and mosques. Along with the Pandits, a few 
Pirs had received generous land grants, tax exemptions, and sustenance from different rulers. 
These beneficences had led Pirs to imagine Kashmir as a pir-waer, the “garden of the Pirs.”40 
While the position of the Pirs diminished significantly after 1846, it was still better than that of 
the overwhelming majority of Kashmiri Muslims. Both the Pandits and the Pirs, therefore, had 
reasons to be conscious of their identity, and probably explains their strict endogamy. On the 
other hand, the so-called “Shaikhs,” the catchall category to which, according to Lawrence, most 
Kashmiris—cultivators, artisans, boatmen, small traders, ironsmiths, or barbers and other service 
providers—belonged, were least conscious of this identity. 
If identity among Kashmiri Muslims, therefore, could be traced along the triple lines of 
sect, caste, and ethnicity,41 there was hardly either a neat overlap or an explicit politicization of 
this identity. As argued, the “Pandit” identity had begun to acquire a political content of its own, 
                                                 
39 The artifice showed cracks in the early 1930s, when a prominent Pandit leader of the 1930s and 40s, P. N. Bazaz 
(who eventually turned to socialism and supported Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan) wrote to seek Gandhi’s and 
Nehru’s help in maintaining exclusive Pandit control over government services (Bazaz 1967, appendix 1).    
40 In the present, the phrase is now simply used as a nostalgic term that refers to Kashmir as a space of spirituality 
41 As we will see later, the Indian state has used and accentuated differences based on “sect” and “ethnicity” over the 
years, to delimit the politicization of the Kashmiri Muslim identity. Yet, such efforts fail because of the state’s 
increasing appeal to and affiliation with Kashmiri Hindus provides yet another occasion for Muslims in Kashmir to 




especially with the late 19th century reform movements aimed at protecting the Karkun class 
interests in the state administration. For the heterogeneous Muslims of the state, “Kashmiri 
Muslim” or Koshur Mussalaman,42 only gradually coalesced as a political identity—mostly 
during the third decade of the 20th century. The name Koshur Mussalman expressed a 
convergence of the multiple interests of the Muslims of the state, and eventually included an 
aspiration for sovereignty. While the regional differences continued to persist between Muslims 
from different regions of the state, Kashmiri Muslim was a political identity precisely in the 
sense that it sought to project itself as representing the political identity of all of the state’s 
Muslims, and not of the Kashmiri-speaking Muslims alone.43 Similarly, caste differences among 
Muslims remained palpable at the societal level, but politically, as Kashmiris mobilized against 
the state, this difference began to lose its earlier power. Below, I argue that it was the advent of 
the Dogra state that created the external conditions for the emergence of Kashmiri Muslim as a 
political identity.  
The exercise of Hindu sovereignty 
Cows, terror, archaeology 
In the subcontinent, intervention (or “non-intervention”) in religion had for the most part 
formed a vital element in the practice of sovereignty. Pre-colonial rulers had sometimes asserted 
the primacy of their own religion or creed over that of the subjects, but the pragmatism of 
sometimes administering a largely non-coreligionist population required not only keeping 
                                                 
42 Koshur Mussalmaan is used in Koshur language, while Kashmiri Mussalmaan, as it came to be called in the Urdu 
press. 
43 Kashmiri Muslim eventually could not bring together all the Muslims of the state, especially the Muslims from 
Jammu. These divisions became obvious during the violence of 1947, when Jammu’s Muslims found themselves 




religious hardliners within the government in check but also granting symbolic patronage to the 
religious establishments of the subjects. In the 19th century, the British colonial authorities 
proclaimed religious “tolerance” and “neutrality” as the main principles of their rule—offsetting, 
thereby, the need for a demonstrable, and often expensive, religious patronage of the natives.44 
After Britain took direct control over the Indian Empire in 1857, Queen Victoria announced in 
her 1858 Proclamation that all her subjects, regardless of race and religion, were to be treated 
equally. While there was always, what Partha Chatterjee has called, “the rule of colonial 
difference” (1993, 16-18),45 the British appear to have taken this proclamation seriously in 
relation to the natives—of course, to preserve the stability of their empire. They saw infractions 
against religious tolerance as diminishing the “paramountcy” and the “impartiality” of the British 
Empire in the eyes of the natives. This image of a “moral empire” had, therefore, animated many 
Englishmen in the subcontinent.46  
While Queen Victoria’s proclamation had not been extended to the princely states, the 
Dogra state’s mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims was so revolting that it became a source of 
embarrassment for the colonial authorities, as is evident in the British writings on Kashmir of the 
era. The mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims was also a source of concern for the British because 
the Dogra rule had begun to come under severe criticism from the Muslims of Punjab, whose 
quietude the British saw as important to the stability of their empire. The role of Maharaja 
                                                 
44 For instance, while the religion of the colonial authorities played a significant role in the imperial symbolism, the 
British East India Company had employed Brahmins and Moulvis (Muslims trained in religious seminaries) to code 
“Hindu” and “Muslim” personal law respectively, to “rule India with Indian laws.” This may have been driven more 
by the company’s need to better assess taxes in the 18th century that truly a genuine desire to preserve “local 
customs” (Cohn 1996, 62).    
45 Chatterjee argues that the application of “universal” principles of British imperial governance were undercut by 
specific history and culture of Western societies as well as historical and cultural differences as they obtained in the 
colonies (especially India).   
46 Indeed, the “moral” image sustained despite the famines and the poverty that the relentless British “drain of 
wealth” caused in the subcontinent and the ferocity with which Muslims and Hindus in India were dealt with long 




Ranbir Singh (r. 1857-85) in intensifying the devastation caused by the Kashmir famines of 
1877-79, particularly its almost exclusive impact on Kashmiri Muslims, had agitated the opinion 
in Punjab. Eventually, all of this would become the reason for the British to intervene, leading to 
the establishment of the British Residency in Kashmir and to sidelining of the third Dogra ruler 
Pratap Singh from the adminstration for almost two decades (Rai 2004, 134-35). 
The sources of Dogra antipathy toward their Muslim subjects lay in the nature of the state 
itself.  When the British handed Kashmir to Gulab Singh in 1846, not only was he devoted to his 
Hindu faith, but also “anxious to be seen a Hindu raja (king).” He based his sovereignty on his 
claim to rule as “a protector of the Hindu dharma” (Rai 2004, 96-98). He took this to mean, first, 
the repression of Muslim religious establishments and practices in Kashmir, and, second, 
creating a Hindu religious geo-space through extensive temple-building and expansive rituals. 
(In later years, his descendant continued this project through archaeology). Gulab Singh cut off 
all previous forms of patronage which had sustained major Muslim religious establishments. He 
also came down harshly upon public expressions of Muslim faith in Kashmir, especially the azan 
(the call to prayer), which was suppressed in the countryside. It was, however, the issue of “cow 
slaughter” that became the centerpiece of the Dogra practice of Hindu sovereignty (Rai 2004, 
178-179).47 
Cows were—or, more accurately, had become—sacred to upper-caste Hindus in the 
nineteenth century, and killing cows for any purpose was deemed a religious offence equivalent 
to murder.48 The punishments meted out to Muslim peasants accused of being “cow-murderers,” 
                                                 
47 The previous Sikh rulers had also been intolerant of Muslim public rituals, and had proscribed the azan. They had 
criminalized cow-slaughter, but had continued the patronage of Muslim religious establishments—which probably 
kept the Pirs happy at least.  
48 The common expression used in Dogra law to describe cow killing was gau-hatya, or “cow-murder.” It is possible 
that banning “cow-slaughter” as a cause célèbre for the Dogras was transmitted via Hindu reform movements in 
India. Indian historian D. N. Jha (2002) has argued that upper-caste Hindus did not see beef as a taboo until early 




or even merely suspected of harboring “intent to injure a cow,” were grossly cruel. These 
punishments included public floggings, chopping off noses, ears and tongues, using of hot iron 
rods on the body of the accused, torching the offender’s house, and long imprisonment, all of 
which could be carried out before the final execution. For good reason, then, the Kashmiri 
peasant lived in terror of being accused of harming, killing or eating a cow. In truth, terror itself 
was the main modality of exercising power over the Muslim subjects, and cow slaughter a 
charged occasion to display it.  
Thorp, who had witnessed some of these punishments during the rule of the second 
maharaja Ranbir Singh, writes: “No one ever connected to cow slaughter has ever been 
released…Many just die in the prison of starvation and torture” (Thorp 2011, 77-78; see also Rai 
2004, 181). He mentions, however, that by 1868 the state was considering commuting the 
punishment for cow killing from death sentence to life. Yet, decades later, the situation had 
barely changed. In 1889, for instance, Bhag Ram, a Hindu member of the Kashmir Council 
appointed by the British Resident, called the system of justice in the state as a “wretched 
specimen of barbarity and oppression.” Describing the highly-charged investigations into 
incidents (or suspicions) of cow slaughter in villages, Ram writes: 
Cow is held in the highest veneration, and no punishment is spared, however faulty the evidence 
may be. When a person is shown to have put a cow to death, his lands and property are 
confiscated, houses are burnt, permanent exile is ordered, and whole families are ruined…A 
person is bound to be sent to jail if he happens to yoke a cow to the plough, or otherwise take 
                                                 
century Hindu reform movements that banning “cow-slaughter” became a part of middle-class Hindu identitarian 
assertion, in opposition to Muslims, who consumed beef. (Interestingly, Jha’s book was banned in India in 2001, he 




excessive hard work from that animal. It is a penal offence to kill animals (any animal) for food 
or meat on certain days in each month (Note 1889; see also Rai 2004, 100). 
Reading reports such as Bhag Ram’s, the British Resident brought the punishment for cow-
slaughter down to an average of two to three-year imprisonment. Yet, after the reinstatement of 
Maharaja Pratap Singh to full power in 1905, many of the previous draconian measures were 
brought back, and the prison sentence was raised to ten years. 
While cutting off patronage to Muslim shrines and mosques created resentment among 
the Pir guardians (or mutawalis) of these shrines, laws like criminalizing consumption of cow 
meat was a source of general misery in the countryside. Eating cow meat was not only an 
acceptable practice among Muslims but, given the regular shortages of food, especially in the 
countryside, it was a practical imperative as well. Cow meat was cheaper than other halal kinds. 
Additionally, the sacrifice of cows on the annual Muslim festival Eid-ul-Zuha was, in religious 
terms, more desirable than sacrificing sheep and goat. But, as Bhag Ram’s note indicates, beyond 
cow meat, even killing other animals for food on certain days of each month considered 
important to Hindus had been declared a penal offense. The proscriptions against cow-slaughter, 
meat consumption on certain days, and azans, were an infringement of Muslim religious and 
cultural practices, but they were also an assertion of the state’s claim to be the protector of Hindu 
cultural sensibilities.49   
As Kashmiris found themselves ruled by a dynasty determined not to seek their consent 
or approval, the discrimination became even more stark given the way their Hindu neighbors 
were treated.50 As Rai (2004) has shown, the Dogra era saw an extraordinary number of Hindu 
                                                 
49 In recent times, the Indian government has again banned consumption of beef in Kashmir, provoking people to 
claim that the government was imposing a Hindu code of life on non-Hindus. 
50 The good treatment of the Pandits of Kashmir by the Hindu rulers from Jammu may have been political in nature, 




temples being constructed or renovated in the state. A large amount of money from the state 
treasury was spent on the maintenance of these temples, in carrying out expensive and a never-
ending cycle of religious rituals, and on religious pilgrimages (tiraths) in the state. The network 
of temples in the state and the daily rituals performed in them were all connected through the 
Dharmarth department to the person of the Dogra maharaja, who was at the center of this 
religious universe.  
Archaeology was another crucial element in consolidating the Hindu sovereignty. By late 
19th century, European philologists and Indologists had becomes greatly interested in pre-
Mughal Sanskrit texts in Kashmir, and the Dogra rulers saw this as an opportunity to reaffirm 
their image as the patrons of Hindu cultural tradition. On the invitation of the British authorities 
in India, the Dogras established the Archaeology and Research Department in 1904, but kept the 
“archaeology” separate from “research.” While archaeology, focused on conservation of 
monuments, was kept under British experts, research, focused on locating new sites or making 
authoritative claims over their provenance, was kept under Pandits (Rai 2009, 416). The 
Research department privileged “Hindu” archaeological artifacts over “Muslim” ones—a 
practice of communal labeling started by the British-established Archeological Survey of India—
taking its primary responsibility as uncovering the Hindu antiquity in Kashmir.51 Its officials 
used Kalhana’s Rajatarangini, a 12th century Sanskrit kaavya, as the basis to locate sites, and 
                                                 
substantiate their claim to legitimacy in Kashmir as Hindu rulers by associating with them its powerful Hindu 
minority, while the Kashmiri Pandit community was concerned to hold on to its privileged access to government 
employment” (2004, 124). While the Dogras were Vaishnavites (followed the Rama cult) and despised some of the 
practices of Kashmiri Pandits, who followed Tantric Shaivism, such differences didn’t come in the way of forming 
political bonds.  
51 Alexander Cunningham, who founded ASI, had been a major influence on the direction archaeology took in 
British India. In Kashmir, Ram Chandra Kak, who later became the Prime Minister of Kashmir (under the last 
Dogra), was particularly interested in locating Hindu antiquity and ignoring sites that indicated Muslim cultural and 




even change place-names from those in common Kashmiri use to their “original” Sanskrit ones.52 
As Rai has argued, by 1920s ARD had become “sufficiently adjunct to the Dharmarth 
department, so that supporting archaeological principles could reinforce his status as the 
protector of Hindu worship” (2009, 416). These efforts inevitably provoked conflicts over sites 
that became “contested” (Rai 2004, 192-205). In any case, the consolidation of a Hindu religious 
domain in the state became coterminous with the territoriality of the state itself, leading to the 
creation of, what Rai calls, a “Hindu State” (2004, 125-127).  
Separate but unequal  
For British travelers in Kashmir, for whom the Victorian Proclamation of 1858 
represented the cornerstone of religious tolerance, the contrast between how religious 
communities were treated in Kashmir and in British India must have been glaringly obvious. Yet, 
only a few commented on it. The colonial governance was broadly based on the principle of 
separateness but equality of Hindus and Muslims. The British, at least partially, claimed their 
legitimacy from standing over and remaining neutral between the subcontinent’s Hindus and 
Muslims. While the coding of separate personal laws over the previous century had had the 
effect of bundling together diverse communities in the subcontinent under the dominant 
communal signs of “Hindu” and “Muslim,” some of the consequential stiffening of religious 
identities was sought to be ameliorated after the legal reforms of 1864, especially with a return to 
“customary laws” and recourse to colonial legislations, instead of using the Hindu and the 
Muslim “personal laws.”53 In the Dogra state, however, separate personal laws began to 
                                                 
52 See Chapter 2 for more on this.   
53 These personal laws had been codified over the previous century, with the help of Hindu Brahmins and Muslim 
Moulvis, from religious texts, which the British thought regulated the everyday life of Hindu and Muslim 




supersede customary ones almost exactly around the same period.54 Erasing any ambiguous 
zones of overlap between Muslim and Hindu customs and practices, the state was intent on 
“diligently maintaining separate religiously-informed identities among the state’s subjects” (Rai 
2004, 178).  
Under the Dogra state, while separateness was carefully maintained, there was no legal 
equality between the Muslims and the Hindus in practice (Rai 2004, 174). This was, for instance, 
not only obvious in the way the Hindu subjects of the state were very lightly taxed, received 
preferences (to the level of exclusivity) in state employment, were gifted funds from the treasury 
or received immense land grants for their religious institutions and rituals, but also in such 
matters as how the state exclusively allowed the Hindus to get licenses for weapons. This 
inequality naturally extended into the domain of dispensing justice in the Dogra courts. Thorp, 
for instance, writes:  
Offences against the Government or against Hindoos (sic) are punished with undue severity, 
while offenses perpetrated by Hindoos or Government officials are either passed over or 
adjudicated with partiality and injustice (2011, 78).  
If the Dogra state was, therefore, assiduous in its quest to exercise power in the name of 
the “Hindu dharma” and maintaining religious difference as a difference of inequality among its 
subjects, the primary reason was clear: as an apparatus of capture, the state wanted to extract as 
much wealth as possible from the majority Muslim subjects with minimal corresponding 
obligations toward their welfare. Since, the legitimacy of the Dogra state was not based in 
                                                 
communities, but also to supersede the diverse customs that had regulated different communities and which were 
irreducible to singular religious identities. See also Cohn, who argues that in fact that by 1864 the British had 
transformed “Hindu law” into English case law (1996, 75).  
54 While Rai reports the first serious attempt to apply the personal laws of Hindus and Muslims around 1872, these 




consent or approval of most of its subjects, terror and violence were the main modality of 
exercising state power.  
As already mentioned, the British government was aware of the nature of the Dogra state, 
but having signed a treaty (in 1846) that put no obligation on the Dogra rulers to provide good or 
responsible government for the subjects, it had neither a legal justification for intervention nor 
did it want to be seen as intervening in the affairs of the princely states. The British were wary of 
losing confidence among the princes in India. Princes were important stilts on which British 
power in India rested. And they keenly watched and protested any British overreach in the 
internal affairs of the states. Or may be the British were simply not concerned about what the 
Dogras were doing so long as the northern frontier of the empire was stable. But stories of 
repression in Kashmir were beginning to leak out into the public domain. Thorp’s writing was 
among the first of these, and may have been the reason behind his untimely death. The growing 
Urdu press in Punjab was beginning to publish accounts of escapees from Kashmir. This 
concerned the British who sensed a brewing agitation among Punjabi Muslims would disrupt 
revenue from one of their richest provinces, and might provoke a “Wahhabi” revolt against the 
empire.55  
Though pressure started to grow on the Dogras to show progress toward a more equitable 
system, the maharaja instead chose to prevent news of the state of affairs in the kingdom from 
leaking out.    
                                                 
55 In the aftermath of the 1857 “Indian Mutiny” against the British East India Company, a large-scale repression of 
Muslims was carried out in northern India. The British especially sought to hunt down disparate groups of Indian 
Muslims living in the interstices of the British, the Russian and the Ottomon empires. These men were 
interchangeably described in the British colonial imagination as “wahabi,” “fanatic,” “outlaw,” and “fugitive 




Control over Dogra self-image 
One must wear jeweled ice in dry plains 
to will the distant mountains to glass. 
The city from where no news can come 
is now so visible in its curfewed night 
that the worst is precise: 
—Ali (2009, 178) 
Kashmiri poet Agha Shahid Ali (1949-2001) wrote these lines about the traumatic years 
of early 1990s, when the Indian government imposed a military occupation in Kashmir and 
prevented foreign press from reporting from there. But this could very well be said of the Dogra 
state. Not only did the Dogras severely curb the migration of peasants and artisans, groveling in 
poverty, out of Kashmir, but they also carefully controlled the flow of Europeans visiting the 
state. There was even an official restriction in place that prevented European visitors from 
coming to Kashmir at the end of autumn—the time of revenue collection. To minimize 
interaction between Kashmiris and the Europeans—and thus to prevent news leaks—the state 
officials used threats, obstructions, and pure manipulation. 
Arthur Brinckman, a British clergyman, who left a record of the “wretched conditions” in 
which Kashmiris lived, complained bitterly that the British, unlike other visitors, were not 
allowed to stay for more than six summer months (2011, 15).56 Brinckman lamented that the 
ruler of the state “didn’t allow Europeans to learn Cashmeree (Koshur)” and “humbugged” 
British officials about Kashmir being a “Happy Valley” (2011, 10, 17). State officials regularly 
questioned the motives of the British travelers who wrote against the Dogra policies, often 
accusing them of being interested in foreign-funded conversion missions. It was common for the 
                                                 
56 Thorp, however, bases the accuracy of his report on the precise fact that despite the official ban he had managed 




Dogras to incite public opinion against missionary activities, complaining about it to the British 
government, and preventing missionaries from establishing schools and hospitals or even mixing 
with local people. As the Kashmiri historian Ishaq Khan writes, “The missionaries were often 
prevented from visiting the artisans’ quarters, and were forced to reside on the outskirts of the 
city” (2013, 139).  
While Christian missionaries castigated the Dogra state for trying to manipulate people’s 
opinion, they often pointed to the “friendliness” of the people, even of the Muslim moulvis “who 
seem(ed) to have no objection to European Christians setting up schools and hospitals” (Khan 
2013, 138-40). Kashmiri Muslims had shown no inclination toward converting to Christianity, 
but they saw the missionaries as valuable conduits for passing their distressful stories under the 
Dogra state to the British government and general publics in India. The missionaries, including 
Brinckman, didn’t hide their missionary role, yet the Dogras knew that complaining about their 
activities as acts of “religious interference” was enough to neutralize their criticism of the state in 
the eyes of the British government. The British as already mentioned, after the experiences of the 
1957 revolt in north India,57 often reproved direct interference in the religious affairs of the 
natives, and especially saw the issue of conversion with alarm.  
The Dogras presented their policies to be in the interest of their subjects. If they had 
prevented Europeans from coming in and settling down, it was to protect the praja from a 
“foreign culture” and the region from becoming a “British colony.” However, given the 
condition of the deliberately impoverished subject population whose religious practices had been 
severely curtailed, Kashmiris would have a hard time believing the maharajas. It is no surprise 
                                                 
57 Muslim and Hindu soldiers feeling insulted at finding pig or cow fat mixed in the grease for their cartridges had 




that Kashmiris—at least the very few who had the means—were writing to the British authorities 
for relief from the Dogras. 
Now, as I pointed out in the beginning, the early colonial modes of knowledge production 
were tied, one way or the other, to the exercise of imperial power in British India. The “oriental 
despotism” narrative had been used to buttress cases for colonial annexations and invasions, and 
then in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the idea was revived to justify strong-handed 
measures to “administer justice” in the Indian provinces. When Brinckman wrote about the 
Dogra state in 1867, he was drawing upon elements of this mode of writing. Possibly, he felt 
bitter at the second Dogra maharaja Ranbir Singh issuing proclamations against missionary 
preaching in his ascendant Hindu State, though there are hardly any signs in his writings that 
suggest so. Brinckman, unlike Thorp, did appeal to the British to annex Kashmir “before 
Kashmir became a stain on the prestige of the British Empire.” To his credit, however, he was 
writing at a time when it was widely known that, having gifted Kashmir to the Dogras, the 
British government considered the stability of the Dogra state as a vital imperial interest.  
In fact, when Brinckman and Thorp (or, even later, when Arthur Wingate and, to some 
extent, Walter Lawrence58) wrote their scathing criticisms of the Dogra state, they were going 
against the prevailing European view of Kashmir of the time being a “happy valley.”59 The 
dominant British perspective all along favored the Dogra rulers, and even when the British 
government eventually did try to intervene, the Dogras had powerful advocates of their own in 
the imperial government. These advocates, often senior British public servants or paid lobbyists, 
like William Digby, denounced anyone critical of the Dogra regime as “slanderers,” as “actively 
                                                 
58 Lawrence was a British civil servant who had succeeded Arthur Wingate as the Settlement Commissioner.  
59 Ten years after the publication of Brinckman’s and Thorp’s reports, William Wakefield decided to write his book 




hostile” toward Dogra officials, and their writings as merely the “unchecked observations of 
stranger(s)” (Digby 2011, 145). Digby was especially prone to presenting Dogra rulers as really 
the ones “wronged.” Here is how he describes a meeting with Ranbir Singh in 1876: 
I was one day sitting by the side of the late Maharaja of Kashmir talking over various matters… 
[And maharaja, having just returned from a royal visit to Calcutta, the capital of India, says] 
“They [his advisors] said that it was an open secret that the British Government wanted to annex 
Kashmir, and it was only a question of time…” I told His Highness that he must be careful not to 
give any excuse for the British authorities to interfere with him, and that if they did unjustly 
interfere, he might always rely upon the English Press to defend his rights. After a pause, he said: 
“Sahib, what do you call that little thing between the railway carriages? It is like a button stuck on 
a sort of gigantic needle that runs through the train, and when the carriages are pushed at one end 
or the other you hear a ‘houff, houff,’ and bang they go against the poor little button. I felt sorry 
for the poor little button, but it is doubtless useful in its way. What do you call it?” I replied that I 
believe it was called “a buffer.” “Buffer, buffer,” repeated the Maharaja in earnest tones. “Yes, 
buffer, that’s just what I am, and that shall henceforth be one of my titles;” and he directed 
Dewan Kirpa Ram to see that it was written down correctly (Digby 2011, 101-102). 
The sly tone of this self-pitying account between His Highness and the Sahib was the 
predominant one in the British writings of Kashmir of the time. British saw the Dogra state as the 
buffer in the Great Game, and the Dogra played the game to their own advantage: “If you want 
the borders peaceful give us free license in Kashmir.” Digby’s account makes it sound like 
Ranbir was a truly humble person, “that little thing,” as he describes the maharaja. But note how 
Rai, drawing from multiple sources of the time, describes this man: 
…(I)t would appear that Ranbir Singh, while still only heir apparent, was the greater “fanatic” 




woman’s tongue for beating a cow which had torn some clothes she had hung out to dry” 
…Ranbir, unhappy with his father’s “liberality” [who had instituted only life sentence for cow 
slaughter], took his own measures to ensure that imprisonment would translate, in effect, into the 
death penalty. For instance, on one occasion, while inspecting a state prison, Ranbir Singh was 
appalled by the “goodness of fate” given to a “stout man” incarcerated for cow-slaughter. He 
ordered that salt be mixed in his food so that he died of dehydration (2004, 101). 
I use this example to illustrate the nature of contest over the self-image of the Dogra 
regime during this time. Dogras were janus-faced. They were extremely careful in presenting 
themselves to the outside world as kind and generous; for instance, they spend considerable 
amount of tax money extracted from Kashmiris on charities in Punjab, and extended generous 
hospitality (of course, paid for by “Maharaja’s tax” and free Kashmiri labor) toward Europeans 
who wrote glorious reviews of the maharaja’s generosity. Toward their Kashmiri subjects, 
Dogras followed the principle of terror. 
British residency 
Yet, forty years after the Dogra rule began, accounts of fleeing Kashmiri shawl-bafs and 
peasants about the tyranny under the Dogras had finally begun to appear in the Muslim-owned 
press in Punjab. The British found these reports carrying the potential to ignite an unrest in 
Punjab, and were, thus, forced to intervene in 1889. The “intervention” was not an annexation, 
but a few administrative reforms. The British retained the full power of the ruling class, but 
temporarily recused the new (third) maharaja Pratap Singh from his executive powers. 
Announcing in the Parliament in London that the British government in India had no intention of 
annexing the state, Pratap Singh was asked “for a time at least to refrain from all interference in 




but the administration was handed over to a “State Council” consisting of the maharaja’s 
brothers and a few officials chosen by the British, under the overall “guidance” of the newly 
appointed British Resident.  
The State Council had no Muslim representation. As such, the British Resident’s 
administration could hardly make much difference to the lives of the Kashmiri subjects, except 
doing away with a few minor taxes60 and some elements of the Dogra apparatus of capture, like 
the nazarana, to ameliorate the few Mussalman jagirdars.61 In any case, the Residency faced 
vociferous criticism from Dogra princes who begrudged their loss of independence, from the 
revenue officials (mostly Pandits) who faced an increased scrutiny of their role after Wingate’s 
and Lawrence’s land settlement and revenue-reform reports, and from the British advocates of 
the Dogras. Most of the criticism was centered on the propaganda that the “treasury was empty!”  
Indeed, there was British profligacy on their own comforts in Kashmir; yet, they were 
also spending a considerable sum on infrastructural projects. They built two major roads that 
connected Kashmir with the rest of South Asia, as well as flood control and irrigation canal 
systems that helped reduce inundation and prevent drought. The British also linked the Dogra 
heartland Jammu with Sialkot through a railway in 1897; however, a similar proposal to connect 
Srinagar with Muzaffarabad in the west, which would have reduced the isolation of Kashmir 
Valley was met with fierce opposition from the Dogras. Expenses on the salaries of professional 
bureaucrats deputed from British India came under the severest attack. It must have sounded 
                                                 
60 Most of the reforms, which included relief from military services, benefitted the people of Jammu, even if 
marginally. Remission of a part of customs duties on sale of rice in Srinagar had minimal impact as the government 
had already kept the price of rice much lower than the market rate.  
61 Nazrana was a gift of gold coins a jagirdar (owner of a landed estate) made to the maharaja in return of the khillat 
(a loose gown), which the maharaja gave to the jagirdar to symbolize the act of “transmitting his authority” over the 
estate. Cohn has argued that passing the khillat had symbolic and political value in pre-colonial political relations in 
India (1996, 114). In Kashmir, however, nazrana/khillat seems not to have been quite symbolic, or universally so, as 
only the Muslim jagirdars were required to pay for it, while the Kashmiri Pandit and the Jammu Rajput jagirdars 




ironical to Kashmiri ears to hear that the Dogras, who spent the revenues wrenched out of 
Kashmiri cultivators and artisans on their elaborate religious rituals and building temples, 
subsidizing an idle class of urban Brahmins, not to mention a lavish palace life, were accusing 
the Resident with spending excessively on his “costly hobbies.”   
Eventually, the vocal advocates of the Dogra rule got the arrangement reversed and 
Pratap Singh was restored in 1905 with full authority. Digby wrote much in defense of Pratap 
Singh (r. 1885-1925). He claimed in his melodramatically titled report Condemned Unheard that 
the British, in “deposing the Maharaja,” had committed a grave error. The ruler, he wrote, had 
been “deposed against the wishes of his subjects” and that “the Kashmirians… had made no 
complaint…(nor were they) aggrieved…on the contrary, if a plebiscite were taken, it is believed 
nine-tenths or more of the people would call for the Maharaja’s speedy restoration” (Digby 2011, 
107). Recalling Digby’s assertion, a Tehreek history-writer lamented to me that the history of 
“plebiscite” in Kashmir had been a paradoxical one: it only involves assuming or speculating 
what Kashmiris would want, and never actually going to them to ask “What do you want?”    
 
Driven into silence, very few Kashmiris during the pre-1931 era left behind written accounts of 
life under the Dogra state, except in poetry form.62 Even though across British India, newspaper 
publications, including nationalist anti-colonial ones, had been thriving, in Kashmir no 
newspapers had been allowed publication until 1932. As a result, for Tehreek history-writers 
trying to understand the “history of resistance” in Kashmir, writings such as Thorp’s, Wingate’s, 
                                                 
62 Even the multi-volume Tareekh-e-Hassan written by Hassan Shah Koihami in 1880s had a very little on the life of 
peasants and artisans under the Dogras. From a prominent landed Pir family, Koihami, despite his deep insights into 
the history of Kashmir, probably took the nature of Dogra rule as a “natural one.” Yet, the lacunae are particularly 
telling because he was one of Walter Lawrence’s important informants, and Lawrence made extensive observations 
about the life of peasants under the Dogras in his report. Even poems of such popular Kashmiri poets of the era as 




and Brinckman’s have become highly valued. Writings of Kashmiris in the wake of the 1931 
events resonate with the experiences the British writers had described sixty years earlier. Not 
much had changed in Kashmir in the intervening period. As the Great Game heated up once 
more, the Dogras became even more useful to the British empire.   
By 1931, however, several major transformations had taken place across the world, 
including, in close vicinity, the gradual maturation of the Indian nationalist movement that began 
demanding political independence from Britain. In Kashmir, where the relations between the 
state and its Muslim subjects had remained essentially the same as Thorp had described, the 
moment of political shift came suddenly. “There had always been incidents of revolt here and 
there, but Kashmiris had essentially failed to organize,” says Zahir-ud-Din, a Tehreek history-
writer. In 1931, an urban uprising in Kashmiri towns, involving attacks on grain depots and debt 
records, and a rural tax revolt, that followed the trial of Abdul Qadir,63 tore through an 
oppressive silence in Kashmir. Tehreek history-writers see the events of 1931 as “revolutionary,” 
precisely because 1931 produced the first major crack in the social and political order set up in 
1846. These events were also the first to give expression to the “Kashmiri Muslim” identity. 
Tehreek history-writers see 1931 events as the birth of modern and mass-politics in Kashmir, 
leading to the emergence of new political subjects who demanded rights and sovereignty. Below, 
I will briefly explore the political implications of 1931 events for the Kashmiri Muslim 
mobilization and Tehreek in general. 
                                                 




From hope to crisis 
Political Mobilization  
The period of British Residency (1890-1905) had provided a window for a small section 
of Islamic reformers in Srinagar to start efforts toward raising questions about the condition of 
Muslims in Kashmir. While the British saw any effort of Islamic reform as “Wahhabi” (and 
hence a political threat), these reforms were actually influenced by the Indian school of Islamic 
reformism Darul-Uloom at Deoband. Deoband school had emerged in the aftermath of the 1857 
revolt against the British East India Company in North India with the aim of reviving Islam in 
the subcontinent through reforms of Muslim practices, and not through political activism against 
the British (Metcalf 1982).64 Some stirrings from this reform movement, it seems had reached 
Srinagar in 1890s, but they became more visible in the early 20th century, especially through the 
work of the “Mirwaiz.” 
The chief preacher of Srinagar was the one who led prayers at the medieval Jami’a 
Mosque. By 1901, his title came to be known as the Mirwaiz of Jami’a Mosque. The Dogras 
found the Mirwaiz of key importance for their stability. Pinched by years of British Residency, 
they were trying to create a loyal Muslim leader who could influence the Muslims of Srinagar 
from the pulpit and prevent them from revolting. Hence, the Mirwaiz position was assured by the 
Dogras as hereditary and came to be controlled by a Kashmiri Muslim family. The Mirwaiz 
family, in return, publicly prayed for the continuation of the Dogra rule (Rai 2004, 235-37). Yet, 
behind the overt political sphere, some reformist efforts were taking place. 
                                                 
64 Wahhabis were followers of Ibn Wahhab, a late 18th century preacher in Arabia, who called for a turn to Quran 
and Prophetic practice as a direct and literal source of socio-political code of Muslim life. He had banded with the 
ruler of Nejd, and they together laid the ground for todays Saudi Arabia. Wahhab’s followers had influenced several 
insurgencies against the British in the Middle East; and the British were alarmed by any sign of Muslim activism in 




Mirwaiz Rasul Shah (d. 1909), influenced by the Deoband school, had set up the 
Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in 1899. Its aim was to eradicate 
“superstitions” and bida’at (“innovations”) that were seen to have crept into Muslim religious 
practices. The Anjuman, much like the Jama’at Islami in the 1950s, claimed its mission was to 
create haqiqi musalman (“true Muslims”), as followers of sharia, unencumbered by the 
burdensome practices of shrine-related devotionalism popular in Kashmir (Sikand 2002, 712-13). 
The Anjuman set up a school in 1905, the first school in the state where Muslims could study. 
Both jadeed (“modern”) and Islamic education was to be imparted in the school. Later Rasul 
Shah’s brother, Ahmadullah, who succeeded Rasul in 1909, set up the Oriental College in 
Srinagar. These endeavors received small grants from the Dogra rulers, who made much of their 
desire to improve the condition of “all their subjects.” Mirwaiz Ahmadullah’s successor Yusuf 
Shah, who was trained at Deoband, returned in the 1920s to set up a printing press and two 
weeklies, which propagated news and views about the Khilafat Movement (Sikand 2002, 713).65 
These efforts were remarkable, even though centered in only a few of Srinagar’s neighborhoods, 
and would gradually produce a new crop of Muslim leaders.  
In 1931, when urban protestors set fire to revenue records and chased revenue officials on 
the streets of Srinagar, and peasants confronted Dogra soldiers in the province of Poonch, they 
had no arms or ammunition. The government had historically barred Kashmiri Muslims 
(including the rare few Muslim land grantees) from purchasing firearms, as well as from joining 
the military. In contrast, Jammu’s Rajputs (a Hindu upper caste to which the Dogras also 
belonged) and the Pandits in Kashmir could acquire weapons, and were the main components of 
                                                 
65 The two weeklies were al-Islam and Rahnuma. Khilafat Movement was launched in India in the early twenties 
with the aim of preventing the collapse of the Ottomon Caliphate at the hands of the British. The Caliphate 
eventually collapsed under the weight of Turkish nationalists. In India, Gandhi had enthusiastically supported the 




the Dogra army (Rai 2004, 141). Tehreek history-writers claim the denial of arms and military 
training, as well as severe forms of punishment meted over even mere signs of disobedience, as 
the primary reason behind the lack of widespread revolts against the Dogras in earlier years.66 
The elaborate network of spies (including the district-level zillahdars and the local hurkuras), 
which Brinckman narrates in detail, made organizing protests lethal.  
Yet, in Srinagar and in the towns, Kashmiri youth would sometimes throw stones at the 
Dogra soldiers, and, in the late 19th century, there had even been incidences of minor revolts, 
especially against grain control and high taxes. Then, in 1924, workers at the government silk 
factory in Srinagar sustained a months-long agitation against their Hindu supervisors over low 
wages and maltreatment, which ended in Dogra soldiers shooting ten workers dead (Kaur 1996, 
112-118). Against this background, the events of 1931 were quite dramatic. While the uprising 
was spontaneous, and there were many actors who played a part, the one who became the driving 
force behind the movement in the years to come was Sheikh Abdullah. 
Sheikh Abdullah was an attendee at what was called the “Reading Room” in Srinagar. 
Among the first Kashmiris of his generation to get education outside of Kashmir,67 Abdullah was 
initiated into politics by the Srinagar city’s tiny class of Muslim khwajas (“moneyed”), who had 
been, until then, content with presenting petitions for Muslim welfare to the Dogra maharaja. 
Abdullah aligned with one of city’s two main Muslim preachers, the Mirwaiz Hamdani (based at 
Khanqa-e-Mualla shrine), who was a proponent of Sufi shrine-oriented intercessionary practices. 
He was an opponent of Mirwaiz of Jami’a Mosque, who was not only orthodox and reformist in 
                                                 
66 One Tehreek history-writer claimed that Kashmiris didn’t vigorously challenge the new political order that was 
coming into being after 1947 because “across the board, Kashmiris felt greatly relieved at being delivered from the 
Dogra rule, even though they didn’t realize then that they were simultaneously being swallowed up by the Indian 
state.”  
67 Abdullah went to Aligarh Muslim University, then the center of elite Muslim cultural and political activity in 
British India. Upon his return, he couldn’t get a job as a teacher, which, some of his biographers believe, was 




outlook, but too close to the Dogra rulers. Where the Islamic reformists, including Mirwaiz 
Jami’a Mosque, saw shrine-oriented devotionalism as an obstruction to Muslim political 
awakening, Abdullah tapped precisely into its inspirational power among the peasants in the 
countryside and the urban working classes. In the coming decades, this would serve him 
handsomely, even in times when he made disastrous political decisions. 
Abdullah’s rise threatened the delicate political balance in Srinagar, in which Jami’a 
Mosque Mirwaiz’s hereditary position had remained assured under the Dogras. While Abdullah 
increasingly took a strident stance against the Dogras, the Jami’a Mirwaiz opposed the Reading 
Room party, refusing, for instance, to support their early call of a general strike against the 
government in 1930 (Khan 2013, 132). The Jami’a Mirwaiz, as already stated, had been keen to 
seek Dogra patronage for his efforts in setting up Islamic education for Muslims. Fearing the loss 
of their own privileges, him and his clique had studiously kept away from making any radical 
demand for equality or the rights of the Muslim subjects in Kashmir.68    
In the aftermath of the events of 1931, a large public gathering was convened in August 
1932 near Pather Masjid (Stone Mosque), which would become Abdullah’s base in the years to 
come. A resolution was passed to establish Muslim Conference, the first political organization of 
Kashmiri Muslims. At the meeting, Abdullah, who had seen the nationalist movement gain 
momentum in British India, chose to take an openly confrontational path of mobilizing the 
Kashmiri masses for equal rights. This made him popular among the vast and immiserated 
Kashmiri Muslim peasantry in the countryside and the artisanal and working classes in the 
                                                 
68 Ian Copland, analyzing the events of 1931, states that “Clearly, religion lay at the heart of the Kashmir conflict” 
(1981: 231). He also traces the roots of the events in the “bitter rivalry” between the Ahmediya and Ahrar Muslim 
sects in Punjab. From my account, it is understandable as to why religious symbolism may have appealed to 
Kashmiris, but for a symbol to have efficacy there needed to obtain material conditions that these symbols brought 




towns. Since the Dogra regime had, despite a series of minor reforms since its early years, 
maintained its fundamentally appropriative character, Abdullah sensed that Kashmiris needed a 
more radical politics than the one based on petitions. His advocacy of popular Muslim practices 
reinforced his position, which also became one of the reasons for fissures, which appeared soon. 
Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, egged on by Dogra regime supporters, started openly calling Abdullah a 
“Qadiani.” Qadianis were Ahmediya, a heterodox sect that had emerged in Punjab in early 
twentieth century, and whose creed was denounced by orthodox Punjabi Muslim politicians as a 
British conspiracy against Islam.69 Abdullah’s supporters were furious and roughed up Mirwaiz 
Yusuf Shah’s supporters, thus starting the never-ending “Sher-Bakra” saga of split among 
Srinagar’s Muslims.70 Abdullah never truly gave up on using henchmen against his opponents. 
In 1939, after a series of experiments with electoral politics (which had been granted in 
the aftermath of the 1931-34 agitation), Abdullah split the Muslim Conference to form National 
Conference. Some Tehreek history-writers believe Abdullah split the party at the behest of the 
Congress leaders in India. Mirwaiz’s supporters believed, he had done so on the advice of the 
Ahmediya. Over the years, Abdullah had indeed grown close to Jawaharlal Nehru. Apparently, 
Nehru’s secular, socialist rhetoric and his stance against princely powers had appealed to 
Abdullah. Nehru, along with Gandhi, had also reciprocated and announced Abdullah as “the sole 
leader of the Kashmiris,” and bestowed on him the title of Sher-i-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir), 
further fueling Abdullah’s “authoritarian” tendencies (Bose 2003, 27). Others have claimed that, 
by replacing “Muslim” with “National” in the party’s name, Abdullah had hoped the members of 
                                                 
69 Essentially, it was claimed that Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian, the founder of the sect, had asserted himself to be a 
prophet. This allegation brought his followers into confrontation with orthodox Muslims in Punjab (especially the 
Jamaat-u-Ahrar), who believed Prophet Muhammad to be the last prophet.  





the influential Pandit community (as well as Sikhs) would join the party, and thereby increase his 
party’s chances at securing more representation in the newly established legislative assembly 
(Copland 1981, 252).  
Very few Pandits joined his party however; probably only those, like Prem Nath Bazaz 
and Raghunath Vaishnavi, who were socialists. (In Jammu, however, sections of non-Rajput 
“lower-caste” Hindus did join). National Conference remained a Muslim party precisely because 
the “Muslim question” was the “class question” in Kashmir. Further, the nationalism of the new 
party came to be circumscribed by Koshur language. That is why, as National Conference grew 
dominant in Kashmir Valley, Muslim Conference remained popular among Muslims in Jammu.  
In contrast to his proximity to the Indian Congress, Abdullah was suspicious of 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League. Muslim League was dominated by the Muslim 
landed elite of British India. Their thwarted efforts to secure increased representation for 
Muslims in the elected bodies of future India had driven the League to demand “Pakistan.” For 
Abdullah, whose primary support came from the landless Muslim peasantry of Kashmir, 
League’s economic program was reactionary and the demand for Pakistan unattractive. 
Additionally, Jinnah was legally minded and believed in the right of the princes to determine the 
future of their states, as had been negotiated under the Viceroy’s plan (1946). This was seen as a 
betrayal by Abdullah who did not trust the Dogra monarch to make his decision in the best 
interest of his Muslim subjects. Yet, unable to weigh these interests himself in the larger game 
between the Congress and the League, Abdullah critically failed to appreciate the historical 
moment that was going to come to pass with the withdrawal of the British patronage to the 




After a period of “moderation” and “cooperation,” in mid-1940s, National Conference 
launched the “Quit Kashmir” movement against the Dogra monarchy, replicating a similar 
movement Gandhi had launched in British India. The movement was short-lived and didn’t meet 
any of its objectives; instead its consequences turned out to be disastrous. Abdullah and his 
associates were arrested and remained out of the political scene when major transformations 
were taking place in the subcontinent. Kashmiris were left leaderless during the key negotiations 
over the future of the region. One of the major factors behind the decision to launch the 
movement at the time was National Conference’s waning appeal in the face of the rise of 
alternative parties such as Kisan (Peasant) Conference in South Kashmir, which had a radical 
economic plan but supported merger with Pakistan, if Kashmiris were to make such a decision. 
Then there were the socialists, who also supported merger with Pakistan.  
With mass politics in Kashmir gaining widespread ground (involving several Pandits 
intellectuals to ally with the Muslims), Abdullah also took a more programmatic stance in 1944. 
His party adopted the Naya Kashmir (New Kashmir) plan, which envisaged a constitutional 
monarchy with a democratic government, and civic citizenship to all the state-subjects. Naya 
Kashmir was remarkably progressive for its time, but, as it turned out, it was eventually only 
partially implemented.71 The key element of “popular sovereignty” in the plan was tied to 
Kashmir becoming an independent state (Bose 2003, 26-27). By 1947, Kashmir appeared on the 
cusp of becoming independent dominated by progressive forces committed to economic and 
political justice. Among most people in Kashmir, accession with India was furthest from mind. 
But history, as it turned out, had a mind of its own. What possibilities existed, is a question many 
Tehreek history-writers often ask themselves?    
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The British Empire in India till 1947 had been a patchwork of large tracts of directly 
ruled “Provinces,” and more than five hundred large and tiny “Princely States” whose rulers 
enjoyed different degrees of sovereignty.72 Kashmir was one such princely state, but a large one, 
and its Dogra rulers enjoyed almost full sovereignty. Around the time when the British 
government decided to roll back its empire in South Asia, a conflict over the structure of the 
post-Independence political order ensued between two major political parties in the subcontinent. 
On one side was the Congress, which claimed a non-religious character, but was led mostly by 
Hindu leaders, some of whom had clear majoritarian agendas; on the other was the Muslim 
League, which claimed to represent the interests of all of British India’s Muslims. The Congress 
wanted a unitary state with a strong center. The League felt such a set up would give Hindus 
more share in power across all regions, including in Muslim majority ones. Instead, the League 
wanted a confederation of states and provinces with a weak center, which in its view would 
ensure a proportionate share of power for Muslims in Muslim majority provinces and safety of 
their rights where they were a minority (Bose and Jalal 2004, 144-145).73 However, in case the 
conflict remained unresolved, the League had decided that the only way out was the creation of a 
separate state of Pakistan.74  
                                                 
72 This description is based largely on the work of Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (2004).  
73 The Muslim League was concerned that in a unitary India, Muslims would become a minority with little influence 
over legislation. 
74 Bose and Jalal (2004) have argued that the demand for Pakistan was merely a bargaining tool in the hands of the 
Muslim League. They point out that till even early 1940s, the Muslim League was not clear what possible shape 
such an entity would take. The idea of Pakistan was based on the “Two Nation” principle that Hindus and Muslims 
formed separate nations. The League argument was Muslims were not a “minority” in British Indian Empire, but a 
“nation,” while Congress claimed Hindus and Muslims formed one nation. The negotiations over the post-1947 




Eventually, instead of committing to a guarantee that would ensure Muslim share of 
power at the all-India center, the Congress decided to have the Muslim majority provinces 
(Punjab and Bengal) be partitioned (Bose and Jalal 2004, 153). The British rulers, eager to leave 
the subcontinent in the aftermath of the Second World War, partitioned Punjab and Bengal, and 
divided them between what were going to be India and Pakistan. Pakistan, as a result, came into 
existence on the eastern and the western flanks of the new state of India. A massive transfer of 
population—in many cases forced—accompanied this partition. Many Hindus from the new state 
of Pakistan migrated to India, and almost an equally large number of Muslims from the new state 
of India moved to Pakistan.    
As Tehreek history-writers would later argue, Partition was tragic but had at least 
resolved the question of sovereignty in the British Indian provinces—people had chosen their 
representatives (Hindus had overwhelmingly chosen leaders of the Congress, while most 
Muslims had chosen leaders of the Muslim League)75 to negotiate on their behalf. The violence 
of the event deeply affected the state of Kashmir as well (Jammu massacre, for instance),76 but 
instead of solving the question of Kashmir’s sovereignty, it had led to its parceling out between 
India and Pakistan.  
In the princely states, including Kashmir, the British government left the “choice” of 
accession to India or Pakistan in the hands of the rulers of these states, with the caveat that such a 
choice be exercised keeping in mind the religious demographic composition of their subject 
populations and the geographical contiguity with the new states. Despite various degrees of 
hesitation on the part of the princes, these principles were largely followed, except in the case of 
                                                 
75 The elections to assemblies in British India had begun after the reforms of 1937, and in the last election (1945-6) 
before the Partition, Muslim League won a decisive majority of Muslim vote, while Hindus exclusively voted for the 
Congress (Bose and Jalal 2004, 148).  




three states: Hyderabad, Kashmir (both large) and Junagadh (a smaller one). In each of these 
cases, the decision of the rulers of these states went against the expected wishes of the subject 
populations. And in all three, the newly independent India intervened. The Muslim ruler (Nizam) 
of the large state of Hyderabad, most whose subjects were Hindus, initially decided to remain 
independent and then join Pakistan. But the Indian army invaded the State, an act that Indian 
leaders called “police action,” and dethroned the Nizam. In Junagadh, the same ruler (Muslim)-
subject population (majority Hindu) situation existed, the lone difference being that the State was 
almost contiguous with Pakistan. India, however, insisted on a plebiscite, and the decision went 
in India’s favor. Expectedly, neither Hyderabad nor Junagadh became a dispute, as both had 
Hindu majority populations, who, it is likely, resented their Muslim rulers. Additionally, neither 
state was contiguous with Pakistan. In Kashmir, however, where the logic of Partition and the 
stipulations set out for princely rulers meant an imminent accession with Pakistan, the events 
took an unexpected turn.  
Maharaja’s choice 
Kashmir had a Hindu ruler but a majority Muslim subject population. Since 1931, there 
had been a mass movement directed against the century-old Dogra monarchy. The movement in 
Kashmir had initially demanded a responsible and unprejudiced government. But by early 
1940’s, Kashmiris supported an end to the monarchy and the establishment of a republican form 
of government. This popular national movement was separate from the Congress and the League, 
both of whom had no presence in Kashmir. Tehreek history-writers see this as proof that the 
Kashmiri struggle could not be subsumed under the Congress-led nationalist movement in 
British India, nor could the Muslim League claim to speak on behalf of Kashmiri Muslims. The 




the National Conference (which split from the former), and several other smaller formations, 
including the royalists and the socialists, none of whom were formally part of the subcontinental 
political formations. When the last Dogra monarch Hari Singh decided to sign the treaty of 
accession with India, he plunged Kashmiris into a political impasse that most Kashmiris had not 
anticipated.  
Some historians have claimed that Hari Singh, when presented with the “choice” of 
accession between India and Pakistan, wanted to remain independent, and had even found 
support among his old opponents in the Muslim Conference, who would have consented to Hari 
Singh’s nominal rule along with substantial constitutional reforms. To this effect, he signed what 
was called a “Stand Still Agreement” with Pakistan, which meant he could get a few months 
after August 14, 1947 (the day Pakistan was born) to make his decision. While Pakistani leaders, 
confident that the ruler had really no choice but to accede to their new state, easily agreed to the 
Stand Still,77 the Indian government refused to sign a similar agreement.  
Tehreek leaders see India’s non-acceptance of the Stand Still as the first indication that 
India had decided to take Kashmir with or without the state ruler’s consent. Indeed, Nehru had 
repeatedly dismissed the notion that princes had any right to decide. But then suddenly Hari 
Singh dismissed his Prime Minister, who had counselled joining Pakistan, armed Hindu militias, 
and instigated a genocidal violence against the Muslims of Jammu. At the behest of the Dogra 
royal family, Dogra troops as well as Hindu nationalist groups coming from India in September 
and October 1947, started massacring Muslims and forcing them out.78 Poonch province of the 
state had also erupted in revolt against the maharaja in the meantime. Most fatefully, India began 
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destabilizing the Junagadh state with the help of armed volunteers towards the last week of 
October, and Pakistan responded by aiding armed militias from North Western Frontier Province 
who were pouring in to support Muslims in Kashmir.  
These militias, however, caused wide-spread mayhem in Kashmir’s border districts. Hari 
Singh fled from Srinagar, leaving the capital defenseless. Like his ancestor Gulab Singh in 1846, 
who had stolen the state treasury from Lahore, Hari Singh carried away the treasury with him 
from Srinagar. On reaching Jammu, he signed the Treaty of Accession with India.79 Nehru, who 
had publicly said he didn’t believe in the rights of princes to decide the future of their states, 
suddenly decided to accept the validity of Hari Singh’s right to sign off Kashmir. India airlifted 
its troops into Srinagar, starting a two-year long war over Kashmir with Pakistan, which resulted 
in the bifurcation of the state and an enduring political conflict.     
 Despite the historical circumstances in which the treaty was signed, the Dogra elite had 
decided quite early that they would be better off with their co-religionists in India, who would 
rehabilitate them politically, instead of remaining as shaky nominal rulers of a restless Muslim 
subject population. Hari Singh, till then a trenchant defender of the borders of the state, had 
already allowed the Indian government to begin laying roads and telegraph lines connecting 
Punjab with Jammu. The systematic genocide of Jammu’s Muslims took place around the same 
time.80 The Dogra elite hoped at least to separate and “cleanse” Jammu, in case retaining 
Kashmir Valley and other Muslim majority provinces of the state became tough. Despite the 
                                                 
79 “Instrument of Accession” gave India a “legal” cover to militarily intervene in Kashmir, and take sovereign 
control over the state in matters of defense, communication, and currency. The date of signing the accession has 
remained in some quarters a matter of legal contestation, and was hotly debated at the time between Indian and 
Pakistani delegates in the United Nations Security Council. Although moot historically, some argue that if the 
Accession was signed on October 27, 1947, then Indian intervention which occurred a day before should be 
considered an “invasion.”  
80 See Introduction and Chapter 2 on Jammu massacre. It is estimated at more than 200,000 Muslims disappeared or 




Dogra-abetted genocide in Jammu, the ongoing popular movement in Kashmir, and the armed 
revolts against Hari Singh’s authority in Poonch and elsewhere (regions to the north, Gilgit and 
Baltistan, had fully slipped from his rule), Indian leaders found it fit to see the maharaja as a 
legitimate authority who could decide the fate of his people.  
For Tehreek history-writers, Hari Singh had no authority to sign the treaty on behalf of 
the subjects of the state, a treaty which they see as unjust and invalid. They also see the 
consequent arrival of Indian military into Kashmir as an act of “invasion.” The man who could 
have stood up to Hari Singh’s decision, the man who had been a bitter foe of the monarchy 
throughout, was Sheikh Abdullah. Toward the end of September 1947, he was released from jail, 
and quickly roped in by Nehru and Gandhi to marshal public support among Kashmiri Muslims 
for the accession with India. Endorsing the accession, however, would have been a reversal of 
his public pledges of a free Kashmir as well as against the spirit of the Naya Kashmir document. 
Yet, in a volte face, Abdullah went ahead and supported the treaty. Instead of taking the question 
of accession to the people of Kashmir, he treated his decision as the decision of all Kashmiris. 
Hardly anyone in Kashmir, except perhaps the tiny, but influential Pandit community, would 
have wanted Kashmir to be part of India. If anything, the Muslims of Kashmir would have 
preferred to remain independent. As the United Nations Security Council saw it, listening to 
extensive arguments from Indian and Pakistani representatives, the so-called “treaty of 
accession” had no legal validity. In 1948, UNSC Resolution 47 called for an impartial 
“plebiscite” to democratically determine the wishes of Kashmiri people.81 India saw the 
                                                 
81 India had taken Kashmir case to the UN in November 1947 presenting Muslim tribals from NWFP attacking the 
Dogra state as an invasion of “Indian territory.” By early January, UNSC set up a commission to investigate. Later 
that year, it passed Resolution 47 calling for demilitarization of Kashmir by both Indian and Pakistan regular and 




international consensus over the plebiscite as a setback for its Kashmir policy; Kashmiris saw the 
resolution as a recognition of their status as a “people” with a right to self-determination. 
Sheikh Abdullah’s ambiguity 
Because of his contradictory stances in 1947, Sheikh Abdullah became the single most 
divisive figure in modern Kashmiri history. His life has been subject of several biographies, and 
his role in shaping Kashmir’s history is doubted by none. Abdullah embodied (and, to many, 
destroyed) Kashmiri nationalism. So hefty was his shadow on the Kashmiri politics—his 
resistance against the Dogra regime, his position as the prime minister of Kashmir (1947-53), his 
long years in Indian prisons and under house arrest (1953-75), his return in the (constitutionally 
degraded) position of chief minister (1975-82), and even in his ghostly presence in public 
discourses years after his death in 1982—that some Tehreek history-writers claim the mass 
rebellion of 1989-90 was, among other things, a cathartic revolt against Abdullah’s legacy. 
“Despite all the good that happened in his earlier avatar, the weight of Sheikh Abdullah’s 
personal ambition broke the back of Kashmiri aspirations,” said a Tehreek activist, looking 
toward the mausoleum of the dead leader on the shores of the Dal Lake.  
The “good” to which the activist was referring were the series of economic 
transformations, like “Land Reforms” and “Debt Cancellation,” which happened during 
Abdullah’s time as prime minister, immediately after the end of Dogra monarchy. Under the Big 
Landed Estates Abolition Act of 1950, agricultural land was redistributed from absentee 
landlords to cultivators, immediately lifting tens of thousands out of poverty. Further, the debts 
that urban artisans and peasants had accrued due to excessive taxations and usurious practices of 




cancelled (Aslam 1977, 62-64).82 The true impact of these measures would take years to become 
evident, but its momentary effect was to neutralize to some extent the popular antagonism 
Abdullah had earned because of his endorsement of Hari Singh’s treaty.83 
Landlords—Dogras, Pandits, and a few Muslims—who lost their massive estates during 
land reforms, found themselves in a quandary: Abdullah was a bitter foe because of his reforms, 
but an ally due to his stance supporting India and opposing Pakistan. In the original treaty, 
India’s jurisdiction in Kashmir extended only to defense, communications, and external affairs. 
The Treaty of Accession had almost preserved the form of the Treaty of Amritsar that Dogras 
had signed with the British empire in 1846. In both cases, a curtailed form of sovereignty was 
agreed upon. Under India, Kashmir’s “autonomy” would include Kashmir having its own 
constitution, an independent judiciary, its own national symbols, its own tax system, and its own 
president and prime minister—all this was agreed upon, with some caveats, between the Indian 
government and Abdullah in Delhi in 1952. “Sovereignty in all matters other than those specified 
in the instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State”—this was the key point of the 
1952 agreement. The agreement was already a significant betrayal of the promise of Tehreek, but 
soon Hindu nationalists in India started a country-wide agitation demanding Kashmir’s 
                                                 
82 Around 4,50,000 acres of land (excluding orchards, fuel and fodder reserves and uncultivable wasteland) over the 
established limit of 22.75 acres of land per holding was taken without compensation from about 9,000 absentee 
landlords. Of this, 2,31,000 acres was distributed among cultivating peasants. In later years, an aborted attempt was 
made to remove some of the flaws in the previous reforms, under the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 
1972. Similarly, “Debt Conciliation Boards” had been set up to either scale down accumulated debts or completely 
liquidate them (Aslam 1977, 62-64).   
83 As Kashmiri economic historian Javed Bakshi argues, land reforms were marred by nepotism and favoritism. 
Many National Conference loyalists got a bigger share than others, while the landlords fragmented their holdings 
and homesteads to avoid having to submit land to the state. Nevertheless, the scale of the land reforms in Kashmir 
was, by South Asian standards, the most radical anywhere in the subcontinent. (Interviews with author, August 
2014). Thorner (1953) also suggests that the primary beneficiaries of the land reforms were those who already had 




“complete integration” with India. “Ek Nishan, Ek, Vidhan, Ek Pradhan” they demanded—one 
symbol, one constitution, one leader.  
By 1953, Abdullah had begun to sense that the general discontent in Kashmir with his 
decision to join India had spread fast. He asked Nehru to conduct the promised plebiscite. 
Having cultivated separate ties to a section of Abdullah’s close confidants, Nehru got Abdullah 
arrested, and replaced him with Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi. Bakshi went about giving away 
elements of the “autonomy” enshrined in the treaty of accession piece by piece. While in jail, 
Abdullah’s popularity grew in Kashmir; his loyalists had even set up a part named “Plebiscite 
Front.” But Abdullah was not interested in the national struggle. He spent more time explaining 
to Kashmiris why independence was not a good idea, than pushing Indian leaders to allow 
Kashmiris their right to self-determination. By the time he was reinstated to political office by 
India in 1975, he had again fallen from his status among Kashmiris. His fall had been occasioned 
by his agreement with Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi in 1974-75. He had agreed to a 
severe delimitation of Kashmir’s autonomy and withdrawal of the plebiscite demand—in return 
for a “chief ministership.” Abdullah’s death in 1982 life a weight from the Kashmiri public 
sphere. By 1990, so much had the political climate changed that Indian soldiers were deployed to 
guard Abdullah’s mausoleum.  
Among Tehreek activists and intellectuals, Abdullah had complicated the Kashmir 
question immensely. From a popular Kashmiri leader, he had become an authoritarian politician. 
Abdullah became an object of hatred for many; especially for those who witnessed the violent, 
post-1990 military occupation in Kashmir. Yet, even among Tehreek sympathizers, opinion on 
Abdullah is not unanimous. For those in Kashmir, who would prefer Kashmir became part of 




and those who hated him for land reforms (ex-ruling class Hindus, pro-India Pandits, and a few 
prominent Muslim Pir families), Abdullah was indubitably a loathsome figure. Pro-Pakistan 
formations retell the history of the events surrounding 1947 in a mode in which Abdullah and his 
associates from the National Conference are represented as conspirators. They accuse Abdullah 
of sabotaging Jinnah’s crucial visit to Kashmir in 1946, crushing his opponents from the rival 
Muslim Conference, and remaining silent over the Jammu ethnic cleansing. Pro-India 
formations, see Abdullah as a “communal” Muslim politician who had hurt the interests of the 
Hindus by taking their land. Kashmiris, who would prefer to see Kashmir independent, uncover a 
side of Abdullah in which he is seen in his early years to have desired to chart an independent 
course for Kashmir, and then lost his way.  
Several Tehreek history-writers take a less ideological stance about Abdullah, and 
question if he represented the entirety of Kashmiri opinion in 1947. Among these is Zahir-ud-
Din, who I have introduced in the Chapter 2. Zahir-ud-Din remains conflicted about Abdullah. 
From his book Flashback, and in interviews, I noted Zahir-ud-Din saw Abdullah as a “tall 
leader,” who had “stood up to the cruelty of the Dogra rulers” and “even up to Nehru to some 
extent.” But Abdullah was also as a “colossal failure of Kashmiri politics,” who “ditched his 
people.” On some occasions in his writings, Zahir-ud-Din even used “Sher-i-Kashmir” (Lion of 
Kashmir) in place of Abdullah’s name. Most significantly, Zahir-ud-Din doubts that Abdullah 
represented the sole or authentic voice of Kashmiris. For instance, in one of his daily column 
“Unsung Heroes” published in Kashmir Reader, Zahir-ud-Din wrote: 
Contrary to common belief, Sheikh Abdullah did not have a cakewalk in 1947. He faced stiff 
resistance not only from Muslim Conference workers, but also from a number of National 
Conference activists as well. A staunch worker of National Conference, Noor Muhammad Sofi 




The struggle with Abdullah’s complicated legacy is centered on his fateful endorsement of Hari 
Singh’s accession with India. Tehreek’s fundamental aim is to undo that accession.  
The aftermath and its aporias 
The events of 1947 and afterwards in Kashmir became a source of well-known conflict 
between Pakistan and India. The two fought several wars over it—in 1947-49, 1965, 1971, and 
1998. The UN-mediated “ceasefire line” came into effect in 1949. The line was to act as a 
temporary demilitarized border, but it became the highly-militarized Line of Control. Indian 
policy since 1953 has involved a combination of an aggressive pacification, using elections to 
split Tehreek, and invisibalizing Kashmir as a “question” in international politics. Even seventy 
years after the UN Resolution 47 was passed, no plebiscite has taken place. India claims 
Kashmiris had accepted the accession to India because Sheikh Abdullah had endorsed the 
accession. Pakistan, on the other hand, sees plebiscite as the corner stone of their position on 
Kashmir.  
The UN resolutions were not unproblematic, nor did they provide an easy solution, as 
Tehreek intellectuals themselves acknowledge. Despite the legal and political case that could be 
made against the Indian position, the UN framing of Kashmir as a “dispute” between India and 
Pakistan, centered principally on the premise of contestation over territory, erased Kashmiris out 
of the picture, even though it simultaneously held up their right to self-determination. For forty 
years after 1947, Kashmir question had essentially been reduced to an inter-state dispute between 
India and Pakistan. In challenging the official Indian discourse of an assumed, originary 
Kashmiri consent to the accession with India, the 1990 uprising created what can only be seen as 
a historical crisis within Kashmir. It had lifted, as one Kashmiri activist put it, “the scab off the 




The “crisis” was that of the Kashmiri political subjectivity as much as that of political 
sovereignty. Kashmiris had arrived at the crisis in 1989-90 after passing through the moment of 
“nationalism” (1939-1953), which had not only failed to deliver the promised sovereignty to the 
people, but was now seen as having cynically led them, through the opportunistic collaboration 
of the Kashmir’s political elite with the powerful India state, into the hands of a crushing military 
occupation. From 1953 to 1988, Kashmir was in a state of political wilderness, being denied a 
space in within the inter-state dynamics between India and Pakistan. There was, therefore, hardly 
a stable ground for a Kashmiri “self-hood” around which a new politics of emancipation could 
be formulated; or, at least, the need for such a ground was felt more than ever. Tehreek, as the 
movement for self-determination, first needed to determine the self. At the time of its inception 
in 1990, aside from its fundamental premise, haq hamaara rai-shumari! (“Plebiscite, is our 
right”),84 as well as slogans like hum kya chahte, azadi! (“We want, freedom”),85 there was 
hardly any consensual narrative on identity that could sustain the movement. Was it just 
Kashmiri or Kashmiri-Muslim which named this “our” and “we”? Was Tehreek a revolution 
without an idea?  
As explained in Chapter 2, Tehreek history-writers took it upon themselves to 
reconstitute a new Kashmiri self-hood, a task which could no longer be entrusted to the old 
guardians of “Kashmiri nationalism.” This new identity could not easily adjust to the ahistorical, 
                                                 
84 Even this was a slogan borrowed from the “nationalist” days when the Indian state, after its initial scramble over 
Kashmir and then the stabilization of its control, began to readjust, to the consternation of its Kashmiri collaborator 
class, how much “autonomy” it was willing to offer Kashmir. After Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953, Plebiscite 
Front, a breakaway faction of National Conference, was formed, which called for an implementation of the UN 
mandated plebiscite in Kashmir. Ironically, only a few years before his arrest, Abdullah had vigorously defended the 
Indian position in the UN, and condemned the UN resolutions.  
85 Even slogans hum kya chahte, azadi! and, later, Pakistan se rishta kya, la illaha illal-lah (what is the relation with 
Pakistan, is Islam) sounded more like questions without any substantive answers. What was the meaning of azadi—
was it independence, liberation from India and then merger into Pakistan, or just end to the suffering, as some 
claimed, and was merger with Pakistan mandated by Islam, or the choice first offered by the British and then 




syncretistic inter-communal “harmony” (or “Kashmiriyat”) as the bedrock of Kashmiri political 
identity—for such a state-imposed view was premised on the notion that Kashmir was part of 
India.86 The work of retelling the past was riddled with aporias, because any retelling would have 
to address the fissures that marked people’s memories in Kashmir, the region’s geo-political 
predicaments, as well as the dualities that split the post-1990 Tehreek.  
First, there was the question of “which history” and “whose history?” Pre-1990 Kashmir 
was already a site of historical contestation, mostly centered on the communalized memories. 
But the fissures ran not only between the memories of the disempowered Muslim majority and 
the influential Hindus minority, but also among rural peasantry and urban artisanal and trading 
classes, and between residents of the valley and smaller communities in the adjoining regions. 
Second, while Kashmir, as a place, had a continuous history, its geo-politics was nevertheless 
entwined, even before 1947, with the regions that surrounded it, and after 1947, with the two 
postcolonial states, India and Pakistan. Third, a set of conflicting dualities marked the post-
Tehreek Kashmir: one, the mutually competing regional-religious duality embedded within the 
identity named as “Kashmiri-Muslim;” two, the territorial duality that had carved up Kashmir 
between India and Pakistan, and under which Kashmir was now practically two “occupied 
Kashmirs;” and, finally, the seemingly insurmountable complexity represented by the end goal 
of Tehreek—complete independence of Kashmir or merger with Pakistan? These historical 
fissures, geo-political conundrums, and political dualities represent central concerns in the work 
of Tehreek history-writers, as well as key structuring elements of Kashmiri politics.  
The work of reconstituting a self-hood has meant returning the gaze to the past to recover 
elements that can give shape to a new Kashmiri identity. It involves retelling the Kashmiri past 
                                                 




as one of “resistance,” and historicizing the Kashmiri self. What Tehreek history-writers 
animatedly ask in their writings is the following: Has Kashmir’s history finally found its 
appropriate subject, the “Kashmiri people,” just as Kashmiri people are discovering “their 
history?” 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, drawing principally from the account left behind by Robert Thorp, I have 
examined the nature of the Dogra era, a traumatic period in Kashmir’s history. Thorp’s long 
subdued writings have acquired a new lease of life in the post-Tehreek Kashmir as well as 
become an important resource for understanding the evolution of the Kashmiri Muslim identity. I 
have argued that examining the nature of the Dogra state is crucial to understanding the 
“Kashmiri-Muslim” identity. With tensions between its two constituent terms, “Kashmiri-
Muslim” encapsulates the historical intertwining of religious, ethnic, and class differences in the 
region, yet it is also an identity that delimits the history of Tehreek in relation to many youths 
who don’t have access to the history of social relations of power in Kashmir before 1947, or even 
the pre-1990. While embracing the history of Tehreek and its roots in Kashmiri-Muslim mass 
politics of the 1930s, younger activists in Kashmir are, at the same time, trying to overcome the 
internal limitations that are presented by this double-helical identity.  
This complex interweaving of the religious, class, and national in Kashmir puts 
constraints on forms of politics that locate Kashmiri struggle for azadi only in the unfolding of 
Islam in the region, which thereby is made into a justification for a “merger with Pakistan.” It 
also interrupts those who produce a seamless, but ahistorical narrative of “coexistence” (or 
“Kashmiriyat”) as the justification for “integration with India.”  




which continues to resonate deeply in the present? Of course, such a collective endeavor is not 
possible so long as India and Pakistan lay claims on Kashmir. In the emerging work of Tehreek 
history-writers, Kashmiris confront on one side a history of dates, dynasties and domination, and 
on the other a history of sentiments, people, and resistance, all forming elements of a political 
subjectivity that Tehreek history-writers have been invested in both revealing and giving shape. 
If Kashmiri history appears like as a cyclical trap, youth activists believe plebiscite or a 
referendum will resolve the question—at least as a start. Is this belief a false hope, I don’t know? 
For now, at least, the right to self-determination, and azadi at its end, has become a placeholder 
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